

PRECEPTORS OF ADVAITA



PRECEPTORS OF ADVAITA

PUBLISHED BY
SRI KANCHI KAMAKOTI SANKARA MANDIR
SECUNDERABAD
1968


First Published in 1968

9 SRI KANCHI KAMAKOTI SANKARA MANDIR, SECUNDERABAD, 1998

Distributors :

**THE PERSONAL BOOKSHOP
10, CONGRESS BUILDING
111, MOUNT ROAD, MADRAS-6**

PRINTED AT G. S. PRESS, MADRAS



TO
HIS HOLINESS JAGADGURU
ŚRĪ CHANDRAŚEKHARENDRA SARASVATĪ
ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARĀCHĀRYA ŚRĪ-PĀDAH
SIXTY-EIGHTH IN THE HALLOWED LINE OF SUCCESSION
FROM
ĀDI ŚAṆKARA BHAGAVAT-PŪJYAPĀDA
IN
THE ŚRĪ KĀNCHĪ KĀMAKOṬĪ PĪṬHA
THIS VOLUME
IS REVERENTLY DEDICATED
ON THE AUSPICIOUS OCCASION
OF THE
DIAMOND JUBILEE OF HIS HOLINESS'S
ASCENSION TO THE PĪṬHA

CONTENTS

PREFACE	..	xi
1. VASISHTHA by Sri K. S. Ramaswami Sastri	.	1
2. ŚAKTI by Sri Srivatsa Somadeva Sarma	..	4
3. PARĀSARA by Sri N. Subramania Aiyar	..	8
4. VEDAVYĀSA by Sri R. Muthukrishna Sastri	..	11
5. ŚUKA by Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer	..	19
6. GAUDAPĀDA by Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan	..	24
7. GOVINDA BHAGAVATPĀDA by Dr. V. A. Devasenapati	..	43
8. ŚAṅKARA BHAGAVATPĀDA by Sri N. Ramesan	..	47
9. PADMAPĀDA by Sri N. Ramakrishna Sastri	..	53
10. HASTĀMALAKA by Dr. A. G. Krishna Warriar	..	57
11. TOṬAKĀCHĀRYA by Sri S. Rajagopala Sastri	..	63
12. SURESVARA by Sri S. V. Subrahmanya Sastri	..	69
13. VIMUKTĀTMAN by Dr. P. K. Sundaram	..	75
14. SARVAJÑĀTMAN by Dr. N. Veezhinathan	..	84
15. MANDANAMIŚRA by Dr. R. Balasubramanian	..	90
16. VĀCHASPATIMIŚRA by Swami Anantanandendra Sarasvati	.	100

17. JÑĀNAGHANAPĀDA	
<i>by Dr. S. O. Ramakrishnan</i>	109
18. PRAKĀŚĀTMAN	
<i>by Dr. Bratindra Kumar Sengupta</i>	119
19. ŚRĪ-HARSHA	
<i>by Sri P. S. Krishnamurti Sastri</i>	126
20. ĀNANDĀNUBHAVA	
<i>by Sri V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri</i>	130
21. ĀNANDABODHA	
<i>by Sri R. Thangaswami</i>	139
22. CHITSUKHA	
<i>by Sri S. Krishnamurti Sastri</i>	148
23. ANUBHŪTISVARŪPA	
<i>by Sri L. Vasudeva Sarma</i>	153
24. AMALĀNANDA	
<i>by Sri Rajesvara Sastri Dravid</i>	157
25. ĀNANDAPŪRNA-VIDYĀSĀGARA	
<i>by Sri V. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>	165
26. RĀMĀDVAYĀCHARYA	
<i>by Sri S. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>	171
27. PRATYAGSVARŪPA	
<i>by Sri S. R. Krishnamurti Sastri</i>	174
28. ŚAṆKARĀNANDA	
<i>by Kumari P. C. Subbamma</i>	178
29. VIDYĀRANYA	
<i>by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan</i>	.. 182
30. GOVINDĀNANDA	
<i>by Sri T. R. Subramaniam</i>	.. 190
31. ŚAṆKHAPĀNI	
<i>by Dr. R. Balasubramanian</i>	.. 194
32. LAKSHMĪDHARA	
<i>by Sri P. Thirugnanasambandam</i>	.. 201
33. SADĀNANDA	
<i>by Dr. T. P. Ramachandran</i>	.. 206
34. SADĀNANDA KĀŚMĪRAKA	
<i>by Srimati Lalitha Ramamurti</i>	.. 212
35. PRAKĀŚĀNANDA	
<i>by Dr. T. P. Ramachandran</i>	.. 216

CONTENTS

ix

36. RĀMATĪRTHA	
<i>by Sri P. V. Sivarama Dikshitar</i>	.. 221
37. NRISIMHĀŚRAMA	
<i>by Dr. N. Veezhinathan</i>	.. 226
38. RĀŅGA RĀJA	
<i>by Sri S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri</i>	.. 233
39. NRISIMHA BHATTOPADHYĀYA	
<i>by Sri S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri</i>	.. 239
40. APPAYYA DIKSHITA	
<i>by Sri Y. Mahalinga Sastri</i>	.. 245
41. MADHUSŪDANA SARASVATĪ	
<i>by Sri V. Rajagopalan</i>	.. 254
42. DHARMARĀJĀDHVARIN	
<i>by Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao</i>	.. 262
43. RĀMAKRISHNADIIVARIN	
<i>by Sri V. Swaminathan</i>	.. 265
44. VEŅKAṬANĀTHA	
<i>by Srimati B. Sitamahalakshmi</i>	.. 276
45. MAHADEVĀNANDA SARASVATĪ	
<i>by Sri N. S. Ramanujam</i>	.. 281
46. GAŅGĀDHARENDRA SARASVATĪ	
<i>by Sri T. S. Narayana Rao</i>	.. 286
47. PARAMAŚIVENDRA SARASVATĪ	
<i>by Sri V. Jagadeesvara Sastri</i>	.. 290
48. NALLĀKAVI	
<i>by Sri C. Sivaramamurti</i>	.. 294
49. SADAŚIVA BRAHMANENDRA SARASVATĪ	
<i>by Sri N. Raghunathan</i>	.. 302
50. SOME PRE-ŚAŅKARA ADVAITINS	
(i) ĀTREYA BRAHMANANDI AND DRAVIDĀCHĀRYA	
<i>by Polagam Sri Rama Sastri</i>	.. 311
(ii) PRITHVĪDHARA	
<i>by Swami Anantanandendra Sarasvati</i>	.. 317
51. ĀNANDAGIRI	
<i>by Sri K. Balasubrahmaniam Sastri</i>	.. 320
52. BRAHMĀNANDA	
<i>by Sri T. V. Ramachandra Dikshitar</i>	.. 323

53. UPANISHADBRAHMENDRA by Dr. V. Raghavan	.. 328
54. KĀLIDĀSA by Sri K. Chandrasekharan	.. 336
55. KRISHṆAMIŚRA by Sri U. Venkatakrishna Rao	. 347
56. SOME AUTHORS OF WORKS IN REGIONAL LANGUAGES	
(i) JÑĀNADEVA by Dr. A. G. Javadekar	.. 356
(ii) NIŚCHALADĀSA by Sri V. L. Sethuraman	.. 364
(iii) TĀṇḌAVARĀYAR by Dr. T. P. Meenakshisundaran	.. 368
(iv) POTANA by Sri D. Ramalinga Reddiar	.. 371
57. ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARA AND ŚAṆKARITE INSTITUTIONS by Swami Anantanandendra Sarasvati	.. 376
58. (i) KĀMAKSHĪ — THE ĀMNAYA ŚAKTI by Swami Anantanandendra Sarasvati	.. 402
(ii) KĀMAKOṬI AND NĀYANMĀRS by Swami Anantanandendra Sarasvati	.. 420
59. ŚRĪ KĀMAKOṬI PĪṬHA OF ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARĀCHĀRYA by Sri N. Ramesan	.. 429
60. THE SAGE OF KAṆCHĪ by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan	.. 469
61. JAGADGURU ŚRĪ CHANDRAŚEKHARENDRA SARASVATI	
(i) ON ADVAITA	.. 549
(ii) ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ŚAṆKARA JAYANTI	.. 559
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS VOLUME	.. 567

PREFACE

In the history of Advaita after Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, it is a unique and rare event that is being commemorated by the publication of this Volume — the Diamond Jubilee of the ascension to the Śrī Kāmakoti Pīṭha by His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Chandrasekharendra Sarasvatī, Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya of Kāñchī. For sixty years the Āchārya has adorned the Holy Seat founded by Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, making its lustre spread far and wide and bringing solace to innumerable seekers all the world over. The present Volume is a collective offering made to the Jagadguru by His devotees, as a humble token of their ineffable gratitude, veneration, and love, on the auspicious occasion of the Diamond Jubilee.

Advaita, which is the Plenary Experience, is not a system among the systems of philosophy or a cult among the cults of religion. It has been taught by great preceptors from time immemorial as the culmination and goal of all philosophical schools and religious persuasions. The Advaita tradition traces its inspiration to God Himself — as Śrīman-Nārāyaṇa or as Sadā-Śiva. The supreme Lord revealed the wisdom of Advaita to Brahmā, the Creator, who in turn imparted it to Vasishṭha. This wisdom was handed down at first as *vaṁśa-paramparā*, i.e. as from father to son, in succession. With Śuka and Gauḍapāda commenced the *śishya-paramparā*, i.e. the line of succession from preceptor to disciple. Śaṅkara, an *avatāra* of Śiva, was the greatest consolidator of Advaita: his penetrating and lucid commentaries on the three *prasthānas*, viz. the Upanishads, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtra*, have been acclaimed as masterpieces of Vedāntic literature. The teachers of Advaita who came after him have expounded the Upanishadic teaching in numerous works. In the present Volume, there are articles contributed by various scholars on the Preceptors of Advaita belonging to the three periods into which the history of Advaita falls: (1) that of pre-Śaṅkara teachers, beginning with Vasishṭha. (2) that of Śaṅkara and his immediate disciples, and (3) that of post-Śaṅkara exponents of Advaita.

The first fifty-six articles cover sixty Preceptors of Advaita: it will be seen that not only philosophers but also poets, literary writers, and exponents in some of the regional languages have been included here. Articles 57, 58, and 59 are devoted to Śaṅkarite Institutions, Kāmākshī and Kāmakoti. and the Kāmakoti Pītha, respectively. The sixtieth article presents a brief life-sketch of His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Chandraśekharendra Sarasvatī, the Sage of Kāñchī, the Diamond Jubilee of whose *Pīṭhārohaṇa* this Volume commemorates. In the last article, the sixty-first, are given English translations of two of His Holiness's discourses — (i) On Advaita, and (ii) On the Significance of Śaṅkara Jayanti.

We are grateful to all those who have, with great joy and profound devotion, helped to make the publication of this Volume possible: to the scholars who have contributed articles; to Dr. N. Veezhinathan who translated into English such of those articles which were originally written in Samskrit or Tamil, and who attended to the many details of publication; to Dr. T. P. Ramachandran who assisted in reading the proofs; to Sri T. Sadasivam, Editor, "Kalki", for help and advice in regard to the illustrations and the cover-design; to Sri Sridhar of "Ananda Vikatan" for supplying photographs of His Holiness; to the G. S. Press for the excellent printing; to the Government of Andhra Pradesh for a generous grant-in-aid.

May this reverential offering to His Holiness serve, in however small a measure, the cause of Advaita — which is the cause of universal Spiritual Peace — so dear to His heart!

Madras

December 31, 1967

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN.

1

VASISHTHA

by

K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

B.A., B.L.

Vasishṭha is one of the supreme seers, sages and saints of India. In the course of uttering the *Gāyatrī-mantra* day after day, the names of seven sages (Atri, Bhrigu, Kutsa, Vasishṭha, Gautama, Kāśyapa, and Āngirasa) are repeated everyday. In Vālmīki's world-famous epic poem *Rāmāyaṇa* (the 19th sarga or chapter in the Bāla-kāṇḍa) the sage Viśvāmitra goes to King Daśaratha of Ayodhyā to ask him to send Rāma with him to protect from destruction by demons the sacrifice that was going to be performed by him. King Daśaratha was unwilling to do so because Rāma was young. Thereupon Viśvāmitra tells him:

*aham vēdmi mahātmānam
rāmam satya-parākramam
vasishṭho'pi mahātejāḥ
ye chānye tapasi sthītāḥ*

(I know Rāma to be high-souled and of true prowess. The sage of spiritual radiance — Vasishṭha — and others who excel in tapas, i.e., spiritual austerity, also know him to be so.)

Even then the king was unwilling to send Rāma with Viśvāmitra. But Vasishṭha advised the king to grant Viśvāmitra's request, and thereupon King Daśaratha sent Rāma and Lakshmana with Viśvāmitra. Vasishṭha was the *purohita* (spiritual adviser) of the king of *sūryavaṁśa*, i.e. the solar dynasty. Viśvāmitra taught them two potent *mantras* — Balā and Atibalā — which enabled them to conquer hunger and thirst and perform miraculous acts. Viśvāmitra performed his projected sacrifice unhindered, as Rāma and Lakshmana protected it from all attackers.

After Rāma and Lakshmana returned from the island of Laṅkā after destroying Rāvaṇa and his rule over the universe, Vasishṭha

was one of the eight sages who crowned Rāma as the king of Ayodhyā.

*vasiṣṭho vāmadevaścha jābāriratha kāśyapaḥ
kātyāyano suyajñāśca gautamo vijayas taṭhā
abhyashiñchan nara-vyāghram prasannena sugandhinā
salilena sahasrāksham vasavo vāsavam yathā*

(Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa — Yuddha-kāṇḍa, sarga 131,
Verses 61, 62).

(Vasishṭha, Vāmadeva, Jābāli, Kāśyapa, Kātyāyana, Suyajña, Gautama and Vijaya performed the coronation of Rāma with limpid and fragrant water, as Vasus crowned Indra as the King of all the worlds).

Such a consummating coronation of Śrī Rāma by Vasishṭha was supplemented and perfected by another coronation, i.e. the gift of spiritual knowledge to Rāma as described in the great work *Yoga-vāsishṭha* which is as great in merit in its way as *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* and is much bigger in size than *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*, Adapting a well-known Sanskrit verse about *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*, we may say about Vasishṭha's work:

*vasishṭha giri sanibhūtā
rāma sāgara gāminī
punātu bhuvanam puṇyā
rāmāyaṇa-mahānadī*

The first part of the work deals with *vairāgya* (freedom from desire), *Mumukshutva* (desire for spiritual liberation), *utpatti* (creation), *sthiti* (preservation) and *upaśama* (dissolution). The second part of the work consists of two sections, viz. *Pūrvārdha* and *Uttharārdha* (the first part and second part) which deal in great detail with *nirvāṇa* (annihilation of individuality and achievement and spiritual experience of universality and divinity).

I shall quote in conclusion from *Yoga-vāsishṭha* a few verses which combine wonderful beauty and divine sublimity.

*evam sarvamidam viśvam paramātmaiva kevalam
brahmaiva parākāśam esa devaḥ parah smṛitaḥ*

*tadetad pūjanam śreyaḥ tasmāt sarvam avāpyate
 tadaiva sargabhūḥ sarvam idam tasminnavasthitam
 akṛtrimam anādyantam advitīyam akhaṇḍitam
 abahissāadhanāsādhyaṁ sukham tasmād avāpyate*

(The whole universe is one with Paramātmā, i.e. the Universal Lord. Brahman is known as Parākāśa, i.e. the Supreme Sky. Worshipping Him is beneficial. From Him comes everything. He is the Creator of everything. All things rest in Him. He is not the Creation. He is without beginning and end. He has no peer. He is undivided and indivisible and full. He is not created by an agency outside Him. We get all bliss from Him).

2

SAKTI

by

SRIVATSA SOMADEVA SARMA

Sāhitya-vānmukha-bhūshana Purāṇa-sūgara

In the uninterrupted lineage of the preceptors of Advaita, Śrī Śakti Āchārya occupies the fourth place. His biography and greatness are described in various Purāṇās. Vasishṭha, the spritual son (mānasa-putra) of Brahmā, had a hundred sons through his wife, Arundhatī. The eldest among them was Śakti, who possibly on account of the varied powers he had, was named so.

The greatness of Śakti is set forth in the work 'Śrī Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha Jagadguru Paramparāratnamālāstuti', by Sadūśivabrahmendra with the commentary by Ātmaprakāśendra Sarasvatī, published by Śrī Vidyā Press, Kumbhakonam, in 1837.

*"bahumitrasahakshītīśapāpāpahasānnidhyam
arodhyasatpratāpam
mahadañchita-mantra-yantra-śaktim
manasā śaktimupaimi sadviraktam"*

"I meditate upon Śakti, the detached one, whose presence removed the sins of the king by name Bahumitrasahan, who had pre-eminent splendour, who possessed of *mantra* and *yantra* powers bestowed upon him by great ones."

The commentator explains the meaning of this verse as follows: Mitrasaha of the solar dynasty had Vasishṭha as his family preceptor. Destruction of wild beasts and demons being the duty of the king, Mitrasaha once wanted to kill a demon; but the latter, by the power of his 'māyā' eluded the arrow and hid himself somewhere. With the evil intention of doing some wrong to the king, the demon disguising himself as a cook, prepared food from a human being's flesh for the ancestral ceremony to be performed by the king. The food was served to Vasishṭha. But, the sage coming to know of the true nature of

the food that was served to him, got angry and spelt a curse on the king that he should become a man-eating demon. The king, not knowing the tricks played by the demon thought that Vasishṭha was wrong in cursing him and he, in turn, in an angry mood took water in his palms to spell a curse on the sage. The minister, however, dissuaded him from doing so by saying that by cursing the preceptor the whole family would be destroyed. The king, fully convinced, poured the water on his feet. If the water taken after determination is poured anywhere that portion or place would get dirty. As a result of the king's pouring water on his feet, his feet also became dirty; henceforth, he was called 'Kalmāshapāda'. This act, according to the king, was mainly intended to show others that any insult done to the preceptor would be a sin. Thus having become a demon, one day while he was on a chase to kill the sons of Vasishṭha he came across Śakti Āchārya, and on merely seeing him his sin and curse were removed. He then prayed to Śakti Āchārya to take him as his disciple and instruct him on the nature of Truth as a result of which he crossed the ocean of transmigration and attained release.

This narrative is slightly different from the one that is found in the other Purāṇa. There, it is found that 'Kalmāshapāda' killed and ate all the one hundred sons of Vasishṭha including Śakti, that Śakti's son Parāśara in order to kill the demons performed a sacrifice and that Śakti by the grace of Lord Śiva appeared before the child to make him stop the sacrifice.

There seems to be a contradiction involved in the narratives of the two Purāṇas. But if we adopt the view that 'Kalmāshapāda' ate Śakti and others from the first Purāṇa and that his sins and curse were annihilated just by the mere presence of Śakti emerging from the sacrificial fire and that he attained liberation on receiving instructions from Śakti himself from the other one (Purāṇa), the mutual contradiction in the views expressed in the two Purāṇas get dissolved.

In the 65th chapter of the first half of the Liṅga-purāṇa the following version is found. It says that Śakti is the eldest of the one hundred sons of Vasishṭha. He learned all the arts from his father, married 'Adṛśyanti' and was running the life of a householder duly performing all the prescribed Karmas. Viśvāmitra,

as a result of his enmity towards Vasishṭha, accosted a demon by name 'Rudhīran' to enter the body of 'Kalmāshapāda' and made him kill Śakti and the other sons of Vasishṭha. Overcome with grief at the death of his sons, Vasishṭha, as was the custom in that cosmic age fell from a hill-top with his wife in an attempt to end his life as well as that of his wife. This way of putting an end to one's life was known as 'bhṛgu-patanam' which was not regarded as suicide, since one was permitted to end one's life at the time of grief by falling from the hill-top. But 'Bhūdevī', the Goddess of earth saved the old couple. 'Ādrśyanti, the wife of Śakti, consoled them by saying that since she was in the family way, the family thread would not be disrupted.

Vasishṭha was solaced on hearing this piece of good news. One midnight Vasishṭha heard the chanting of the Vedas from the place where Ādrśyanti was sleeping. As he was wondering, he heard an unknown voice saying that it was his grandson, the son of Śakti who was chanting the Vedas from the womb of his mother, that he (the child) was going to be a great devotee of Śiva and that he would compose Vishṇupurāṇa. Vasishṭha, forgetting the grief that had seized him, began expecting the day of his grandson's birth. At last, the day also came and the joy of Vasishṭha and his wife knew no bounds. After having worked out the child's horoscope, he was named 'Śākteyan'. The child, noted for his wisdom even while in the womb, asked his mother the reason for her not being able to enjoy the birth of a child for her. While everyone else including Vasishṭha and his wife was avoiding a reply, the mother herself informed the child that his father was killed by a demon and that was the reason why she was not happy. Even before she could conclude her narrative, the child told the mother that he would bring his father very soon. Śākteya, praying to Lord Śiva, lit up a fire and began performing a sacrifice aiming at exterminating the demons. Thousands of them perished in that fire. Devī Pārvatī, consort of Lord Śiva, astonished at the child's devotion to his father requested her husband, Śiva, to return the father to the child. Śiva also complied with the request of his consort. Śākteya, coming to know through his mother that Śakti was his father, prostrated before him. The father embracing the child told him thus: "Who can kill whom? It is only one's karma that is responsible for one's death. So, stop

the sacrifice". The family of Vasishṭha was once again united. Pulastya of the 'Rākshasa' race, blessed him thus: "Since you were like an arrow to the enemy, you shall henceforth be known as 'Parāśara' and you shall compose Vishṇupurāṇa".

The Mahābhārata, Ādiparvan, 192-195, gives a biographical sketch of the three preceptors—Vasiṣṭha, Śakti, and Parāśara. Once, a king by name 'Divodāsa' also known as 'Mitrāsaha' was returning after a tiresome hunting in the forest. On the way, he came across some sages among whom Śakti also was one. The king, feeling hungry and thirsty, asked the sages to give him way. Śakti told the king that it was he who should give way for the sages and not *vice versa*. The king, getting angry at this reply whipped Śakti and he in return pronounced a curse on the king that he would forthwith become a demon. While the king, repenting for his action, was about to apologise to the sage, Viśvāmitra prevented the king from doing so, by making a demon called kiṅkara enter the body of the king.

Śakti learnt all the Advaita texts under his father, Vasiṣṭha. He was always conscious of his identity with the Supreme Self. It was indeed our good fortune to have had such illustrious, realised souls like Śakti who kept alive the Advaita tradition for the benefit of posterity.

3 PARASARA

by

N. SUBRAMANIA AIYAR (ANNA)

B.A., L.T.

I bow down to that great Saint, Parāśara, who composed the gem of a Purāṇa (the Vishṇu-purāṇa) revealing therein faithfully the truths about soul, matter, God, their inter-relationship, enjoyment of this world, freedom and the ways and means thereof.

—*Stotra-ratnam* by Yāmunāchārya

I

Vasishṭha, the mind-born son of Brahmā, begot Śakti. Śakti begot Parāśara. Parāśara begot Veda Vyāsa. Vyāsa begot Śuka. And all of them were great seers and the earliest of the builders of the enduring edifice of Sanātana Dharma.

Parāśara lived at the end of Dvāpara-yuga, just before the Kali era set in. He was once crossing the Ganges in a boat plied by a fallen angel in the guise of a fisherwoman, by name Satyavati. Parāśara fell in love with her and of their union was born a child of destiny. We are told that the birth of the child was mysterious, that he was no sooner conceived than he was born, 'Sadyotpannaḥ'. He came to be known as Dvaipāyana because he was born on an island. He was called Krishṇa because he was black. He earned the appellation of Veda Vyāsa, as he became later on the Codifier of the Vedic literature.

Perhaps the greatest glory of Parāśara is that he gave Veda Vyāsa to the world. A tree is known by its fruit. Speaking of Vyāsa, Sri Aurobindo says, "A wide and searching mind, historian, statesman, orator, a deep and keen looker into ethics and conduct, a subtle and high aiming politician, theologian and philosopher, it is not for nothing that Hindu imagination makes the name of Vyāsa loom so large in the history of Aryan thought and attributes to him work so important and manifold."

Parāśara is illustrious not only because he is the father of Veda Vyāsa but on his own account as a Mahārshi, as a law-giver

and as a powerful writer. We owe to him the Parāśara-smṛiti and the Vishṇu-purāṇa, called a gem among the Purāṇas.

II

The teachings of Parāśara can be understood from a few quotations given below, culled from the Vishṇu-purāṇa:—

As the air blown through different holes of a flute produces different notes, the one Paramātmā appears as many.

He who creates, sustains and destroys the worlds in the guise of Brahmā, Vishṇu and Śiva is Bhagavān Janārdana himself.

Whatever is seen is His manifestation but people who have no eyes to see the truth, see this manifestation as the universe.

The life of the world is His Kaustubha, Śrīvatsa is Prakṛiti, Buddhi is the mace; the Conch represents the Pañchabhūtas and the bow the Indriyas; the mind is the Chakra and the senses the arrows; the sword is Vidyā and its sheath is Avidyā. The Lord is Māyārūpin. Though he has no form, he assumes a form and wears ornaments and weapons for the good of the creatures.

Word is Śrī, meaning is Hari; Wisdom is Vishṇu, Buddhi is Lakshmī; Dharma is Vishṇu, Dharmic action is Lakshmī; Creator is Vishṇu, Creation is Lakshmī; the earth is Śrī and he who lifts the earth is Hari; joy is Vishṇu and Gaurī is Lakshmī; the Lord is the tree, the Mother is the creeper; the flag is Śrī and the flagpost is Hari.

“I am Hari, all this is Janārdana and apart from Him there is nothing, gross or subtle” — He who realizes this will not be caught in the meshes of birth and death.

By performing sacrifices, one sacrifices to Him, by meditation one meditates on Him, by killing others one kills Him, for, Hari is all.

If one avoids calumny, envy, untruth, harsh words, He is pleased. If one extends the same love to others as to one's self or to one's own son, He is pleased.

III

The quintessence of Parāśara's philosophy of life is brought home to us in particular in his narration of the story of Prahlāda. Through Prahlāda, Parāśara reveals his own heart.

Says Prahlāda: Viṣṇu is not in my heart alone, he pervades the whole world. He is in me and in you and in every being and He stands revealed in all our actions. When He the dispeller of all fears is seated in my mind, how can fear find a place there? By the mere thought of Him, fear of birth, old age and death is immediately dissolved.

The best way of worshipping Him is the practice of equality and equanimity and to see Him equally everywhere and in all things.

Those who came to kill me, those who gave me poison, who threw me into fire, who set elephants to trample over me and serpents to bite me — to them also I have nothing but love. I cannot wish evil, do evil or talk evil, seeing the Lord is in everyone as in me. When the Lord is seated in the heart of every being, how can there be the distinction of friends or foes?

Unexpected good fortune, rulership and enjoyments come even to people who are unjust, unwise, foolish and cowardly. Therefore, one who desires the highest good should not crave for pleasures but should strive for holy things and the practice of equanimity.

The Lord is everywhere. I am He. From me has come everything, I am everything, in me is everything. I am the imperishable Paramātmā called Brahma. I am the beginning and the end. I am the Parama Puruṣa.

Realizing that he was not different from Viṣṇu, Prahlāda forgot himself and he did not cognize anything else.

Coming down from that plane, he saw the world again and thought of himself as Prahlāda. Then he sang the praise of Puruṣottama with a one-pointed mind. The Lord then appeared before him clad in golden silk. Prahlāda uttered the following prayer:— As I wander in the world taking numerous births, wherever I may be born, may I always have unswerving devotion to Thee. May I be attracted to you with that love which the foolish people have for the fleeting objects of the world.

This is the philosophy of Parāśara.

VEDAVYASA

by

R. MUTHUKRISHNA SASTRI

Mīmāṃsā and Sāhitya Śiromaṇi

*vyāsam vasishṭhanaptāram
śaktēḥ pautramakalmasham
parūśarātmajam vande
śukatātām taponidhim.*

Śrīmad Bhagavad-gītā emphasises that the Lord Almighty incarnates in this world for the establishment of Dharma as and when necessary. Dharma can be established in many ways, namely, protecting the pious, destroying the wicked, removing ignorance, and establishing knowledge. Among such incarnations, in the *dvāparayuga*, Lord Viṣṇu was born as Vēdavyāsa in order to remove ignorance and establish knowledge on a firm basis. Out of the three basic energies (desire, action, and knowledge) this *avatāra* of Viṣṇu represents *jñānaśakti*.

*jñānaśaktyavatārāya
namobhagavato hareḥ*

(Bhāmatī-Sloka, 5).

Born of *Mahaṛṣhi Parāśara* and *Satyavatīdevī*, Vyāsa is known by several names. We may refer to him as *Vedavyāsa* or merely *Vyāsa* because he codified the Vedas into four sections, viz. *Ṛig*, *Yajus*, *Sāma* and *Atharva*, and taught them to his four disciples, Pila, Vaiśampāyana, Jaimini, and Sumantu, respectively, for the benefit of posterity. He is also known as *Dvaipāyana* because he was born in an island; *Krishṇa* as he was dark in colour, and more familiarly as *Krishṇa-dvaipāyana*, combining both the names. As he performed *tapas* under a badara tree, he is referred to as *Bādarāyaṇa*.

“Cogent presentation of truths spread out in different Śāstras, directing the disciple to follow the tenets of our Dharma, and

practising them himself rigidly, are said to be the chief characteristic of an ideal guru”.

*āchinoti ca śāstrārtham āchāre sthāpayatyapi
svayamācharate yasmāt tamāchāryam pracakshate.*

Śrī Vyāsa was a shining example of these qualities. Books written by him are so many and voluminous, and unsurpassed in depth of thought and elegance of expression, so much so that we are sometimes led to wonder whether one person could have found the time to write such a large variety of literature, and that perhaps several persons wrote these Volumes and passed them under the name of Vyāsa. But there is no reason to doubt their authenticity, as both internal and external evidences go to prove that they were all the products of one mighty intellect.

Brahma-Sūtra

There are six systems of Āstika philosophy, namely, *Nyaya*, *Vaiśeshika*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, and *Uttaramīmāṃsā* or *Vedānta*. Out of these, Vyāsa is the author of *Brahma-sūtrā* in respect the Vedānta philosophy of the Upanishads. This sūtra is known by several names, such as *Vyāsa-sūtra*, *Brahma-sūtra*, *Bhikshu-sūtra* and *Vedānta-sūtra*. This consists of four *adhyāyas* or sections and there are 555 *sūtras*.

Sūtras are brief and significant statements, that could be expanded and expounded by gurus and scholars to their disciples. *Sūchanāt sūtram*.

The word ‘*sūtra*’ also means a thread used to string flowers into a garland. Śrī Śaṅkara, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, says that the sentences of the Upanishads are strung together by the thread of these *sūtras*, like flowers in a garland, and hence they are known as *sūtras*.

*vedāntavākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt
sūtrāṇām (Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣhya of Śaṅkara 1-2).*

The Nyāya, Vaiśeshika, Yoga and Sāṅkhya systems of philosophy try to arrive at the ultimate truth by means of reasoning only. Pūrvamīmāṃsā, although based on the authority of the Vedas, is unable to express the true import of the Upanishads, which form the final expression of the Vedas. To this extent, all these systems of philosophy are defective in arriving at the

Ātmatattva, the truth that is the Ātman. To a careful student, it will be apparent that it is not possible to understand the ultimate truth that is Ātman purely by intellectual arguments. At the same time, it has to be stated that the Upanishads are not in any way contrary to reasoning. To understand the Upanishadic thought, although human intelligence can be useful to a certain extent, we can never arrive at the ultimate truth through reasoning alone.

*tarkāpratishṭhānādanyathānumeyamiti cet
evamapyavimokshaprasaṅgaḥ* (*Brahma-sūtra*, 2-1-11).

The following passage from the *Mahābhārata*, namely, *tarko'pratishṭhaḥ śrutayaḥ vibhinnāḥ*. (*Vana parvā*, 314-119) also confirms this view of the *Brahma-sūtra*. If we examine the *Vyāsa-sūtra* we shall come to the conclusion that Advaita alone is their true import. We shall now explain a few sūtras here:

"The state of liberation, according to Advaita philosophy, is the attainment of one's own disembodied nature of eternal bliss and knowledge—the removal of nescience. According to others, it is settling in a superior world with body, mind, and other senses. In the *Vyāsa-sūtra*, "*sampadyāvīrbhāvaḥ svēna śabdāt*" (4-4-1), the words "*svēna*" and "*āvīrbhāva*" clearly declare that the liberation is the manifestation of one's own self. The same conclusion is arrived at in the succeeding sūtras also, viz.

"brāhmēna jaiminirupanyāsādibhyaḥ" (4-4-5)
"cititanmātrēṇa tadātmakatvādityaudulomiḥ" (4-4-6)
*"evamapyupanyāsād pūrvabhāvādvādivi-
rodham bādarāyaṇaḥ"* (4-4-7)

The first sūtra is an exposition of the view of Jaimini that the released soul gains all the highest qualities of the *Saguṇa* or qualified Brahman. The second is of *Audulomin*. According to him, the released soul is manifest as pure knowledge alone. The third is the view of *Bādarāyaṇa*, according to which, there is no contradiction between the two above-mentioned views. Now, this reconciliation of *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* states is exactly what the Advaitins maintain and others reject.

There is another sūtra in the first-adhyāya,
"sāstradrṣṭyatūpadeśo vāmadevavat" (1-1-30).

In this sūtra, the sage Vāmadeva, on his realization of Brahman, declares that he is "Manu" and he is "Sūrya". "I am all" is the Śāstraic realization. "I am different from my fellow being" is the typically wordly knowledge. This distinction between wordly knowledge and Śāstraic realization—the prominent feature of Advaita philosophy—is brought out in this sūtra. (See *Advaitāksharamālikā*, page 276).

Śrī Śaṅkara, in his *Sūtrabhāṣya*, has explained in unambiguous terms that these sūtras are definitely advaitic in their meaning. According to his bhāṣya, the theme of the first chapter is *Samanvaya*, that is, the true import of all the Upanishadic passages is the non-dual Ātman. The second chapter is called *Avirodha*, that is there is no conflict between the import of the first chapter and other pramāṇas. The third chapter expounds the *sādhana* necessary to attain the knowledge of Ātman or Brahman. The fourth chapter explains the nature of the result i.e. *Phala*, of the knowledge of Brahman. This, in brief, is the substance of the *Brahma-sūtra*.

Similarly, Śrī Rāmānuja, Śrī Mādhva, and other āchāryas also have written *Bhāṣyas* on the *Brahma-sūtra*. It is an accepted tradition that no exposition can be treated as authoritative unless quotations from the *Brahma-sūtra* can be given to support those views. Therefore, it is no wonder that the *Brahma-sūtra* has given rise to a large volume of literature, consisting of *Bhāṣyas*, *Tīkā*, *Vārtika*, *Vivarana*, etc. There are many books expounding Advaita philosophy based on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Similarly, many books have been written on the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Dvaita* aspects based on these the *Sūtra*. Nothing more need be said to show the importance of the *Brahma-sūtra* for real understanding of the *tattvas*.

Itihāsa and Purāṇas

As the *Brahma-sūtra* was necessarily terse and brief and could not easily be understood by men of average intellect, Śrī Vyāsa wrote the *Mahābhārata* and the eighteen *Mahāpurāṇas*. These *Itihāsa-purāṇas* enable one to understand better and appreciate the truths adumbrated in the Vedas and the Upanishads. It is said that the Vedas are really afraid of one who has not properly

studied the *itihāsa-purāṇas*, because such a one will misunderstand the truths.

*yaścaturvedavidvipraḥ purāṇam vetti
nārthataḥ tam dṛṣṭvā bhayamāpnōti
vedo mām pratarishyati. (Sūta-saṁhitā, 1-1.34).*

Therefore, it follows that to expound the Vedas a study of the *Ītihāsa* and *Purāṇas* is necessary. It is thus to the credit of Śrī Vyāsa that he wrote these *Purāṇas* and the *magnum opus*, the *Mahābhārata*.

(1) Creation, (2) Dissolution, (3) Manvantara, (4) the Genealogy of the Sūrya and Chandravamśa, and (5) the story of the descendants of these Vamśas—these five are elaborately dealt with in the *Purāṇas* only with a view to explain clearly and in easy language the profound and ultimate truth of Ātman and Brahman. It is, therefore, that in all these *Purāṇas*, under some pretext or other, compact and terse philosophic chapters are added, like precious gems in a jewel-box. For example,

Brahma-gītā in the *Yajñavaikāṇḍa* of the *Sūtasamhitā* in the *Skānda Purāṇa*.

Jadōpākhyaṇam, comprising the 36th to 44th chapters of the *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇam*.

Īśvaragītā in the *uttara-kāṇḍa* of *Kūrmapurāṇam*.

Śrutigītā, *Uddhavagītā*, and other portions in *Bhāgavata*.

Bhagavadgītā, *Sanatsujātīyam*, and *Mokṣadharmaprakaraṇam* of Śānti parvā in the *Mahābhārata*, etc.

The eighteen Mahāpurāṇas

(1) Brahman, (2) Pādmam, (3) Vaishṇavam, (4) Śaivam, (5) Bhāgavatam, (6) Bhaviṣyam, (7) Nāradyam, (8) Mārkaṇḍeyam, (9) Āgnēyam, (10) Brahmavaivartam, (11) Liṅgam, (12) Vārāham, (13) Skādam, (14) Vāmanam, (15) Kaurmam, (16) Mātsyam, (17) Gāruḍam, (18) Vāyavīyam.

It is doubtful whether anyone in his life time would be able to study all these eighteen *Purāṇas* containing 4,00,000 granthas.

Of these eighteen Purāṇas, ten speak of the glories of Śiva, four of Mahāvishṇu, two of Brahman, one of Agni, and one of Sūrya.

*kathyate daśabhirviprāḥ purāṇaiḥ
parameśvaraḥ
chaturbhiḥ kathyate viṣṇuḥ dvābhyām
Brahma jagatpatiḥ
ekēnāgnistathaikena bhagavān caṇḍabhā
-skaraḥ*

The fact that the same author should have written several Purāṇas glorifying different gods is a positive proof that the vedas do not make any difference between one god and another and that all arrive at the same goal provided they worship with *ekāgra chintana* (concentrated meditation) any one of the gods.

The Purāṇas explain, with detailed and interesting examples and stories, the different natures of *dharma* and *adharma*, the importance of particular *kṣhētrās* and *puṇyanadīs*, the significance of different *mūrtīs* and also particulars of anatomy and health precepts. In fact, these *Purāṇas* form the sources from which we can study the culture, civilization, religious and social laws, and organization of our ancient period. Without the help of these, our ancient history will be full of dark patches, and we cannot rightly interpret our Vedic tenets and principles.

The Mahābhārata

It is said that Śrī Vyāsa put forth his best effort in writing the *itihāsa*, the *Mahābhārata*. The *Harivaṁśa* also is a section of the *Mahābhārata*. One cannot do enough justice by words to the important place this *itihāsa* holds in the life and thought of the Hindus, so much so it has been called the fifth *Veda*.

*bhārataḥ pañchamo vedaḥ; mahābhārata pañchamān;
kārshṇam vedam,*

It is also known as the *Veda* written by Krishṇa-dvaipāyana. Śrī Vyāsa starts writing this *itihāsa* by stating that "what is not mentioned in this *itihāsa* cannot be found in any other book; and what is mentioned in other books can be found in this".

*yadihāsti tadanyatra
yannēhāsti natatkvachit.*

The famous texts such as the *Bhagavad-gītā*, *sanatsujātīyam*, *Anugītā*, and *Mokshadharmaprakaraṇam* of *Śānti parva*, all of them help to explain and expound the thoughts expressed in the *Upanishads*. Further *Viḍura-nīti*, *Yakshapraśnam*, *Anuśāsana-parva*, and others set forth the basic principles of Dharma and Codes of conduct. *Vishṇusahasranāmam*, *Śivasahasranāmam*, and others sing the glories of the respective gods and promote *bhakti*. *Rājadharmaprakaraṇam* and *Āpaddharama-prakarana* of *Śānti parva*, speak of administrative principles. Thus, almost all aspects of human conduct, both individual and communal, are dealt with in great detail, precision and authority.

The *Mahābhārata* has been the source and inspiration of most of the *Mahākāvyas* composed in India during the last several millenniums. Śrīharsha's *Naishadham*, Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīyam*, Māgha's *Śiśupālavadham*, and Kālidāsa's *Abhijñāna-Sākuntalam*, all owe their inspiration to the stories narrated in the *Māhābhārata*. Kavi Kālidasa has bodily incorporated several sentences and ideas from the *Mahābhārata* in his own works. The poet *Bhāsa* also has based many of his dramas on this *itihāsa*.

Śrī Śaṅkara, Śrī Rāmānuja and other āchāryas have borrowed very liberally and quoted stanzas from the *Māhābhārata* in their own *Bhāshyas*.

How can we sing the praise of such a genius as Vedavyāsa! We shall have to content ourselves with quoting below some *ślokas* in praise of this great āchārya.

“You poured the oil of *Mahābhārata* and lit the lamp of our knowledge to shine brightly for ever. What return can we ever give you for this act of grace on your part? We can only bow down in adoration”.

namostu te vyāsavīśāla buddhe
 phullāravindāyata patranētra
 yena tvyā bhāratataila pūrṇaḥ
 prajvālito jñānamaya pradīpaḥ.

It is thus obvious that without the oil of *Mahābhārata* the lamp of our knowledge will cease to burn.

“Even if one is learned in all the four Vedās and their auxiliary disciplines, one will not be considered a scholar if he has not mastered the *Mahābhārata*.

*yo vidyāt caturo vedān
sāṅgopanishadō dvijaḥ
na chākyānamidam vidyāt
naiva sa syūt vichakshaṇaḥ.*

As is *Vishṇu* among the gods, Brahmins among two-legged animals, *chūḍāmaṇi* among jewels, *Vajrāyudham* among weapons, mind among senses, even so is *Mahābhārata* among *Śāstras*.

*tridaśānām yathā viṣṇuḥ
dvipadām brāhmaṇo yathā
bhūṣaṇānām ca sarveśham
yathā chūḍāmaṇirvaraḥ
yathāyudhānām kuḷiśam
indriyāṇām yathā manaḥ
tateha sarvaśāstrāṇām*

mahābhāratamuttamam. (Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇam, 1. 4 & 5).

A Dharma-śāstra by name *Vyāsasmṛiti* and *Vyāsaśikṣa* explaining the *lakṣhaṇa* of the Vedas are also to be found in the name of Śrī Vyāsa.

Thus Śrī Vedavyāsa has written many books to expound the sacred truths contained in the Vedas and the Upanishads.

We have not seen Śrī Vyāsa face to face. But we are very lucky now in having in our midst the great scholar-saint, Śrī Kāmakoṭi-pīṭhādhipati Śrī Chaṇdraśekharendra Saraswatī Pūjya-pādāḥ at whose feet I dedicate this humble essay of mine.

SUKA

by

K. BALASUBRAHMANYA IYER.

B.A.,B.L., M.L.C.

The truth of Advaita rests not merely on the inherent validity of the scriptures or the Vedas but on that of actual experience or *anubhava*. The Great Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, who is the foremost expounder of the truth of Advaita, clearly states in his commentary on the second Sūtra of the *Brahma-Sūtra* (*janmādyasya yataḥ* 1.1.2) that unlike in the case of Dharma the knowledge of Brahman rests also on experience (*śrutyādayaḥ anubhavādayaścha yathā-sambhavam iha pramāṇam*). Again when discussing the possibility of the existence in this world of *jīvan-muktas* or realised souls he emphasises that the only test for the existence of such realised souls in the human form is their own heart-experience, and such experience cannot be questioned by arguments about the possibility or not of the existence of *jīvan-muktas* after they have destroyed their *karmavāsanās*. Hence it is that Śaṅkara postulates the necessity for initiation by a Guru for the realisation of the truth of Advaita. As a corollary to this proposition came the acceptance of a series of Gurus, who developed the Advaita-saṁpradāya. Before initiation into the study of Vedānta, everyone is expected to make a *Sāntipāṭha*, and in that one recites the *Guru-paramparā*, from the beginning. God Nārāyaṇa himself is the first Guru, next comes Brahmā, next Vasishṭha, then his son Śakti, then Sakti's son Parāśara, afterwards the son of Parāśara, the great sage Vyāsa, then his son Śuka, afterwards Gāuḍapāda, his śishya Govinda Bhagavatpāda, and then his śishya Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, and then his śishyas Hastāmālaka, Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Totaka and others, and then downwards to one's own Guru under whom one gets initiation into the study of Vedānta. We find therefore that Bhagavān Śuka occupies a highly honoured place in our *Guru-paramparā*. In this *Guru-paramparā*, that has been handed down to us in the Advaita tradition, all the Gurus are, as will be seen, realised

souls that have experienced the Advaita-tatva. When praising Vyāsa the famous verse about him refers to him as the father of Śuka (*śukatātam taponidhim*). This is a unique distinction for, usually, the name of the son is denoted by the name of his father. Here Vyāsa is extolled by being mentioned as the father of Śuka. This shows with what veneration the great devotees of Advaita Vedānta looked upon Śuka. He is one of the greatest of Brahma-Nishṭhas. The story of Śuka's wonderful birth and the way of his realisation of Brahman are very graphically narrated in the *Mahābhārata* — Śānti Parva-Adhyāya 323, and following Adhyāyas. It is said therein that Bhagavān Vyāsa performed a severe penance for begetting a son. He meditated on the great Śiva. Pleased with his austerities God Śiva blessed that a son would be born to him who would be pure as fire, air, earth, water and etheric space and that he would attain fame throughout the three worlds by his spirituality. Having attained this boon from Lord Śiva, it is narrated that Vyāsa began to produce fire from two sticks of wood (*arāṇi*). At that time the beautiful celestial dancer Ghṛitāchī appeared. Enslaved by Kāma on seeing her, Vyāsa let fall his *Vīrya* on the fire produced from the sticks of wood, and out of it a son was born. As the Apsaras Ghṛitāchī took the form of a parrot (*śukī*) at that time, this son came to be known as Śuka. This boy shone like effulgent fire and resembled Vyāsa in his appearance. The child was later initiated into the study of the Vedas, and Vyāsa instructed him in all Śāstras. The child was also instructed by Bṛihaspati himself. Curiously enough in a short time the boy attained the knowledge of all branches of learning. But his mind did not move by the attractions of the other two āśramas, of Gṛihastha and Vānaprastha. But he was intensely longing for Moksha. Hence his father Vyāsa, advised him to go and study under the great Rāja Rishi Janaka at Mithilā. The *Mahābhārata* specifically says that from the great āśrama on the Himalayas, Śuka came all the way to Mithilā on foot, even though he had the power to fly over the intervening space between the Himalayas and Mithilā. When he went to the palace of Janakā a discriminating gate keeper readily admitted him, struck by his attractive appearance. Śuka was received in the palace by the ministers of Janaka and enjoyed the hospitality of the maids of the palace. Even then he had absolute selfcontrol, and was indifferent to their attractions. In the morning Śuka was

received by Janaka and instructed in the path to Moksha. Then Janaka portrays to him beautifully the characteristics of a realised soul, how he is utterly devoid of jealousy and other evil qualities, how he looks upon all people with the same eye, how he is devoid of the opposites, praise and calumny, pleasure and pain, heat and cold, how he treats gold and iron as same, and how he has mastered the mind and indriyas.

Having thus been instructed in the Moksha-mārga by Janaka, Śuka returned to his father. At that time his father Vyāsa was engaged in teaching the four Vedas to Sumantu, Vaiśampāyana, Jaimini and Paila. He taught Śuka all the four Vedas as his fifth śishya. Then Śuka sought Nārada as his Guru for being instructed in Rājayoga and Bhaktiyoga. Nārada taught the way of Dhyāna, Abhyāsa and Bhakti. He emphasised the absolute importance of jñāna and vairāgya. After obtaining the complete knowledge of the way of realisation of Moksha through Yoga and Bhakti, Śuka entered into austerities and attained Sūryaloka and became part of the effulgence of Sūrya. In the same way he identified himself with the other elements, Vāyu, Jala and Bhūmi, and finally he attained Brahman and wandered about.

Vyāsa was stricken with profound grief on account of the separation from his son and ran after him.

It is during his journey following his son that a wonderful incident occurred. The Heavenly dancers who were sporting in the water without dress, remained unmoved when Śuka went along that path, and when Vyāsa came, they hastily dressed themselves. When asked by Vyāsa the reason for the difference in their conduct towards himself and his youthful son, they said that Śuka was a person absolutely devoid of the knowledge of the difference of sex, and that Vyāsa had not come to that stage. This incident is mentioned with great enthusiasm in the *Bhāgavata* also. The greatest achievement of Śuka, according to the traditional story, is his reciting the *Bhāgavata* to King Parīkshit, who expecting death in a period of seven days, on account of a curse uttered by a sage, was intently meditating upon the Lord and was anxiously seeking for the way to attain the feet of God. The *Bhāgavata* narrates that Parīkshit was seated near the banks of the Ganges surrounded by Ṛishis and at that time Śuka made his appearance.

There is a beautiful description of Śuka who was of the age of sixteen at that time. The Great Brahmanishṭha who never stayed even a short time before any householder, stayed for seven days and instructed King Parikshit in the famous *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. The *Bhāgavata* goes into ecstasies over the fine appearance of this lad of sixteen years with soft limbs of beautiful proportion, with attractive eyes, and smiling face, saturated with a mind absolutely tranquil and devoid of any desires. The whole assembly of Ṛishis rose to their feet on seeing this Great Bhrama-nishṭha and made obeisance to him. Parikshit received him with great veneration and made him seated and asked him to teach him the way of meditating upon the Lord and concentrating on him. He said he was very fortunate in having Śuka to instruct him when he was greatly anxious to attain the knowledge of the way of salvation. Very much pleased with his desire to know the truth Śuka congratulated him, and himself began to utter verses ending with *tasmai śubhadraśravase namo namaḥ*. This Hymn to the Lord by Śuka, one of the finest in the *Bhāgavata* is fit to be uttered by everyone desiring to practice devotion to the Lord. In that Hymn Śuka emphasised the greatness of Bhakti to the Lord. He declares that the path of Bhakti can be followed by all irrespective of caste, creed or race.

*kirāta hūṇāndhrapulinda pulkasā
ābhīrakaṅkā yavanāḥ khaśādayaḥ
ye anye cha pāpāḥ yadupāśrayāśrayāḥ
śudhyanti tasmai prabhaviṣṇave namaḥ*

He also stresses that the Goal of all religious system is the realisation of God and the different mārḡas expounded by those who have realised God is due only to their differences in the exposition of their experience due to the varying degrees of their intellectual perception.

But the only way by which they have attained the knowledge of Brahman is concentration through Bhakti-yoga on the feet of the Lord, by which their mind is purified.

*yadaṅghryanudhyānasamādhidhautayā
dhiyānupaśyanti hi tattvamātmanaḥ
vadanti chaitat kavayo yathārucham
sa me mukundo bhagavān prasīdatām*

Bhagavān Śuka thus expounded the great message of Bhakti as the royal road for all people irrespective of their intellectual attainment, for the realization of God. This Bhakti, the *Bhāgavata* declares, is the be all and end all of life. But this Bhakti according to the *Bhāgavata* must be inspired by tattajñāna (the knowledge of the truth) and by the practice of vairāgya accompanied by the pursuit of Rājayoga.

Śuka remains for all time as the foremost example of a Brahmanishṭha, who realised God through jñāna, Bhakti, Vairāgya and Yoga.

The *Bhāgavata* rightly extols Śuka as a Muni, a sage with the cosmic universal heart, (*sarvabhūtahridaya*).

Therefore it is that both the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhāgavata* state that at the call uttered by Vyāsa the whole of Nature responded to the call, (*putreti tanmayatayā taravo'bhineduḥ*). Even the trees, being united with him, responded to his name. Even the great sage Tayumānavar refers to the cosmic mind of Śuka and to the incident of nature resounding to the call of his father Vyāsa. He reckons Śuka among the immortal yogis. Śuka is undoubtedly the shining star among the illustrious galaxy of saints, who attained the knowledge of Brahman and merged into the universal soul, even during their sojourn on earth.

GAUDAPADA

by

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN,

M.A., PH.D.

1

Gauḍapāda, like most of the classical Indian thinkers, lives in our memories mainly through his work. Tradition regards Gauḍapāda as Śaṅkara's *paramaguru* (preceptor's preceptor). A verse which contains the succession list of the early teachers of Advaita gives the names of those teachers in the following order: Nārāyaṇa, the lotus-born Brahmā, Vasishṭha, Śakti, his son Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, the great Gauḍapāda, Govinda-yogīndra, his disciple Śaṅkarācārya, and then his four pupils Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka and the Vārtikakāra (i.e. Sureśvara).¹

From this list we learn that Gauḍapāda was the preceptor of Govinda who was Śaṅkara's *guru*. The first teacher is Nārāyaṇa, the Lord himself; and the line of succession, which is from father to son upto Śuka, consists more or less of mythical persons. The first teacher of whose historicity we may be sure is Gauḍapāda; and from him onwards we have the rule of *sanyāsins* succeeding to the Advaita pontificate. With him commences, according to tradition, what may be called the *mānava-saṃpradāya* in the present age of *Kali*; he was the first *human* preceptor to receive the wisdom of the One and impart it to his pupils. Anandagiri in his gloss (*tīkā*) on the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā-bhāṣya*, says that the teacher Gauḍapāda in those days spent his time in Badrikāśrama, the holy residence of Nara-Nārāyaṇa, in deep meditation on the

1. *nārāyaṇam padma-bhuvanṁ vaśiṣṭham śaktim cha
tat putra parāśaram cha,
vyāsam śukam gauḍapadam mahāntam
govinda-yogīndram athāśya-śiṣyam,
śrī-śaṅkarācāryam athāśya padmapadam, cha
hastāmalakam cha śiṣyam,
tam troṭakam vārtikakāram anyān asmad-gurūn santatam
ānatoṣmi.*

Lord, and that the Lord, Nārāyaṇa, greatly pleased, revealed to him the Upanishadic wisdom. Bālakṛishṇānanda Sarasvatī (17th Century A.D.) writes in his *Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāshya-vūrtika* that there was in the country of Kurukshetra a river called Hīrarāvatī, on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people (people of Gauḍadeśa, the modern North Bengal); that the pre-eminent of them, Gauḍapāda, was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age; and so, as his proper name is not known to the moderns, he is celebrated by the class-name of the Gauḍas.

Gauḍapāda, after he was blessed with the intuitive wisdom of the Absolute, must have taught those who gathered round him the truth he had discovered and embodied it in a work which came to be called the *Āgamasūtra* or *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*. It is an exposition of a short but important Upanishad called the *Māṇḍūkya*, which is counted as one of the principal Upanishads by all the schools of Vedānta. Besides the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*, other works are also attributed to Gauḍapāda. They are: a *vṛitti* on the *Uttaragītā*, a *bhāshya* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, a commentary on the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupanishad*, a *bhāshya* on *Durgāsaptasatī* and two independent Tāntric treatises, viz., *Subhagodaya* and *Śrīvidyāratnasūtra*. Since nothing definite can be said regarding the authorship of these other works, we shall here attempt a study of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda as it is set forth in the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*.

2

Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, which is more than a verse-commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, contains the quintessence of the teaching of Vedānta.² The work consists of 215 couplets arranged in four chapters. Following the Upanishad, the first chapter, *Āgama-prakarṇa*, analyses the three *avasthās*, waking, dream, and deep sleep, and finds that the Self which is referred to as the Turiya underlies and transcends these changing states. The second chapter, *Vaitathya-prakarṇa*, seeks to establish the illusoriness of the world of plurality, on the analogy of dreams, and through a criticism of creationistic hypotheses. The third chapter, *Advaita-*

2. The commentator on the *Kārikā* says: *vedāntārtha-sāra-saṅgraha-bhūtam*.

prakaraṇa, sets forth the arguments for the truth of non-dualism, gives citations from scripture in support thereof, and discusses the path to the realisation of non-duality, called Asparśa-yoga. The last chapter, Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa, repeats some of the arguments of the earlier chapters, shows the unintelligibility of the concept of causality through dialectic, explains the illusoriness of the phenomenal world, comparing it to the non-real designs produced by a fire-brand (*alāta*) and pressing into service modes of Bauddha reasoning, and establishes the supreme truth of non-duality which is unoriginated, eternal, self-luminous bliss.

3

The central theme of Gauḍapāda's philosophy is that nothing is ever born (*ajāti*), not because 'nothing' is the ultimate truth, as in Śūnya-vāda, but because the Self is the only reality. 'No jīva is born; there is no cause for such birth; this is the supreme truth, nothing whatever is born.'³ From the standpoint of the Absolute there is no duality, there is nothing finite or non-eternal. The Absolute alone is; all else is appearance, illusory and non-real. They are deluded who take the pluralistic universe to be real. Empirical distinctions of knower and object known, mind and matter, are the result of Māyā. One cannot explain how they arise. But on enquiry they will be found to be void of reality. If one sees them, it is like seeing the foot-prints of birds in the sky.⁴ The Self is unborn; there is nothing else to be born. Duality is mere illusion; non-duality is the supreme truth.⁵

4

Gauḍapāda expounds his philosophy of non-origination or non-birth in several ways and through many an argument. The reality of the non-dual self he first establishes through an enquiry into the purport of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*. Though extremely brief, the *Māṇḍūkya* contains the essentials of Vedānta. For the liberation of those who desire release, says the *Muktikopaniṣad*,

3. III, 148; IV, 71.

*na kaścij-jāyate jīvaḥ sambhavo 'sya na vidyate,
etat-tad-uttamaṁ satyaṁ yatra kiñcin-na jāyate.*

4. IV, 28.

5. I, 17, *māyā-mātraṁ idaṁ dvaitaṁ advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ.*

the *Māṇḍūkya* alone is enough.⁶ The *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* begins with the equation 'Om=all=Brahman=self' and proceeds to describe the three states of the self, waking, dream and sleep, as well as the fourth (*Turīya*) which is not a state alongside the others but the transcendent nature of the self—the non-dual peace, the self *per se*. Gauḍapāda makes this declaration of the Upanishad the basis of his metaphysical quest and seeks to show through reasoning that non-origination is the final truth.

Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña are the names by which the self is known in the three states, waking, dream, and sleep. Viśva is conscious of the external world, enjoys what is gross and is satisfied therewith. Taijasa is conscious of what is within,⁷ enjoys what is subtle and finds satisfaction there. Prājña is a consciousness-mass without the distinctions of seer and seen; its enjoyment and satisfaction is bliss. The three, Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña, are not distinct selves. It is one and the same self that appears as three.⁸ To show that all the three aspects are present in waking, Gauḍapāda assigns localities to them. Viśva has its seat in the right eye; Taijasa in the mind; and Prājña in the ether of the heart.⁹ And the three should also be thought of as identical with the three cosmic forms of the self, Virāṭ, Hiraṇyagarbha, and Avyākṛta or Īśvara. It is to indicate this identity that the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* describes the Prājña-self as the lord of all, the knower of all, the controller of all, the source of all, the origin and end of beings.¹⁰ The recognition of Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña in the waking state, and the identification of the three individual forms of the self with the three cosmic forms, are for the purpose of realising non-duality.

The non-dual reality is the *Turīya*. It has no distinguishing name; hence it is called 'the fourth' (*turīya*).¹¹ It is the self-

6. *Muktikā*, I, 26.

7. The distinctions of 'within' and 'without', it must be remembered, are from the standpoint of waking experience; for it is in this state that inquiry is possible.

8. I, i. *eka eva tridhā smṛtaḥ*.

9. I, 2. See commentary.

10. *Māṇḍūkya*, 6.

11. Here again it must be noted that the real is called 'the fourth' from the empirical standpoint; in truth, the category of number is inapplicable to it.

luminous self, changeless, non-dual, one without a second. The states that change and pass, with their words and enjoyments, are illusory, products of *Māyā*. *Māyā* is two-fold in its functioning; it veils the one and projects the many. Non-apprehension of the real (*tattvā-pratibodha*) and the apprehension of it otherwise (*anyathā-grahana*). For the Prājñā in the state of sleep there is non-apprehension alone, and not misapprehension. It knows neither the self in its real nature nor the not-self. The Turīya is free from both the aspects of *Māyā*. It is consciousness *per se*, without even a trace of ignorance. It is unfailing light, omniscient sight.¹² The metaphysical implication of sleep is that it hides the true, and of dream that it projects the untrue. Viśva and Taijasa are associated with dream and sleep; Prājñā is associated with dreamless sleep; for the Turīya there is neither dream nor sleep. Real awakening comes with the realisation of the Turīya, with the transcendence of *Māyā* in its double role of veiling the real and showing up the non-real. When the jīva wakes from the beginningless sleep of illusion, it knows its true nature as unborn, as that in which there is neither sleep nor dream nor duality.¹³

In the *Alātaśānti-prakarana*,¹⁴ Gauḍapāda teaches the same theory of the three *avasthās*, employing Bauddha terminology. Waking, dream, and sleep are there called *laukika*, *śuddha-laukika*, and *lokottara* respectively. The difference between the first two is that while in the former there are external objects (*savastu*), in the latter there is none (*avastu*); but in both there is consciousness of duality (*sopalambha*). In the *lokottara* there is neither the external world of things nor the internal world of ideas, and consequently there is no apprehension of duality; ignorance, however, persists. It is only he who knows these three as non-real states that knows the truth. For him there is no duality, nor ignorance, the seed of duality. When the real is known, there is not the world of duality.¹⁵

12. I, 12. *turīyaḥ sarvadṛk sadā*.

13. I, 13-16.

14. IV, 87, 88.

15. I, 18. *jñāte dvaitam na vidyate*.

5

As a result of the inquiry into the *avasthās* it must be evident that the pluralistic world is illusory, as the self alone is real. That the world which we take to be real in waking is illusory, Gauḍapāda seeks to establish in the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa on the analogy of the dream-world. Judged by the standards of waking, it will be readily seen that the world of dreams is unreal. A person may dream of elephants and chariots; but on waking he realises that all of them must have been illusory because they appeared within him, within the small space of his body.¹⁶ The dream-contents do not form part of the external world which we take to be real in waking; and so they are illusory. Nor do they conform to the laws of space and time which govern the waking world. In a trice of waking time one may travel far and wide in dream. There is no real going to the place of dream, for on waking one does not find oneself there. Nor are the objects experienced in dream real, for when the dream-spell is broken one does not see them.¹⁷ Because chariot, etc., seen in dream are non-existent, they are illusory.¹⁸

The world of waking is in many respects similar to that of dream. The objects of waking are *perceived* as the dream-objects are; and they are evanescent as well, like the contents of dream. What is non-existent in the beginning and at the end, is so even in the present.¹⁹ That is real which is not conditioned by time. *Per contra* that which is conditioned by time cannot be real. Just as the dream-objects are experienced in dream alone neither before nor after, even so the objects of waking are experienced in the state of waking alone. A difference between the two states cannot be made out on the ground that, while the objects experienced in waking are practically efficient, those seen in dream are not; for even the objects of waking experience are fruitful in practice only in that state and not in dream; and the dream-objects are useful in their own way in the state of dream. It is

16. II, i; IV, 33.

17. II, 2.

18. II, 3; see *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, iii, 10.

19. II, 6; IV, 31.

ādāvante ca yan-nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā

true that the dream-water cannot quench actual thirst. But it is equally true that the so-called actual water cannot quench the dream-thirst either.²⁰ It may be argued that the contents of dream are unreal because, unlike the objects of waking, they are strange and abnormal. But when and to whom do they appear abnormal? To him who has returned to waking after a dream. In the dream state itself the contents are not realised to be strange. With perfect equanimity the dreamer may watch even the dismemberment of his own head. We are told that the denizens of heaven have their own peculiarities which to us are all abnormal. Similarly, from the side of waking the dream-contents may seem abnormal; but in themselves they are quite normal.²¹ That there is an essential similarity between the contents of dream and the objects of waking may be shown by a closer scrutiny of the two states. In the state of dream, the dreamer imagines certain ideas within himself and sees certain things outside; and he believes that, while the former are unreal, the latter are real. But as soon as he wakes from the dream, he realises the unreality of even the things which he saw in dream as if outside. Similarly in waking, we have our fancies which we know to be unreal, and we experience facts which we take to be real. But when the delusion of duality is dispelled, the so-called facts of the external world will turn out to be illusory appearance.²² Therefore it is that the wise characterise waking as a dream.²³ Just as the dream-soul arises and perishes, the souls of waking come into being and pass away.²⁴ It is the self that posits the dream-contents as well as the

20. II, 7; IV, 32.

21. II, 8. See J. A. C. Murray, B.D.: *An Introduction to a Christian Psycho-Therapy* (T. & T. Clark), p. 252; Waking consciousness is, after all a limited affair, narrowed by the immediacies of the five senses, and concentrated at every moment on but one moving point. In dreams, we seem to enter a wider kingdom, freed from the fears and restraints of normal life, a field where earthly forces and laws are set at naught, and where the whole immensity of the sub-conscious can have freer speech, and like a rising tide, submerge the petty logics of our daily life.

22. II, 9 & 10, IV, 63-66.

23. II, 5. *svapna-jāgarite sthāne hy ekam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ*. An ancient Chinese sage said: "Last night I dreamt that I was a butterfly and now I do not know whether I am a man dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he is a man."

24. IV, 68.

external world. The things created in the mind within and those posited in the world without—both these are the illusory imaginations of the Ātman. The difference between the two sets of things is that while the dream-contents last only till the mind of the dreamer imagines them (*cittakālāḥ*) and are peculiar thereto, the objects of the external world are perceived by other subjects²⁵ as well (*dvayakālāḥ*), and are cognised through the sense-organs. Illusoriness (*vaitathya*), however, is common to both.²⁶ In dream as well as in waking it is the mind that moves impelled by *Māyā*, and creates the appearance of plurality. As identical with the self the mind is non-dual; but owing to nescience duality is figured and there is the consequent *saṃsāra*.²⁷

Illustrations for illusoriness are to be found even in the state of waking. Just as in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a streak of water, the self is imagined to be the world through nescience. And as when the rope is known as rope the posited snake, etc., vanish, so also when the self is known as non-dual, that pluralistic world disappears.²⁸ Like the Palace city of Fairy Morgana (*gandharva-nagara*), the universe is seen but is not real.²⁹ The things of the world are believed to exist because they are perceived (*upalambhāt*) and because they answer to certain practical needs (*samāchārāt*). But these two reasons cannot make them real; for even the objects like the elephant conjured up by the necromancer are observed and are practically efficient but are not real.³⁰ One more illustration Gauḍapāda gives in the fourth chapter, viz. the *alāta* or fire-brand. When a fire-brand is moved, it appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on; and when the movement stops, the appearances vanish. They do not really come from the fire-brand in motion, nor do they enter into it when it comes to rest. The patterns of fire that appear with the movement of the fire-brand are illusory; they have no substance whatsoever. Similarly, con-

25. Who are also positions of the supreme Self.

26. II, 11-15.

27. III, 29, 30; IV, 61, 62.

28. II, 17, 18.

29. II, 31.

30. IV, 44.

sciousness appears in manifold forms due to *Māyā*. These do not come out of it, in reality, nor do they return to it; for they are naught.³¹ There is no dissolution, no origination; no one in bondage, no one who desires release, no one who is released—this is the supreme truth.³²

6

The establishment of the non-reality of the world by Gauḍapāda does not mean that the great teacher subscribes to the view of ontological unreality (*śūnyavāda*). We have already seen how in the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* he expounds the meaning of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* and shows through an inquiry into the nature of the three *avasthās* that the Self (*turīya*) is the sole reality. That this is so Gauḍapāda argues through reasoning in the *Advaita-prakaraṇa*, and cites in support the evidence of passages from other scriptural texts as well.

The self is unlimited like ether, undivided and the same throughout. The *jīvas* are apparent distinctions therein, as pots, etc., produce in ether divisions as it were. We speak of a plurality of souls and a multiplicity of material objects, even as we speak of pot-ether, pitcher-ether, and so on. The one *Ātman* appears as the many *jīvas*, as the same ether seems divided, enclosed in the different things. When the things are destroyed, the distinctions in ether too vanish; so also when the *jīvas* are realised to be manifestations due to *Māyā*, the self alone remains. There is no contingency of the defects of one *jīva* being occasioned in the other *jīvas* or the defects of the *jīvas* defiling the purity of the self. It must be noted that Gauḍapāda's theory is not *eka-jīva-vāda* but *ekā-'tma-vāda*. Since the empirical plurality of *jīvas* is recognised, there is not the contingency of the defects of one *jīva* being occasioned in the others or the experiences of one being confused with those of the rest. And by the defilements of the *jīvas* the self is not affected, as dust, smoke, etc., present in the pots or pitchers do not make ether foul. Forms, functions, and

31. IV, 47-52.

32. II, 32.

*na nirodho na chotpattir na baddho na ca sādḥakaḥ
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā,*

names differ from object to object; but there is no difference in ether. Similarly, the jīvas vary in their physical make-up, mental and moral endowment, in station and status; but the self is unvarying, formless, functionless, and nameless. Just as children attribute wrongly dirt, etc., to the sky, the ignorant superpose on the unsullied self defects like birth and death, pleasure and pain. But these are changes that are not real and do not touch the self. The birth of the jīvas and their death, their coming and going, do not alter the Ātman. They are not products of the self, nor are they parts thereof. The non-dual reality is partless; it neither causes anything, nor is caused by anything.³³

Scripture in many places proclaims the non-duality of the self and deprecates the delusion of duality. Through an inquiry into the five sheaths (*kośas*) that cover the soul, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*³⁴ exhibits the self as the non-dual bliss, not to be confused with the mutable coverings. In the 'Honey section' of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*³⁵ the principle behind the cosmic elements is identified with the self which is the substrate of the body and its functions. What is without is within as well. The same 'honey' pervades all beings. It is immortal, the self, Brahman, the all. As the spokes are fixed in the nave of a wheel, so are all beings centred in the self. Thus scripture declares the non-difference of the jīva from the self and denounces plurality. Difference is illusory; the one appears as many through Māyā. "There is no plurality here."³⁶ "Indra through *māyās* assumes diverse forms."³⁷ "Though unborn he appears variously born."³⁸ The *Īśāvāsyā*³⁹ denies birth of the self, and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* asks, "Who indeed could produce him?"⁴⁰ Of what is real birth is incomprehensible; and what is unreal cannot even be born.⁴¹

33. III, 3-9.

34. Second vallī.

35. II, v.

36. Brh. Up., IV, iv, 19; Katha Up. IV, 11.

37. Rg Veda, VI, 47, 18; Brh. Up., II, v, 19.

38. Tait. Ār. III, 13, 1.

39. Īśa, 12.

40. III, 9, 28.

41. GK, III, 11-13, 24-26.

It is true that in some contexts scripture speaks of creation. Through the illustrations of clay, metal, sparks, etc., creation of the many from the one is described. But this is only to enable those who are dull-witted and middlings to understand the fundamental unity of reality. Śruti declares creation in some places, and non-creation in others. The two sets of passages cannot have equal validity. That teaching should be taken as the purport of scripture which is ascertained through inquiry (*niśchitam*) and is reasonable (*yukti-yuktam*). If birth is predicated of the real, it must be in the sense of an illusion, and not in the primary sense. The self is unborn, sleepless and dreamless, nameless and formless, self-luminous and all-knowing.⁴²

7

That the self is unborn and that nothing else there is which is born, Gaudapāda seeks to demonstrate through a dialectical criticism of the causal category in the fourth chapter. Causation, like all other relations, falls within the realm of nescience, because on analysis it turns out to be unintelligible. There are two rival views on causation which are totally opposed to each other. The Sāṅkhya theory is that the effect is pre-existent in the cause and is not produced *de novo*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that the effect is non-existent prior to its production. On either of these hypotheses there will not result causation. If the effect is already existent, there is no need for any causal operation; it is meaningless to say that what is existent is born. If the effect is non-existent, it can never be produced; what is non-existent like the barren woman's son is not at any time seen to take birth.⁴³ Even without their knowing the two rival schools, *satkārya-vāda* and *asatkārya-vāda*, are thus seen to support the view of non-creation or non-origination.⁴⁴

Of what is really unborn the disputants predicate birth. But this is a flagrant violation of the law of contradiction. How can that which is unborn and therefore immortal become mortal? The immortal cannot become mortal, nor the mortal immortal; for it

42. III, 14-16, 23, 36.

43. IV: 4. *bhūtam na jāyate kiñchid abhūtam naiva jāyate.*

44. IV, 3-5,

is impossible for a thing to change its nature. If what is by nature immortal were to become mortal, then it would cease to be changeless, and attain artificiality, illusoriness. But this is impossible for what is immortal by nature. The Sāṅkhya thinks that the unborn and beginningless Prakṛiti evolves itself into the manifold evolutes that constitute the universe. But this view cannot be justified by any canon of logic. If Prakṛiti becomes the world, it cannot be unborn (*aja*) and eternal (*nitya*). Even to admit that there is a first cause is to confess the failure of causation as a principle of explanation. To add to the confusion the Sāṅkhya says that the effect is non-different from the cause. Now, is the effect born or unborn? If it is born, it cannot be non-different from the cause which is unborn. If it is unborn, then it cannot be called 'effect', as the effect is that which is *produced*. And if the effect is produced and is non-different from the cause, the cause cannot be permanent or unchanging. There is no illustration that could be instanced to prove the production of the effect from the unborn cause. If to avoid this difficulty it be said that the cause too is born, then there should be a cause for that cause, a still further cause for that other cause, and so on *ad infinitum*.⁴⁵

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the cause and the effect are reciprocally dependent. Merit and demerit are responsible for producing the body; and the body occasions merit and demerit. The chain of causes and effects is without beginning, each alternating with the other, like the seed and the sprout. Here again we meet with insuperable difficulties. If the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, then both cause and effect are begun. How can they be beginningless? Moreover, there is a paradox in the very thesis that is proposed. To say that the antecedent of the cause is its effect is like saying that the son begets his father.⁴⁶ There must be some definite sequence recognised as between cause and effect. It is no use believing that the two are reciprocally dependent. If the cause and the effect can be indifferently antecedent or consequent, there would be no distinction whatever between them, and to call one a cause and the other an effect would be entirely arbitrary and

45. IV, 6-8, 11-13.

46. IV, 15, *putrāṅ janma pitur yathā*.

void of meaning. Now, there are three possible ways of stating the sequence. It may be said that first there is the cause and subsequently the effect takes place (*pūrva-krama*); or it may be held that the effect is followed by the cause (*apara-krama*); or it may be thought that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (*saha-krama*). None of these alternatives is intelligible. That the cause cannot produce the effect we have shown already. If the cause is unborn, it cannot change and therefore cannot produce; if it is born there is infinite regress. The reverse order too is impossible; for, as we said, it is just like making the son antecedent to the father. The effect by definition is that which is produced by the cause; and if the cause is not there before the effect, how can the effect be produced? And from the unproduced effect how can the cause come into being? The third alternative also is untenable. If what are simultaneous be causally related, there must be such a relation between the two horns of an animal. But as a matter of experience it is well known that the two horns are not so related. This, then, is the crux of the problem. Without settling the sequence, the distinction of cause and effect would be unintelligible. And it is impossible to settle the sequence. In despair, appeal might be made to the illustration of seed and sprout. But a little thought would reveal that these—seed and sprout—cannot serve as illustration. It is only when the causal sequence has been settled that the relation between seed and sprout would become intelligible. Since the latter is a particular falling under the wider relation of cause and effect, it cannot be used as an illustration. It is, in short, *sādhya-sama*, still to be proved.⁴⁷

A thing is not produced either from itself or from another. A pot is not produced from the self-same pot, nor from another pot. It may be urged that pot is produced from clay. But how is pot related to clay. Is it non-different, different, or both different and non-different from it? If pot is non-different from clay, it cannot be produced, since clay is already existent. If it is different, there is no reason why it should not be produced from another pot or a piece of cloth which are also different. And it cannot be both different and non-different, because of contradiction. Similarly,

47. IV, 14-18, 20.

neither the existent nor the non-existent nor what is existent and non-existent can be produced. It is meaningless to say that what exists is produced. The non-existent cannot be produced even because of its non-existence. The third alternative involves us in contradiction.⁴⁸

It is true that empirical distinctions are observed between knower and known, pain and the source of pain, etc. From the standpoint of reasoning based on relative experience (*yukti-darśanāt*), there is difference as also causal relation governing the differents. But from the standpoint of the Absolute (*bhūta-darśanāt*) there is no difference and the concept of cause is unintelligible.⁴⁹

Gauḍapāda admits creation in the sphere of the empirical. But creation, according to him, is neither *de novo* nor transformation of an original stuff. It is of the nature of *Māyā*, illusory manifestation or transfiguration. The world is not related to the self either as a piece of cloth to the threads or as curds to milk. In fact, no relation is intelligible. The one reality somehow appears as the pluralistic universe through its own *Māyā* (*ātma-māyā*). The complexes that constitute the world are projections, like the dream-contents, effected by the illusion of the Ātman.⁵⁰ Things are said to be born only from the standpoint of empirical truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*); they have therefore no permanence. Just as an illusive sprout shoots from an illusive seed, all things arise from *Māyā*.⁵¹

There are several theories of creation. Some philosophers favour materialistic origins for the world. For example, there are thinkers who attribute the origination of the universe to Time. Theists, however, regard God as the first cause of things. Some of them ascribe to Him efficient causality alone, others both efficient and material causality. The former say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord, while the latter hold that it is His ex-

48. IV, 22.

49. IV, 24, 25.

50. III, 10. *saṅghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātma-māyā-visarjitāḥ*.

51. IV, 57-59

pansion. Some maintain that God creates for the sake of His enjoyment. Others urge that creation is His sport. But how can desire be in God who is *āpta-kāma* and has no end to achieve? In our ignorance we must content ourselves with saying that creation is His nature or *māyā*. Like dream and magic it is illusory.⁵² The non-dual is imagined to be the manifold world. The latter is neither different from the self nor identical therewith. Hence it is declared to be indeterminable.⁵³

The philosophers of the different schools characterise the real in different ways and give their own schemes of categories. Each emphasises one particular aspect of reality and holds on to it as if it were the whole. The self has been variously conceived as life, elements, constituents of Primal Nature, things, worlds, Vedas, sacrifice, what is subtle, what is gross, what has form, what has no form, and so on. According to the Sāṅkhyas, there are twenty-five tattvas or principles. To these, the followers of the Yoga system add one more, viz., God. In the view of the Pāsupatas there are twenty-one categories. There are others who make the categories endless in number. All these theories are but the imaginations of their respective advocates.⁵⁴ There is only one self which appears as many through self-delusion as it were.⁵⁵ First the jīvas are imagined and then the various things, external and internal. The world of souls and things is an appearance superposed on the self, as the snake-form is imposed on the rope-substance in the dark.⁵⁶

The teaching of creation has no final purport. As has been shown already, what is real cannot be really born. If it is said to be born, it must be in the sense of an illusory appearance.⁵⁷ Ordinarily it is stated that *saṁsāra* which has no beginning comes to an end when release is attained. But this is figurative language. If *saṁsāra* had no beginning, it could not have an end. If

52. I, 7-9.

53. II, 33, 34.

54. II, 20-29. For details see *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, pp. 30-37.

55. II, 19. *māyaishā tasya devasya yayāyam mohitaḥ svayam.*

56. II, 16, 17.

57. III, 27. *sato hi māyayā janma yujyate na tu tattvataḥ.*

release is attained, it is liable to be lost again.⁵⁸ If the universe really existed, it would be destroyed. As we have observed, duality is *māyā-mātra*, mere illusion. Removal of *saṁsāra* and attainment of *moksha* are figurative. These have to be taught in language which needs must relate to duality. When the real is known, there is no duality whatever.⁵⁹

9

True to its character as an *upadeśa-śāstra*, the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* contains practical teaching at the end of each chapter. The purpose of a *śāstra* is to enable the aspirant to cross the sea of *saṁsāra* and reach the shore of blessedness which is the highest human goal (*parama-purushārtha*). The vicious circle of empirical life dependent on the law of cause and effect is evil (*anartha*). This, however, as has been shown above, is a product of *avidyā* or *Māyā*. As long as there is an obstinate faith in causality which is illusory (*āvidyaka*), the chain of birth and death will not cease. When that false belief is destroyed through knowledge, *saṁsāra* is removed.⁶⁰ The cause of birth and death is ignorance as regards the ultimate truth which is causeless. When this is realised, there is no further cause for metempsychosis, and we attain release which is freedom from sorrow, desire, and fear. Attachment to the non-real is responsible for the illusory wanderings in the wilderness of *saṁsāra*. When one becomes non-attached through knowledge, one turns back from the false pursuit of the non-real, and reaches the non-dual reality which is homogeneous and unborn.⁶¹

The real bliss is veiled and the non-real sorrow is projected on account of the perfection of illusory plurality. Enshrouded by the darkness of ignorance, those of immature knowledge (*bālīśaḥ*) dispute about what they consider to be the nature of reality. Some say, it is; some, it is not; others, it is and is not; yet others, it neither is nor is not.⁶² All these are *kripanas*, narrow-minded,

58. IV, 30.

59. I, 18.

60. IV, 56.

61. IV, 78-80.

62. IV, 82-84.

who see fear in the fearless,⁶³ and follow the way of difference, getting themselves engrossed therein. Opposed to these are the great knowers (*mahājñānāḥ*) who are settled in their wisdom about the unborn, unchanging reality.⁶⁴

The knowledge which saves is not that which remains a mere theoretical comprehension, but that which has become a direct experience. Study of scripture, ethical discipline, detachment from objects of sense and intense longing for release—these are essential for realising the self. The aspirant should learn the purport of the Veda and acquire freedom from passions like attachment, fear, and anger (*vīta-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ*); and he should fix his thoughts on the non-dual reality.⁶⁵ Gauḍapāda teaches two methods of concentrating the mind on the non-dual, Praṇava-yoga in the first chapter and Asparśa-yoga in the third. These are to serve as auxiliaries to the knowledge of the Absolute, methods to loosen the cords of ignorance.

Asparśa-yoga is the yoga of transcendence, whereby one realises the supra-relational reality. *Saṅkalpa* is the root of activity and bondage. The mind contemplates objects and gets distracted and shattered with the result that there is no peace or happiness. Acceptance and desistance are motivated by the centrifugal tendency of thought-process. The out-going mind should be called back and controlled. Controlling the mind is difficult, indeed, as difficult as emptying the ocean drop by drop by the tip of *kuśa* grass. But it is not an impossible task; only it requires relentless effort. If the mind is restrained through discrimination, the end will certainly be reached. One must remember first that all is misery and turn back from desires and enjoyments. The mind that moves out must be brought to unity. But in this process care must be taken that it does not fall into sleep. When the mind goes to sleep, it must be awakened; when it tries to go out, it must be calmed. When the stormy mind is stilled, there is the thrill of quietude. But one should not revel even in this *yogic* trance. Anything that is *enjoyed* must belong to duality; it can-

63. III, 39, *abhaye bhaya-darśinaḥ*.

64. IV, 94, 95.

65. II, 35, 36.

not be unlimited or lasting happiness. The mind must become non-mind (*amanābhāva*); the relations of subject and object, enjoyer and enjoyment must be transcended. This will come only through the knowledge of the non-dual self. Knowledge and the self are not different. Knowledge is the self or Brahman. Hence it is said that through the unborn (knowledge) the unborn (Brahman) is known.⁶⁶ Self-established, the unborn knowledge attains its natural equanimity or sameness. This is called *asparśa-yoga*, the yoga which is pleasing and good to all beings, and which is beyond dispute and contradiction.⁶⁷

The same end may be reached through meditation on OM (*praṇavayoga*). 'Om' is the term indicative of the Brahman-self. It consists of three *mātras*, *a*, *u*, *m*, and a soundless fourth which is *amātra*. *A* stands for Viśva, *u* for Taijasa, and *m* for Prājña. Meditation on the significance of the three sounds respectively will lead to the realisation of the three aspects of the self. The sound 'om' proceeds from and is resolved in the soundless *amātra*. Similarly, the Turiya is the absolute which is unchanging and non-dual, but which appears as many and changing. When the meaning of the soundless culmination of Om is realised, there is leading to or attainment of anything; for the Turiya is no other than real and only self. Thus the Praṇava is to be meditated upon and known. It is the beginning, middle and end of all things. It is the lord established in the heart of all beings. There is nothing before it nor anything after it, nothing outside it nor anything other than it. Understanding the Praṇava in this manner, one attains the supreme.⁶⁸

Mokṣha or release is not a *post-mortem* statē; it can be realised even here (*iha*), while in embodiment.⁶⁹ To speak of it as an attainment or realisation is but figurative. It is the eternal and inalienable nature of the self. He who knows this is released, he is a *jīvan-mukta*. Because he has attained full omniscience and is free from the delusion of duality, there is nothing

66. III, 33. *ajenā-'jaṃ vibhudhyate*.

67. III, 31-46, IV, 2.

68. I, 19-29.

69. IV, 89.

for him which he can desire.⁷⁰ He is not elated by praise nor depressed by blame. He does not offer obeisance to any, nor does he perform any rite. He has no fixed home, and subsists on what comes his way. He lies like a non-conscious being, and lives as he likes.⁷¹ Though he has no obligations, his conduct can never be immoral. Virtues like humility, equanimity, calmness, and self-control are natural to him.⁷² His is the immortal state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn, ever the same, and fearless.⁷³ He sees the truth everywhere. He delights in the truth and does not swerve from it. He is the truth.⁷⁴

10

From the account of Gauḍapāda's philosophy given above it will be clear that this great teacher was an Advaitin, the earliest known to us—who in his *Kārikā* laid the foundations of a philosophy which was to become a glorious edifice through the immortal work of Śaṅkara. While making use of logical reasoning and the dialectical method, he does not deviate from the teaching of the Upaniṣhads. Even where he employs Bauddha terminology, he takes care to point out that his system should not be confused with Buddhism. While denying absolute reality to the world, he is firm in proclaiming that the non-dual Brahman-self is the supreme truth. He has no quarrel with any system of philosophy because, in his view, all systems if properly understood are pointers to non-duality. While the dualists oppose one another, the doctrine of non-duality does not conflict with them.⁷⁵ *Ajāti* or the unborn reality is the final goal of all metaphysical quest.

70. IV, 85.

71. II, 36, 37.

72. IV, 86.

73. IV, 100.

74. II, 38.

75. III, 17.

GOVINDA BHAGAVATPADA

by

W. A. DEVASENAPATI,

M.A., PH.D.

To be known to all posterity as the preceptor of a world teacher — Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya — is indeed a rare honour. It evokes our sense of wonder. When we remember that Īśvara Himself was born as Śrī Śaṅkara for the spiritual rejuvenation of Hinduism, our wonder knows no bounds. But it may be asked whether a world teacher—especially if He is none other than the Supreme Lord Himself — needs a teacher. The answer is that the world will learn more readily by example rather than precept. The need for a teacher, especially in spiritual matters, is generally recognised. It is he who dispels the darkness of ignorance and frees us from all sorrow. He quickens our understanding and makes us see either what we had not seen before or what we had seen all too dimly. He makes the effulgence of wisdom which is latent in us shine forth in all its splendour. To make us realise this need for *guru*, He who is the preceptor of all preceptors set an example by Himself sitting at the feet of a *guru*. He wants us to realise that one who has not learned to obey is not fit to command and that one who has not himself sat at the feet of a worthy teacher, cannot become a teacher himself.

The preceptor who enjoys this honour of being the preceptor of Śrī Śaṅkara is Śrī Govinda Bhagavatpāda. In his *pūrvāśrama*, he was Chandra Śarmā, a handsome Brahmin of Kashmir. Yearning to hear Patañjali's exposition of the *vyākaraṇa* at Chidambaram, he was coming to the South. On the bank of the River Narmadā, he saw Gauḍapāda who under a curse from Patañjali for leaving the place of instruction without permission had become a Brahmarakṣas. Patañjali had decreed that the curse would be lifted when Gauḍapāda found a disciple fit enough to learn the

vyākaraṇa. It so happened that till the arrival of Chandra Śarmā, every scholar who came that way went wrong in giving the ending of a tricky word and was eaten up by the Brahmarakṣas. Chandra Śarmā proved an exception. He gave the correct ending. The time for the lifting of the curse had come. Gauḍapāda asked Chandra Śarmā where he was going. On being told that he was going to Chidambaram to learn at the feet of Patañjali, Gauḍapāda said that the exposition at Chidambaram was over and that he would himself teach the young man. But the condition was that without getting down from the tree on which the Brahmarakṣas sat, and without sleeping, the disciple should learn what he was taught as quickly as possible. Having no access to writing materials, Chandra Śarmā made a deep scratch in his thigh and with the blood that oozed out wrote on the leaves of the tree all that he was taught. The instruction continued night and day without a stop for nine days. The disciple thus had to go without food and sleep for nine days. On the completion of his instruction, he gathered up the leaves and tying them up into a bundle, took leave of his teacher.

According to the *Patañjali-vijaya*, a work by Rāmabhadra Dikshita written about 200 years ago, Chandra Śarmā is none other than Patañjali himself. Feeling that Gauḍapāda was not likely to secure a suitable disciple and thus might have to languish under his curse, Patañjali took pity on him and was himself born as Chandra Śarmā. This was but one more of the many roles that Patañjali played. Patañjali is none other than Ādiśeṣha. Among the roles he played, those of Lakshmaṇa and Balarāma may be remembered.

To continue the narrative, Chandra Śarmā walked some distance with his precious bundle. Overpowered by sleep and hunger, he slept for a while. On waking, he found that a sheep had eaten away part of the leaves in his bundle. He took the bundle with the remaining leaves and on reaching Ujjain, he lapsed into a state of unconsciousness on the pail of a Vaiśya. The daughter of the Vaiśya who was struck by the radiant face of Chandra Śarmā found him in this state of unconsciousness on account of complete starvation and exhaustion. She fed him by applying on his body ~~and rice~~. The nourishment entered his body through the pores

of the skin and Chandra Śarmā woke up. He wanted to resume his journey. But the Vaiśya wanted him to marry his daughter who had saved his life. On finding him disinclined for marriage, the Vaiśya took Chandra Śarmā to the king. The king who was favourably impressed by the striking appearance of Chandra Śarmā wanted him to marry his own daughter. He sent for his minister to consult him in order to see whether there was sanction in the Dharma Śāstra for such a marriage. It so happened that the minister himself had a daughter; and so he was keen on giving her in marriage to this stranger. Thus, Chandra Śarmā had to marry all the three girls. He stayed with them till each of them had a son by him. Then he continued his journey to find his teacher — Gauḍapāda, from whom he had learnt the *vyākaraṇa*. Gauḍapāda had become a sannyāsin and was in Badarikāśrama. Chandra Śarmā also became a sannyāsin, receiving dīkshā from his preceptor and henceforth came to be known as Govinda Bhagavatpāda.

While Govinda Bhagavatpāda was with his teacher at Badarikāśrama, sage Vyāsa, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* visited them. He asked Govinda Bhagavatpāda to go to the bank of the River Narmadā and await the arrival of Śrī Śaṅkara who was the incarnation of Lord Śiva. The purpose of this incarnation was to write a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Prior to that, Śrī Śaṅkara was to be accepted formally as a disciple by Govinda Bhagavatpāda. Govinda Bhagavatpāda came to the bank of the River Narmadā. It is significant that Gauḍapāda was his teacher both before and after he became a sannyāsin. It is significant again that to play the role of the teacher he was at the foot of the same tree on which he had sat earlier to receive instruction from Gauḍapāda.

Śrī Śaṅkara came to the bank of the River Narmadā and offered his salutations at the lotus-feet of Govinda Bhagavatpāda. Govinda accepted Śaṅkara as his disciple and initiated him in all the *mahāvākyas*. Śaṅkara lived with his guru for sometime and learnt the spiritual truth and disciplines under him. After mastering all that had to be learnt from the *guru*, Śrī Śaṅkara took leave of his master to go to Benaras, where he wrote an authoritative commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and preached the Advaita doctrine.

The *Patañjalīcharita* which narrates briefly some facts of the life of Śaṅkara says in the last verse—

*govindadeśikamupāsya chirāya bhaktyā
tasmin sthite nijamahimni videhamuktyā
advaitabhāshyamupakalpya dīśo vijitya
kāñcīpure sthitim avāpa sa śaṅkarāryaḥ.*

The writer wishes to place on record his deep sense of gratitude to His Holiness the present Śaṅkarāchārya of Kāñchi for the material of this biography. (Vide His Holiness' Madras lectures, 1932).

SANKARA BHAGAVATPADA

by

N. RAMESAN

M.A., I.A.S.

Ādi Śaṅkara, otherwise known as Bhagavatpāda, had a remarkable career within a short span of lifetime of thirty-two years. He was not merely an intellectual philosopher of the highest calibre, but also an ardent devotee and a mystic poet singing in ecstasy of the bliss and beauty of the Divine Mother. The austere and serene philosophy of the Upanishads was combined by him with a mystic ardour and fervour to produce a balanced system which would satisfy the deepest religious instincts of the people and which to this day stands unrivalled in its brilliance and mystic appeal.

Śaṅkara was, in addition, a practical reformer. He re-established the Śaṅmatas or the worship of the six ancient Gods, viz., the Śaiva, the Śākta, the Gāṇapatya, the Vaiṣṇava, the Saura and the Kaumāra, and restored the influence of Hinduism among the people, with a belief in itself and in its capacity to satisfy the religious needs of its adherents. Just before Śaṅkara appeared on the scene there was a medley of confused religious thinking in the country. On the one hand were the groups of karma-mīmāṃsakas who concentrated on the precise and meticulous performance of the Vedic rites and rituals, independent of meditation and the soul's worship of God. On the other were the nihilism of the Buddhists and the indeterminism of the Jains. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Miśra denounced the value of 'jñāna-mārga' and were exaggerating the importance of the strict observance of the outward forms of Vedic rites. The times were therefore ripe for an incarnation to appear on the scene and to re-establish the eternal truths of the Upanishads on a foundation of logical reasoning that could stand the severest tests of dialectical experts.

To this difficult task Śaṅkara applied himself and by his remarkable commentaries on the *Prasthānatraya* he has produced

a system of philosophy based upon the strictest logical reasoning, that, to this day, stands unparalleled for the brilliance of its logic and the greatness of its universal conception. There have been few souls in the history of thinking in the world that have produced such a remarkable combination of qualities. As Dr Radhakrishnan says:

“It is impossible to read Śaṅkara’s writings, packed as they are, with serious and subtle thinking, without being conscious that one is in contact with a mind of very fine penetration and profound spirituality—The rays of his genius have illumined the dark places of thought, and soothed the sorrows of the most forlorn heart. And whether we agree or differ, the penetrating light of his mind never leaves us where we were”.

As is common with the lives of our great men in the past, Śaṅkara was more concerned with his teachings than with himself, and as such it is an extremely difficult task to weave into an acceptable pattern the events of his life. Śaṅkara himself was a great writer, and has left us a remarkable collection of his writings, including his classic commentaries on the Brahma-sūtra, the Gītā, and the Upanishads, and such general works as the ‘Vivekachūḍāmaṇi’, the ‘Upadeśasāhasrī’, etc., which all reflect his general tenets. Unfortunately these do not contain even stray references to the biographical details of his life. However, a number of biographies by his disciples called ‘Śaṅkara-Vijayas’ are available, the oldest and most trustworthy being Ānandagiri’s *Śaṅkara-vijaya*. Other works like the *Śivarahasya*, the *Patañjalivijaya*, *Śaṅkarābhyudaya*, etc., also give us some broad events of his life.

As is the case with all of our historical personages it is difficult to determine with any finality or accuracy the date of Śaṅkara. The following evidences are generally alluded to:—

(a) The Cambodian inscription mentions one Śivasoma who styled himself as a pupil of Bhagavān Śaṅkara. This Śivasoma was the Guru of Indravarmā who is said to have lived from 878 to 887 A.D. It is therefore assumed that Śaṅkara must have lived a short while before Indravarmā and hence this Cambodian inscription is said to support the theory first propounded by Teile and Phatak that Śaṅkara was born in 788 A.D. and died in 822 A.D.

(b) The 75th verse on Saundarya-laharī of Śaṅkara contains a reference to 'Draviḍaśiśu' which is said to be a reference to Tirujñāna Sambandar who is known to have lived in the 7th century A.D.

(c) Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is generally assigned to a date earlier than 700 A.D., and hence Śaṅkara is supposed to have lived sometime after him.

(d) Śaṅkara refutes the doctrines of Asaṅga, Nāgārjuna, Diṇṇāga and Aśvaghosha who are known to have lived not earlier than the 3rd century A.D.

(e) Śaṅkara came later than Bhartṛhari who is generally assigned to 600 A.D. on the authority of I-tsing.

(f) There is the chronogram 'Nidhi Nāgebha Vanhi' which reversed, gives 3889 of Kali or 778 A.D. as Śaṅkara's birth date. Similarly the other chronogram 'Chandra Netranka Vanhi' gives his date of Siddhi as 820 A.D.

The above are generally given as evidence in support of the theory of the western scholars that Śaṅkara was born in 778 A.D., and died in 820 A.D. However, the evidence is far from being absolutely correct. The difficulty of identifying Bhagvan Śaṅkara of the Cambodian inscription, with Ādi Śaṅkara is there. Draviḍa Śiśu is said to refer to Śaṅkara himself in Lakshmīdhara's authoritative commentary. The date of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is not also free from doubt, as is also the date of Bhartṛhari. Though Śaṅkara refutes the Vijñānavāda, he does not refer to Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and others by name. Hence it is possible that he may be refuting the earlier exponents of the same doctrine. The chronogram is also not free from doubt since the verse which contains it gives the date of Śaṅkara's birth, as Cyclic year Vibhave, Vaiśāka Māsa, and Daśami tithi. This goes against the accepted tradition of his being born in Nandana year in Pañcami tithi. Moreover this chronogram may not refer to Ādi Śaṅkara but perhaps to Abhinava Śaṅkara who was a renowned Jagadguru of the Kāñchī Kāmakoti Pīṭham of the 8th century A.D.

Internal evidence about Śaṅkara's date is practically nil. There is a reference in the 18th sūtra, 2nd adhyāya of the 1st pāda to the cities of Srughna and Pāṭaliputra. But Pāṭaliputra was

destroyed only in 756 A.D., and hence this does not help us to determine when Śaṅkara was born except that it must have been before 756 A.D. Similarly in the same Bhāṣhya of the *Brahma-sūtra*, there is a reference to a king called Pūrṇavarman. However, confirmation of Pūrṇavarman's date is also not forthcoming.

There are the Guruparamparās kept in the Dvārakā, Purī, Śṛīṅgeri and Kāñchī Maṭhas. Out of these, the generally accepted date is about 500 B.C. whereas the ancient tradition of the Śṛīṅgeri Maṭha takes it to 44 B.C.

It is difficult to determine with finality the date of Śaṅkara in view of the above conflicting evidence, though several attempts have been made by several scholars in the past.

Although the biographical works on Śaṅkara do not agree completely in all their details, still it is possible to ascertain the main events of Śaṅkara's life. He was born in Kālaḍi in Malabar to Śiva Guru and Āryāmbā. At an early age he lost his father. He was a precocious child who could pick up easily anything that came to his notice. One day while having his bath in the river, a crocodile caught his feet and he was saved from an untimely death by adopting the Sannyāsa order and thereby attaining as it were a new life. He travelled all over the country and found his master in Śrī Govinda Bhagavatpāda on the banks of the river Narmadā. After being initiated by him and mastering all that he had to learn from him, Śaṅkara went to Benaras or Kāśī and lived for some years there. It was during this period that his great works came to be written. Śaṅkara then set out on a mission of conquest and met Kumārila Bhaṭṭa at Allahabad. Kumārila directed him to Maṇḍanamīśra living in the town of Māhishmatī. After conquering him in debate, Śaṅkara moved southwards and reached Śrīśailam. From there he went to Gokarṇa, Harihar, Mukāmbi, etc., and reached Śṛīṅgeri. He was so charmed by the natural beauty of the scenery of Śṛīṅgeri that he is said to have lived there for 12 years. At about this time he learnt that his mother Āryāmbā was on her death bed and went to Kālaḍi to attend to her funeral rites. He then set out on a second *digvijaya* and touched Rameśvaram, Chidambaram and Tirupati, and then started on a journey to Kailāsa. *En route* he also visited Nasik, Somanath, Dvaraka, Ujjain, Mathura and Kashmir. Finally, he reached Badrinath and Kailāsa. It was here that he obtained from

the Lord the famous five sphaṭikalingas. From there he went to Kāñchī after touching other Kshetras. At Kāñchī he ascended the Sarvajña Pīṭham and ultimately attained his Siddhi also there. He established for the continuance and the correct interpretation of the Advaita doctrine propagated by him many Maṭhas and monastries all over the country, the most important of them being Śringeri, Dvārakā, Badri, Purī, and Kāñchī.

During his *digvijaya* Śaṅkara's main purpose was to propagate the tenets of Advaita. He expounded his views by the well-known method of debate, in order to win round persons of the opposing view. Śaṅkara derived his tenets from a strict interpretation of the truths contained in the Vedas and Upanishads. The truths of his doctrine are as simple as they are profound. According to Advaita Reality is one, viz., Brahman. This is immutable, inscrutable and without qualities. This by its own power of Māyā appears to exhibit itself as the various phenomena of the seen world, though ultimately the entire corpus of universal existence is nothing but the original substratum. This principle of Māyā is also inscrutable. Śaṅkara does not deny the validity of the known world as is generally thought. He accepts it but denies any original and separate existence for it, apart from and independent of Brahman. He propagated levels of truth, viz., the Vyāvahārika Satya, the Prātibhāsika Satya and the Pāramārthika Satya. Thus, the relative existence of the known world is not a total non-existence, like the son of a barren woman. Some measure of reality is given even to the phantom world of apparitions and dreams called Prātibhāsika Satya. The reality, being the plenary unconditional experience beyond the concepts and the categories of the mind, it is only Śruti that can testify to its truth. All the same a rational explanation of the contradictions that we see in the relative world becomes necessary and this reconciliation of the two seemingly irreconcilable principles is done in terms of the doctrine of Māyā and Adhyāsa. Adhyāsa means superimposition, as for example the superimposition of the serpent on the reality of the rope. The problem of error has been very thoroughly discussed by Śaṅkara, who concludes that the existence of error, though from the standpoint of ultimate reality, has to be denied, still has its own practical purposes. Thus Māyā is 'tuchchha' or negligible from the standpoint of Brahman, and the question of its existence or non-existence at that level does

not arise. But from the standpoint of common experience Māyā is 'Satya' or real and of the world. The three ideas of truth, illusion and absolute non-existence, or in other words, 'Satya', 'Mithyā', and 'Atyantāsat', are expounded with the illustrations of the 'Supreme one', the serpent in the rope, and the son of a barren woman etc. The 'Atyantāsat' is never associated with the word 'is' or 'asti'. *Sat* is never associated with the word 'is not' or '*nāsti*'. It is the second alone—Mithyā, which is associated with both *asti* and *nāsti*, as for example the serpent in the rope is at one time associated with the word '*nāsti*', from the point of view of ultimate reality, and at another time with the word '*asti*' from the point of view of limited reality. The mundane world belongs to this category. Thus Śaṅkara's definition of the world is not that of an illusionist as has been misrepresented by some, who denies reality to that which is seen and felt by us, in our daily activities. Śaṅkara has never said so. On the other hand, he reconciles our various experiences by the device of the various levels of truth.

Śaṅkara was not a mere dreamer but a practical missionary and an organiser of no mean ability. Within the short span of thirtytwo years he travelled all over India, destroyed the unholy accretions and the other cults and established the *Shanmatas* on a proper footing. He was responsible for establishing the order of Sannyāsa and the institution of the Maṭhas which to this day have survived the onslaughts of time and change. As Dr Radhakrishnan so nicely puts it: "Even those who do not agree with his general attitude of life, will not be reluctant to give him a place among the immortals".

PADMAPADA

by

N. RAMAKRISHNA SASTRI

Asthana Vidvan, Śrī Kāñchī Kamakoṭi Maṭha

Padmapāda was one of the favourite disciples of Śrī Śaṅkara, the others being Hastāmalaka, Toṭaka and Sureśvara. Towards the close of his career, Śrī Śaṅkara conceived the idea of perpetuating the doctrine of Advaita by establishing various Maṭhas in different corners of India for the propagation of Advaita. According to the *Śaṅkara-vijaya* of Ānandagiri, the manuscripts of which are available in the Madras and the Mysore Government Oriental Manuscripts libraries, Śrī Śaṅkara appointed Padmapāda as the first Āchārya at the Śringeri Maṭha. Under instructions from his preceptor Śrī Śaṅkara, Padmapāda wrote a commentary on the bhāshya of Śrī Śaṅkara on the first four aphorisms of the *Brahma-sūtra*; and that commentary is known as *Pañchapādikā*. Being the earliest commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāshya*, the *Pañchapādikā* deserves a careful study by every student of Advaita philosophy. It was commented on by Prakāśātman in his *Pañchapādikā-vivaraṇa*. The *Pañchapādikā-vivaraṇa* was further commented on by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana*. Ānandapūrṇa, who wrote his *Vidyāsāgarī* commentary on Śrī Harsha's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* wrote a commentary on the *Pañchapādikā*. Nṛsiṃhāśrama wrote a commentary on the *Pañchapādikā-vivaraṇa* called the *Pañchapādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā*. Dasgupta mentions one more commentary on the *Pañchapādika-vivaraṇa* by one Śrī Kṛishṇa. Vidyāraṇya wrote a separate monograph called *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* in which the Vedānta doctrines are clearly set forth on the lines of the *Pañchapādikā-vivaraṇa*. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, a pupil of Govindānanda, the author of the *Ratna-prabhā* commentary on the Śaṅkara bhāshya on the *Brahma-sūtra* wrote his *Vivaraṇa-upanyāsa*, a summary of the main theses of

the *Vivaraṇa*. Dasgupta says that this work was probably the last important work on the *Vivaraṇa* line.

The first four sūtras on the *bhāṣhya* of which Padmapāda has commented set forth the quintessence of Advaita Vedānta. Each system of philosophy has to deal with three topics, those relating to God, Soul and the World. While the pluralistic and theistic schools regard these three as distinct realities, the Advaita teaches that the basic Reality, Brahman is one and non-dual. The truth of non-duality is the import of the Upanishads. And Brahman, owing to its association with avidyā, appears as God, Soul and the World. Padmapāda says that māyā, avyākṛita, prakṛiti, agrahaṇa, avyakta, tamaḥ, kāraṇa, laya, śakti, mahāśakti, nidrā, kshara and ākāśa are the terms which are used in older literature as synonymous with avidyā. Avidyā, like knowledge, requires a substratum as well as a content. On this issue Padmapāda's view as interpreted by Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* is that Brahman is both the locus and content of avidyā as against the view of Vācaspati Miśra that avidyā has Brahman as its object and jīva as its support. This is one of the fundamental points of difference between the *Vivaraṇa* line of interpretation and the interpretation of the Vācaspati line. In this Prakāśātman agrees with the view of Sureśvara and his (Sureśvara's) disciple Sarvajñātman. Brahman associated with avidyā is viewed as the source of the universe. On the subject of causality of Brahman, Padmapāda says that that on which the world-appearance is manifested, that, the Brahman is the cause of the world. On this point three alternative views are offered by Prakāśātman; and they are: (i) Just as two strands conjoined together make a rope, Brahman and māyā are the material cause of the world, in a relation of equal primacy. The elements of reality and manifestation are caused by Brahman; and the elements of inertness and change are produced by māyā. (ii) The potency of māyā alone may be characterised as the material cause. But, since potency always depends on the potent, it would have to be said presumptively that even Brahman that possesses the potency is the material cause. (iii) Since Brahman is the substrate of māyā, though material causality may belong directly to māyā alone, for Brahman too material causality cannot be avoided. Of these three views, the first maintains that material causality in the principal sense belongs to Brahman qualified by māyā; and the other two hold that it belongs to māyā

alone. But on all the three views, Brahman is only figuratively the material cause.¹ As regards the nature of the universe, Padmapāda holds that it is indeterminable in the sense of not being either real like Brahman or unreal like an absolute nothing. In other words, he defines mithyātvam or indeterminability as 'Sad-asad-vilakṣhaṇatvam'.

As regards the nature of the individual soul and the Supreme Lord, three theories are set forth by the Advaitic writers; and they are: pratibimba-vāda, avaccheda-vāda and ābhāsa-vāda. According to the pratibimba-vāda, the consciousness that transcends avidyā and serves as the original is Īśvara; and, the consciousness that is reflected in the intellect in its gross and subtle states is Jīva. Or, the consciousness reflected in avidyā is Īśvara, and in intellect is Jīva.² According to the avaccheda-vāda, the consciousness conditioned by avidyā is Īśvara; and the consciousness delimited by avidyā is Jīva.³ According to the ābhāsa-vāda, the reflection of consciousness in avidyā when identified with the original is Īśvara; and, the reflection of consciousness in the intellect when identified with the original is Jīva.⁴

The difference between pratibimba-vāda and ābhāsa-vāda lies in this that according to the former the consciousness that is reflected and is present in avidyā or intellect is real and is identical with the original. Only the state of reflection (pratibimbatva) is indeterminable either as sentient or insentient. But, according to the ābhāsa-vāda, the consciousness that is reflected and present in avidyā or intellect is indeterminable either as sentient or insentient.⁵ The pratibimba-vāda is advocated by Padmapāda in his *Pañchapādikā* in the section which is designated by later Advaitic writers as *Darpaṇa-tikā*.⁶ The avaccheda-vāda is advocated by Vācaspati-miśra, and the ābhāsa-vāda by Sureśvara.

1. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita*, pp. 228-229.

2. *Siddhāntabindu* (Kāśī Sanskrit series), p. 226.

3. *Avidyāvacchinna-anavacchinna-eva jiveśau iti pakṣaḥ avaccheda-vadāḥ, Nārayanī* on the *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 232.

4. *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 219.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

6. *Ratna-prabhā* on *Śaṅkara's bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, 2-3-50.

As regards the relation between the affirmative and negative Upanishadic texts, Padmapāda has a theory of his own. Maṇḍana-miśra holds that the negative Upanishadic texts are primary and the affirmative texts are secondary. Padmapāda, however, maintains⁷ that the negative texts merely restate what is presumptively known from the affirmative Upanishadic texts. In the case of the erroneous perception of silver in the nacre, when it is said that 'this is nacre and this is not silver', the sentence 'this is not silver' merely restates the absence of silver which is presumptively known from the affirmative sentence 'this is nacre'. Similarly, the negative Upanishadic texts such as 'neti, neti' merely restate the absence of the universe in Brahman which is presumptively known from the affirmative Upanishadic texts that convey Brahman to be truth, consciousness and absolute. Thus the negative Upanishadic texts are subordinate to the affirmative ones. This view, according to Sarvajñātman is faultless, desirable, and commendable.⁸

The greatest contribution of Padmapāda to Advaita lies in this that his interpretation of Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* served as the source of the most important school of Advaita, that is, the Vivarṇa school.

7. *Pañcapādikā*, p. 499. [Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri's Edition].

8. *Samkshepasārīraka* I, 257.

HASTAMALAKA

by

A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER

M.A., PH.D.

Unlike Sureśvara and Padmapāda who have left an indelible mark on the history of Advaitic thought, Hastāmalaka and Toṭaka, two other direct disciples of Śrī Śaṅkara, have been revered more for what they were than for any works they have bequeathed to posterity. Nevertheless, if tradition may be trusted, a small treatise, *Hastāmalaka-stotra* by name, consisting of twelve verses, may be ascribed to Hastāmalaka, the marvellous boy disciple of the great Master. Its distinction is that it is accompanied by a commentary whose author, according to the traditionalists, is none other than Śrī Śaṅkara himself.¹ The views set forth in the *Stotra* constitute orthodox Advaita, of course, and they may properly be taken to represent the quintessence of Hastāmalaka's spiritual experience. Before analysing these verses let us reproduce the few events in Hastāmalaka's life, incidentally incorporated in the *Śrī Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Mādhavāchārya and the *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Vyāsāchala.² The fact that the accounts given in these works discover a striking measure of agreement proves, not their authenticity so much as the dependence of the one on the other.

In the course of his triumphal tour of India as the authentic exponent of Advaita philosophy, Śaṅkara, accompanied by a large group of disciples and admirers, reached Śrī Bali a *brāhmaṇa* village near Gokarṇa. An affluent villager, Prabhākara by name, together with a sick son, thirteen years old, approached Śaṅkara hoping to get his son healed.³ According to etiquette the father

1. Cf. pp. 163 ff, Vol. XVI of *The works of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya*, Sri Vani Vilas Edition. It is only fair to point out that the traditional view has been disputed by scholars like Belvalkar. Cf. Mallik Lectures on *Vedānta Philosophy*, Part I (first edition), p. 218.

2. Besides the authors referred to, Ānandagiri also briefly mentions Hastāmalaka in his *Śaṅkaravijaya*; 1868 A.D. Edition; cf. pp. 250 and 267.

3. *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Mādhavāchārya, 12, 47.

bowed low before the sage and caused his son to do likewise. The latter, "a live coal hidden in ashes" would not get up, but remained prostrate demonstrating, as it were, his grievous malady. When, however, the compassionate sage lifted up the boy, his anxious father respectfully enquired what the matter could be with his son who behaved so strangely. Thirteen years had gone by and so far he had shown no sign of sensibility. Of course, he could not learn the Vedas so far, though the formal ceremony of initiation had been performed. In the midst of his playmates, the boy would remain listless; even physical harm inflicted on him failed to evoke angry reactions of any kind. In the matter of diet, too, he was indifferent. It was, thus, by the force of sheer *karma* that he was growing up.⁴

Upon hearing this account, the great Teacher asked the boy: "Who art thou? Why dost thou behave as one possessed?"

In answer, 'the great soul', inhabiting the body of the boy uttered the twelve verses of the *Hastāmalaka-stotra*. They set forth, in the main, the nature of the Self or the Ātman. The refrain of all of them is: I, the Self, am eternal Awareness, *nityopalabdhisvarūpo' ham ātmā*. The author of these verses seeks to translate into intelligible language the content of his integral experience, which, being *sui generis*, does not lend itself to such translation. Hence the profuse use of symbols and metaphors strewn in these verses. The initial step in the process of the translation has been to relate, unavoidably, the unrelated Absolute, the contentless awareness, to the activities of mind and sense-organs. The real inspirer of all activities, subjective and objective, is the Ātman.⁵ The sun energizing the world of objects into their varied activities is a fit analogue of the Ātman. The author is very well conscious of the intrinsically indefensible nature of his initial step. The Absolute is, strictly, the relationless, the unconditioned. Hence, his characterization of it as *nirastākhilopādhi*. Its appropriate analogue may be sought for in the boundless space.⁶ (V-1).

4. *Ibid.*, 12, 50-53.

5. Cf. *Kenopanishad*, I, 1 and 2.

6. Cf. *niraṃśatvāt vibhūtvācca tathānaśvarabhīvataḥ,
brahmavyomnornabhedo'sti caitanyam brahmano'dhikaṇ.
Hastāmalakastōtrabhāṣya,*

—The works of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, Vol. XVI,
Śrī Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam.

The dependence of all objects for their activities on the un-failing Awareness or Ātman is reiterated in the second verse. Every object, not excluding the mind and sense organs, is inert. Their formations, functions and operations point to an Intelligence⁷ that supervises, controls, and directs them. (V-2).

This very Ātman abides in the living body as the Jīva, exactly as the face, in the guise of the reflection, is present in the mirror.⁸ In other words, the plurality of Jīvas is only an appearance whose timeless truth is the non-duality of the Ātman. What differs from individual to individual is not the foundational principle of awareness,⁹ the real content of 'I'; the forms or modes of the *antaḥkāraṇa*, embodying it from moment to moment, alone, differ. (V-3). Transcend these momentary fluctuations, and, at once, the indivisible wholeness of the Ātman is restored, just as once the mirror is removed, the reflection vanishes leaving the wholeness of the face, intact.¹⁰ The empiric plurality of the Jīvas is due to the superimposition, on the non-dual Ātman, of the manifoldness of the modes, in which this Ātman is reflected. (V-4).

The given fact of a temporal association of the Ātman with the psycho-physical organism is not denied; what is stressed is that in its timeless transcendence, the Ātman is relationless. It is, in very truth, the mind of the empirical mind; the eye of the empirical eye, etc.¹¹ In its utter transcendence, of course, it is beyond the purview of all instruments of cognition¹² (V V. 5 & 9). How then is such an entity affirmed at all? *Svato vibhāti*—Ātman is a self-luminous conscious being: as such it is self-positing and self-validated. As pointed out already (in verse 3) the factual plurality of the centres of consciousness may be traced to that of the reflecting media, the modes of the *antaḥkāraṇa*. (V. 6). The phenomenon of the multiplicity of Jīvas may be elucidated with reference to an analogue. Just as a single sun, simultaneously,

7. *Bṛihadāraṇyako'paniṣad*, 3.7.23.

8. cf. *ābhāsa eva ca; Brahma-Sūtra*, 2. 3. 50.

9. cf. *What is Life?* pp. 89, 90. E. Schrödinger, Cambridge, 1944.

10. Cf. *Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali*, 1. 3. *tadādraṣṭṛusvarūpe' vasthānam*.

11. *Kenopanishad*, 1.2.

12. Cf. *Yato vāconivarttante' prāpya manasāsaha Taittirīyo'paniṣad*, 2.4. The fact that the eye, or the mind functions at all is due to their vivification by the Ātman. Cf.—*tamevabhāntaṃ anubhāti sarvaṃ tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti. Kaṭhapaniṣad*, 5.15.

enables a multitude of eyes to behold various things, so does the non-dual Ātman, at one and the same time, enable Jīvas to perceive their respective objects. (V-7).

It was observed above that the Ātman is the mind of the mind, etc; i.e. it is the hidden source of their characteristic energies and operations. In the world outside, the sun illuminates objects and makes them fit to be cognized; but this the sun cannot do without its illumination by the Ātman. In other words, exactly like the sense organs the sun, too, derives its characteristic energies and capacities from the sole source of all light and power.¹³ As the Ātman is the mind's mind and the eye's eye, so too it is the sun's sun. (V-8).

Despite the eternal transcendence of the self-luminous Ātman, the Self of the Jīva, the empirically experienced finitude and fragmentariness of the cognitions of the latter may not be gain-said. Bondage of the Jīva is an incredible fact. It consists in the appearance, to the ignorant Jīva, of the Ātman as bound, *baddhavadbhāti mūḍhaḍṛśteḥ*. A parallel phenomenon may be cited by way of illustration. An observer whose eye-sight is obstructed by clouds is apt to imagine that the sun is engulfed by them. As the sun, in fact, so the Ātman, in truth, does not suffer the slightest diminution in its natural effulgence. Notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, the Ātman is eternally pure, awake, and free, *nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvaḥ*. (V-10). The transcendence of the Ātman must be understood together with the complementary truth of its immanence in all phenomena. 'On it, but without, in the least, affecting its wholeness and purity, are strung the phenomena constituting the cosmos.'¹⁴ It is their abiding ground and in this respect its analogue is space accommodating the objective manifold. (V-11). The concluding verse reaffirms the nondual status of the Ātman while it traces all plurality to the limiting adjuncts and media of reflection. The psycho-physical organisms are multiple and the Ātman, in empiric association with them, consequently, appears to be many. The phenomenal plurality of the Jīvas in no way affects the transcendental non-duality of the Ātman.

13. Cf. *Kāthopanishad*, 5.15.

14. Cf. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, 7.7.

Thus the verses constituting the *Hastāmalaka-stotra* deal with the real or *pāramārthika* status of Ātman. Their author seems to convey through them the fullness of his realization of the same. The author of the *bhāṣhya* on these verses raises a few supplementary questions, a brief reference to some of which may also be made in order to underscore the major implications of the *Hastāmalaka-stotra*. The affirmation in verse two that Ātman is eternal awareness or cognition calls for some elucidation since 'bodha' or awareness, generated by the sense organs in contact with their objects is obviously *ephemeral*. Generated awareness perishes, after leaving its impression on the mind or it yields place to a subsequent awareness. In any case it is anything but eternal. Again, Ātman in its essence ought not to be awareness, for while Ātman is held to be eternal, awareness, as just shown, is *ephemeral*. In answer, it may be urged that by awareness is meant consciousness or *chaitanya*. Awareness is of two kinds—what is generated and what is eternal. The former, being knowable, is no better than objects like pot and, therefore, is inert. That the generated awareness is a 'knowable' is clear from expressions like: I have had the awareness (= knowledge) of the pot, of the cloth, etc. Such awareness is experienced. Only such experienced and particularized instances of awareness may be treated as *ephemeral*. This does not militate against the proposition that the Ātman is eternal awareness.

What is the proof that Ātman is awareness or *Chaitanya*? The awareness of the objective manifold, *jagatprakāśa*, may be cited as the requisite proof.¹⁵ None may deny that the world is presented to our consciousness in acts of cognition. In the complex of factors involved in this situation, every *known* factor is inert. The one factor not *known*¹⁶ but knowing, the Ātman, therefore, is the source of the *jagatprakāśa*. While illuminating all else, it shines forth in its own right, *svaparaprakāśavān*.¹⁷

Before concluding this brief account of Hastāmalaka's affirmation of Self-realization, the fact may be noted that he may be cited as the living proof of the state of *jīvanmukti*, implicit in the

15. *jagatprakāśa iti brūmah—Hastāmalaka-stotra-bhāṣhya*, p. 160.

16. *viññātāraṃ are kena vijānīyāt—Bṛihadāraṇyako'paniṣad*, 2.4.14.

17. *Hastāmalaka-stōtrabhāṣhya*, p. 166.

Advaitic position that Jīva is, in truth, *nityopalabdhisvarūpa*. None of the verses directly mentions it; the Commentary, however, argues the case as follows. The paradox resulting from the contention that *Mukti* is a state of disembodiment,¹⁸ and that, nevertheless, the *jīvanmukta* lives in the body has to be resolved. One may urge that by the disembodied state is meant, not that life in the body has ceased, but that egoistic experiences incidental to such life have ceased. This however is inconceivable; for so long as the sense-organs operate cessation of such experiences is out of question. "But as egoistic experiences result from nescience, should not their cessation logically follow from the fact that right knowledge or *samyagdarśana* has dispelled nescience?" No; for, though nescience has been dispelled, its consequences may very well persist as in the case with the illusory experience of the double moon. How else can the fact of embodiment of the liberated sage be accounted for? The assertion of *Śruti* that pleasure and pain never cease for the embodied being¹⁹ may be cited as negating the dogma of *jīvanmukti*.

The following considerations, however, must be urged against the arguments set forth above. One who lives alone may acquire the knowledge of the real, *tattvajñāna*. No dead man ever grows wiser. In fact the circumstances leading to right knowledge, such as the study of scriptures, ratiocination, the cultivation of moral virtues, etc., are relevant only to the living. The latter alone may take the step of renunciation, the *sine qua non* of illumination. Hence right knowledge or *Ātmañāna* can accrue only to the living and it must entail emancipation in a state of embodiment.²⁰

In conclusion the point may be stressed that the sage Hastāmāla is not concerned to develop a full-fledged system of philosophy with its complement of metaphysics, ethics, logic, and so forth. He just reveals, in the brief compass of twelve verses, his vision of non-dual Reality as plenary Consciousness. The charge of acosmism against his position, therefore, far from detracting from the merit of his affirmation is bound to prove a compliment.

18. *tadetadaśarīratvaṃ mokṣākhyaṃ* Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, 1.1.4.

19. *Chāndogyo'panishad*, 8.12.1.

20. *sayo havai tatparamaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*, *Muṇḍako'panishad*, 3.2.9.

TOTAKACHARYA

by

S. RAJAGOPALA SASTRI

M.A., M.LITT

Śrī Śaṅkara, the greatest expounder of Advaita Vedānta is reputed to have flourished between 788 and 820 A.D. This date cannot be regarded as finally settled and a large number of Indian scholars bring down his date to the first or second century A.D. or B.C. However, the latter part of the eighth century has been accepted by thinkers as the most probable date. It is not worthwhile to enter into a controversy regarding the date of this āchārya; for, the absence of relevant inscriptions and historical records permits a pliability in investigation which need not always take us in the right direction. Nor are the teachings of Śrī Śaṅkara affected in any way by the absence of certainty regarding his date. He is considered as the incarnation of Lord Śiva; and his specific object was to propagate the Vedic and the Upanishadic truths and eradicate the unhealthy trends and practices associated with Hinduism. Before his sixteenth year, he finished his main work of refuting all heretical views and restoring the lustre and purity of the Vedāntic systems. But another span of sixteen years was allotted to him by providence to consolidate his work. During the course of his wanderings throughout the length and breadth of India, a large number of disciples came to him for initiation and knowledge, chief among them being Sanandana, who later on became Padmapāda, Ānandagiri better known as Hastāmā-laka, and Giri who seems to have also another name, Kalanātha. This Giri was the son of one Viśvanātha Adhvarī and he later on came to be called Toṭakāchārya. According to tradition, Toṭakāchārya, whose original name was Giri was the arṇśa of Agni, while Hastāmā-laka and Padmapāda were the incarnations of Vāyu and Śrī Nārāyaṇa.

Unfortunately not much is known about the life of these great disciples, except what tradition has cared to preserve. But

in the case of Śrī Toṭaka even tradition seems to be silent; for, what we know about this Āchārya is very little, though he exemplified in his life the spirit of service and dedication to his Guru, even at the expense of knowledge. In this respect he is on a par with Bharata, the illustrious brother of Śrī Rāmachandra, and with Hanumān, Śrī Rāmā's great devotee. The reverence which he had for his Guru, the great Śaṅkarāchārya so completely dominated him that Giri had no other interest in his life except to serve the great Master and neglected even his teachings and discourses. All that we know about him definitely is that his original name was Giri and from the time that Śrī Śaṅkara accepted him as his disciple, he lost himself in the service of his master. The work going by the name of *Toṭakāshṭaka* is attributed to him. It was a spontaneous outpouring of profound gratitude to the Guru whom the disciples held as Īśvara himself. It contains only eight verses and invokes in every verse the grace of Śaṅkara. The only other work of his is called *Śrutisūrasamuddharaṇam* in about 179 ślokas which contains the quintessence of the Advaita Vedānta. Śrī Śaṅkara, after his digvijaya, seems to have made Toṭaka the head of the Maṭha which he founded in the Badari Kṣhetra.

Tradition has it that the devotion of Giri to his Master was very profound; but he did not profit much by the teachings. He seems to have felt that a strong personal devotion to the Guru was of far greater importance than a mere intellectual grasp of the teachings. The latter influenced only the intellect, while the former bound the whole personality to the Guru. He used to absent himself frequently from the classes taught by the Preceptor, preferring to do personal service to the teacher without wasting even that time in mere listening. Śrī Śaṅkara who was aware of the depth of his disciple's affection and reverence towards himself did not mind his absence during the discourses. But the other disciples including Padmapāda had a contempt for this ignoramus whose gurubhakti was not apparent to them. One day the class was about to commence and all the other disciples were present. But the Guru did not begin his lessons waiting for some one. He was expecting Giri to come back to the class from the tank where he was washing his Master's clothes. Getting impatient at this delay, Padmapāda suggested to the teacher that since all the students had come, the discourse might start. "Let Giri also come", were the words of the Master. Padmapāda who had a great contempt for the intellectual backwardness of Giri exclaimed rather

hastily that there was the wall in the place of Giri. The Master who should have been a bit pained at this discourteous reference to Giri, nevertheless waited for his arrival. With a view to teach the students that a mere intellectual comprehension of the philosophical problems was after all only of secondary importance and that a right attitude and reverence were very necessary in the spiritual sphere, he silently blessed the absent Giri with a complete knowledge of the Vedāntic truth. Giri who was still engaged in washing his Master's clothes, suddenly felt an upsurge of his intellect and a divine flash of illumination. This made him experience and realise the spiritual uplift instantly. While others took years and perhaps several births to realise this truth, Giri was able to perfect this state of realisation almost in an instant. Gratitude to the Guru who in his extraordinary compassion had inspired him with divine knowledge and bliss made Giri spontaneously praise Śrī Śaṅkara in eight verses (*Toṭkāśṭaka*) in Toṭaka metre each verse ending with the refrain, "*bhava śaṅkara desika me saraṇam*." It is clear that the composition of this work in Toṭaka metre earned for him the name of Toṭakāchārya. Repeating these verses he approached his Guru and his holy presence, and in the midst of all his disciples he composed the work by name — *Śrutisārasamuddharaṇam*. It is also known by another name *Vedāntavedyaparātattvanivedanam*. These ślokaś have an even flow and rhythm and an easy diction, but manifest an unrivalled depth of thought. With this single work, the fame of Toṭakāchārya was made and he has now an abiding place in the galaxy of Advaita Āchāryas.

The *Śrutisārasamuddharaṇam*, according to tradition, is a spontaneous flow of a well-sustained discourse on Advaita Vedānta dealing with the most crucial and important topic of the identity of Jīva and Brahman. It seems to have been spontaneously composed and recited in the presence of Śrī Śaṅkara and the other disciples when Giri was under the silent inspiration of the teacher. However it may be, we have in this work a careful and authoritative exposition of the subject and Toṭakāchārya being the direct disciple of Śrī Śaṅkara has lent to this work a peculiar significance. It is not necessary to give an elaborate account of the philosophy underlying the work; but even a cursory summary will reveal the masterly touch of one who had realised the Absolute, or who had become a mukta.

This small work in one hundred and seventy-nine slokas has been published by the Śrī Vāpi Vilās Press, Śrīrangam, with the commentary of Śrī Sacchidānanda Yogī, together with a foreword in English by R. Krishnaswamy Iyer. The Āchārya insists that before one begins the Vedānta vichāra, one should be disciplined and be pure in mind. The four Sādhanas are very necessary and the novice should have disciplined himself thoroughly. He should have the firm belief that the Ātman alone is eternal and consequently worthy of cultivation and that all the other things are worthless. A stern negative attitude to all types of sense enjoyments, either in this world or in heaven should be cultivated. At the same time, the senses should be restrained from going outward, the mind must be content, and more than all, the aspirant should have an ardent desire to attain *mukti*. Without this moral discipline Vedāntic study is entirely useless.

Though the central theme of the work is the exposition of the identity between the Self and Brahman, the Āchārya leads up to this topic by discussing some allied questions at the outset. The seeker should completely renounce his attachment to the five sheaths or *kośas*, *annamaya* (food), *prāṇamaya* (vital airs), *manomaya* (intellect), *vijñānamaya* (buddhi) and *Anandamaya* (bliss). In other words, the aspirant should not identify himself with any of these sheaths. These are merely the outer coverings as it were of the true Self. Brahman is unlimited though immanent in every one. Brahman does not change, though associated with the changing and modifying *upādhis* like mind and intellect. Most of all, one should never identify oneself with *ahamkāra* (ego) because it is after all an adventitious factor and is not the real self. Brahman is absolutely unrelated to *ahamkāra*, and Toṭakāchārya affirms that Ātman should not be equated with the individual self. Brahman is without any attributes or personality, and is eternal and self-luminous. All the *Mahāvākyas* in the Upanishads assert that the Self is Brahman. This is the central theme of this work. The identity between the Self and Brahman is one of essential identity and the similarity should not be carried on to non-essential and trivial things. As the English Introduction points out, all unnecessary and irrelevant factors in each of the two equating terms should be eliminated. The *Mahāvākya Tat-tvamasi* contains three words, viz. *tat*, *tvam* and *asi* (That, thou, and art). Of these "thou" stands for the *Jīva* which when divest-

ed of the adventitious conditions, is really the Pure Consciousness. This Pure Consciousness is delimited by individuality, when it comes to believe that it is a particular being. It then acquires *ahantā* ("I-ness"). Again the Jīva (as we should now call the particularised and delimited self) is limited by its experiences. There is also a third limitation when the Jīva qualified by experiences begins to perceive empirical and personal states. When one says, "I see this", it is an indication that one is bound by a particular experience or perception. The state of "I see", is devoid of this particularity of perception but nevertheless is a limitation of the self in the direction of experience or perception. The statement implies a possibility of generalised experience. The most underlying delimitation lies in reducing the pure self to the status of an individual. We see here that the self is only limited to an individual subject and nothing more. The Āchārya points out that the state, namely, the one in which the direct apprehension of the various objects is simultaneous with the functioning of the sense organs is called the waking state. The second one is the dream state in which the knowledge of things is acquired without the functioning of the sense-organs and is due to the latent impressions present in the mind. And, the third one is the deep sleep state when the intellect together with its latent impressions merge in *avidyā*. The real self is the eternal Witness (*sākshī*) of these three states. It subsists in these three states but at the same time is beyond them. This is described as the *Turīya* (the fourth). Totakāchārya points out that the individuated 'I' though regarded by some as the real self is not so and that it is only the *upādhi* of the *buddhi*.

Regarding the term "That" (*tat*), it is pointed out that it is real, eternal, impartite and infinite. It is also *satyam* (truth) at all the three times. There was no time at which Brahman did not exist and in the same way there will be no time at which Brahman will cease to exist. The universe has no substantiality or reality apart from Brahman. It is created, sustained and destroyed, and hence it is not eternal and not true. But at the same time it is not an absolute nothing because it exists. It cannot be both true and untrue for this is a logical impossibility. It is clear that Śrī Totaka is making a reference to *Māyā* while speaking about the *prapañcha* in this way. We thus see that the true meaning of the *Mahāvākya* is that the individual Jīva is not different

from the Paramātman (Brahman). The former is neither a part nor a modification of Brahman. The embodied self, when the embodiment is removed, is the same disembodied, eternal, impertite Self.

Toṭakāchārya drives home this conclusion by removing certain possible misconceptions which may arise in the equation process. But these are too detailed for our purpose. By the process of negation (*apavāda*) we prove that the self is not the "I" nor the *buddhi* nor the *manas* nor the senses nor the *prāṇa*. References are made to other systems and their views are criticized. Direct references are made to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and its statements are regarded as mistaken. Apart from the intellectual superiority of these teachings, one should admire the utter selflessness and spirit of devotion characteristic of Śrī Toṭakāchārya; and if the Āchārya is today regarded as a resplendent luminary in the galaxy of Advaita teachers, one may be excused if appreciation is more for the high moral and spiritual character of the teacher than even for his teachings.

SURESVARA

by

S. V. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI

Vedānta Śiromaṇi

The *Guruparaṁparāstotra* of the Śringeri Āchāryas published by Dr Hultzsch says that Śrī Śaṅkara after establishing a Maṭha on the banks of the river Tuṅgabhadra reached Kāñchī. After consecrating Kāmākshī Devī and after appointing Viśvarūpa (Sureśvara) to spread Advaita from his own Āśrama, Śaṅkara attained immortal bliss there. It says:

*tatra saṁsthāpya kāmākshīm
jagāma paramaṁpadam,
viśvarūpayatim sthāpya
svāśramasya prachāraṇe.*

The manuscripts of *Śaṅkara-vijaya* of Ānandagiri preserved in the Madras and Mysore Government Oriental Manuscripts Libraries state in the chapter sixtyfive that Śrī Śaṅkara installed one of the five *Sphaṭika Liṅgas* called the Yogaliṅga in the Kāmakoti-pīṭha at Kāñchī and ordained Sureśvara to be in charge of that pīṭha.

*tasmāt muktikāṅkshibhiḥ sarvaiḥ śrīchakrapūjā kartavyā iti
niśchitya tatraiva nijāvāsayogyam maṭhamapi parikalpya tatra
nijasiddhāntapaddhatim prakāśayitum antevāsinam sureśvaram
āhūya yoganāmakam liṅgam pūjaya iti tasmai datvā tvam atra
kāmakotipīṭham adhvāsa iti vyavasthāpya śishyajanaiḥ paripūjya-
mānaḥ śrīparamaguruḥ sukhamaśa.*

Sureśvara was commissioned by Śrī Śaṅkara to write treatises elucidating his works. He accordingly prepared a most voluminous *Vārtika* on the *Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishadbhāṣya* and a shorter one on the *Taittirīyopanishadbhāṣya*, both of which were published with the commentary of Ānandagiri, at the Ānandaśrama Press, Poona. Besides these we have his *Mānasollāsa*, explanatory of Śrī Śaṅkara's short poem entitled *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra*, the

Pañchīkaraṇa-vārtika based on a prose work of Śaṅkara named *Pañchīkaraṇa*, and the *Naishkarṇyasiddhi* which reiterates the views embodied in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, another important work of Śaṅkara. We shall now briefly set forth the Advaitic doctrine as expounded by Sureśvara.

The Advaitins assign an important place to the Upanishads and hold that the Upanishadic sentences such as '*tat tvam asi*' '*aham brahmāsmi*', etc., signify *Brahman* which is absolute, truth, and consciousness, and which is the sole reality. It is in this connection that the Advaitins consider the question concerning the relation of the words of the Upanishadic texts to *Brahman*. Words signify their senses through three kinds of signification, and they are: (i) primary signification, (ii) secondary signification, and (iii) signification based on similarity. These three are defined as follows: The primary signification is the process through which the primary meaning of a word is conveyed. The secondary signification is: when the primary sense of a word is incompatible with the senses of the other words of a sentence the word conveys another sense invariably connected with its primary sense. This is adopted in the case of 'The hamlet is on the Ganges'. Here since the literal meaning, viz., the hamlet being on the current of the Ganges is discrepant, the word 'Ganges' abandons its primary sense and secondarily signifies its bank which is invariably connected with the current of the Ganges—the primary sense. The signification based on similarity (*Gauṇī-vṛitti*) is: When the primary sense of a word is incompatible, the word conveys the other sense which has the same qualities that are present in its primary sense and this process is known as signification based on similarity. This kind of signification is adopted in the case of "Devadatta is a lion". Here since the literal meaning, viz., 'Devadatta being a lion' is discrepant, the word 'lion' signifies the person 'Devadatta', who has the qualities of valour, cruelty, etc.,—the qualities which are present in the primary sense of the word 'lion'.

Among these three kinds of signification, the primary one and the one based on similarity do not admit of varieties. But the secondary signification is of three kinds: (i) *jahallakṣhaṇa*, (ii) *a-jahallakṣhaṇa*, and (iii) *jahad-ajahallakṣhaṇa*. These three are defined and illustrated as follows:

Jahallakṣhaṇa is that where the word totally abandons its primary sense and signifies the other sense invariably connected with its primary sense. This is adopted in the case of 'The hamlet is on the Ganges' already referred to.¹ *A-jahallakṣhaṇa* is that where a word without abandoning any part of its primary sense signifies the other sense connected with its primary sense. This kind is adopted in the case of 'The red (horse) stands outside'.² Here the primary sense of the statement, viz., the quality of redness standing is incompatible; and the incompatibility is removed by understanding from the word 'red', without excluding its primary sense, a horse to which redness belongs. *Jahad-ajahallakṣhaṇa* is that where a word by excluding a part of its primary sense conveys another part. This is adopted in the case of the sentences such as—'This is that brahmin'.³ This sentence involves a partial contradiction in this that 'brahmin' as related to past time and a different place (referred to by the word 'that') is identified with brahmin as related to present time and a particular place (referred to by the word 'this'). Hence the word 'this' and 'that' discard a part of their primary sense, viz., the relation of present and past time and place, and convey the other part, viz., the person-in-himself. Thus the secondary signification is three-fold.

So far the explanation of the three kinds of signification. It remains to see what kind of signification is adopted by the words of the Upanishadic texts in conveying *Brahman*. The words cannot convey Brahman through primary signification because of the absence of media through which the words could primarily convey their senses. Every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing as associated with a certain genus, or act or quality or mode of relation. But *Brahman* which transcends both speech and mind, which is free from all qualities has no genus, possesses no qualities, does not act and is related to nothing else, in which case the primary signification would hold good. Hence *Brahman* cannot be primarily conveyed by the words of the Upanishadic texts. Now it is to be examined whether Brahman can be

1. *Svātmanirūpanam* by Śrī Śaṅkara, v. 33.

2. *Ibid.*, v. 34.

3. *Ibid.*, vv. 35, 36.

secondarily signified and, if so, what kind of secondary signification can be adopted. Śrī Śaṅkara, in his *Svātmanirūpaṇa* holds⁴ that *jahallakṣhaṇa* and *ajahallakṣhaṇa* are not applicable and *jahad-ajahallakṣhaṇa* alone should be adopted. Sureśvara, on the other hand, would maintain that *jahallakṣhaṇa* should be adopted in the interpretation of the words of the Upanishadic texts.⁵ He further holds that the signification based on similarity (*Gauṇī-vṛitti*) also may be adopted. The arguments of Sureśvara in favour of the adoption of these two kinds of signification may be briefly stated as follows:

It has been said that a word can secondarily signify that sense alone which is invariably connected with its primary sense. Hence, in order to make any further analysis of what is secondarily signified by the words 'tat' and 'tvam' in the Upanishadic text 'tat tvam asi' it is necessary to find out their primary meanings. The primary meaning of the word 'tat' is *Īśvara* and that of the word 'tvam' is *jīva*. Sureśvara holds *Īśvara* and *jīva* to be the reflections of pure consciousness, i.e. *Brahman*, in *avidyā* and intellect respectively. He further holds that the reflection in entirety is false or indeterminable either as sentient or insentient. *Īśvara*, although indeterminable, is falsely identified with the consciousness that serves as the original and is viewed as the creator of the universe. *Jīva* too, although indeterminable, is falsely identified with the pure consciousness that serves as the original and is viewed as the agent, enjoyer, etc. This theory is known as *ābhāsa-vāda*. The primary meanings of both the terms are indeterminable and hence they must be discarded. The terms totally abandon their primary senses and secondarily signify the pure consciousness with which their primary senses are falsely identified. Sureśvara thus adopts the secondary signification known as *jahallakṣhaṇa*. It has been said that Śrī Śaṅkara favours the adoption of *jahadajahallakṣhaṇa*. This is as it should be; because Śrī Śaṅkara holds the reflections of the pure consciousness in *avidyā* and intellect not to be indeterminable, but to be real. This theory is known as *pratibimba-vāda*. According to this theory, the consciousness that is reflected is real; but the state

4. vide vv. 33, 34 and 35.

5. vide *Siddhāntabindu* (Kāśī Sanskrit series), pp. 219-222.

of reflection (*pratibimbatva*) pertaining to the consciousness is indeterminable. Thus the reflection of pure consciousness is partly real and partly indeterminable. *Īśvara*, as the reflection of pure consciousness in *avidyā*, is real; but *Īśvaratva*, i.e. the state of reflection pertaining to the reflected consciousness is indeterminable. Similar explanation applies to the reflection of consciousness in the intellect. The words 'tat' and 'tvam' discard a part of their primary sense, i.e. *Īśvaratva* and *jīvatva*, and secondarily convey the other part, i.e. the consciousness which is identical with the original. Śrī Śaṅkara thus admits *jahad-ajahallakṣhaṇa*. Sureśvara no doubt admits the foundation laid by Śrī Śaṅkara; but he has made improvement on it.

Sureśvara in his *Naishkarmyasiddhi* admits *Gauṇīvṛitti* also in the interpretation of the terms of the *Upanishadic* texts. The word 'tat' secondarily signifies the absolute consciousness which is the essential nature of its primary sense, that is, *Īśvara*, through the common feature of consciousness present in both the primary and secondary senses. Similarly the word 'tvam' secondarily signifies the inner consciousness which is the witness of pleasure, pain, etc., and which is the essential nature of its primary sense, that is, *jīva*, through the common feature of inwardness, subtlety, etc. Thus both the terms signify the pure consciousness through signification based on similarity. It must be noted here that although consciousness, subtlety, etc., are the essential nature of Brahman or Ātman, yet they are, by courtesy, spoken of as the attributes of Brahman or Ātman. Sarvajñātman in his *Samkshhepaśārīraka* refers to this view; and this view according to Madhusudana Sarasvatī is only a '*prauḍhivāda*'.⁶

As regards the locus and content of *avidyā*, Sureśvara considers the differentiation between the locus and content to be unnecessary and therefore maintains⁷ that Brahman is the locus and content of *avidyā*.

On the practical side of Advaita, Sureśvara holds⁸ that the rituals including the optional ones (*kāmya-karmas*) when perform-

6. *Vedāntakalpālatikā* (Sarasvatībhavana series), p. 49.

7. *Naishkarmyasiddhi* (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. XXXVIII), pp. 105-106. Compare *Samkshhepaśārīraka*, I, 319.

8. *Bṛihadāraṇyako'panishadbhāṣyavārtika*, 4, 4, 1052.

ed without any attachment to their fruit generate in the mind of the aspirant the desire to know Brahman. In his *Naishkarmyasiddhi*,⁹ Sureśvara criticises the view that the Upanishadic texts give rise to only mediate knowledge which later becomes immediate by meditation; and he holds the position that the intuitive knowledge of Brahman arises directly from the Upanishadic texts.

Sureśvara in his commentaries on Śrī Śaṅkara's works elucidates the Advaitic doctrine expounded by Śrī Śaṅkara; and his commentaries are very valuable aids to the understanding of the texts of Śrī Śaṅkara. In authority they are second only to the best writings of Śrī Śaṅkara.

VIMUKTATMAN

by

P. K. SUNDARAM

M.A., PH.D.

Madhusūdana Sarasvati, at the end of his great classic *Advaita-siddhi*, refers to three *Siddhi* works, viz. *Ishṭa-siddhi*, *Naishkarmya-siddhi*, and *Brahma-siddhi*. The *Brahma-siddhi* of Maṇḍana may be said to devote itself to the definition (*lakṣhaṇa*) and testimony (*pramāṇa*) of Brahman indicated in the expression, *Brahmajijñāṣā*, the *that* of the desire to know. The *Naishkarmya-siddhi* of Sureśvara is interested in showing the *how* of Brahman-knowledge, i.e., whether it is by knowledge alone or by action that release is secured. The *Ishṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman engages itself rather in the question of the *why* of Brahman-knowledge, enquiring into the nature and cause of error, that is, the world. In short, ontology, ethology and epistemology may be said to be the respective contents of these three *Siddhis*.

Summary of the chief points discussed in the Ishṭa-siddhi

The various theories of error are enumerated by Indian philosophers as follows:

ātma-khyātir-asat-khyātir
akhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā
tathā-anirvachana-khyātir-ity-
etat-khyāti-pañchakam

These five can be classified into two broad categories, viz., *sat-khyāti* and *asat-khyāti*. *Ātma-khyāti* of the Yogācāra Buddhists, *akhyāti* of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and *anyathā-khyāti* of the Bhāṭṭas and Naiyāyikas fall under the first category, and the *asat-khyāti* of the Mādhyamika Buddhists falls into the opposite camp. The doctrine of *anirvachanīya-khyāti* adopted by the

Advaitins tries to show that the object of illusion is neither real nor unreal but indeterminable.

Akhyāti

Akhyāti or non-discrimination is the explanation that the Prābhākara offers to the problem of illusion where there are *two* knowledges, each of which taken in isolation is not false (p. 42). The failure to discriminate that there are really two *jñānas* leads to error. In other words, *bheda-agraha* or *asamsargāgraha* is the cause of error. This position of the Mīmāṃsakas is the result of their realism. Knowledge is self-valid and what it shows up is valid and true. If error arises, it is a subjective short-coming. Knowledge itself can never be doubted (p. 41). There is no question of the defective senses presenting positive illusion (p. 42).

Vimuktātman argues that the theory of the self-evidencing character of knowledge adopted by the Prābhākara rebels against his theory of error. For, if he is consistent he will see that the *two* separate knowledges (of the shell and silver in the illusion where the shell appears as silver, for example) must present themselves as *separate* in which case there is no question of their not being discriminated (p. 43).

If truth, as the Prābhākaras hold, is that which succeeds in yielding the expected results, Vimuktātman points out that there are instances where knowledge issues in no practical activity at all (pp. 45-46). To be sure, knowledge *does* lead to activity, but this is only incidental.

Again, non-discrimination is said to be the cause of error, but Prābhākaras at least cannot hold this doctrine for they do not accept negation as a category at all. For them there could be no *absence* of knowledge as in non-discrimination (p. 116).

Anyathākhyāti

The Bhāṭṭas hold that in error the object appears otherwise than what it is. But it remains to be asked, whether the *object* in error becomes other than what it is, or the *knowledge* becomes other than what it is, or the knowledge *shows* the object as other than what it is. The first two alternatives are rejected on the grounds that the object cannot become something else if it has a

nature of its own, and that knowledge cannot suffer a change without reference to the object, for knowledge is object-dependent.

Thus it is the third alternative that is discussed elaborately by Vimuktātman. To the Bhāṭṭas, what appears in illusion is not unreal. But what is unreal is the *samsarga* or identity of the appearance with its basis. Defects in the sense-organs contribute positively to the production of error (p. 45). While to the Prābhākaras, error is *bheda-agraha*, to the Bhāṭṭas it is *abheda-graha*.

All the time, the Bhāṭṭas protest that they are realists. In that event, it is not obvious how they can bear the introduction in error of a subjective element which brings about the mistaken identity between two real objects. This subjective element does not have any corresponding reality (p. 105).

Again, how can the silver, in the silver-illusion that is presented in immediate perception, be denied particularly when the Bhāṭṭas hold it to be real? If silver is denied, then illusion will have to be accepted and realism must be given up. If silver is not denied, there will be no question of illusion at all (pp. 94-96). Either that the silver is remembered or that it is presented here and now. But what is denied in the judgment '*nedam rajatam*' is the silver presented actually and not the remembered one. If was already stated that the presented object cannot be the content of negation without damage to the professed realism of the Bhāṭṭas. Nor can the remembered one be the object, for the negation of the remembered silver cannot affect the presented one and thus illusion would never have been negated. Hence, we cannot have both the remembered and the presented as factors in illusion.

If it is said that what is denied here and now of the shell, viz., silverness, characterizes really another object existing elsewhere and that *this* is the intention of the negative judgment, in that case, it is the silverness that will be denied and not silver (I, 19). But in illusion we are concerned with the particular silver, and not with a universal.

Again, the negating judgment, *nedam rajatam*, is supposed to make only the predicate false, but not the *this*, or the relation 'is'. Why should one alone of the three factors in "this is silver" be false? (III, 15). Moreover, the fact that while the 'this' element

is reaffirmed by the negating judgment "This is not silver", the silver-element is denied clearly demonstrates that of the two elements, 'this' and 'silver', silver is less real than the 'this', which, in the example, is the shell, or at any rate, not real in the same sense. But this conclusion will militate against the pluralistic realism of the Bhāṭṭas.

Ātma-khyāti

The Yogācāra Buddhists hold that there are no external objects at all. What exist are only the cognitions. One proof for this is the togetherness of object and thought, *sahopalambhaniyama*. Even in an illusion, what we see as silver outside is only our own cognition. It is the mind that splits itself up as subject and object, as in dreams. To these Buddhists, silver is real only as a mode of cognition. What the negative judgment "This is not silver" does is to negate, not the supposedly external silver (there is no such thing) but the appearance of its externality (p. 40).

Vimuktātman thinks it is useless to reduce the object to a mode of thought. While thought or knowledge is constant, objects are specific and shifting. The constancy of thought cannot be explained if it takes shape into objects. And there can be thought without objects (p. 14).

What is said to be *sahopalambhaniyama* by the Buddhists is really *sahopalabhyatva-niyama* and there can be no such *niyama* between the *dr̥k* and the *dr̥śya*, for the *dr̥k* is not seen. Nor is it *sahopalabhitvam* for the object is not and cannot be the seer. Moreover, the very notion of externality will be impossible to explain when there is no external object at all. *bāhyatvasya asataḥ khyāti-prasaṅgāccha*.

Again, how can one cognition which is momentary according to the Vijñāna-vādin be the cognizer of another cognition? Both of them cannot co-exist. *asatvāt, kṣaṇikatvāccha* (p. 113). Lastly, one cognition cannot reveal itself and at the same time be revealed by another, and to the Vijñānavādin, cognition is self-luminous. The silver being a mode of cognition must be at once apparent, in which case there is no occasion for error at all.

Asat-khyāti

In error, the *asat-khyāti-vādin* argues that that which is non-existent appears as existent. The negating judgment "This is not

silver", establishes the non-existence of the perceived silver in the silver-illusion (p. 155)

If, either in the error or by its cancellation, the existent were known it will be tantamount to admitting that there is no illusion at all since there is no possibility of error or its cancellation when the content is the existent *sat*. That which is existent can be cancelled neither by the knowledge of the existent, nor of the non-existent. Nor does the knowledge of the existent cancel the knowledge of the existent or that of the non-existent. As then, the relation of the sublating and the sublated cannot subsist between two cognitions of the existent, and as a sublation is actually perceived, it is fair to conclude that it is the non-existent that appears as the existent in error.

To the argument that the merely non-existent cannot be perceived, the *asadvādin* replies that the negative judgment points to the fact that the non-existent can be experienced (p. 156). Even when one urges the perception of non-existent *tuchchha* as error, one accepts it as presented in error (p. 157). Even Advaitins must accept the perception of *tuchchha*, because in *māyā*, which is of the nature of inexplicability, silverness and reality are perceived in error. Both of them are thus *tuchchha* and perceived.

Now, against this theory, Vimuktātman asks: How can the non-existent appear as existent, when it cannot even appear as non-existent? Again, since there is not possible distinctions of time in the *śūnya*, the *earlier* appearance and the later sublation have no meaning and consequently both the error and its cancellation will be there always; and if this is not desired, never at all, because of distinctionlessness itself. Since there is not restrictions of space in *śūnya* either, it is not possible to suggest that silver that exists elsewhere appears in the shell. Moreover, the usage in illusion is: "This is silver" and not "negation is silver". Even the "This" does not appear in the form of negation. There is no such apprehension of the "This" as "*this is not*".

Anirvachanīya-khyāti

When the theories of the *sat* and the *asat* as presented in error cancel out each other, what we are left with is the fact that the object in error is characterisable neither as real nor as unreal nor

as both. *khyateḥ nasat, budhūr na sat iti anyonyapakṣham nirākurvadbhiḥ vādibhireva rupyasya anirvachanīyatam sthāpitam.*

There can be no knowledge without an object. In error, then, we seem to have an object which belongs to an order of reality different from the normal. (p. 120). Silver, the product of nescience, like nescience itself cannot be an object of any valid means of knowledge. Likewise, its negation, too, is not open for knowledge by means either positive or negative. Does the effect of nescience exist and come into being or is it non-existent? Does nescience also existing in the same form become otherwise, or does it change and become otherwise? Does it, existing, perish or being non-existent perish? Is this destruction a negation or a positive entity? Questions like these are relevant only with reference to either positive or negative entities, and not to the inexplicable illusion. That the inexplicable should appear as existent is precisely the illusion. And it is not *asat-khyāti* because there is no evidence for the unreality of that inexplicable form. As is silver, so is everything in this world.

Nescience

Ajñāna or nescience is the material cause of all illusion. Just as a single principle continues to manifest itself both in the seed and the sprout, the earth and the pot, one beginningless persistent cause produces all the empirical existence. There is no necessity that when the cause is present, the effect is necessarily present. Otherwise, since *ajñāna* is always present, the illusion will constantly be present.

This *ajñāna* is beginningless. Though the shell in illusion has a beginning, its ignorance is beginningless. This is because this ignorance is not located in the shell but in the Intelligence-Self, even as the knowledge of the shell is. Nescience is established only by Self-Intelligence, and not by *pramāṇas* (p. 60-61).

The non-apprehensibility by *pramāṇas* is, however, not the reason why nescience is indeterminable, but its destructibility by knowledge. (*jñāna-mātra-apanodyatvāt*) (p. 63). For, non-apprehensibility is found even in determinable categories like knowledge, pleasure, etc. (p. 63). Nescience of specific objects are

many, though the *mūla-ajñāna* or primordial nescience is one. In fact, there are as many nesciences of, say, a shell as there are shell-cognitions (p. 63). All cognitions, in other words, have the hitherto unknown for their content. Everytime an object is cognized, the nescience concealing that object is removed.

Nescience is not just absence of knowledge. If it were, it will be known by a negative means, *abhāva-pramāṇa*; one reason for this is that it is located in the Self. *Ajñāna* cannot be of the nature of mutual negation, because mutual negation has for its substrate the object, while for nescience it is the Self. Nor is it posterior non-existence for which beginning is accepted and nescience is beginningless. Again, while nescience is removable, *pradhvaṃsa* is not.

Ajñāna is like darkness which is not mere antecedent non-existence of light. It is positive. Otherwise, it will be difficult to explain how a lamp taken from one place to another dispels darkness there. *Ajñāna* is called so either because of its conflict with knowledge or because of its being other than knowledge.

Removal of Nescience

Destruction of nescience does not conform to any of the known categories, existent, non-existent, both, and indefinable, but belongs to the fifth alternative: *pañchamaprakāra*. One has, as Prof. Hiriyanna suggests, to speak of it thus by the fact of the actual removal of nescience which is indefinable. But in the last chapter of the *Ishṭa-siddhi*, *Vimuktātman* seems to take the view that the destruction of nescience is indefinable with this difference that while *ajñāna* is removable by knowledge, *ajñāna-nivritti* is not (VIII, 2). He also says that Ātman alone is *ajñāna-nivritti*. Jñānottama writes that *Vimuktātman* agrees to the suggestion of some among the Advaitins that Ātman alone is the removal of *ajñāna* in so far as it does not conflict with non-dualism (p. 620).

But the difficulty that if Ātman is the remover of *ajñāna* how there was any bondage at all is felt by *Vimuktātman*. He suggests the alternative view that *avidyānivritti* is the absence of any other than Ātman. And Advaita is not opposed to the non-existence of anything other than Ātman. Moreover, if Ātman were not opposed even to the presence of nescience, how can it be opposed to its absence? Here the *abhāva* is only the removal.

Jīvan-mukti

Vimuktātman does not accept the theory that the continuance of the body after realization in the case of a *jīvan-mukta* is due, not to *ajñāna* itself, but to its latent, impressions, (*saṃskāras*). Latent impressions are nothing apart from nescience. In the case of the rope-snake illusion, it is suggested that fear, trepidation, etc., are present even when one knows that there is only the rope and not the snake, and that, similarly, the *saṃskāras* alone are responsible for the continuance and maintenance of the body of a *jīvan-mukta*. But this is a mistaken view. Fear, trepidation, etc., do not constitute the body of nescience. Only the snake-illusion does. And when that is over, nescience at that place is removed. If the *saṃskāras* themselves causing fear, trepidation, etc., were part of the *śukti-ajñāna*, they will be enough to produce the *sarpa-bhrānti* at any time. But that is not found to happen.

It is, then, reasonable to suppose that in the *jīvan-mukta* there is a residuum of *ajñāna* in the form of the *prārabdha-karmas* which is responsible for the continuance of the body. There is no conflict between *prārabdha* and the origination of redeeming knowledge. In principle, actions bestow their fruits only without conflict with the results of other actions that have commenced yielding their consequences. Actions of great merit like the Horse-sacrifice wait for their operation for the exhaustion of the *prārabdha-karmas*. Similarly, actions which pave the way for the rise of true knowledge will yield their results only in the body which is the locus of experiences brought about by other activities, without conflict (p. 75).

Knowledge then does not militate against experience and *vice versa*. This shows that though inhabiting a body, a *mukta* is not a *baddha*. The body should be there for the released soul so that he can transmit the knowledge to others. If wisdom and death were simultaneous, there will be no one to pass the wisdom on to others and with the first wise man, his wisdom would be buried. The actions which lead to knowledge, says Vimuktātman, preserve the body for sometime for this purpose.

*vidvachcharīram paripālayantyeva vidyārthānyapi karmāṇi
kimchit kālam yāvatā vidyā-saṃtatyucchhedo na bhavet.*

Indeed, without the teacher and his instruction, mere activities, however correct according to scriptures, will never lead to permanent good.

Means to Release

The intuition into the oneness of Reality alone can remove *avidyā* completely. For this intuition, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* are the means. Calmness and equanimity are prescribed till renunciation of all actions takes place. Even sacrifices indirectly help this process by creating purity of mind. The *asambhāvanā* (the notion of improbability) and *viparīta-bhāvanā* (the notion of contrariety) with regard to the real nature of Brahman are removed by the scripture by means of explaining the nature of Ātman beginning with *astitva* and ending with freedom from hunger and thirst. (See *Chhāndogya Upanishad*). The Upanishad repeats nine times the declaration: *tat-tvam asi*, dispelling every time an illusion about Reality.

If *śravaṇa* or hearing once only without these aforesaid means could bring about intuition, they would be futile. When the mind is sufficiently pure to receive the final illumination mellowed by these disciplines, then *śravaṇa* of the Vedānta texts results in the intuition, removing the specific illusion every time it is repeated. Here too, Vimuktātman does not see eye to eye with the school of Maṇḍana which holds that mediate knowledge arising from *śravaṇa* needs to be transformed into immediacy by repeated meditation. He, on the contrary, suggests that from *śravaṇa* itself, intuition takes place, provided it comes at the top of all spiritual equipment.

*na cha paroksham vastu paroksha-jñānāireva abhyasyamānāḥ
aparokshābhavet.....tasmāt śravaṇādīni abhyasyamānāni
aparoksha eva ātmani anekaprakārān bhramān nivartayati-
santi sākshāt darśanārthāni bhavanti* (p. 64)

* The numbers within brackets refer to the page number or the Adhyāya number in *Ishṭa-siddhi* edited by Prof. Hiriyanna in Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda.

SARVAJNATMAN

by

N. VEEZHINATHAN

M.A., PH.D.

In order to keep alive the Advaitic tradition for the benefit of posterity, Śrī Śaṅkara established Maṭhas or centres of religious learning and practices in various parts of India. Badari, Dvāraka, Purī, Śringeri, and Kāñchī were his farflung spiritual capitals. Of these, the Maṭha at Kāñchī is the foremost and is termed the Kāmakoti-pīṭha. And, Śrī Śaṅkara himself assumed the headship of this pīṭha. Ordained as Sannyāsin by Śrī Śaṅkara himself, Sarvajñātman was nominated successor to the Kāmakoti-pīṭha with Sureśvara—his preceptor, as his protector.

In the history of the Kāmakoti-pīṭha and in the Advaita literature, Sarvajñātman stands out as a prominent figure. He is well known to be the author of the work *Samkshepasūtrika* which is a succinct exposition in verses of the views of Śrī Śaṅkara as stated in his bhāṣhya on the *Brahma-sūtra*. He also wrote another work on Advaita entitled *Pañchaprakriyā* which is divided into five sections. The first of them deals with the different kinds of meanings which a word may have. The next three sections treat of what are described as the 'great-sayings' of which 'tat tvam asi' is a familiar example and point out how they should be interpreted. The last section is devoted to the elucidation of the nature of bondage and release. This work summarizes the teachings of the *Samkshepasūtrika*.

Apart from his works on Advaita, he wrote a short treatise—*Pramāṇalakṣhaṇa* on the Mīmāṃsā system. This work deals with the various pramāṇas of the Mīmāṃsakas and closes with an estimate of their epistemological doctrines and it is available in manuscript in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library.

The *Samkshepasārīraka* has one thousand two hundred and forty stanzas in various metres and consists of four chapters. The first comprises five hundred and sixty three verses and corresponds to the first adhyāya of the *Brahmasūtra* termed 'samanvayādhyāya', and as such it is the most important adhyāya. It is devoted to the correct interpretation of the different texts of the Upanishads pointing to the attributeless Brahman.

The second comprises two hundred and forty eight verses and it corresponds to the second adhyāya of the *Brahmasūtra* termed 'avirodhādhyāya'. It shows that the Upanishadic teaching is not stultified by other proofs like perception, etc., or by the views of other philosophical systems.

The third contains three hundred and sixty six verses and it corresponds to the third adhyāya of the *Brahmasūtra* termed 'sādhanaādhyāya' and it is devoted to an exposition of the means to the realization of Brahman.

The fourth contains sixty three verses and it corresponds to the fourth chapter of the *Brahmasūtra* termed 'phalādhyāya' and it deals with the nature of liberation.

Though the titles of the four adhyāyas of this work correspond to those of the *Brahmasūtra*, and the subject-matter treated of in each is the same as in the bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara on the corresponding chapters of the *Brahmasūtra*, all reference to the nature of the qualified Brahman, the methods of meditative worship thereof and the result arising therefrom, is avoided. On this ground, the title *Samkshepasārīraka* (the gist of the *Śārīrakabhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara) is significant.

This work *Samkshepasārīraka* has eight commentaries. The earliest of them seems to be the *Siddhānta-dīpa* by Viśvaveda and it is available in manuscript [R. 1558 (b)] in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. Another commentary called *Sambandhokti* is by Vedānanda and it is also available in manuscript (R. 2919) in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. Rāmatīrtha, the disciple of Krishnatīrtha, wrote a commentary known as *Anvayārthaprakāśikā* published in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit series, Poona. He has based his commentary on the commentary *Siddhāntadīpa* already referred to. His disciple Purushottama wrote a commentary called *Subodhinī*.

This also has been published in Anandāśrama Sanskrit series, Poona. Nṛsiṃhāśrama, the disciple of Jagannāthāśrama who was a contemporary of Krishṇatīrtha, the preceptor of Rāmatīrtha referred to above, wrote a commentary called *Tattvabodhinī* published in the Princess of Wales Sarasvatibhavana texts series. Madhusūdanasarasvatī wrote an authoritative commentary *Sārasaṅgraha*, and it is published in the Kāśī Sanskrit series. This commentary is based on the one by Viśvaveda referred to above. Apart from these commentaries, Aufrecht mentions one more commentary known as *Vidyāmrītavārshinī*. Another commentary by one Pratyagviṣṇu is referred to by Madhusūdanasarasvatī in his *Sārasaṅgraha*.

Sarvajñātman has distinct views on the important Advaitic concepts, and they have considerable importance in the historical development of Advaita. His merits appear most clearly when he is contrasted with other Advaitic writers like Padmapāda, Sureśvara and Vācaspatimiśra.

Sarvajñātman's most important contribution is his view regarding the locus and content of avidyā. He holds¹ that the pure consciousness is the locus and content of avidyā as against Vācaspati who maintains that the individual soul is the locus of avidyā, while Brahman is its content. The latter view is refuted by Sarvajñātman on the ground that the notion of individual soul derives its existence from avidyā and as such it is posterior to avidyā. The latter cannot abide in a substratum which is decidedly subsequent to it. Sarvajñātman further contends² that the pure consciousness is the locus and content of avidyā neither in its absolute form, nor in its blissful form, but in the form of inner self (*pratyakchaitanya*). This he proves on the basis of the experience 'I do not know myself'. It is Sarvajñātman who explains the apparently contradictory statements of Śrī Śaṅkara regarding the presence of avidyā in Brahman in deep sleep. To any serious student of Advaita, the contradiction in the statements of Śrī Śaṅkara, viz., avidyā does not exist in the state of deep sleep and avidyā exists in Brahman in that state³ remained unsolved. And,

1. *Sanḥshepaśārīraka*, I, 319.

2. *Ibid.*, II, 211-212.

3. *Ibid.*, III, 125-126.

Sarvajñātman explains⁴ this view of Śrī Śaṅkara by stating that avidyā is not determinately perceived in the form of 'I do not know myself' in the state of deep sleep and it is with this view that Śrī Śaṅkara has said that avidyā does not exist in that state. Really it exists in that state in Brahman, as it is evident from the reminiscent experience in the form 'I did not know anything when I was asleep'.⁵ Similarly Sarvajñātman explains Śrī Śaṅkara's statement⁶ that the individual soul is the locus of avidyā, by contending⁷ that avidyā though present only in the pure consciousness is revealed in the form 'I am ignorant' by the intellect which is the limiting adjunct of the individual soul. It is well-known that the nature of a revealing medium is such that what is revealed through it appears as though present in the medium itself. The mirror which reflects the face appears to contain the face. In the same way, the intellect which is the revealing medium of avidyā reveals it as present in itself and consequently in the consciousness delimited by it, that is, the individual soul. Avidyā, however, is present in the pure consciousness.

Sarvajñātman's contribution to the theory of the nature of Brahman also is noteworthy. Relying on the method of gathering the unrepeated words found in the affirmative Upanishadic texts to arrive at the exact nature of Brahman—the method prescribed by the author of the sūtras in the aphorism 'ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya' (III, iii, 11), Sarvajñātman affirms that, on the whole only ten words convey the essential nature of Brahman in an affirmative manner. And those words are: nitya, śuddha, buddha, mukta, satya, sūkshma, sat, vibhu, advitīya and ānanda.⁸ This same method is adopted in the case of the negative texts also. But, Sarvajñātman suggests that as the elements that are to be negated in Brahman are numerous, the words found even in all the negative Upanishadic passages are not exhaustive and hence many words should be gathered. Herein arises the question of relation between the affirmative and negative Upanishadic passages. Sarvajñātman

4. *Ibid.*, III, 123.

5. *Ibid.*, III, 120-122.

6. *Ibid.*, II, 175.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, I, 173.

says⁹ that the negative Upanishadic texts, by denying all duality, confirm the knowledge of the absolute nature of Brahman arisen from the affirmative Upanishadic passages.

The question whether lordship is natural to Brahman or not is answered¹⁰ in the negative by Sarvajñātman, on the ground that lordship involves a reference to the controlled beings; and whichever is dependent on something else is illusory, and hence lordship, being illusory, cannot be natural to Brahman. This conclusion seems contrary to the view of the author of the sūtras, who in the aphorism 'parābhidhyānāttu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau' (III, ii, 5) holds that lordship is natural to Brahman. Sarvajñātman, with a refreshing independence of judgment, points out¹¹ that the author of the Sūtras has said so from the opponent's stand-point and it is not his final view. And to substantiate this point, he refers¹² to the other aphorism 'kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ' (III, iii, 39) which treats lordship on a par with attributes like possession of desire, etc., which cannot be said to be natural to the attributeless Brahman. Hence, Sarvajñātman holds¹³ that Brahman is eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, truth, subtle, existent, all-pervasive, absolute, and bliss. And herein lies Sarvajñātman's contribution to the theory of the nature of Brahman.

As regards the elucidation of the nature of the supreme lord and the individual soul, Sarvajñātman adopts the well-known theory, the pratibimba-vāda, and in this he seems to have been influenced by the views of Padmapāda.

Coming to the practical side of Advaita, Sarvajñātman speaks¹⁴ of asceticism as a necessary condition for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. He holds¹⁵ that the remote means such as the performance of rituals including the optional ones (kāmya-karma) lead to the desire to know Brahman; and after this result is

9. *Ibid.*, I, 263.

10. *Ibid.*, III, 151-170..

11. *Ibid.*, III, 175.

12. *Ibid.*, III, 177.

13. *Ibid.*, I, 173.

14. *Ibid.*, III, 358-361.

15. *Ibid.*, I, 64; III, 330-340.

achieved the remote means should not be pursued. Again, Sarvajñātman holds¹⁶ that the Upanishadic texts alone give rise to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman; and śravaṇa, manana, and nīdhyāsana remove the impediments which are present in the intellect of the aspirant who has such a knowledge and which hinder the knowledge from becoming effective in dispelling avidyā.

Summing up, Sarvajñātman as a philosopher has a considerable historical importance. His main contribution to Advaita rests in his clear exposition, in verses, of Śrī Śaṅkara's views as stated in his bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtra*. His work is entitled *Samkshhepaśārīraka*; and the title is very significant, as throughout the work, Śrī Śaṅkara's phrases and arguments recur. He is most concerned with finding a way of reconciling the apparent contrary statements of Śrī Śaṅkara. His treatise is systematic, critical, and without any trace of dogmatic assertion. He does accept the foundations laid by his predecessors, yet he makes improvement on them. He is best in detail and in criticism. His style is easy and unpedantic. He has an admirable literary sense, and, in fact, only several centuries after Sarvajñātman the world could produce Vidyāraṇya, who like Sarvajñātman, wrote in verses on the Advaitic concepts in an admirable way. Sarvajñātman is a great philosopher who has influenced profoundly the Advaita-thought in the subsequent ages. As Madhusūdanasarasvatī characterizes him, he knows the traditional interpretation of the Advaita Vedānta. His views are very respectfully cited by Appayya Dīkshita, Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Brahmānandasarasvatī.

śrīkāṇchīkāmakotyaṅkhyā-
pīṭhādhishṭhitam adbhutam,
bhāvaye 'ham mahā-moha-
dhvāntasaṅghātaham mahāḥ.

MANDANAMISRA

by

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

M.A., PH.D.

Maṇḍanamīśra, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*, is one of the best known figures in the literature of Advaita Vedānta, and one of the few teachers of great renown who have left the characteristic hallmark of their thought on the stupendous structure of Advaita. In addition to the *Brahmasiddhi*¹ which considered to be one of the major classical treatises on Advaita, he wrote three works on Mīmāṃsā—the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*,² the *Bhāvanāviveka*,³ and the *Vidhiviveka*,⁴ one work on the philosophy of language—the *Sphoṭasiddhi*,⁵ and one work on the theories of error, viz., the *Vibhramaviveka*.⁶

It is not difficult for us to fix the upper and the lower limits of the period when Maṇḍana must have lived. Maṇḍana quotes a passage from Bhartrihari's *Vākyapadīya*,⁷ and also a verse from Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* in the *Brahmasiddhi*.⁸ He cites the authority of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Śloka-vārtika* either for approval or criticism many a time.⁹ There are evidences to show that he was a younger contemporary of Prabhākara, for while he is

1. Edited with Introduction by Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri (Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series No. 4, Madras 1937). In this paper this work will be referred to as BS.

2. Edited by Dr Ganganatha Jha, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

3. Sarasvati Bhavan Texts, Benares No. 6.

4. The Pandit, Benares.

5. Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 6.

6. Madras Oriental Series No. 1.

7. BS, Part I, p. 26.

8. BS, Part I, p. 150.

9. BS, Part I, pp. 10, 11, 38, 40.

critical of Prabhākara's *Bṛihati*,¹⁰ Prabhākara himself does not presuppose Maṇḍana's works. Śālikanātha, a disciple of Prabhākara, quotes extracts from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* and criticises them in his *Prakaraṇapañchikā*.¹¹ So Maṇḍana was later than Bhartṛihari and Gauḍapāda and earlier than Śālikanātha, and must have been a younger contemporary of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara. Though Maṇḍana does not quote or refer to any passage from Śaṅkara's works, there are internal evidences to show that he is quite conversant with Śaṅkara's standpoint, particularly with regard to *karma* and *jñāna*.¹² A careful study of the *Brahmasiddhi* will prove that Maṇḍana expounds the philosophy of Advaita drawing his inspiration from the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahmasūtra*. In all probability he was an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara. If the view of modern scholars who assign Śaṅkara to 788-820 A.D. (?) is accepted, then Maṇḍana as a contemporary of Śaṅkara must have lived in the second half of the eighth century and the beginning of the ninth century A.D. Though we find it difficult to determine the date of Maṇḍana, we can confidently assign him to the period later than Gauḍapāda and Bhartṛihari and earlier than Śālikanātha.

Maṇḍana's aim in writing the *Brahmasiddhi* is to vindicate the authority of the *Upanishads* which intimate the non-dual, ever-existent Brahman. The main purpose of this work as indicated by its title is to ascertain the real nature of Brahman which is the ultimate reality by means of a searching enquiry and critical investigation. The work is divided into four chapters: (1) the *Brahma-kāṇḍa*, (2) the *Tarka-kāṇḍa*, (3) the *Niyoga-kāṇḍa* and (4) the *Siddhi-kāṇḍa*. Of these, the third chapter is the biggest occupying nearly half of the work and the last one the smallest.

Almost the entire first chapter which is devoted to elucidate the substance of the first verse through the authority of Scripture and reasoning is concerned with the main theme of the work, viz., the ascertainment of the true nature of Brahman. Towards the end of this chapter there is a discussion about the place of *karma* and

10. Compare BS, Part I, pp. 23-26 with *Bṛihati* (Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 3), p. 20, 22.

11. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 17, pp. 154, 155.

12. BS, Part I, pp. 32-34.

knowledge in the scheme of discipline leading to liberation. In the *Tarka-kāṇḍa* there is elaborate discussion about the superiority of the scriptural testimony *vis-a-vis* perception and other means of knowledge in respect of our knowledge of the trans-empirical reality; and this is followed by a critical examination of the nature of difference and the views of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas, and the Bauddhas thereon. The central theme of the third chapter is that Brahman-realisation does not fall within the scope of injunction. The explanation of the Advaita view of liberation and the refutation of the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* are also to be found in this chapter. In the last chapter the question how the *Upanishads* convey the sense of Brahman, not already known, through words whose meanings are known in the sphere of ordinary thought is discussed.

Maṇḍana has made valuable contribution to the Advaita ontology. His arguments to show that bliss which is Brahman is not absence of misery or absence of desire, but a positive state of happiness are elaborate and exhaustive. He argues that the transcendental bliss, of which the empirical pleasure is only a fragment, should be conceived positively and not negatively; for only a positive category admits of specification and determination. The more and the less are possible only in the case of a positive category. Brahman or the Self is bliss, because it is the seat of supreme love. There is not only the authority of Scripture but also the evidence of experience to show that the Self is of the nature of bliss. For all the creatures including the smallest worms, the self is dear. The love of one's self, says Maṇḍana, is nowhere more evident and better expressed than in the desire of every creature, 'Let me not go out of existence; let me live for ever'. This love of the Self is consistent only if it be of the nature of bliss.¹³

Maṇḍana's argument to establish the self-luminosity of Brahman or the Self serves as a model of philosophical reasoning. Brahman, argues Maṇḍana, is never an object in relation to a knowing subject. It cannot be known in the way in which other things are known. The Self which is pure consciousness lights up all our experiences and reveals all the objects of the world, which being insentient are incapable of revealing themselves. While

13. BS, Part I, p. 5.

everything else is presented to the Self as an object, the Self is not presented to anything, not even to itself. It follows, therefore, that the ordinary categories like cause and effect, substance and attribute, whole and parts, etc., do not apply to it. It is not an object in relation to a subject; and so it is not in space and time. It is not a cause in relation to an effect, not a substance in relation to attributes, not a whole in relation to its parts, not an identity in the midst of diversity. In short, it is supra-relational and so supra-rational. It is for these reasons that Maṇḍana says that the self-luminosity of the Self which is the knower is its cognizability. It is not cognizable in the usual sense of the term. If we say that the Self is cognizable, it is because it is self-luminous. Its self-luminosity is what is meant when it is treated as cognizable.

Maṇḍana's discussion of the knower-known relation is very interesting. One of the arguments adduced in favour of the reality of difference centres round the knower-known relation. The object which is known implies that there is a knower independent of and external to it. The knower is inferred from the known, and so the knower and the known are different from each other. Though Maṇḍana spares just twelve lines for the purpose of refuting this view, he is able to show with a remarkable dialectical dexterity that the knower-known relation, far from lending support to the reality of difference, undermines it. His contention is that the knower-known relation is intelligible and consistent only when the oneness of reality is accepted. In the course of the discussion Maṇḍana points out that, if difference is accepted as real, the Self or the knower and the object which is known cannot be related, since the two are of different nature; the Self or the knower is knowledge pure and absolute, whereas the object which is known is insentient. He rejects the contention that the internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) could relate the knower which is consciousness and the object which is its opposite. The explanation that is given in terms of the modification (*vr̥tti*) of the internal organ, which by its proximity to the sentient Self acquires lustre by which it is able to reflect the objects, though the underlying consciousness which is the Self remains unaffected by the modifications of the internal organ does not, declares Maṇḍana, serve to show that objects are really seen, and that they are different from the

knower. If it be said that the internal organ gets the reflection of the Self, it only means that the internal organ which is insentient *appears* to be sentient. And so this 'getting the reflection' of the sentient Self by the internal organ is not real but illusory. We cannot under these circumstances argue by depending upon this acquired power of reflection of the internal organ, which is *mithyā*, that objects are really seen and that they are different from the knower.¹⁴ It may not be out of place to point out here that the line of reasoning which Maṇḍana has adopted in the discussion of the knower-known relation has very much influenced Ānandabodha, who himself admits that he has gathered his materials from others.¹⁵ This admission is significant in view of the fact that most of the arguments which we find in the works of Ānandabodha have been borrowed by the later writers of the Vedānta school.

Being influenced by Bhartrihari, the noted grammarian-philosopher, Maṇḍana introduces the *śabdādvaita*¹⁶ in the course of his interpretation of the significance of the word 'aksharam' contained in the opening verse of the *Brahmasiddhi*. Brahman, says Maṇḍana, is *aksharam* or of the nature of sound (*śabdātmatā*), because the scriptural texts establish the identity of the mystic sound *Om* or *Pranava* with Brahman. The *Praśna Upanishad*, for instance, says: 'That which is the sound *Om* is verily the higher and the lower Brahman'.¹⁷ The sound *Om* is not indicative of Brahman; on the other hand, *Om*, according to this text, is Brahman. This is on account of the termination '*kāra*' which refers to the preceding letter or word, and which has its purport in the word and not in the object which the word refers to.¹⁸

Maṇḍana does not deny that *śruti* texts sometimes teach meditation on *Pranava* as Brahman, since it is difficult to meditate on Brahman which is devoid of attributes without some image or symbol as an aid. Just as a piece of wood or stone taken as 'the symbol of a deity is worshipped as if it were the deity, so also

14. BS, Part I, p. 8.

15. *Nyāyamakaranda* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 38), p. 359.

16. BS, Part I, pp. 17-19.

17. 5-2.

18. *Vyākaraṇa-vārtika*, 3-3-108.

Brahman is to be meditated upon by means of *Om* since it is the name for Brahman. *Praṇava* is commended for purposes of meditation in *śruti* statements like, 'Meditate on *Om* as the Self', etc.¹⁹ But it should not be construed that *Om* is commended for meditation in all places. If a *śruti* text purports to bring out the nature of *Om* without commending it for meditation, it must be interpreted as teaching the identity of *Om* with Brahman. The *Taittirīya Upanishad*, for example, declares the identity of *Om* with Brahman when it says: '*Om* is Brahman, *Om* is this all'.²⁰ Again, the *Chāndogya Upanishad* says: 'Just as all leaves are permeated by the stalk, so is all speech permeated by *Om*. Verily, the syllable *Om* is all this'.²¹

Maṇḍana vindicates by means of elaborate arguments that the phenomenal world is only an illusory appearance of *śabda* which is the reality. If the ultimate reality is said to be *śabda*, there is the fear that it may not be identical with the Self or Brahman of the *Upanishads*; for *śabda*, it may be thought, is insentient; while the Self is said to be of the nature of knowledge. There is no room for any such fear, for Maṇḍana clearly shows that *śabdatattva* is identical with knowledge which is Brahman. Knowledge manifests objects in a clear and distinguishable way only when it comes to be associated with sound. Sound is identical with knowledge, for it is the potency of sound (*vākśakti*) that illuminates objects.

Maṇḍana's exposition of the nature and locus of *avidyā* contains several striking features peculiar to the Advaitic tradition as embodied in the *Brahmasiddhi*. Maṇḍana does not make any distinction between the two terms *avidyā* and *māyā*. He uses them as synonyms. It is only in the post-Śaṅkara period that the two terms came to be used in different senses. *Avidyā*, says Maṇḍana, is not of the nature of Brahman; nor is it something other than Brahman; it is neither real nor unreal. It is thus known as *māyā*, *mithyāabhāsa*. Since it is neither real as Brahman nor unreal as the sky-flower, it is said to be *anirvachanīya*. Maṇḍana argues that the *jīva* is the seat or locus of *avidyā* which obscures the true nature of Brahman and thus has Brahman as its object.²²

19. *Muṇḍaka-upanishad*, 2-2-6.

20. 1-8-1.

21. 2-23-3.

22. *BS*, Part I. n. 10.

It may be argued that Maṇḍana's standpoint involves the fallacy of mutual dependence: that is, the *jīva* is the result of *avidyā*, and *avidyā* has to depend upon the *jīva* which is its locus. Maṇḍana refutes the criticism that his explanation involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. First, *avidyā* does not admit of logical analysis in terms of consistency and cogency. How can we expect *avidyā* to stand to reason? Therefore the objection that *avidyā* which is dependent on the *jīva* for its existence cannot itself be the cause of the *jīva* is meaningless. Second, since both *avidyā* and the *jīva* are beginningless like the sprout-seed series, there is no logical priority as between *jīvatva* and *avidyā*; as for chronological priority, the question does not arise as neither has a beginning in time.

How is *avidyā* to be removed? *Avidyā*, says Maṇḍana, is destroyed by the practice of aids (*sādhana*) like *śravaṇa* or the understanding of the truth from the scriptural texts, *manana* or the investigation of the truth in the light of reason, *dhyānābhyāsa* or repeated contemplation upon the truth as enjoined by Scripture.²³ Repeated contemplation upon the truth preceded by *śravaṇa* and *manana* annuls the multifarious cognitions of diversity (*bheda-darśana*), as it is opposed to it. The knowledge that results from *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyānābhyāsa* is itself one which involves distinctions. *Śravaṇa* implies the distinctions of the teacher, the taught, and the teaching, and so the knowledge which arises therefrom is a form of *avidyā*. For the sake of our understanding, this can be characterised as the good phase of *avidyā*. It serves to remove the multifarious cognitions of difference due to *avidyā*. The latter can be called the bad phase of *avidyā*. Not only does it remove the world of diversity projected by *avidyā* but also removes itself, just as the clearing-nut purifies the turbid water of dirt by removing it and also removes itself, just as poison nullifies another poison and also annihilates itself. When all the illusory differences conjured up by *avidyā* as well as the different aids (*sādhana-bheda*) like *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc., disappear, the *jīva* shines forth remaining in its natural state, pure and unperturbed. In support of his account of the removal of ignorance—how the good phase of *avidyā*, viz., the knowledge resulting from

23. BS, Part I, p. 12.

śravaṇa, *manana* and *dhyānābhyaśa*, removes its bad phase, viz., the appearances of plurality due to nescience—Maṇḍana quotes the authority of the scriptural text which declares: 'Knowledge and ignorance, he who knows the two together crosses death through ignorance, and attains immortality through knowledge.'²⁴ The meaning of the text, according to Maṇḍana, is this: *avidyā* and *vidyā* must be taken together, as the former is the means to the latter or as the former is dependent on the latter. The bad phase of *avidyā* is '*mṛityu*' which is removed by the good phase of it consisting of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyānābhyaśa*, and the knower of truth thus remains what he has always really been, the eternal, free, self-luminous consciousness.

Maṇḍana's contribution to epistemology is as valuable as his contribution to the metaphysics of Advaita. His refutation of the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* is thorough and elaborate.²⁵ Though the theory of *akhyāti* alone is examined in the *Brahmasiddhi*, the other important theories of erroneous cognition are discussed in his *Vibhrama-viveka*. It should be pointed out in this connection that the discussion of the theory of *akhyāti* in the *Vibhrama-viveka* and the *Brahmasiddhi* is almost identical. By maintaining the Bhāṭṭa theory of *viparīta-khyāti* which is practically the same as the Nyāya theory of *anyathā-khyāti*, Maṇḍana prepares the way for the *anirvachanīyakhyāti* of Advaita.

According to Maṇḍana, the knowledge which we get from the *Upaniṣads* is indirect and mediate (*parokṣa*) and necessarily involves relation in some manner like any other cognition arising from a valid verbal testimony. Meditation upon the content of the verbal cognition is necessary in order to transform the indirect and mediate knowledge into direct and immediate experience. So repeated contemplation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) on the import of the principal texts (*mahāvākyas*) is a 'must' in order to attain the direct intuition of Brahman. Vāchaspati who is greatly indebted to Maṇḍana follows him in this respect, as in many others.

Like other Advaitins, Maṇḍana too upholds the doctrine of *jīvanmukti* or liberation in the living state.²⁶ He contends that at the onset of knowledge ignorance and all karmas, the fructified

24. *Īśāvasya Upaniṣad*, 11.

25. *BS*, Part I, pp. 136-146.

26. *BS*, Part I, pp. 129-130.

as well as the unfructified, disappear. In support of his contention, he quotes the *Munḍaka* text: "The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled and his *karmas* terminate, when He is seen, the higher and the lower."²⁷ If all *karmas* including *prārabdha* cease to exist at the time of Brahman-realisation, a person who attains perfect intuition should become disembodied immediately; and this would go against the *Chāndogya* text²⁸ which fixes the falling off of the body as the limit for the attainment of final release (*kaivalya*). In order to show that his position does not come into conflict with the *Chāndogya* text, Maṇḍana interprets it in two ways. One interpretation results in the advocacy of *sadyo-mukti* or complete liberation from embodied existence immediately following Brahman-realisation, while the other involves the acceptance of *jīvanmukti*. Since Maṇḍana refers to both *sadyo-mukti* and *jīvanmukti*, he is compelled to explain the *sthitaprajña* described in the *Gītā*²⁹ in two ways. From the point of view of *sadyomukti*, the *sthitaprajña* may be taken as a *sādhaka* who has closely approximated to realisation and is awaiting it. According to the second interpretation, the *Gītā* description of *sthitaprajña* may be taken to refer to a *jīvanmukta*. Maṇḍana does not say that in all cases the body should fall off as soon as Brahman-realisation is attained. Though *prārabdha* ceases to exist like other *karmas* together with *avidyā* at the onset of knowledge resulting in complete liberation from embodied existence, it may be that in certain cases the body persists for a short while even after realisation, because of the impressions of *prārabdha*. There is therefore no justification for the view that Maṇḍana does not advocate *jīvanmukti*.

Maṇḍana's evaluation of *karma* and its relation to knowledge exhibits certain features peculiar to the tradition of Advaita which he upholds. According to him, *karma* and knowledge are related as means and end.³⁰ He does not accept the view that *karma* and knowledge, being diametrically opposed to each other, could not be brought into relation. He maintains that both *karma* and meditation play a vital role in bringing about Self-realisation.

27. 2-2-8.

28. 6-14-2.

29. 2-54.

30. BS, Part I, p. 32.

The verbal cognition which arises from the *Upanishads* should be supplemented by certain aids (*sādhana*) like contemplation in order to attain Brahman-intuition. As a result of repeated contemplation (*abhyāsa*), the impressions of the knowledge of the non-dual Self obtained from the *Upanishads* grow and develop in such a way that they are able to remove the impressions of *avidyā* and thereby bring about the final manifestation of the real nature of the Self. Since *karmas* are prescribed by Scripture,³¹ they are also useful in this regard. Whereas the usefulness of contemplation is visible, that of the *karmas* is imperceptible. The *karmas* belonging to the *āśramas* are exceptional means (*sādhana-viśeṣa*). Though he readily admits that it is possible for one who observes life-long celibacy to attain Self-realisation exclusively through contemplation in association with the control of the mind, etc., without performing scriptural rites, he says that one who combines the contemplative and the ritualistic disciplines will be able to reach the goal far more quickly than otherwise. The *āśrama-karmas* are helpful to the seeker after truth as a horse is to the wayfarer in reaching the goal quicker. Though the goal may be reached by plodding on without a horse, yet a horse is sought to be employed for gaining time or for avoiding inconvenience. *Karmas* are of as much service to a seeker after truth as a horse is to one who would otherwise have to trudge the whole distance on foot.³²

Maṇḍana is a firm believer in *āśrama-dharmas*, not as ends in themselves but as very valuable means to the end. By recommending the association of the contemplative discipline with the ritualistic discipline for the purpose of attaining Self-realisation, he has distinguished himself as the foremost among 'integrative Advaitins'.

A respected authority on Mīmāṃsā and a reputed teacher of Advaita, a doughty champion of the *Upanishadic* tradition and a master-mind skilled in dialectical reasoning, Maṇḍana occupies a high pedestal in the imposing edifice of Advaita Vedānta. His contribution to Advaita is of lasting importance. Among the lustrous names that adorn the history of Advaita, Maṇḍana's is a prominent one.

31. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4-4-22.

32. *BS*, Part I, pp. 36-37.

VACHASPATIMISRA

by

SWAMI ANANTANANDENDRA SARASVATI

In the history of Advaita literature, Vāchaspatimiśra stands out as a prominent figure. He is well-known as the author of the commentary—*Bhāmatī* on Śrī Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtra*. In the concluding verses of the *Bhāmatī* Vāchaspati enumerates his other works. And, they are as follows: the *Nyāyakaṇṭhikā* (a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka*), the *Brahmatattvasamīkshā* (a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*), the *Tattvabindu* (a discussion of language in its relation to meaning), the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā* (a commentary on Udyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika*), the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha* (perhaps written as a supplement to the *Tātparyatīkā*), the *Sāṅkhyatattva-kaumudī* (a commentary on Īśvarakṛishṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā*), the *Tattvavaiśārādī* (a commentary on Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya*), and the *Bhāmatī* (a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya*). All the works have been published with the exception of the *Brahmatattvasamīkshā*.

The *Bhāmatī* itself has been commented on by other Advaitic writers. Amalānanda (13th Century A.D.) wrote his *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī*. The *Kalpataru* in turn formed the subject of two commentaries, the *Parimala* of Appayyadīkshita (16th Century A.D.) and the *Ābhoga* of Lakshmīnṛisimha (17th Century A.D.). Other commentaries on the *Bhāmatī* are (1) the *Bhāmatīvyākhyā* or *Ṛijuprakāśikā* by Akhaṇḍānanda, (2) the *Bhāmatītilaka*, and (3) the *Bhāmātīvilāsa*.

Date of Vāchaspatimiśra

On the strength of a reference in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, Prof. Das Gupta has come to the conclusion¹ that Vāchaspatimiśra must have flourished in the first half of the ninth century A.D.

1. See Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 107.

The name of the *Bhāmatī* is identified with one of the two main streams of Śāṅkara Advaita. The views of Padmapāda as interpreted by Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* are known as the tenets of the *Vivaraṇaprasthāna* while the views of Vāchaspatimiśra are known as the tenets of the *Bhāmatīprasthāna*. We shall now briefly set forth the differences between the two view-points.

1. Vāchaspatimiśra holds that performance of rituals and other duties relating to one's stage and order of life generate in the mind of the aspirant the desire to know Brahman. While commenting on the section known as *Sarvāpekshādhikaraṇa* (iii, iv, vi) Vāchaspatimiśra states that knowledge of Brahman for its rise requires the performance of rituals which generates in the mind of the aspirant the desire to know Brahman; and the Upanishadic text '*vividishanti yajñena*' states so.

*utpattau jñānasya karmāpekshā vidyate vividishct-
pādadvārā, vividishanti yajñena iti śruteḥ.*

This view is reiterated by him in his commentary on Śāṅkara's bhāshya on the aphorism '*sarvathāpi cha ta evo'bhayaalin-gam*' (iii, xxxiv).²

Prakāśātman, on the other hand, maintains that the performance of rituals, etc., are responsible for giving rise to the knowledge of Brahman. In his *Vivaraṇa*³ as well as in his work *Śūrīra-kanyāyasaṅgraha* he affirms this view.

According to both the views, the performance of rituals and other duties belonging to one's class of life must be given up after the rise of the desire to know Brahman. But, while according to Vāchaspatimiśra the utility of karma ceases with merely giving rise to the desire to know Brahman, according to Prakāśātman the results of the performed deeds are operative till the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The former view is known as *vividishāpaksha*; and the latter one, as *vedanāpaksha*.

2. Vāchaspatimiśra holds that the mind is the instrument in giving rise to the knowledge of the identity of Ātman and Brahman,

2. See *Bhāmatī*, Nirnayasagar Press, 1909, p. 30.

3. Vide *Pañchapādikāvivarana*, Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Edn., 1958, pp. 37, 543, 554.

while, according to Prakāśātman, the major texts of the Upanishads give rise to the knowledge of the identity of Ātman and Brahman.

Vāchaspatimiśra states:

*'nirvichikitsita-vākyārtha-bhāvanā-
paripākasahitam-antaḥkaraṇam
tvampadārthasya-aparokshasya
tattadupādhyākūranishedhena
tatpadārthatām anubhāvayatīti yuktam'*⁴

Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* holds⁵ that since Brahman is immediate the Upanishadic texts give rise to the immediate knowledge of Brahman. But, owing to the impediments such as *vishaya-bhogavāsanā*, *pramāṇāsaṁbhāvanā*, *prameyāsaṁbhāvanā* and *viparītabhāvanā*, the immediate knowledge that has arisen appears to be mediate. When the impediments are removed by the cultivation of virtues like control of intellect, external senses, etc., and by Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation, the immediate knowledge that has already arisen becomes effective in dispelling *avidyā*. The point that is of great importance here is that the knowledge of Brahman arises from the major texts of the Upanishads and not from the mind. Prakāśātman further holds that in the Upanishadic text — '*tam tu aupanishadam puruṣam prichchāmi*' — the *taddhita* suffix in the word '*aupanishadam*' signifies that śabda or the Upanishadic text is the means of knowing Brahman.

*"'tam tu aupanishadam' iti taddhitapratyayaṇa brahmā-
gatīhetutvam śabdasya darśitamupapannam bhavati"*⁶

At the end of his work *Śabdanirṇaya* Prakāśātman affirms this view, and there the following verse occurs:

*vishayotpannataḥ saṁvid-
aikyādvā'jñānahānataḥ
svatassiddherataḥ śabdād
āparokshyam prajāyate.*

4. See *Bhāmatī*, p. 31.

5. *Vivaraṇa*, pp. 403-408.

6. *Vivaraṇa*, p. 408.

3. Another point of difference between the two schools is in respect of injunction regarding Vedāntic study, reflection and meditation.

The Vedāntic study is only inquiry into the purport of the Vedānta and its fruit is only the removal of impediment consisting in delusion and doubt as to the import of Vedānta. Reflection is only arguing within oneself as to the validity of the truth learnt and its fruit is only the removal of impediment consisting in delusion as to the validity of the truth. And, meditation is only concentrated and continuous thinking on the truth of the Upanishads, and its fruit is only the removal of contrary notions regarding the truth learnt.

That a study of a particular text leads to the ascertainment of the import of the text, and that reflection and meditation lead to the ascertainment of the validity of the truth and to the removal of false notions regarding it are a matter of common experience.

*anvayavyatirekābhyām cha śravaṇamanananididhyāsanābhyā
sasya svagochara sākshātkāra phalatvēna lokasiddhatvāt*.⁸

No other means is established with reference to these results. Hence Vāchaspati holds that an aspirant who knows the relation of words to their senses spontaneously engages himself in the Vedāntic study and then in reflection and meditation. The Upanishadic declaration that Ātman should be heard, reflected on, and meditated upon is only a restatement of ordinary experience. And restatement is useful in this that the aspirant could have a strong and irresistible attraction toward Vedāntic study, reflection and meditation.⁹ Vāchaspatimiśra concludes that there is no scope for any injunction at all in respect of Vedāntic study, reflection and meditation.

7. *Bhāmatī* on iii, iv, 26.

8. See *Bhāmatī*, p. 826.

9. *Bhāmatī*: 'anyataḥ prāptā eva hi śravaṇādayo vidhisarūpaiḥ vākyaīr-anūdyante, na chānuvādo' prayojanaḥ pravṛitti viśeshakaravāt'—(pp. 84-85).

Vide also: *na cha chintāsākshātakārayoḥ vidhiriti tattvasamīkshāyām asmābhiḥ upapāditam*. — (pp. 649-650).

Vāchaspatimiśra comes to this conclusion on the authority of Śrī Śaṅkara's text on the Samanvaya-sūtra. There Śrī Śaṅkara observes: "For what purpose, then, are these texts like 'the self is to be seen, heard,' etc., which have the appearance of injunctions? We say that they are for turning one away from the objects of natural activity."

In all these places, Vāchaspatimiśra maintains that there is no injunction at all in respect of Vedāntic study, etc. But in his commentary on some *adhikaraṇas* it seems that he accepts injunction in respect of Vedāntic study, etc. For instance, while commenting on the section known as *Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa* (1.4.6), Vāchaspatimiśra says: '*ātmaiva drashṭavyaḥ sākshātakartavyaḥ, etat sādhanāni cha śravaṇādīni vikitāni śrotavyaḥ ityādinā*' (p. 328).

Further, while commenting on the section known as *Sahakāryantaravidhyādhikaraṇa* (3.4.14) Vāchaspatimiśra says: *apūrvatvāt vidhirūstheyāḥ* (p. 828).

From this it seems that Vāchaspati admits injunction as regards Vedāntic study, etc., which clearly leads to contradiction. His commentator Amalānanda reconciles this apparent contradictory position by pointing out that the statements which appear to have the sense of injunction are merely restatements of what is a matter of ordinary experience. And they are helpful in this that they give rise in the mind of the aspirant to an irresistible attraction towards Vedāntic study, etc.

Prakāśātman, on the other hand, maintains that there is *niyama-vidhi* in respect of Vedāntic study, etc. In the ninth *varṇaka* of his *Vivaraṇa* (p. 352) he describes the nature of *śravaṇa*, etc. And in the same *varṇaka* he states that the first aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa has full scope only on the acceptance of injunction in respect of *śravaṇa* strengthened by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.

*manana-nididhyāsanopabṛimhitasya śravaṇasya
samyagdarśanāya vidheyatvam aṅgīkritya
prathamāsūtram pravṛittam.*

This discussion leads us on to the other one, namely, whether Vedāntic study (*śravaṇa*) is principal among the means that give rise to knowledge or meditation (*nididhyāsana*) is principal.

Vāchaspatimiśra holds that *nididhyāsana* is the principal one and the other two are its auxiliaries.¹⁰

Prakāśātman in his *Vivarāṇa* holds that *śravaṇa* is principal and the other two are its auxiliaries.¹¹

4. In accounting for the nature of *jīva* and *Īśvara*, Vāchaspatimiśra differs from Prakāśātman. Advaitins maintain that the difference between *Īśvara* and *jīva* is only adventitious and not real. There, one view is that consciousness is delimited by the adventitious conditions such as *avidyā* and *antaḥkaraṇa*; the other view is that it is reflected in these adventitious conditions. The former theory is known as *avaccheda-vāda*; and the latter is known as *pratibimba-vāda*.

Of these, the *avaccheda-vāda* is advocated by Vāchaspatimiśra and the *pratibimba-vāda* is refuted by him. While commenting on the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* Vāchaspati states that there could not be any reflection of *Ātman* which is free from any form in the intellect which is also formless. He says that an object having a form could receive the reflection of some other thing that has also a form. Brahman being free from any form cannot have any reflection in the intellect which also is formless. How could there be any reflection of sound, smell, taste, etc?

While commenting on the section known as '*rachanānu-papatyadhikaraṇa*' (2.2.1), Vāchaspatimiśra says:

*avidyopādāna kalpitāvacchedo
jīvaḥ paramātmapratiimbakalpaḥ*.

In the *Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa* (1.4.6) Vāchaspati says:

*avidyo'pādānam cha yadyapi vidyāsvabhāve paramātmāni na
sākshādasti tathāpi tatpratibimbakalpa jīva-dvāreṇa parasminnu-
chyate.*

In these passages by the word *pratibimbakalpa* he means that *jīva* is not a reflection, but may be likened to a reflection for purposes of exposition. We may infer from this that *pratibimbavāda* is not acceptable to Vāchaspatimiśra. If it were so he could have

10. *Bhāmatī*, pp. 71, 802.

11. *Vivarāṇa*, pp. 29-30.

very well said *tatpratibimba jīva* instead of saying *tatpratibimbakalpa jīva*.

Vāchaspati compares¹² the individual soul to the etheric space delimited by jar, pot, etc., Since there could only be delimitation and not reflection of etheric space in jar, pot, etc., and since Vāchaspati compares the individual soul to the etheric space confined in jar, pot, etc., we may take that Vāchaspati favours only *avaccheda-vāda*.

Prakāśātman maintains the theory that *jīva* and *Īśvara* are only the reflections of consciousness in *avidyā* and the intellect. Etheric space which is formless is reflected in water. Similarly consciousness which is formless could have reflection in *avidyā* and the intellect. Prakāśātman advances the theory that *jīva* and *Īśvara* are the reflections, on the authority of the Upanishadic texts like —

rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva,
'ekadhā bahudhā chaiva dṛśīyate jalachandravat'

and on the authority of the *Brahma-sūtra*

'ata eva ca upamā sūryakādivat' (3.2.18). In the ninth *varṇaka* he asks: Of what nature is the individual soul? and he answers: Brahman reflected in *avidyā* is the individual soul.¹³ From this it is clear that Prakāśātman favours only *pratibimbavāda*.

5. All Advaitins agree that the content of *avidyā* is pure consciousness. But as regards its locus Vāchaspatimiśra holds that *jīva* is the locus while Prakāśātman maintains that pure consciousness itself is the locus. While commenting on the section *-samanvayādhikaraṇa* (i.i.iv) Vāchaspatimiśra observes that *avidyā* has *jīva* as its locus and it is indeterminable. Brahman, therefore, is always pure.

*'nāvidyā brahmāśrayā, kintu jīve, sā tu anirvachanīyā
ityuktam tena nityaśuddham brahma'*

12. See *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, 3-2-3; 2-1-4; and 2-3-11.

13. *Vivaraṇa*, p. 760.

The same view is reiterated by him in his commentary on the sections *sarvatraprasiddhādhikaraṇa* (i, ii, i), *ānumānikādhikaraṇa* (i.iv.i) and *vākyānvayādhikaraṇa* (i.iv.vi).

Prakāśātman in the first *varṇaka* of his *Vivaraṇa* refutes the differentiation between the locus and content of *avidyā* and holds that Brahman itself is the locus and content of *avidyā*.

*na tāvadajñānam āśraya-vishaya-bhedāpeksham, kintu ekasminneva vastuni āśrayatvam āvaraṇam cheti kṛtyadvayam sampādayati.*¹⁴

6. The next point of difference between the two schools is as regards the plurality of *avidyā*. Vāchaspatimiśra admits the plurality of the primal nescience which is indeterminable and positive in nature. *Avidyā* according to him has *jīva* as its locus. Hence *avidyā* is different in the case of each and every individual soul. He observes:

*‘na vayam pradhānavad avidyām sarvajīveshvekāṃ āchakshāmahe, ena evamupalabhyemahi, kiṃ tu iyaṃ pratiṣṭvām bhidyate’.*¹⁵

Prakāśātman, on the other hand, maintains only one nescience indeterminable and positive in nature. He, however, admits manifold aspects of the one nescience which are called *tūlājñāna* and which serve as the material cause of silver, etc., that appear on nacre, etc.

*mulājñānasyaiva avasthābhedāḥ rajatādyupādānāni śuktikādijñānāiḥ sahādhyaśena nivartante’.*¹⁶

7. The content of the intuitive knowledge, according to *Vivaraṇa*, is Brahman unenveloped by any *upādhi*.¹⁷ Vāchaspatimiśra, however, maintains that Brahman enveloped by the mental state (*upahita brahman*) is the content of the intuitive knowledge. While

14. p. 210. Vide also p. 219.

15. See *Bhāmatī* on 1-4-1.

16. See *Vivaraṇa*, p. 99. For more details See *Brahmānandīyabhāva-prakāśa*, Edited by Sri V. Subramania Sastri and published by The Private Secretary to His Highness The Maharaja of Cochin, (1961), p. 12.

17. See *Vivaraṇa*, pp. 211, 213 and 224.

commenting on the section known as *Janmādhyaadhikaraṇa* (1.1.2.) Amalānanda makes clear the view of Vāchaspatimiśra thus: 'vṛittivishayaivatvamapi tasyaiva upahitasya, na nirupādheḥ tanna prasmartavyam'.

It should be borne in mind that according to Vāchaspati Brahman associated with the mental state is the content of the intuitive knowledge, and Brahman unenveloped by any mental state is self-luminous.

The above are a few important differences between the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa* school. The Advaitic thought after Śaṅkara flowed in these two channels, of course, towards the same goal.

*upāyāḥ śikṣhamāṇānām
bālānāmupalālanāḥ
asatye vartmani sthitvā
tataḥ satyam samīhate*

Various theories have been set forth in order to understand the truth. Although the theories are not ultimately true, yet they are helpful in realizing the ultimate truth. Just as alphabets are useful in understanding the sounds, though they are less true than sounds being mere lines, the theories that are set forth by Vāchaspatimiśra, Prakāśātman and others are helpful in leading the aspirant to liberation, though they are less true than the latter. These theories, though different, lead one to the same goal, that is, liberation.

JNANAGHANAPADA

by

S. O. RAMAKRISHNAN

M.A., PH.D.

Among the many schools of Indian philosophical thought, the system of Advaita by virtue of its thoroughness and profundity occupies a pre-eminent position. Rooted in the Upanishads, this system was expounded, fairly consistently, by Gauḍapāda in his commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* and later, systematically worked out by Śaṅkarāchārya in his commentaries on the 'Prasthānatraya'. After him his followers took upon themselves the task of interpreting, elucidating, and supplementing his teachings; in the process, they formed distinct views on some of the important concepts like *māyā*, the nature of the individual soul (*jīva*), release (*mukti*), etc., which eventually led to the formulation of the three sub-schools, viz., the Vārtika, the Vivaraṇa, and the Bhāmatī. Noteworthy, and one of the earliest among these followers who made significant contributions to the development of Advaitic thought, was Jñānaghanapāda. His views are identical with those of the Vivaraṇa school. His main work *Tattvaśuddhi* is known for its clarity and precision and has been referred to by Appayya Dikshita in several places in his *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*.

There is a well-known half-verse which sets forth the fundamental position of the Advaita philosophy thus: 'Brahman alone is real, the world is illusory and the so-called individual self (*jīva*) is non-different from Brahman.'¹ The predominant feature that strikes one at the outset in this half-stanza is the non-difference of Brahman or the Universal Self with the Ātman, the core of the individual self (*jīva*). This ultimate non-difference of the indi-

1. *brahma satyam, jaganmithyā, jīvobrahmaiva nāparaḥ.*

vidual self (*jīva*) in its essence with Brahman forms the central theme around which every one of the post-Saṅkara advaitic preceptors, Jñānaghana not excepted, weaves his theories. Brahman and Ātman, thus, in their non-difference as remaining unconditioned by the three divisions of time, viz., past, present, and future (*trikālābādhyam*) is eternal and is alone ultimately real, spoken of by the Upanishads as being 'One only without a second'.² These words 'One only without a second' referred to in the Upanishads, in the view of Jñānaghana, exclude internal differences (*svagata-bheda*) from the non-dual Reality and declare that it (Reality) is partless-ultimate (*akhaṇḍaikarasa*).³ Jñānaghana commences his treatise with the chapter on 'Advaita', in which he tries to prove that Advaita can be established even through perception. According to him, "Perception comprehends bare reality, the constant substrate in pot, cloth, etc. The co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ serves only in the comprehension of bare reality, pot, etc., being delusively presented. Absence of sublating cognition is no defect. Differences cannot be cognised through perception, because they are cognised only together with the counter-correlates, many of which are remote in space and time; nor is difference cognised through memory, since there is no memory-impression of its being qualified by the counter-correlate as such; nor can it be inferred, since inference proceeds on the comprehension of difference; counter-correlates are but delusive appearances; hence, differences and their correlates are also delusive; hence no conflict of scripture-declared non-duality with perception."⁴

Reality, further, as the irreducible substratum of existence that cannot be denied is of the nature of existence which is identical with consciousness. Advaita regards the triune perception involving the distinction of the knower, the known, and the act of knowing, as constituting different aspects of pure consciousness. The distinction among these is merely due to the mental modifications resulting from *avidyā*. When these modifications cease, what re-

2. *ekamevādviṭīyam*: *Chāndogyopanishad*, VI, 2, 1.

3. Jñānaghanapāda: *Tattvaśuddhi* (Edited by S. S. Suryanarayana sastri and E. P. Radhakrishnan, University of Madras, 1941) p. 4.

4. See S. S. Sastri's table of contents to his translation on Appayya Dīkshita's *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* (University of Madras, 1935), Vol. I, p. 91.

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyagātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, "They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness."⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnavāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

His essential nature, He is all-knowing (*sarvajña*) and is able to perceive the world of the present, past and future; hence omniscient.⁹ Brahman viewed from this perspective, i.e., Brahman in association with *māyā* is the cause of the universe. In trying to establish the advaitic position that only an intelligent principle like Brahman can be the cause of the universe, the rival schools of thought such as the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya, holding atoms and *pradhāna* respectively to be the cause of the universe, are refuted. Brahman is not merely the efficient but the material cause as well (*abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇa*). Arguing on the basis of scriptures, he says that when the Upanishadic statements such as 'In the beginning, O, gentle one! this was Being or Existence alone, one only without a second', 'In the beginning, verily, all this was Ātman only', 'Brahman alone is all this', etc., speak of co-ordinate relation between a sentient cause and the world, they clearly indicate that Brahman is the material cause. If Brahman were not the material cause, the Upanishads cannot speak in terms of co-ordinate relation between Brahman and the world, the reason being that co-ordinate relation cannot hold between the non-material cause and effect.¹⁰ The effect is not a transformation (*pariṇāma*) but only a transfiguration or an appearance (*vivarta*) of the cause; and as such, it (the effect) as being neither existent nor non-existent is inexplicable (*anirvachanīya*), not only after but also even before its origination.¹¹

Since Jñānaghana enunciates his theory of the world on the basis of his causal theory, the corollary that follows from it is not far to seek. Viewed in the light of this theory, Brahman, the cause, by its own nescience, can only be said to appear as the world of names and forms without undergoing any change whatsoever, and that the world regarded as an effect, being an illusory appearance of the cause, is neither real nor unreal. It is not real since it is sublated by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman.¹² Nor is it unreal, for, unlike hare's horn, it comes within the range of perception. It is, therefore, inexplicable (*anirvachanīya*) and it

9. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 157-158.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 100

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyagātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, "They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness."⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnavāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

and (b) as the effect. Viewed from the former perspective, *māyā* may be said to be the principle of creation or the creative power (*śakti*) of Brahman while from the latter, to the phenomenal creation itself. In other words, it may be said to signify the causal as well as the manifest state of the universe. In its former aspect, *māyā* is the causal potency (*bījaśakti*) of the primordial nature, with the diversity being latent in it which becomes patent with the development of the objective world from it. And it is in this sense that *māyā* is said to be the origin of the world and the latter a product thereof. But *māyā* differs from its products in this respect that while it, as the source of the universe, is beginningless (*anādi*), its products have a beginning in time. Further, *māyā* being neither real for the reason that it is liable to be sublated by right knowledge, nor unreal as it is the root cause of all appearances, nor both as that would involve contradiction, is indeterminable (*anirvachanīya*) in its nature.

In this connection, it needs to be mentioned that, according to Jñānaghana, the terms *māyā*, *ajñāna*, and *avidyā* connote one and the same principle, viz., ignorance. Ignorance is called *māyā* because it is illumined by pure consciousness which is the eternal self; it is also called *ajñāna* since it is contradictory to knowledge, being removable by it.¹⁷ The two, *māyā* and *ajñāna*, thus as referring to the same principle, viz., ignorance are regarded by Jñānaghana as being identical. In fact, in his work he makes use of these two terms, *māyā* and *ajñāna*, interchangeably and almost synonymously.¹⁸

Jñānaghana agrees with the other advaitic preceptors in holding the view that *māyā*, in so far as it conceals the self-luminous Brahman, has Brahman for its content (*vishaya*). But he argues that to conceal Brahman which is consciousness, it is perforce necessary that *ajñāna* should have its abode in Brahman.

17. *ato nityātmaprakāśenaiva māyādi śabdavāchyaṃ jñānavirodhāt jñānaparyudāsena ajñānamiti cha uchyamānaṃ. Op. cit., p. 134.*

18. *avidyāpratibimbitaṃ brahma anavacchinnatvāt īśvara iti gamyate. antahkaranapratibimbitaṃ brahma jīvaśabdavāchyaṃ bhavati. Ibid., pp. 243-44.*

In another context he says: *tattva māyāvacchede parameśvaratva vyavahāraḥ, antahkaranavacchede jīvatva vyavahāraḥ. p. 244.*

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyagātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, "They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness."⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnavāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

something positive in its nature (*bhāvarūpa ajñāna*). And that it is so is established by Jñānaghana on the basis of the experience that one has of it (ignorance) during deep sleep and the subsequent recollection of it on waking up in the form of "I slept happily until this time and knew nothing." In other words, the recollection of ignorance in deep sleep cannot be accounted for, unless ignorance is regarded as something positive. Even in the waking state, *ajñāna* as a positive entity should be admitted. Otherwise, questions regarding the unknown things would become unintelligible.²¹

But the '*āvaraṇa*' aspect of *māyā* in the case of *Īśvara* is powerless over Him in the sense that Brahman though concealed by *māyā* retains its own nature of pure consciousness without in any way being affected by the concealment and is ever conscious of His identity with the world. *Īśvara*, in fact, as devoid of internal organ and sense organs is referred to as the non-doer (*akartā*) and therefore the merits and demerits which arise as a result of one's performing actions do not pertain to Him; His knowledge being unsurpassable is infinite and so independent.²² With regard to the individual self (*jīva*) on the other hand, it is just the reverse in that, it (*āvaraṇa*) accounts for its bondage. It is on account of ignorance (*ajñāna*) that the individual self identifies itself with the sense organs and internal organ, performs actions, earns merits or demerits as a result of which it gets itself entangled in the transmigratory existence. Further, being under the influence of ignorance (*ajñāna*) its knowledge is limited and therefore dependent (on the Lord).²³ As the mediacy characterising *Īśvara* and the transmigratoriness and finitude characterising the individual self (*jīva*) are the results of ignorance (*ajñāna*), the cognition of difference also, as caused by ignorance (*ajñāna*) cannot but be apparent like the difference between the original and the reflection. Both the Lord (*Īśvara*) and the individual self (*jīva*) are, as mere reflections and as having consciousness as their essential nature are essentially non-different.²⁴

21. *Ibid.*, p. 137

22. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 240 (also see p. 21).

24. *Ibid.*, p. 244.

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyagātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, "They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness."⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnatvāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

or through being the cause for aspiration.²⁷ Jñānaghana is not in favour of the view which combines knowledge and rituals (*jñāna-karma-samucchaya*) as the means for release.²⁸ It is only the immediate knowledge of Brahman generated by the mahāvākyas such as "That thou art" (*tat tvam asi*), "I am Brahman" (*aham brahmāsmi*) that can dispel the beginningless ignorance and bring about release. Concluding his treatise with a description of the nature of release, Jñānaghana observes that it is a state of consciousness which is ever-lasting, unsurpassable bliss, being the inner non-dual Supreme Self.²⁹

27. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 254-263.

29. *nityasiddhaniratiśayānandapratyagadvitīyaparamātmachaitanyātmanā avasthānam apavargaḥ*. *Ibid.*, p. 306.

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyagātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, "They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness."⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnavāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

has further to be dependent on an ontological approach and, therefore, the two schools have to face each other. But the second, and more important, question will be about the real crux in the matter of the analysis and approach, which we find in the Reality of all existence,—apart from its epistemological analysis.

Prakāśātman wrote the famous sub-commentary *Pāñchapādīkāvivaraṇa*, on the *Pañchapādīkā*, a commentary by Padmapāda on the *Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Coming to the *Pāñchapādīkāvivaraṇa* of Prakāśātman, we land ourselves in the epoch-making period of this school, and henceforward move towards a history of dialectical literature of Advaita philosophy, which bases itself solidly upon the conclusions arrived at in clear terms by Prakāśātman. From the colophon of his work we know that his real name is Svaprakāśānubhava-bhagavat, or simply Svaprakāśānubhava, and he was the disciple of Ananyānubhava.² But the more commonly known name of the author of the *Pañchapādīkāvivaraṇa* is Prakāśātmayati or Prakāśātman.³

The Advaitist stand-point regarding the awareness of the object is distinct from the view of Mahāyāna Buddhism, specially in the Yogācāra School. When two objects are perceived, they are perceived as distinct from each other where the distinctness is perceptible. Supposing, according to the Mahāyānist, we perceive a 'nīla' (blue) and 'pīta' (yellow) substance (which is itself an object of perception as this or that). The Yogācāra view will lead us to the unity of consciousness and the substance. But we should also remember that as 'nīla' is distinct from another as 'pīta', and the distinctness *ought to be* perceived, though that is somewhat inexplicable in the subjective idealism of this particular school. Still the distinctness is also one with consciousness and hence cannot be evaded. Therefore, though unwarranted, this position has to be willy-nilly accepted by the Yogācāra idealist. In the Advaitist School however, as Padmapāda, and following him, Prakāśātman very clearly bring out, that there is no necessity of the distinctness in the direct awareness of this or that object. Even in the awareness of a distinctness regarding this object or that object the awareness remains the same in regard to the directness. It

2. *Pāñchapādīkāvivaraṇa* Introductory verse, 6.

3. *Ibid.*, 7.

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyagātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, "They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness."⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnavāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

subjective consciousness of the second (*samanantara*) stage, the objection will be that the resultant consciousness will be of the nature of a whole, which is again a distinct consciousness, and hence the relation will not be adhering to that consciousness which the subject will have for itself. This unpracticable relation of the subjective consciousness, according to the Buddhists, will never have been achieved even on their own showing. If the knowing activity is to be 'a relation', then it should be shown that the activity involved cannot pertain to the momentary pieces of consciousness. Therefore, the subjective consciousness should depend on a permanent object of experience as 'nīla' to be the permanent seat of that knowing activity. But when an activity engenders the direct awareness of 'nīla', etc., there is no meaning in the permanence of the consciousness regarding the object, i.e. the permanent object of experience on which the consciousness is based. Every knowing activity should, therefore, pertain to the present consciousness as distinct from the non-present one, according to this Buddhist view. That is to say, every object should be bound to the limits of the present consciousness as a distinct individuality (*ahamiti samvidah pratikshanam svalakshanabhedenā bhāvyaṃ*) as Padmapāda analyses. But that is going too far into the epistemology of perception where the actual experience is split into logical bits. Even if it is argued that all these logical bits of experience are very much identical, and hence no distinction is apparent amongst them, still a greater epistemological difficulty will arise. All our experience will have no footing if the real distinction of the actual experiences, one from the other, is not known and the stream becomes a bundle of disjoined moments of a single experience. The idea of similitude is again unwarranted and unmeaning when there is real unity of consciousness. Unless the idea of unity be false, the idea of similitude cannot arise at all. But the question of the falsity of unity of consciousness is forthright rejected by the Advaitist. Still the Mahāyānist may argue that any fallacy applicable to his theory may well apply to the Advaitist. For example, the fallacy of mutual dependence (*itaratarāśrayatva*), is levelled against the Yogācāra idealist. For, according to his theory, there is the similitude possible due to the falsity of the unity (of consciousness). Difference amongst bits of consciousness is, according to his School, nothing but the nature of consciousness (*samvitsvarūpa*), as the difference cannot

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyagātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, "They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness."⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnavāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

thesis. Unreality is ungrounded as a false character imposed on consciousness, and the idea of similitude is born out of this false knowledge. Hence it is equally ungrounded. There is no question of positing a similitude amongst various bits of knowledge when this itself is so ungrounded. There is only unity and no heterisation of experience. Nor can the idea of similitude be established by inference, based on the experience of destruction of the succeeding bit of experience in one single knowledge, as the Buddhist upholds. The penultimate bit of experience, say, of a jar, is no more existent when the knowledge of the object is ultimately destroyed. Thus all the preceding bits of experience are inferred to be non-existent at the successive stages of their destruction. Hence, the Buddhist dialectician would say that all existent beings are but momentary (*yat sat tat kṣaṇīkam*) based on the inferential proof as his argument is. But against this argumentation, the Advaitist equally advances the opposite inference to prove that existence does not posit momentariness, but continuity of unity. The Buddhist cannot also argue that as our experience of the ultimate moments is necessarily of destruction (i.e. negation), we cannot posit any existence with regard to the same. For, the opposite argument from the Advaitist stand-point would again equally apply that our experience of re-perception or re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of the previous moments would posit their continuity of unity, and not successive destruction or negation. In fact, re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) has been accepted as a proof by the Advaitist, *contra* the Buddhist and, to some extent, *contra* the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka as regards the status of the self in such experience.

The arguments set forth here from the Buddhist standpoint regarding the momentariness of the *existent* entity, which have been controverted by the Advaitist, are very clearly set forth in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* by Mādhavāchārya (circa 14th Cent. A.D.) Mādhavāchārya has detailed all these arguments of the Buddhist hypothesis that whatever is existent is momentary and that existence (*sattva*) means potentiality of action (*arthakriyākāritva*). All these arguments of the Buddhist dialecticians have been analysed by Mādhavāchārya in his work on the chapter *Saugatadarśana*. Mādhavāchārya has quoted from Jñānaśrī, a Buddhist philosopher (circa, 9th Cent. A.D.), who flourished before Udayana, and who in his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* has enume-

rated all these arguments of the Buddhist dialectics to establish momentariness by existence *qua* potentiality for action.

The Buddhist theory of existence *qua* potentiality for action is, however, open to serious objections. This potentiality for action may be said to be the origination of the knowledge of itself as the object (*svavishayañāna*) but that is true of external object only. For, the internal bits of consciousness are never the objects of knowledge of themselves, as they are never objectified by the knowledge-process being unique (*svalakṣaṇa*) as self-revealed in their own nature. Objectivity would make for this other-revealedness. Thus the unique characteristic of the external object (*vishayasvalakṣaṇa*) and the unique characteristic of the internal consciousness (*samvitsvalakṣaṇa*) are totally different in nature. Hence according to the Buddhists' own acceptance of potentiality for action, it would apply to only the external objects, which alone would be existent. Nor can it be argued by the Buddhists that the internal bits of consciousness also are objectified by the consciousness of a different subject (person as *perceiver*). For, such kind of objectivity will attach an indirect character to the *perceived* consciousness, which is undesirable epistemologically, if not also ontologically. The Buddhist dialectician would not condescend to accept an indirect or inferred character in the consciousness which is only *perceptible*, i.e. self-revelatory. Even in an external perception of an object there is the possibility of inference through an indirect method of positing *arthakriyākāritva*, which is a unique characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) in that case. But in the case of the unique characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of consciousness it is only direct, being non-objectified and self-revelatory.

SRI-HARSHA

by

P. S. KRISHNAMURTI SASTRI

Vyākaraṇa Śiromaṇi

In the history of Advaita, in the times before the 10th century the orthodox schools, particularly the Nyāya, were concerned with opposing the Buddhistic schools. After this period, the influence of Buddhism waned and the attention of the orthodox schools turned in a more pronounced manner against each other. The Nyāya school justified the reality of the categories of experience as against the philosophy of *jagan-mithyātva* of Śaṅkara. This school formed the main target of the criticism of the Advaitins in the 12th and the 13th Centuries.

Śrī-Harsha flourished during the middle of the 12th Century and he led the opposition against the Nyāya system. His most important philosophical contribution is the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* in which he refutes all definitions of Nyāya system intended to justify the reality of the world and tries to show that the world and all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them. The only reality is the non-dual Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness. The Nyāya system holds that whatever is known has real existence. Śrī Harsha, on the other hand, proves that all that is known is indefinable either as real in the sense in which Brahman is real or as unreal in the sense of an absolute nothing. They have only relative existence and they are adapted to practical needs of life. Though the Nyāya system is the main target of Śrī-Harsha's criticism, yet since his arguments are of destructive nature they could be used with some modifications against any other system. He refutes all definitions of Nyāya and so his dialectic would be valid against any definition of other systems. Śrī-Harsha starts with the thesis that none of our cognitions ever require any proof for their validity. The Advaita of Śaṅkara and the idealistic school of Buddhism (*Vijñāna-*

vāda) differs in this that while the latter holds that everything including the cognition is unreal and indeterminable, the former holds that knowledge is identical with Reality from which the entire universe proceeds and, therefore, knowledge is real and the entire universe is indeterminable. It is this distinction between the Advaita school of Śaṅkara and the idealistic school of Buddhism that the critics of Advaita often overlook when they charge that Advaita is akin to the Vijñāna-vāda school of Buddhism. Indefinability is the very nature of the objects of the world. Śrī-Harsha contends that no amount of ingenuity can succeed in defining the nature of the objects which have no definable existence. All the definitions of the objects put forward by the Nyāya writers are shown to be faulty even according to the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the Naiyāyika. Śrī-Harsha contends that no definitions of the phenomenal world are possible and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences of it are indefinable. So the Advaitins could affirm that the indeterminable nature of the world is proved. Śrī-Harsha does not believe in the reality of his arguments. He employs them without any assumption of their reality or unreality. If the arguments of Śrī-Harsha are proved to be unreal then that establishes his own contention that nothing except the self-luminous Brahman is real. Śrī-Harsha is interested only in refuting the definitions of the Naiyāyikas. And, his conclusion is that the manifold world of our experience is indefinable and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real.

The Advaitin may be asked to furnish a proof for the ultimate oneness of being. Śrī-Harsha argues that the very demand suggests that the idea of ultimate oneness already exists. If the idea does not exist, no one could ask for a proof of it. If, in anticipation of this reply, it is admitted that the idea of ultimate oneness is known already, then, the question that naturally arises is whether that knowledge is a valid one or an erroneous one. If it is the former, then it is itself the proof. If it is the latter, then one cannot ask to set forth proofs to demonstrate what is false. Hence Śrī-Harsha concludes that it is highly improper on the part of one to ask the Advaitin to furnish a proof for the ultimate oneness. He, however, states that the Upanishadic texts are the sole means of knowing the ultimate oneness, that is, Brahman.

It may be objected that the non-duality taught in the Upanishadic texts is contradicted by the cognition of difference arising from perception. Perception gives us knowledge of the object (say) cloth as well as its difference from other objects in the form of 'The cloth is different from (say) pot'. Śrī-Harsha points out that the concept of difference can hardly be defined. He asks whether the difference which is cognised at the time of perceiving the object is identical with the object or different from it. In either view there are difficulties. The first alternative, namely, that difference is of the nature of the object comprehended, is untenable on the ground that while the notion of difference is relative, that of the nature of a thing is not so. We can cognize 'cloth' by itself, but we cannot cognise its difference from 'pot' without distinctly calling to mind that from which it differs, namely, pot. Owing to this disparity between the 'cloth' and 'difference', they cannot be the same. It may be added here that, as difference is relative, it should be held as unreal. The second alternative is that difference is different from the object. Śrī Harsha argues that, if 'difference' were different from the object, then it would amount to saying that there is difference between 'the first difference' and the object. The second difference must be admitted to be different from the relata; and in order to account for this difference we must admit a third difference. And, so on, *ad infinitum*. Śrī Harsha concludes that, as the concept of 'difference' cannot be defined, it is *anirvachanīya*, and as such it has no intrinsic validity. It cannot, therefore, contradict the non-duality taught in the Upanishadic texts. Śrī-Harsha does not deny that we perceive *seeming* differences in all things; but what he denies is their ultimate validity.

‘na vayam bhedasya sarvathaivāsattvam abhyupagacchā-
mah kim nāma na pāramārtikam sattvam’.¹

The above passage is more or less identical with the one found in the *Ishta-siddhi* of Vimuktātman. He says that there exists the cognition of difference. And, that is why we are able to use words to refer to objects, and objects are adapted to practical needs

1. *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1914), p. 214.

mains is the 'Inward Self' (*pratyugātman*) as changeless and as of the nature of consciousness, which renders possible every type of knowledge but which does not depend on any other knowledge for its manifestation. In other words, Brahman-Ātman Reality, as of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and that it is so is demonstrated by Jñānaghana by means of perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁵ Since realising one's Self as being non-different from Brahman is regarded as the supreme bliss which is the *summum bonum* of all human endeavour (*paramapurushārtha*), Brahman-Ātman Reality referred to as of the nature of Existence and Consciousness is also spoken of as of the nature of Bliss (*ānanda*).

Jñānaghana, in this connection, takes care to stress that Existence (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Cit*) and Bliss (*Ānanda*) are not the qualities (*guṇa*) of Brahman but constitute its very nature. Brahman is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda-svarūpa*. To express it in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, 'They are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness.'⁶ To show that existence, consciousness and bliss are not qualities, it is argued that quality (*guṇa*) as a relational category always implies a qualified (*guṇī*); the former, viz., quality, always depends upon the latter, viz., the qualified (*guṇī*) without which it (quality) has no meaning. This predicament is a relational predicament. But, the Absolute as conceived by the advaitic philosophers is 'One without a second' and is devoid of all kinds of relations (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bhedarahita*). So, the relationship between the quality (*guṇa*) and the qualified (*guṇī*) cannot exist in it.⁷ Hence the reason why Brahman is said to be 'quality-less' or 'attribute-less' (*nirguṇa*).

But Brahman being infinite and reflected in *māyā* is *Īśvara*,⁸ endowed with all auspicious qualities (*saguṇa*). Knowledge being

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

6. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1956), Vol. I, p. 118.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

8. *avidyāpratibimbitam brahma anavacchinnatvāt īśvara iti gamyate*, *Ibid.*, p. 243.

ANANDANUBHAVA

by

V. R. KALYANASUNDARA SASTRI

Sāhitya-Vedānta Śiromani

Ānandānubhava has written three valuable treatises on Advaita Vedānta. The *Ishṭa-siddhi-vivaraṇa*, as the name indicates, is a commentary on the *Ishṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman. The *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali* and the *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya* are his independent works. In addition to these Advaita works, he has also written a commentary on the *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña. Ānandagiri has written a commentary, *Vedāntaviveka*, on the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali*. The *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya* has been commented upon by Ānandagiri and Ātmasvarūpabhagavān.

In the colophon of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali*, Ānandānubhava is described as a pupil of Narāyaṇajyotiṣ. We come across in this work references to Kumārila, Prabhākara, Viśvarūpa, Maṇḍana, Vāchaspati, Sucharitamīśra, Ānandabodha, and others. Ānandabodha, a celebrated teacher of Advaita, has written the *Nyāyamaakaranda*, the *Nyāyadīpāvali* and the *Pramāṇamālā*. It is believed that Ānandabodha must have lived about 1100 A.D. Ānandanubhava has written a commentary on the *Ishṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman. The latter is assigned to the period between 850 A.D. and 1050 A.D. From these it is clear that Ānandānubhava must have lived after Vimuktātman and Ānandabodha. Chitsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā* refers to Ānandānubhava. The date of Chitsukha is said to be 1220 A.D. And so, Ānandānubhava could not have been later than Chitsukha. Most probably, he must have lived in the second half of the twelfth century A.D.

The *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya* seeks to refute the categories of the Vaiśeṣika system and also the views of the Bauddhas, the Sāṅkhyas, the Mīmāṃsakas and others. The work is divided into two chapters. The prima-facie view (*pūrva-pakṣa*) is cogently

explained in the first chapter, while the final view (*siddhānta*) is established in the second chapter. Ānandānubhava vindicates the Advaita view that Brahman alone is real and that the phenomenal world of diversity is just an appearance.

The *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali* is one of the authoritative, polemical treatises on Advaita Vedānta. Ānandānubhava establishes the fundamental standpoint of Advaita not only on the authority of the *Upanishads* but also by reasoning. According to Advaita, Brahman or the Self which is the ultimate reality is one only without a second (*ekameva advitīyam*). The real nature of the non-dual Brahman is missed due to the beginningless *avidyā*. Coming under the spell of *avidyā*, we look upon the pluralistic world as real; and we are deeply attached to it. Bondage is our attachment to the non-real. If the ignorance of the real is responsible for our bondage, it can be removed only by the knowledge of the real. In other words, liberation can be attained only by the knowledge of Brahman. It is wrong to think that Advaita Vedānta which maintains that *moksha* can be attained by the right knowledge of the Self belittles the importance of *karma* and *upāsana*. *Karma* purifies the mind and the knowledge of the Self is manifested in such a pure mind. It cannot directly lead to *moksha*. The function of *karma* is restricted to the *preparatory stage*. Control of intellect, external senses, etc. (*śamadamādi*), have to be practised, as they are also useful to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. While the help of *karma* is indirect, that of practices like control of intellect, external senses, etc., are direct to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman.

Following the arrangement of chapters in the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, Ānandānubhava has divided the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali*¹ into four chapters. The first chapter begins with the discussion about the validity of the Vedic testimony. By means of elaborate discussion, Ānandānubhava establishes the view that the Vedas, which are *apaurusheya* are a source of valid knowledge. This is followed by a discussion about the validity of knowledge. After refuting the views held in other systems, Ānandānubhava esta-

1. Critically edited with Introduction by V. Jagadisvara Sastrigal and V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastrigal (Madras Govt. Oriental Series No. CLXVI, 1961). This work will be referred to hereafter as *NRD*.

blishes the Advaita view that (i) truth is intrinsic, and that error is extrinsic and that (ii) the validity of knowledge is due to conditions which are intrinsic to knowledge itself. In the course of the discussion of the causality of the universe, Ānandānubhava maintains the view that the blend of pure Brahman and *māyā* (*māyā-śabalita-brahman*) is the material cause. By elaborate arguments, he proves that the Self is of the nature of existence (*sat*), knowledge (*chit*) and bliss (*ānanda*).

On the model of the second chapter known as *avirodhādhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtra*, Ānandānubhava shows in the second chapter of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali* that the so-called scriptural contradictions do not exist with regard to the Vedāntic view and that all other views are incorrect. There is an elaborate discussion of the different theories of error. After refuting the views of others, he establishes the soundness of the *anirvachanīyakhyāti* of Advaita. His discussion of the *paramāṇuvāda* of the Vaiśeṣikas is important as well as interesting, for he proves in the course of the discussion that atoms must have parts.

The third chapter of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali* is mainly concerned with the means to the realisation of Brahman. He argues that *karma* is not directly conducive to the attainment of liberation, and that the combination of knowledge and action (*jñāna-karma-samuchchaya*) is untenable. In this chapter, the scriptural sanction with regard to *sannyāsa* of the *ekadaṇḍin* type and of the *tridaṇḍin* type is also discussed. Ānandānubhava points out that *śruti* and *smṛti* texts lend support to the *sannyāsa* of the *ekadaṇḍin* type followed by Śaṅkara.

Ānandānubhava discusses in the fourth chapter the nature of liberation, the removal of *avidyā* and *jīvanmukti*. Though like other Advaitins he admits *jīvanmukti*, he points out that from the ultimate point of view even *jīvanmukti* must be considered to be *māyā*. Brahman which is non-dual can never be said to be born or destroyed. In the absence of creation and destruction, there is no bondage; and in the absence of bondage, there is no seeker after liberation, and there is none free from bondage. In support of his stand he quotes from Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*:²

*na nirodho na chotpattir
na baddho na cha sādhaḥ,
na mumukshur na vai muktaḥ
ityeśhā paramārthatā.*

In the remaining part of this paper let us consider in detail Ānandānubhava's explanation of the locus of *avidyā* (*avidyāśraya*) and of the removal of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivṛtti*).

The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins take sides in answering the question regarding the locus of *avidyā*. While Prakāśātman holds the view that Brahman, the pure impartite consciousness, is the locus of *avidyā*, Vāchaspati argues that the *jīva* is the locus. Ānandānubhava follows the standpoint of Prakāśātman, which has come to be known as the *Vivaraṇa* view.

The four possible alternatives that one might think of with regard to this question are: (i) that Brahman is the locus of *avidyā*, (ii) that Īśvara who is omniscient, etc., is the locus of *avidyā*, (iii) that an insentient object is the locus of *avidyā*, and (iv) that the *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*. By showing the untenability of the last three alternatives, Ānandānubhava maintains the view that Brahman, the pure consciousness alone, is the locus of *avidyā*.³

Īśvara who is omniscient cannot serve as the locus of *avidyā*, for Īśvara Himself comes into being as a result of the association of *avidyā* with the self-luminous consciousness. Since *avidyā* is posited even prior to Īśvara, the latter cannot be the locus of the former.

It may be argued that Brahman or the Self cannot be the locus of *avidyā*, as the two are diametrically opposed to each other. Brahman is of the nature of knowledge; and *avidyā* is just the opposite of it. If so, how can Brahman be the locus of *avidyā*? Ānandānubhava answers this objection by pointing out that there is no opposition between the self-luminous Brahman and *avidyā*. It is only the knowledge which arises from *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-jñānam*) which being opposed to ignorance (*avidyā*) removes it. The Self which is self-luminous consciousness is not only not

3. NRD, pp. 344-346.

opposed to it, but reveals it, as a lamp reveals the existence of an insentient object, say, pot. Ānandānubhava cites the case of deep-sleep to show how *avidyā* can co-exist with the self-luminous consciousness (*svarūpa-jñāna*.)

The view that an insentient object can serve as the locus of *avidyā* is untenable. For one thing, there is no *pramāṇa* which reveals the existence of *avidyā* in an insentient object; nor is it made known through *sākshin*, as there is no relation between consciousness and the insentient. Secondly, the positing of *avidyā* in an insentient object does not serve any purpose. The two-fold work of *avidyā* is concealment and projection: that is to say, *avidyā* conceals the true and projects the false. What is by its very nature insentient and therefore does not reveal itself need not be concealed. So it is impossible to think of an insentient object as being the seat of *avidyā*.

Let us now consider the view that the *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*. There are two reasons which contribute to the plausibility of this view. First, the *jīva* is sentient, and so while an insentient object cannot be the seat of *avidyā*, the *jīva* can. Second, the experience of 'I am ignorant' shows that the *jīva* is the seat of *avidyā*. Ānandānubhava argues that this view, too, is not acceptable. The *jīva* is what it is because of the association of the internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) which is itself a product of *avidyā*. How can the *jīva*, being dependent on a product of *avidyā* which is therefore earlier, be the locus of *avidyā*? Further, those who uphold the view that the *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* must clearly specify whether the *jīva* as qualified by the internal organ (*ahamkāraḍi-viśiṣṭa-jīva*) is the locus or the *jīva* as indicated by the internal organ (*ahamkāraḍi-upalakṣhita-jīva*) is the locus. The *jīva* is a complex of consciousness and internal organ. The former view considers the relation between the two as that of the qualified and the qualifier, similar to the relation between rose and the red colour. The latter view takes the internal organ as a mark (*upalakṣhaṇa*) indicating consciousness in the same way as a crow serves to indicate the house on the top of which it is perched. Ānandānubhava argues that the former view is untenable, for it seeks to rest *avidyā* on the internal organ too, which qualifies consciousness, and this amounts

to maintaining that the cause, viz., *avidyā* is seated on its own effect, viz., the internal organ.

It may be argued that *avidyā* and its product, viz., the internal organ, form a series in such a way that the one is preceded by the other alternatively constituting a continuous chain backwards like the seed-sprout series; and so the difficulty of the cause (*avidyā*) resting on its own effect (internal organ) does not arise. And also the objection of infinite regress is not possible, since the series is *anādi*. This argument, according to Ānandānubhava, overlooks an important point of difference between the two. In the case of seed-sprout series, there are individual differences (*vyakti-bheda*) with regard to seeds and sprouts. But this is not possible in the case of *avidyā*. It is true that erroneous cognitions and their impressions are many; but all of them are the product of *avidyā* which is one and the same.

Ānandānubhava brings out the difficulty involved in this view in another way also. If it be said that the *jīva* qualified by the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra-viśiṣṭaḥ*) is the locus of *avidyā*, then the gross body differs from birth to birth, and so it will result in different centres of consciousness. Such a consequence is undesirable, for there will not be any continuity between one life and another life; and in the absence of continuity, one will not reap the consequences of the deeds done in the previous birth and one may get certain good or bad results, without being the merit of the earlier deeds. If, on the other hand, it be said that the *jīva* qualified by the subtle body (*sūkshma-śarīra-viśiṣṭaḥ*) is the locus of *avidyā*, the destruction of the subtle body in the state of liberation will also involve the destruction of consciousness of the individual. If it is argued that the subtle body is not destroyed in the state of liberation, then there is no difference between liberation and bondage. For all these reasons, the view that the *jīva* qualified by the internal organ is the locus of *avidyā* is untenable. The view which considers the internal organ as a mark (*upalakshana*) will lead to Ānandānubhava's standpoint; for the internal organ as a mark is separated from consciousness which it serves to indicate, and so *avidyā* is seated only in consciousness.

After refuting the explanation of the nature of liberation given by the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṅkhyas and others, Ānandānubhava sets forth the Advaita view that the removal of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivṛtti*)

is liberation. He states the possible objections against the view, criticises them and finally establishes the soundness of the Advaita view of liberation.⁴

The critics are interested in proving the untenability of the very conception. They argue that *avidyā-nivṛitti* cannot be said to be real (*sat*) or unreal (*asat*) or both (*sadasat*) or indeterminate (*anirvachanīya*). If it be said to be real, is it other than Brahman or identical with Brahman? If it is other than Brahman, it will give rise to dualism which is not acceptable to the Advaitin. The other alternative, so the critics argue, fares no better. In what sense can it be said to be identical with Brahman? There are two possible alternatives here: either *avidyā-nivṛitti* gets itself merged in Brahman or Brahman gets itself merged in *avidyā-nivṛitti*. If the former, then it is eternal in as much as Brahman is eternal, and so knowledge (*jñāna*) is not required; if the latter, Brahman has to be treated as a negative entity in as much as *avidyā-nivṛitti* is negative. Can it be said to be unreal (*asat*)? Even this possibility is ruled out by the critics. If it is unreal like the sky-flower, there arises again the futility of knowledge. If it is unreal, it cannot be brought into being. If it be argued that it can be brought into being, then sky-flower, etc., which are unreal can also be brought into being; and this is absurd. It cannot be both real and unreal at the same time, as it goes against the law of contradiction. Since *avidyā* is said to be *anirvachanīya*, *avidyā-nivṛitti* too cannot be *anirvachanīya*.

The critics further point out that it is not possible to explain *avidyā-nivṛitti* as a fifth mode (*pañchama-prakāra*) as other than the four possibilities mentioned above. First, there is no *pramāṇa* which would justify it. For the sake of argument let us suppose, so the critics argue, that there is *avidyā-nivṛitti* which is a fifth mode. It is incumbent upon the Advaitin to say whether it is removable or not. It cannot be removed by *jñāna*; the latter can remove only *ajñāna*; and there is no other means available to the Advaitin to bring about its disappearance. There is also another difficulty here. The disappearance of *avidyā-nivṛitti* will mean the re-emergence of *avidyā*, which is not desirable. The other alternative, viz., that it is not removable, may now be considered. The

4. NRD, pp. 382-386.

question that arises here is whether it is knowable or not. If it be said that *avidyā-nivṛtti* which is not removable (i.e. which is eternal) is knowable, the Advaita view that "whatever is perceived is illusory" has to be given up. If *avidyā-nivṛtti* is said to be eternal and also is knowable, the world also which is knowable may be said to be eternal. It is not open to the Advaitin to formulate the *vyāpti* as "whatever is perceived other than *avidyā-nivṛtti* is illusory". To the Advaitin there is no real other than *avidyā-nivṛtti*. If it be said that it is not knowable, then no efforts need be taken for attaining it. The critics, therefore, argue that it is impossible for the Advaitin to show that the conception of *avidyā-nivṛtti* is intelligible and tenable. The untenability of the conception of *avidyā-nivṛtti* will, according to the critics, undermine the central thesis of Advaita, viz., that the Self is non-dual and that the world which is a product of *avidyā* is illusory.

Ānandānubhava argues that the explanation of *avidyā-nivṛtti* as a fifth mode (*pañchama-prakāra*) is quite sound and that the critics have not really shown the conception to be unintelligible and untenable. Since *avidyā* is indeterminable, its removal has to be explained only as a fifth mode. It cannot be real, for in that case *avidyā* too will become real. Since it has *avidyā* as its *pratiyogī* and also since it is brought into being, it cannot be unreal like the sky-flower. Nor can it be both real and unreal as it amounts to breaking the law of contradiction. It cannot be indeterminable (*anirvachanīya*), since *avidyā* is indeterminable. So it has to be explained as a fifth mode, as something other than all the four mentioned above.

It is true, says Ānandānubhava, that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is different from real and unreal in the same way as *avidyā* is different from real and unreal. But that is no reason for characterising it as *anirvachanīya*. If *avidyā* is said to be *anirvachanīya*, it is not because of its being different from real and unreal (*sadasat-vilakṣhaṇa*), but because it is removable by knowledge. In other words, *anirvachanīya*, according to Ānandānubhava, is to be explained in terms of removability by knowledge (*jñānanivartyatva*)⁵. *Avidyā* is *anirvachanīya*, because it is removable. But *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not removable by knowledge. On the contrary,

5. This is also the standpoint of Vimuktātman.

it is brought into being by knowledge. It is knowable in as much as it falls within the scope of experience. It is wrong to think that it is not removable. Only if it is maintained that it is not removable, it will be prejudicial to the inference by which the Advaitin proves the illusoriness of the world. Ānandānubhava cites the authority of Scripture to show that *avidyā-nivṛitti* too is removable. The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text says: "In it there is no diversity".⁶ The purport of this text is to show that there is nothing else, either positive or negative, other than Brahman; and in this total denial *avidyā-nivṛitti* is also included. Ānandānubhava takes pains to show that his standpoint is quite consistent with the view of Vimuktātman, the author of the *Ishta-siddhi*. The explanation of *avidyā-nivṛitti* as a fifth mode (*pañchama-prakāra*) is acceptable to Vimuktātman,⁷ as he himself adopts this mode of interpretation in the *Ishta-siddhi*. It is true that he equates *avidyā-nivṛitti* with the non-dual Self subsequently in the same work.⁸ Ānandānubhava's elucidation of Vimuktātman's position makes it clear that any suggestion that Vimuktātman is vacillating between these two explanations and that he is not consistent is unwarranted. Since there is nothing else, either positive or negative, other than the Self, *avidyā-nivṛitti* cannot be given a permanent standing as a negative something coeval with the Self. If Vimuktātman seeks to equate *avidyā-nivṛitti* with the Self, it is to show that the Self, indicated by *avidyā-nivṛitti*, is bereft of everything, positive as well as negative.

6. IV, iv, 19.

7. *Ishta-siddhi* (Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda), p. 85.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

ANANDABODHA

by

R. THANGASWAMI

Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Vedānta Śiromaṇi

Śrī Vyāsa in the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* indicated that the knowledge of Brahman is the cause of the removal of bondage. This idea has been developed by Śaṅkara in his *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* stating that bondage itself is mere illusion. This doctrine has been subjected to severe criticism by the pluralistic, the theistic, and the Pūrvamīmāṃsā schools. A school of Advaitins took up the defence of the doctrine of Śaṅkara on the basis of logical arguments; and Ānandabodha belongs to that school.

Two methods can be noticed in the books devoted to the criticism of rival schools. Of these, the earlier method is characterised by close reasoning, depth of sense and diction, sweet to the ear: it is conversational in form. When the modern logicians like Gaṅgeśa transformed logic into something entirely new, scholars from Madhusūdanasarasvatī to Brahmānandasarasvatī rose to refute them and, giving them their due, used a highly technical language. This is the later style; and Ānandabodha's is the earlier style. Unlike the other style it is neither artificial nor difficult; but there is no dullness in the presentation of ideas, statement of reasons, and choice of words. Expressions characterised by rigorous reasoning and elegant wit reveal Ānandabodha's eloquence and dialectical skill.

Ānandabodha's Preceptor: A commentary, *Dīpikā*, by Ānandabodha available in manuscript in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library on Prakāśātman's *Śabdaniṣṭaya* has a stanza "*namo . . . ātmavāsābhidhānāya gurave guṇa-veśmane*". In the other works of Ānandabodha there are no verses of salutation to the teacher but only a verse of obeisance to the Supreme

Being in whom plurality is assumed; this verse also states the four *anubandhas*, that is, the essential aspects of a work. From this we conclude that Ānandabodha was the disciple of Ātmavāsa.

Ānandabodha is usually regarded as the disciple of Vimuktātman. In his work *Pramāṇamālā* he quotes from the *Ishṭa-siddhi*, mentioning the source of the quotation thus:

etadevoktam gurubhiḥ
‘nānyatra kāraṇāt kāryam na chet tatra
kva tad bhavet’.

From the word ‘gurubhiḥ’ it is proper to conclude that Vimuktātman was his *vidyā-guru* and Ātmavāsa was his *dīkshā-guru*. But the commentary *Sambandhokti* by Chitsukha on *Pramāṇamālā* which is still in manuscript does not refer to Vimuktātman as the preceptor and Ānandabodha as his disciple; and it prefaces the quotation from the *Ishṭa-siddhi* referred to above thus: “*uktam artham ishṭa-siddhi-kāra-vachanena dṛḍhayati*”.

Vimuktātman must have flourished before Sarvajñātman. The latter in the fourth chapter of his work *Samkshepaśūrīraka* says:

chitibhedam abhedam eva vā
dvayarūpatvam atho mṛishātmatām
parihṛitya tamo nivartanam
prathayante khalu muktikovidāḥ.

His commentators are agreed that the term *muktikovidāḥ* refers to the author of the *Ishṭa-siddhi*. Sarvajñātman refers to the author of the *Ishṭa-siddhi* in his other work *Pañchaprakriyā*.¹

Prakāśātman in the *Vivaraṇa* refers to the view of the *Ishṭa-siddhi*. Hence we may conclude that Vimuktātman flourished before Sarvajñātman and Prakāśātman. And, he could not have been the disciple of Vimuktātman who must have flourished earlier than Sarvajñātman. The term ‘guru’ in the *Pramāṇamālā* is intended to show respect towards Vimuktātman. We may, therefore, take Ānandabodha to be the disciple of Ātmavāsa.

1. Bulletins of the Sanskrit Department, University of Madras, p. 69.

The date of Ānandabodha: Ānandabodha in his work *Nyāya-makaranda* refers to the views of Prakāśātman, the author of the *Vivaraṇa* who flourished in the 11th Century A.D. Anubhūtiśvarūpa who flourished between the middle of the 12th Century and the first half of the 13th Century wrote commentaries on all the three works of Ānandabodha. Hence we may take that Ānandabodha flourished in between the middle of the 11th Century and the first half of the 12th Century.

Ānandabodha wrote three works, namely, *Pramāṇamālā*, *Nyāya-dīpāvalī*, and *Nyāya-makaranda*. Of these, the *Nyāya-makaranda* is the most important one. This is of a polemical nature and refutes the doctrines of the Sāṅkhyas, Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Pūrvamīmāṃsakas and Jñānakarma-samuccaya-vādins by using the accepted procedure of debate.

Noteworthy among his contributions are the refutation of the difference between *jīva* and Brahman, rejection of difference in objects of knowledge, establishment of the *anirvachanīya* theory of error, phenomenal nature of the universe, self-revealing nature of the self, self as of the form of consciousness, the view that words refer (also) to accomplished or existing things, the doctrine of impartite sense, conception of liberation, the substratum of avidyā, and the doctrine that liberation results from knowledge only.

Doctrines established in the Nyāya-makaranda: The main doctrine of Advaita is that the universe is phenomenal. It is by nature constantly changing and evolving and is ever unstable. So it does not satisfy the definition of Reality propounded by Śaṅkara, namely, that reality is that which does not fail to have that nature determined as belonging to it. The universe which evolves every moment, is always unsteady, and as a rule changing cannot answer to this definition; so also the various entities which are present in the universe.

Then, is the universe absolutely and always false? The reply to this question is presented with great effort aided by the support of scripture and reason, using the analogy of silver that appears in nacre. The Upanishads say '*Ether was born from Ātman*'. Here the ablative case in '*from Ātman*' stands for the cause, material as well as efficient. This cannot be said to be self-contradictory

and impossible, as, in the case of the nacre-silver, both kinds of causality are seen to exist in the same thing, nacre. Here, if there is no silver but only the recollection of silver once seen in the shop, how can there be the effort on the part of the percipient to pick up the thing before him. So, silver has to be postulated as existing there; otherwise the effort cannot be accounted for.

What is the material, and the efficient cause of this illusory silver? As regards all effects, both these kinds of causality are necessary. As the destruction of the effect is, as a rule, inferred from the destruction of the cause, we have to determine that as the cause of the silver, the destruction of which would lead to the destruction of the silver. It is the silver that is destroyed by means of the perceptual knowledge of the nacre. The causality of the knowledge of nacre in the destruction of the silver arises through the destruction of the nescience present in nacre. This naturally leads to the conclusion that nescience present in nacre is the material cause of the silver.

Again, where the nacre is totally unperceived, there silver does not appear. So we have to say that the perception of nacre in its general form is also a cause. Thus the nacre perceived in its general form (i.e. as possessed of 'thisness') is the efficient cause; this itself is also called the substratum. Altogether, the nacre known in its general form and unknown in its particular form is the cause of silver. Known in its general form, it is the efficient cause; unknown in its particular form, it is the material cause. This co-ordination of these two kinds of causality is technically known as *vivarta* (transfiguration). The etymology of the term *vivarta* is: *vi*—opposite, *varta*—existence, i.e. having an existence (reality) different from that of the effect, whereas *pariṇāma* or modification is becoming an effect having the same degree of reality. Thus the nacre-silver is the modification of the nescience present in nacre, and transfiguration of the nacre itself. In the Upanishadic passage quoted above (*Ether is born from Ātman*) the ablative case in 'from Ātman' should be understood to refer to Ātman as the transfigurative cause. The universe is the modification of nescience present in Ātman and the transfiguration of Ātman itself.

Now a question arises. Unlike the nacre-silver, the universe is not seen to be sublated; so, how can it be said to be the modifi-

cation of nescience? The reply is detailed with the support of scriptural passages like '*neha nānāsti kiñchana*'. (There is no plurality here). The sublation of the world is known from these passages. It cannot be said that this passage does not deny the plurality relating to the universe but only that pertaining to the Ātman. For, what is the authority for assuming that the scripture denied plurality in particular, i.e. in regard to Ātman? On the contrary, it denies plurality in general. Also, plurality, not well known in regard to Ātman, does not stand to reason and so there arises no question of its denial. Nor is it a case of plurality of the creation of the universe being denied, as there will clearly arise lack of unanimity as well as prolixity.

So, multiplicity of Ātman cannot at all be a subject of denial here; and as there can be no other subject of denial, we have to take that the difference between *jīva* and *Īśvara* is denied.

Nor can this passage be taken to deny difference between *Īśvara* and inert matter. It is well-known that the attributes of matter cannot exist in *Īśvara*, and so the difference cannot be denied. So, what is denied is the difference between *jīva* and *Īśvara*.

Now, the next point to be discussed is whether the denial pertains to all time or to a limited time. Two such kinds of denial are well-known: (1) The pot is not on the ground (This pertains to limited time); (2) Wind has no colour (This relates to all time). If the passage '*neha nānāsti kiñchana*' is denial of the first kind, then '*iha*' will refer to Brahman as the substratum; this means Brahman is related to time. It is self-contradictory to say that Brahman is eternal and is related to time. So only the second type of denial remains, and this must be meant by the passage. This denial is technically called *bādhā* (sublation).

Now, one question naturally arises. This denial would lead to the contingency that the universe is never related to Brahman; so, how can one justify scriptural passages describing creation of the universe, etc.? The reply is that the passages describing creation deal not with creation (primarily) but with Brahman which is one and undivided. There is a great dispute as to whether the substratum of the universe is one or many. The Advaitins say it is one; the dualists say that it is manifold. Among the

dualists omitting the sub-divisions, there are varieties from the materialists to the Yoga school of philosophers. In short, all philosophers except Śāṅkara are dualists. This must be discussed.

Those who follow scriptures or reason as regards creation must be asked: Why is there difference among scriptural passages themselves regarding the order of creation? One passage says ether was born of Ātman, another says fire, water, food, etc., were born from Ātman. Elsewhere mind, etc., are spoken of as created from Ātman. Yet another passage speaks of creation as constituted of the three guṇas. Thus there is no unanimity regarding the order of creation. Further, scripture speaks of liberation through self-knowledge; it does not say it is got through knowledge of creation. A passage says '*tam eva viditvā atimṛityum eti, nānyah panthā vidyate ayanāya.*' But there is no passage which speaks of any special result as arising from the knowledge of creation. So, according to the maxim 'In the presence of the fruitful statement the fruitless one becomes accessory', the creation becomes accessory to knowledge, as it is in the presence of self-knowledge which is fruitful. So, according to the rule that accessories are fruitful only through the principal, it is reasonable to conclude that the fruit of self-knowledge is the same as that of knowledge of creation. So, the main purport of the passages conveying creation is not the knowledge of creation but of the Supreme Being. And, this is accepted by tradition. This is shown by reason also. Creation which is perceived by us is traced by different philosophers to different causes like atoms. If we follow these divergent assumptions we cannot arrive at a single substratum of the universe and in its absence, knowledge will not be adequate to lead to self-knowledge. So we have to postulate a single entity as substratum; 'this cannot be anything but the self. Otherwise, 'the knowledge of all from the knowledge of one' is not possible. If this substratum is the self, there can be no *real* origination from it as the self is changeless. So the account of creation is given only to establish the Supreme Being which is the sole substratum.

Again, those who zealously assert the reality of creation cannot justify their acceptance of liberation. Philosophers differ in regard to liberation, from the (nihilist) Buddhist to the Vaiśeṣhika. Anandabodha has critically examined almost all views on libera-

tion.² Is liberation the cessation of bondage? Bondage is a series of sufferings; in the view of those who say that creation is real how can there be a cessation of this series of sufferings? It cannot be said that cessation is brought about in the manner in which a pot is annihilated by means of a club. Of course, the cessation may be possible as, in the Nyāya view, the self's qualities exist only for two moments and in the Sāṅkhya view an opposite process can destroy the previous process. But how can there be a cessation of suffering which is of the nature of non-recurrence? Nobody says that such recurring destruction or cessation constitutes liberation; all are unanimous in conceiving of liberation as eternal. So, if the universe is eternal, then suffering also is eternal and thus, liberation is as unreal as a flower sprung from the sky.

Liberation is accepted in all schools and we must say what its cause is. Scripture states its cause to be self-knowledge and not the knowledge of pot or cloth or the categories accepted by the Naiyāyikas. Suffering is born of ignorance of self and from the knowledge of self arises the destruction of suffering which is the effect of ignorance.

Liberation is of the nature of total destruction of suffering and the manifestation of bliss, eternal and unsurpassed; and this is nothing but the destruction of *avidyā*. The Supreme Being is One; it is bliss independent, absolute and unsurpassed, but owing to *avidyā* it appears as having a second, as sullied by the attributes of the cycle of births and deaths and as having the designation of *jīva* (individual self). Thus, the cycle of births and deaths is none other than beginningless *avidyā*, while liberation is its destruction and is dependent on the rise of the knowledge of Brahman which is beyond all differentiation and also immediate. This is the definition of liberation given in the *Nyāya-makaranda*.³ So, the falsity of bondage which is of the nature of suffering is proved on the ground that it is the product of *avidyā*.

Just as nacre-silver is not admitted to be real, on account of its being sublated by the perception of its substratum, so also the universe which is sublated by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman is not real. Further the universe in its ramifications

2. *Nyāya-makaranda*, pp. 270-271.

3. Vide, p. 288.

is born of assuming the self to be enjoyer. This characteristic of being an enjoyer depends on the superimposition of body on the self and the relation of the self to the body. This superimposition is due to *avidyā*. So it is established that the universe which consists of the objects of enjoyment, enjoyer, etc., is derived from *avidyā* which is also known as '*māyā*' or illusion. *Māyā* is the same as *avidyā* and it is a positive entity, opposed in nature to knowledge. It has varied powers and they are inferred from the products arising from it.

This *māyā* has consciousness as its substratum. Now, the question arises: how can there arise *māyā* in regard to the self which is of the nature of consciousness, just as there can be no darkness while the sun is shining? The solution to this problem is found in the *Nyāya-makaranda*. The existence of *māyā* has to be accepted by all schools as none can deny the universal experience, 'I am ignorant'.

Those philosophers who admit the existence of the self have to grant that the self is of the nature of consciousness. Some speak of consciousness as the attribute and not the very nature of the self and explain the perception of the self in association with this attribute. They have to explain how they can speak of the existence of the self during deep sleep. The conception that the self is eternal but its perception arises from a knowledge which is adventitious and momentary cannot support in any way the doctrine of the eternality of the Self.

The position is this: Those who admit the self to be eternal have also to admit that the self is of the nature of knowledge and, being ever perceived, is self-revealing.

There arises another question. How are we to account for the judgment, 'I am ignorant'? The answer to this question is: We have to say that the self, being known in its general characteristics and unknown in its particular nature is the substratum of *avidyā*. Hence, in keeping with experience, the self is the locus of *māyā* or *avidyā*.

Another question is raised. Is the individual self the locus of *māyā*, or the Supreme Self? In the former case, *māyā* would be many (which would mean that the material cause of the universe is also manifold); in the latter case, oneness would be lost,

Thus there would result a paradox that the very Being which is to be resorted to for the removal of *māyā* is its locus. And the blind cannot lead the blind.

This question is answered thus: There is no fault in either cases. In the view of the *Drishṭi-sṛishṭi-vāda* where *māyā* is considered as the transformative material cause, the plurality of *māyā* is acceptable. This does not mean that the oneness of material cause is lost; the *Drishṭi-sṛishṭi-vāda* speaks only of the transfigured cause, and this cause is the One, Supreme Being. Thus it is logical that the Brahman which has no beginning and end is the locus of *avidyā* or *māyā*.⁴ So it is correct to say that the Supreme Being itself undergoes the cycle of births and deaths because of *avidyā* and is released through knowledge. It is Brahman and not *jīva*, that is the locus for *avidyā*.⁵

Another objection is raised in his other work *Pramāṇamālā*.⁶ If the universe is derived from *māyā*, it must be unreal, just as nacre-silver. This means that all the phenomena in the world and all knowledge are unreal. Even the knowledge of Brahman got from scriptures must be unreal because scripture is a part of the universe and it being unreal the knowledge imparted by it also must be unreal. This objection is wrong, since unreality does not mean absolute nothingness. It is neither real like Brahman, nor unreal like a hare's horn, but it is different from the two. The universe is neither absolutely real, nor absolutely unreal, but it is neither real nor unreal.⁷ This is Ānandabodha's definition of unreality given in Ānandānubhava's *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*, and Chitsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā*. This is referred to and elaborated by Ānandajñāna in his *Tarkasaṅgraha*. This definition has been refuted by Vyāsātīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛita*; and Madhusūdana-sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* answers all the objections and proves that the definition is logically sound.

4. *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 313.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

6. *Pramāṇamālā*, p. 16.

7. *Nyāyamakaranda*, pp. 115, 125, 145, 155, 305, 306. See also *Pramāṇamālā*, p. 16.

CHITSUKHA

by

S. KRISHNAMURTI SASTRI

Nyāya Śiromani

Chitsukha is one of the outstanding *āchāryas* who contributed to the development of the dialectical phase of *Advaita*. The background to his distinctive contribution may be stated in brief.

From the time of Nāgārjuna, Chandrakīrti, and Āryadeva, the Bauddhas had taken to the use of the dialectical method of logical discussions. In the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries the Naiyāyikas also adopted this method, and Nyāya authors such as Jayanta, Udayana, Vātsyāyana, and Uddyodakara vigorously introduced them in philosophy. But though these writers utilized the dialectical method of Nāgārjuna's arguments, there was little attempt on their part to develop the formal side as such of the method. It was only the later Nyāya writers that began to devote special attention to the dialectic as a method and develop it with rigorous attention to its form. This they sought to do by formulating definitions for the various categories of experience and offer criticisms with emphasis on the formal and scholastic side of arguments. This movement, namely logical formalism, which was steadily growing among the Naiyāyikas in the tenth and eleventh centuries attained its culmination in the works of writers like Raghunātha Śiromani, Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭāchārya, Mathurānātha Bhaṭṭāchārya, and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya. One notable instance of this over-emphasis on formalism and scholasticism is the formulation of the *mahā-vidyā* modes of syllogism by Kulārka Paṇḍita in the eleventh century.

The *mahā-vidyā* modes of syllogism were invented by Kulārka Paṇḍita for refuting the Mīmāṃsā arguments for the eternality of sounds and proving the non-eternality of sounds. But if these modes of syllogism could be regarded as valid, they would have

a general application, i.e. they could be used for proving or disproving any theory or doctrine. The special feature of the *mahā-vidyā* syllogism was that it attempted to formulate definitions for all that is knowable. Kulārka Paṇḍita's *Daśa-ślokī-mahā-vidyā-sūtra* contains sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types of *mahā-vidyā* syllogisms. Such an attempt naturally produced a reaction on the Advaitic doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable and unreal, which consequently appeared to be losing ground. In the eleventh century and in the early part of the twelfth century writers like Ānandabodha and his commentator, Anubhūtiśvarūpa attempted to uphold the Advaitic doctrine on logical grounds. But it was Śrī-Harsha who in the third quarter of the twelfth century for the first time effectively refuted the entire logical apparatus of the Naiyāyikas. With Śrī-Harsha thus began the special study of the dialectical method among Advaitic writers—though the use of the dialectical method in Advaita could be traced back even to āchārya Śaṅkara who utilized it in the refutation of the Bauddha, Jaina, Vaiśeṣhika, and other systems of philosophy. Śrī-Harsha's work was carried on by Chitsukha in the early part of the thirteenth century, by Ānandajñāna or Ānandagiri in the latter part of the same century and subsequently by a number of minor writers, by Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni in the sixteenth century followed by his pupil Nārāyaṇāśrama, and by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the seventeenth century.

The formal criticisms of Śrī-Harsha produced a new awakening among the Naiyāyikas who began to devote their whole attention to perfecting the formal accuracy of their definitions and methods to the utter neglect of the development of the content of their philosophy. This naturally enabled the Naiyāyikas to employ their tools successfully in debates. But as a result of this it became essential for Advaitins also to master the methods of this new formalism for the defence of their own views to the neglect of new creations in philosophy. Thus in the history of Advaita dialectic we can find two stages. In the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, when the controversies of the Advaitins were mainly with the Bauddhas, Mimāṃsakas, and Naiyāyikas, the element of formalism in the Advaita arguments was at its lowest, and the arguments were based largely on the analysis of experience from the Advaita standpoint and its general approach to philosophy. But in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries

the controversy was largely with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika schools and was based on considerations of logical formalism more than anything else. For the most part criticisms were nothing more than criticisms of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika definitions. From the thirteenth century onwards the Advaitins' attack was directed against the followers of Rāmānuja and later of Madhva, who, themselves adopting the method of dialectic, were strongly criticizing the arguments of the Advaitins. But this change of target for the Advaita writers meant little change in their strategy. The method of dialectic had attained such an importance that though the Vaiṣṇava critics brought many new considerations into the controversy, the dialectical method never lost its high place in the argument of the Advaita thinkers.

When we consider the place of Chitsukha in the history of Advaita against this background, we find that he was one of the pioneers of dialectical Advaita. Chitsukha flourished in the early part of the thirteenth century. He was a pupil of Gauḍeśvara āchārya, also called Jñānottama. (This Jñānottama was a *saṃnyāsin*, and is the one who wrote *Nyāya-sudhā* and *Jñāna-siddhi*, and is different from the Jñānottama [miśra] who wrote a commentary on Sureśvara's *Naishkarmya-siddhi*). Chitsukha wrote a commentary on Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭarakāchārya's *Nyāya-makaraṇḍa* and also on Śrī-Harsha's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* and an independent work called *Tattva-pradīpikā* or *Chitsukhī*. In the *Tattva-pradīpikā* he quotes Udayana, Uddyodakara, Kumārila, Padmapāda, Vallabha (*Līlāvātī*), Śālikanātha, Sureśvara, Śivāditya, Kulārka Paṇḍita, and Śrīdhara (*Nyāya-kandalī*). This work has been commented on by Pratyagbhagavān (A.D. 1400) in his *Nayana-prasādinī*. In addition to these Chitsukha produced a work called *Vivaraṇa-tātparyā-dīpikā* and an index to the *adhikaraṇas* of the *Brahma-sūtra*, called *Adhikaraṇa-mañjarī*, and wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, called *Bhāṣya-bhāva-prakāśikā*, a commentary on the *Pramāṇamālā* of Ānandabodha, and a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*, called *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā*.

The writer with whom Chitsukha is intimately connected is Śrī-Harsha. Śrī-Harsha lived probably during the middle of the twelfth century. His most important work is the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*. In this he refutes all the definitions of the Nyāya

system by which it justifies the reality of all that is known, and tries to show that the world which is experienced is purely phenomenal, having only relative existence based on practical grounds. The essence of Śrī-Harṣha's dialectic is this. The reality of the things one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (*chakraka*); and hence the real nature of things can in no way be defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known, and knowledge. None of these can be defined without reference to the rest. On account of this relativity, it is impossible to define the reality of any of these. The only reality is the self-luminous *Brahman* of pure consciousness.

A characteristic feature of Śrī-Harṣha's refutation is that while he showed that the formal definitions of the categories put forward by the Nyāya were faulty, he did not attempt to show that the concepts involved in those definitions were impossible. The way in which a concept is presented may be faulty, but this does not mean that the concept itself is false. If the concepts representing the world appearance are to be shown as false, they must themselves be analysed and shown to be fraught with such inherent contradictions that, in whatever way they are defined, they will not be rid of these contradictions. Śrī-Harṣha does not seem to make any deliberate attempt to do this. This deficiency is made good by Chitsukha.

In his *Tattva-pradīpikā* Chitsukha not only furnishes, like Śrī-Harṣha, a refutation of the Nyāya categories, thereby defending the doctrine of Advaita, but also gives us a very keen analysis and interpretation of some of the more important concepts of Advaita-Vedānta. Thus Pandit Harinātha Śarmā in his Sanskrit introduction to the *Tattva-pradīpikā* speaks of this work as being not only a defence of the philosophy of Advaita but also an exposition and interpretation of it: '*advaita-siddhānta-rakshako'py advaita-siddhānta-prakāśako vyutpādakaś cha*'. The work is written in four chapters. In the first chapter Chitsukha deals with the interpretation of the Advaita concepts such as self-revelation (*sva-prakāśatva*), the nature of the self as consciousness (*atmanah samvid-rūpatva*), and the nature of ignorance as darkness. In the second chapter he refutes the Nyāya categories such as difference, separateness, and quality. In the third chapter he deals with the

possibility of realizing *Brahman* and how release comes through knowledge. In the fourth chapter he deals with the nature of the ultimate state of liberation. The first two chapters form the major portion of the work, and the third and fourth are much smaller in size. This may be taken as itself an indication of the main purpose of the work which was on the one hand to defend Advaita by the refutation of the Nyāya system and on the other to expound and interpret the Advaita concepts.

Chitsukha owes the basis of his work to the earlier contribution of Śrī-Harsha, and the kinds of Nyāya categories discussed by Chitsukha are mostly the same as discussed in Śrī-Harsha's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*. But the arguments of Chitsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Śrī-Harsha. Chitsukha's general approach to the refutation of the categories is also slightly different. For, as Dasgupta says, "unlike Śrī-Harsha, Chitsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedānta, and his refutations of the Nyāya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self-revealing *Brahman* was the only reality and truth."¹

1. See S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 46-163.

ANUBHUTISVARUPA

by

L. VASUDEVA SARMA

M.A.

Anubhūtiśvarūpa has been well-known in the history of grammar, if not in that of Advaita. His *Sārasvata* grammar has long been in print. The identity and the several works of Anubhūtiśvarūpa in the field of Advaita have been discussed by Dr V. Raghavan in his paper on Anubhūtiśvarūpa published in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*.¹ Anubhūtiśvarūpa wrote mainly commentaries. All the three *Prakarāṇas* of Ānandabodha received his attention and we have manuscripts of his glosses on the *Nyāya-makaranda* (the *San̄graha*), the *Nyāyadīpāvalī* (*Chandrikā*) and the *Pramāṇamālā* (*Nibandha*). Among other standard authors whose works Anubhūtiśvarūpa has commented upon are Śaṅkara, Vimuktātman, and Śrī-Harsha. On Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, Anubhūtiśvarūpa wrote the commentary called *Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa*, and on his *bhāṣya* on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* of Gauḍapāda a brief *ṭippaṇa* was written by Anubhūtiśvarūpa; and three manuscripts of this work are known to exist. On the *Iśṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman, he wrote an extensive commentary called *Iśṭa-siddhi-vivaraṇa* which is available in manuscript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. His commentary on Śrī-Harsha's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-lchāḍya* also is not printed and it is available in a single manuscript in the Big Bhandar at Jessalamere. In the *Gītā-prasthāna*, Anubhūtiśvarūpa made his contribution in the form of a brief gloss on Śaṅkara's *Gītā-bhāṣya* which is still in manuscript.²

Anubhūtiśvarūpa for all that he wrote became a forgotten author in the history of Advaita. But it should not be supposed

1. *Silver Jubilee Volume*, pp. 352-68.

2. See *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Vol. 1, p. 159.

that there was no trace left at all of him in the writings of the later Advaitins. His commentaries on *Vimuktātman*, *Śrī-Harsha* and *Ānandabodha*, no doubt fell into oblivion; but his commentary on the *bhāṣya* of *Śrī Śaṅkara* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, namely, the *Prakāṭārtha-vivaraṇa* was remembered in the Advaitic tradition. Even in this case his real identity was lost and he was remembered only as *Prakāṭārtha-kāra* or the author of the *Prakāṭārtha*.

To begin with, *Anubhūtiśvarūpa* is very critical about *Vāchaspatimiśra*.³ *Amalānanda-Vyāsāśrama* wrote in the later part of the 13th century his *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī* of *Vāchaspati-miśra*; and without mentioning the name of *Anubhūtiśvarūpa* he defended *Vāchaspati* against his criticism. The reference in *Amalānanda*'s work could easily be identified as one to *Anubhūtiśvarūpa*. An express identification of the reply in *Amalānanda* as directed against the *Prakāṭārtha-kāra* is to be had in the *Ratnaprabhā* of *Govindānanda*.

Appayya Dikshita, the most noteworthy and versatile writer among the later Advaitins makes more than one reference to *Prakāṭārtha-kāra* in his *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*.

The above references have been pointed out to show that some of the criticisms and specific views of our author had not been completely forgotten.

Date of Anubhūtiśvarūpa

Śrī-Harsha on whose *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, *Anubhūtiśvarūpa* has commented flourished in the middle of the 12th Century A.D. *Amalānanda*, the commentator on *Vāchaspati*'s *Bhāmatī*, replies, without mentioning the name, to *Anubhūtiśvarūpa*'s criticisms of *Vāchaspati*. At the end of his *Kalpataru*, *Amalānanda* mentions that he wrote under the *Yādava* King of *Devagiri*, *Krishṇa*, (1248-1259 A.D.) and his brother *Mahādeva*. So we may take *Anubhūtiśvarūpa* as having flourished between the middle of the 12th Century and the first half of the 13th Century.

Anubhūtiśvarūpa's important contribution to Advaita lies in his view regarding *avidyā*. In Advaita, the supreme lord, the

3. See *Gleanings from Prakāṭārtha* by Prof. M. Hiriyanna, JORM. Vol. 15.

4. *Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya* with the commentaries *Ratnaprabhā*, *Bhāmatī* and *Nyāyanirṇaya*, Nirṇaya Sāgar Edn, 1904, p. 311.

individual soul, and the phenomenal world are but the appearances of the transcendent Reality, Brahman. The principle that accounts for this seeming diversification of Brahman is *avidyā* or *māyā*.

Some Advaitins draw a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. Bhāratīrtha in the *Pañchadaśī* distinguishes *avidyā*, the impure-*sattva*-predominant *prakṛiti* from *māyā*, the pure-*sattva*-predominant *prakṛiti*. The former is the adjunct of the Lord. In the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*, however, Bhāratīrtha follows the *Vivaraṇa* tradition of not making any difference between *māyā* and nescience (*avidyā*).⁵ Anubhūtiśvarūpa closely follows the *Vivaraṇa* school and he does not make any distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. He holds that the beginningless, indeterminable primal cause of beings which is present in the pure consciousness is *māyā*. The limited innumerable parts of *māyā* are endowed with the concealing and revealing powers and are called *ajñāna*.⁶ Thus Anubhūtiśvarūpa by referring to *ajñāna* or *avidyā* as the parts of *māyā* considers them to be identical.

As regards the locus and content of *māyā* or *avidyā*, Anubhūtiśvarūpa's view is not very clear. He closely follows the *Vivaraṇa* school. This school maintains that Brahman, the pure consciousness is the locus and content of *māyā* or *avidyā*. Anubhūtiśvarūpa says that *māyā* is present in or associated with pure consciousness as such. From this we may take that according to Anubhūtiśvarūpa Brahman itself is the locus and content of *māyā* or *avidyā*.

As regards the nature of the supreme lord and the individual soul there is difference of opinion between the two main post-Śaṅkara Advaita schools — the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Bhāmatī*. According to the former view, the individual soul is the reflection of consciousness in *avidyā*, and consciousness that serves as the original is the Supreme Lord. This view is known as *pratibimba-vāda*. According to the *Bhāmatī* view, consciousness delimited by *māyā* is the individual soul and the consciousness which is not delimited by *māyā* is the Supreme Lord. Anubhūtiśvarūpa follows the *pratibimba-vāda*. He, however, makes some improvement on it.

5. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita*, p. 229.

6. *Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa*, Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 9, Vol. I,

He holds that pure consciousness when reflected in *ajñāna* or *avidyā* which is a part of *māyā* is the individual soul. And the consciousness that transcends *māyā* is the *śuddhachaitanya*.⁷ The parts of *māyā* which are termed *ajñāna* are innumerable. And, since the consciousness reflected in *ajñāna* is the individual soul and since there is a plurality of *ajñāna*, there are many individual souls.

Anubhūtiśvarūpa maintains the distinction of released and bound souls thus:

In the case of an individual soul who has attained to the knowledge of Brahman, his *ajñāna* which is the part of *māyā* is annihilated and thereby he is released. The universe which is the transformation of *māyā* continues to exist; but the released soul is not attached to it, just as a blind man cannot see the colour although it exists. *Māyā* would be annihilated only when all its parts are annihilated, that is when all the individual souls attain to the knowledge of Brahman.⁸

Appayya Dikshita in his *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* in the very first topic expounds the view that the injunction as regards the study of Vedānta, reflection, and meditation contained in the Upanishadic text that 'Ātman is to be seen, heard, reflected on and meditated upon' is an *apūrva-vidhi*; and, this is the view of Anubhūtiśvarūpa.⁹

It may be added here that the author of the *Vivaraṇa* maintains that there is *niyama-vidhi*, while Vāchaspatimiśra holds that there is no injunction at all.

Anubhūtiśvarūpa flourished in an age when post-Śaṅkara Advaita had to contend against the *Bhedābheda-vāda* of Bhāskara and the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. Anubhūtiśvarūpa attacked bitterly Bhāskara who opposed the philosophy of Śaṅkara. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists hold several categories all of which are not acceptable to the Advaitins. And, they form the target of attack for Anubhūtiśvarūpa. By refuting the two schools mentioned above, Anubhūtiśvarūpa rendered a solid service to the cause of Advaita.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, p. 989.

AMALANANDA

RAJESVARA SASTRI DRAVID

Mahāmahopādhyāya

Śrī Appayya Dikshita, the most noteworthy and versatile Advaita scholar, in the beginning of his work *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* observes:

“Victorious is the auspicious birth-destroying discourse (the *Sūtrabhāṣya*), which issues forth from the blessed lotus face of the Bhagavadpāda, has for its sole purport the non-dual Brahman, and is diversified a thousand-fold on reaching the (numerous) ancient preceptors (who expounded it), in the same way as the river (Gaṅgā), which issuing from the feet of Viṣṇu, is diversified on reaching different lands”

Ancient preceptors of Advaita who wrote commentaries and treatises on the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara with a view to determine its import were keen on establishing the unity of the self. And, in order to establish this, they advocated several theories which differ among themselves. All these differing theories, however, pertain only to the empirical stage, and hence they do not in any way stultify the non-dual nature of the self. Sureśvara, well-known as the author of the *Vārtikas*, states that by whichever theory one attains to the knowledge of Brahman that theory must be taken to be the best; and there are many theories within the fold of Advaita.

Among the manifold theories explored and expounded by the ancient preceptors, the theories advocated by Vāchaspatimiśra in his commentary, *Bhāmatī*, on the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara are prominent. His work is traditionally known as the *Bhāmatīprasthāna*. He wrote treatises on the six orthodox *darśanas*, and was well-versed in *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsa* and *Vyākaraṇa*. The word *prasthāna* etymologically derived means a work by which is determined (*sthiyate-nirṇīyate*) beyond all uncertainty (*prakarṣheṇa*) the

import of the *Sūtrabhāṣhya* of Śaṅkara. The work *Bhāmatī* determines beyond all uncertainty the import of the *Sūtrabhāṣhya* of Śaṅkara and hence it is called a *prasthāna*.

The views set forth in the *Bhāmatī* are difficult to understand and, in order to favour the earnest students of Advaita, Śrī Amalānanda wrote a commentary on it by name *Vedāntakalpataru*. Śrī Appayya Dīkshita in his *Parimala* on the *Vedāntakalpataru* says that the latter gives room, like the aerial car of Pushpaka, to the manifold theories set forth by wise men. We shall now set forth briefly some unique features of the *Kalpataru* in the interpretation of the *Bhāmatī* on the *Chatussūtrī* portion of the *Sūtrabhāṣhya*.

Śrī Śaṅkara in his *adhyāsabhāṣhya* states, 'After imposing on each the nature and the attributes of the other through non-discrimination of each from the other in the case of attributes absolutely distinct among themselves as also of the substrates absolutely distinct among themselves, there is this natural empirical usage like, "I am this", and "this is mine", coupling the true with the untrue, with its cause in the illusory cognition'.¹

The *Bhāmatī* on this passage is as follows: The true is the intelligent self; the untrue are the intellect, the sense-organs, the body, etc.; coupling (*mithunīkritya*) these two substrates; coupling means yoking (*yugalīkritya*).²

Although the word *mithunīkritya* is interpreted in the sense of *yugalīkritya*, yet the intended sense is not clear. A doubt naturally arises whether this *yugalīkaraṇa* means the relations of contact, etc., or a unique kind of relation.

Amalānanda in the *Kalpataru* explains the word "*yugalīkaraṇa*" thus: The manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed is *yugalīkaraṇa*.

"*yugalīkaraṇam nāma adhiśṭhānāropyayoḥ
svarūpeṇa buddhau bhānam.*"

1. *tathāpi anyonyasmin anyonyātmakatām anyonyadharmānīścha adhyasya itaretarāvivekena atyantaviviktayoḥ dharmadharmiṇoḥ mithyājñānanimittatḥ satyānṛite mithunīkritya ahamidam mamedamiti naisargiko'yam lokavyavahārah.*
2. *satyam chidātmā, anṛitam buddhīndriyadehādi, te dve dharmiṇi mithunīkritya yugalīkritya ityarthah.*

This definition has one difficulty. *Yugalīkaraṇa* is the cause of superimposition. And, it is interpreted to mean the manifestation of substrate and the object superimposed. The latter, therefore, necessarily precedes superimposition. But, before the first superimposition of mind on the self, when one gets back to waking state from deep sleep or at the time of first creation when the cosmic dissolution is over, the manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed, that is, mind, is not possible. For, it is admitted that at the time of dissolution or deep sleep mind merges in its cause that is, *avidyā*. Hence it must be held that the latent impressions arising out of the manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed (mind) before the dissolution or deep sleep is the cause of the superimposition of mind on the self when one gets back to waking state from deep sleep or at the time of the first creation when the cosmic dissolution is over. *Yugalīkaraṇa* thus comes to mean the latent impressions arising out of manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed. The manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed is superimposition. Hence *yugalīkaraṇa* means the latent impressions of the earlier superimposition.

Yugalīkaraṇa, therefore, means the latent impressions of the earlier superimposition which has for its content the substrate and the object superimposed and whose form is identical with the form of the succeeding superimposition.

*adhyāśasamanākāraḥ adhiśṭhānāropya viśayaścaḥ
pūrvabhramasamskāraḥ yugalīkaraṇamityarthaḥ.*

It has been said that *yugalīkaraṇa* means manifestation of the substratum and the object superimposed. From this it should not be understood that there is the manifestation of the substrate and the superimposed object as distinct entities. According to Advaita, error is not admitted without a substratum. What is superimposed is unreal. And it has no existence independent of the substratum. Substratum is the limit of sublation. And by its knowledge, the knowledge of the superimposed object is sublated or at least taken to be not valid. So when it is said that there is manifestation of the substratum and the object superimposed, it must be understood that the two are manifest as a blend or a unified whole.

Now it might be objected thus. The manifestation of substratum and the object superimposed as a unified whole is error or superimposition. It is the cause of later superimposition. The knowledge of the substratum is independently the cause of the knowledge of the substratum of the later superimposition. Similarly the knowledge of the superimposed object is independently the cause of the knowledge of the superimposed object of the later superimposition. One need not hold that the form of the earlier superimposition or its latent impression *as such* is the cause of the later superimposition and must correspond to the form of the later superimposition.

This objection is not valid. One does not have the erroneous cognition in the form of 'I am the body' (*aham dehaḥ*) although there exists the knowledge '*aham*' and '*dehaḥ*' separately. The reason is that there is no such previous knowledge and so no such latent impression which could lead to the superimposition in the form of 'I am the body'. On the other hand, there is the superimposition in the form of 'I am a man', and this is caused by the previous superimposition or its latent impression in the form of 'I am a man'. Hence the form of the later superimposition corresponds to the form of the earlier superimposition or its latent impression. And, the earlier superimposition or its latent impression by having a form similar to that of the later superimposition is the cause of the later superimposition. Hence *yugalīkaraṇa* means earlier superimposition or its latent impression.

In the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* Śaṅkara says: There is this natural empirical usage like 'I am this', and 'This is mine'. The *Bhāmatī* on this passage is as follows: 'When there is cognition of what is superimposed, there is the superimposition of what was formerly seen, while that cognition itself is conditioned by superimposition; thus, (the defect of) reciprocal dependence seems difficult to avoid. To this he says: "natural". This empirical usage is natural, beginningless. Through the beginninglessness of the usage, there is declared the beginninglessness of its cause—superimposition. Hence, of the intellect, organs, body, etc., appearing in every prior illusory cognition, there is use in every subsequent instance of superimposition. This (process) being beginningless, like (the succession of) the seed and the sprout, 'there is no reciprocal dependence; this is the meaning'.

From this it is clear that the empirical usage, its cause, that is, superimposition, and its cause, earlier superimpositions or the latent impressions—all these are beginningless like a stream. Amalānanda explains the concept of beginninglessness in the following verse:

*tadākṛityuparaktānām
vyaktīnāmekadhā vinā
anādikālāvṛittiḥ yā
sā kāryānāditā matā.*

Earlier superimpositions or their latent impressions are beginningless in this sense that there always exists the relation of time to either of these. In the same way, *adhyāsa* or superimposition is beginningless in the sense that superimposition or its subtle form is always related to time. Similarly, empirical usage is beginningless in this that empirical usage or its subtle form is always related to time.

Some hold that this series of superimpositions or their latent impression is *avidyā*. And they cite the following texts from the *Sūtrabhāṣya* to substantiate their contention. One text is: "Wise men consider the superimposition of this nature to be *avidyā*";³ and the other text is: "It is for the removal of this cause of evil, for the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the self, that all the Vedāntas are commenced".⁴ On the basis of these texts, some conclude that the *Bhāmatī* which speaks of two kinds of nescience in the invocatory verse is not true to the view of the *Sūtrabhāṣya*.

In order to remove this misapprehension the *Kalpataru* states that one kind of nescience which is beginningless and positive in character is explained in the *devatādhikaraṇa*; and the other kind is the series of latent impressions arising from previous erroneous cognitions. Between these two kinds of nescience, the one that is explained in the *devatādhikaraṇa* is well-known in the Advaita literature to be the *mūlāvidyā*, primal nescience.

3. *tametam evamlakṣhanam adhyāsam paṇḍitāḥ avidyeti manyante.*

4. *asya anarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatva-vidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntāḥ ārabhyante.*

Now two questions arise, one as to the nature of nescience and another as to its primal nature. Nescience is that which has undifferentiated consciousness alone as its content (*vishaya*). And it is *avidyā* in the sense that it is removable by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Or, we may say that it is *avidyā* in the sense that it has the characteristic of veiling the true nature of Brahman. And this characteristic of veiling the true nature of Brahman is present both in the *mūlāvidyās* and the *tūlāvidyās*. It is a *jātivīśeṣha*; and it gives rise to the empirical usage 'I do not know'. Its primal nature consists in this that it is the material cause of the superimposition of the body, the senses, etc., by veiling the true nature of the substratum. The phrase "material cause of erroneous cognition (*bramo'pādāna*)" occurring in a *Kalpataru* passage conveys the sense that *mūlāvidyā* is the material cause of superimposition by veiling the true nature of the substratum.

Now an objection may be raised. The superimposition of the body, senses, etc., is like a continuous stream and so the earlier superimposition is the cause of the succeeding one. When such is the case there is no necessity to resort to primal nescience as the cause of superimposition.

This objection does not hold good. Primal nescience serves a two-fold purpose. One is that it conceals the specific nature of the substratum of superimposition. There arises the superimposition of silver in the nacre only when the specific nature of the substratum, that is, the consciousness delimited by nacre is not manifest. It is an invariable rule that non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum is the most important cause of superimposition. The phrases like *vivekāgraha*, and *asamsargāgraha* refer only to the non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum. When there is the manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum, there does not arise superimposition. The chief reason for this is that there is the absence of the cause of the superimposition, that is, non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum. Thus, only when there is the non-manifestation of the specific nature of the undifferentiated consciousness, could the superimposition of mind, etc., on the self arise. And, the non-manifestation of the specific nature of Ātman is caused only by *mūlāvidyā*. In this sense it is the cause

of the superimposition of mind, etc., on the self and the relation of the self on the mind, etc.

Another purpose is served by *mūlāvidyā*. It is the transformative material cause of the superimposition of the body, senses, etc. It is thus: The superimposition of the body, senses, etc., has a transformative material cause, because it is an existent effect, like pot, etc. Thus is assumed only one transformative material cause with reference to all superimpositions. It is similar to the Naiyāyika position that only one omniscient being, that is, God, is inferred to be the efficient cause of the entire universe. The Upanishadic text '*māyām tu prakṛitim vidyāt māyinam tu maheśvaram*' affirms *avidyā* to be the primal cause of the universe.

Although Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Brahmānandasarasvatī established the validity of the Advaitic truth by adopting the Navya-nyāya method, yet it must be noted that they adopt the line of arguments of the *Kalpataru* and other commentaries. And this is evident from this that both the writers often refer to the views of the *Kalpataru* in their works.

There is a *bhāshya* text which is as follows: "There is begun respectful enquiry into the Vedānta texts whose auxiliary is reasoning not inconsistent therewith and whose purpose is liberation".⁵ The *Bhāmātī* on this passage is as follows:

"The enquiry into the Vedānta is itself reasoning; other reasoning which does not conflict therewith such as is mentioned in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Nyāya-sūtras* in discussing the authoritativeness of the Veda, of perception, etc., serves as auxiliary".

The *Kalpataru* on the above passage comments that the *Nyāya-śāstra*, *Smṛitis*, etc., are said to be 'reasonings' (*tarkāḥ*) in this that they are auxiliaries to the understanding of the import of scripture.

5. *vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitarakopakarāṇā nīśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate* (*Sūtrabhāshya* on i, i, 1).

6. *vedāntamīmāṃsā tāvattarka eva, tadavirodhinaścha ye anyepi tarkāḥ adhvaramīmāṃsāyām nyāye cha vedapratyakshādiprāmāṇyapariśodhanādishūktāḥ te upakaraṇam yasyāḥ sā tathoktā;*

Thus the *Navya-nyāya* terminology also must be taken to be 'tarka' and it is part and parcel of the *Vedāntamīmāṃsā*. And the later Advaitic writers adopted the *Navya-nyāya* method in their works in order to achieve logical precision.

Amalānanda at the end of the *Kalpataru* says that he wrote the work under the Yādava king of Devagiri (the present Doulatabad)—Krishṇa and his brother Mahādeva (1247-1260 A.D.). Hence Amalānanda flourished in the middle of the 13th century.

In the beginning of the *Kalpataru* on the third chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra*, Amalānanda gives his name as Vyāsāśrama.

“śrīmad vyāsāśramasya prativadanamadāt karṇayugmam
viriñchiḥ”.

In the beginning of the *Kalpataru*, Amalānanda says that he is the disciple of Śrī Anubhavānanda.

“yathārthānubhavānanda-
padagītā gurum namaḥ”.

He further states that Śrī Ātmānanda-yati is his grand-preceptor.

ātmānandayatiśvaram tam
anīśam vande gurūṇām gurum.

And his *vidyāguru* is Sukhaprakāśa, the disciple of Chitsukha.

“prodyat-tāraka-divya-dīpti-paramām
vyomāpi nīrājyate,
gobhīrasya sukhaprakāśaśaśinam
tam naumi vidyāgurum”.

Amalānanda lived in Nasik-trayambaka-kshetra. In the *Saman-vayādhikaraṇa* there occurs the following verse in the *Kalpataru*.

“asti kila brahmagiri nāma girivaraḥ
trayambakajaṭājūtakalanāya vinirmitā
pāṇḍureva paṭi bhāti yatra godāvarī nadī.

While commenting on this, Śrī Appayya Dīkshita states that our author who lived in Nasik-trayambaka-kshetra composed his works. Apart from the *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī*, Amalānanda wrote *Śāstradarpaṇa* an exposition on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

ANANDAPURNA-VIDYASAGARA

by

V. SUBRAHMANIA SASTRI

Nyāya Śiromaṇi

Śrī Bādarāyaṇa set forth the *Vedānta-darśana* in his aphorisms by stringing together the flowers of the Upanishadic texts. And, this *darśana* is the most noteworthy among the *darśanas*. Śrī Śaṅkara enriched it by his commentary on it. Preceptors of Advaita wrote many commentaries on it; and these commentaries were supplemented by other commentaries.

In the Advaita literature there are many works which prove the validity of the import of the Upanishads by refuting, on the basis of reasoning, the objections raised against Advaita by other opposing schools. And these works are termed *Vādaprasthāna*.

In the *Vādaprasthāna* the most prominent one is the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* by Śrī-Harsha. He proves on the basis of reasoning that the phenomenal universe is indeterminable either as real or as unreal. All the categories and their definitions admitted in the Nyāya system are proved to be riddled with inconsistencies. He says that if one repeats, like a parrot, his arguments against the Nyāya system then that itself is enough to make the realists dumb. Whether one who repeats his arguments knows the import of them or not—it does not matter much.

This work is so complex that it is exceedingly difficult to understand it. Not only this: the view-points that are set forth in the work are confusingly interposed. It requires profound scholarship to deal with the work.

Ānandapūrṇa wrote the commentary *Vidyāsāgarī* on this work. And this commentary is superb. It solves all the intricate points deliberately introduced in the work. Further, it refers to the view-points of the Nyāya, the Prābhākara, the Bhāṭṭa and the Sugata

schools and critically examines them. Thus what was once so complicated and so full of perplexities and hence so hard to follow, that work has been made much easier to understand by Ānandapūrṇa.

Varadarāja, the commentator on Udayana's *Kusumāñjali* speaks of Udayana thus:

*audayane pathi gahane
videśikaḥ pratipadam skhalati lokaḥ.*

This passage means that one who is a foreigner to the Nyāya system falters at every step in the impenetrable path of Udayana's philosophy. Ānandapūrṇa reveals his profound scholarship by explaining the import of the complex statements of Udayana and the much more complicated points of Śrī-Harsha, and by making clear the arguments used to refute the definitions of the categories of the schools opposed to Advaita.

Certain view-points of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system which are not explicitly referred to and criticized in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* are referred to and criticized by Ānandapūrṇa. The *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* refers to the intrinsic validity of knowledge and further states that that validity can be removed only when there arises some counteracting factor—*dhiyām svataḥ prāmāṇyasya bādhakaikāpodyatvāt* (p. 145). While commenting on this passage, Ānandapūrṇa refers to the inferential argument of Udayana that establishes the validity of knowledge to be extrinsic. And that inferential argument is:

“Validity of knowledge depends upon a cause which is different from the cause that gives rise to knowledge; because it is a unique kind of effect, like absence of validity.”

yadapyudayano jagāda—“*pramā jñānahetvatirikta hetvadīnā, kāryatve sati tad viśeṣatvāt, apramāvat*” (p. 147). Ānandapūrṇa proves that this inferential argument is not valid. This inferential argument is again referred to and criticized on a different ground while commenting on the passage of the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* which refutes extrinsic validity to knowledge and which runs as follows:

“*prāmāṇyaparatastvavyudasti prastāve.*” (p. 445)

Again, in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* it is said that a cause has a *śakti* to create an object and the characteristic that determines the existence of such a *śakti* is the effect that is going to be produced.

“*kāraṇa-śakteścha viśeshakam asadeva kāryam.*” (p. 76).

While commenting on this passage, Ānandapūrṇa refers to the passage of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana. The Naiyāyikas do not admit *śakti* to be a separate category. Udayana holds that if a cause should produce an effect then what is necessary is only the absence of any factor that would prevent the origination of the effect and not the existence of *śakti*. And Ānandapūrṇa refutes the view of Udayana in detail. The *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* text deals with the nature of the witness-self (*sākshī*). This provides an occasion for Ānandapūrṇa to refer to and criticise the objection of Aparārka raised in his commentary *Nyāyamuktāvalī* on *Nyāya-sāra* of Bhāsarvajña.

All the above references have been given to show that Ānandapūrṇa refers to and refutes the view-points of the schools opposed to Advaita although they are not referred to in the text on which he comments.

Apart from his superb commentary on the amazingly logical treatise of the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, Ānandapūrṇa wrote a commentary on Sureśvara's *Vārtika* on the *Bṛihadāraṇyako'paniśadbhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara. The *Bṛihadāraṇyako'paniśad* is replete with reasonings, vast in extent and great in sense. Śrī Śaṅkara wrote his *bhāṣya* on it, and Sureśvara wrote his *Vārtika* which consists of more than eleven thousand verses. Sureśvara was mainly concerned with refuting the concept of difference, the views of Bhartriprapaṇcha, and the theory of *jñāna-karma-samuchchaya*, and also with establishing the indeterminable nature of the universe and oneness of the self. And on this *Vārtika*, Ānandapūrṇa wrote his commentary which is known as *Nyāya-kalpalatikā*. In this work he explains the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* in the order in which the followers of the Prābhākara school have arranged them into *adhikaraṇas*; and this shows his profound knowledge of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school. Although he criticizes the view-points of both the Nyāya-vaśīśhika and the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, yet his antipathy is more deep-rooted towards the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school than to-

wards the Nyāyavaśeshika. And the chief reason for this is that the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school, unlike the Nyāya-vaśeshika school, does not admit the existence of God.

avidyāratānām tārīkikāṇām īśvarakāraṇinām aviveko bahutaraḥ mīmāṃsakānām tu nirīśvarāṇām bahutamo'vivekaḥ (Nyāya-kalpalatikā).

He is always averse to any digression from the subject on hand. That is why he does not explain each and every word of the *Vārtika* which, by itself, is elegant in style. He interprets only the important words and he gives the construction of the sentences only wherever necessary. He prefaces a succeeding *Vārtika* by the sense of an earlier *Vārtika*. He does not thrust upon the original verses the several theories of Advaita if they are not relevant. He does not cite the passages that set forth the views of the schools criticized. In the *Vārtika* the philosophy of Bhartṛiprapaṇcha comes in for a good deal of criticism. But very rarely he cites the passages of Bhartṛiprapaṇcha. He is rather indifferent in identifying the authors of the schools who are referred to either directly or indirectly in the *Vārtika*. For example, in his commentary on the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* he says that the aphorism “*yugapat jñānānutpattiḥ manaso liṅgam*” is that of Kaṇāda. In fact this is the aphorism of Gautama (1.1.16). Kaṇāda's aphorism runs as follows:

“*ātmendriyārthasannikarshe jñānasya bhāvo' bhāvaścha manaso liṅgam*” (3.2.1). But, as the intended sense is the same and both the systems are more or less similar, he takes the one for the other.

While commenting on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text

“*tameva dhīro vijñāya prajñām kurvīta brāhmaṇaḥ,*”

Sureśvara refers to the view of Maṇḍana.

*anye tu paṇḍitam manyāḥ
sampradāyānusārataḥ
vijñāyati vachāḥ śrautam
idam vyāchakshate'nyathā (4.4.796)*

While commenting on this verse, Ānandapūrṇa says that the view of Vāchaspatimiśra is referred to here. Sureśvara who flourished before Vāchaspati could not refer to him. But since

Vāchaspati is considered to be a close follower of Maṇḍana, Ānandapūrṇa might have identified the two. This is as it should be, because while commenting on the *Vārtika*.

*nanvatrāpi kṛtaivāsau
lyabantenābhidyate
prajñātaḥ karaṇam tasyāḥ
bhūyaḥ kasmānna vidhīyate (4.4.798),*

he says that the view referred to herein is that of Maṇḍana.

While commenting on the *Bṛihadāraṇyako'panishad* text "brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti" (4.4.6) Śrī Śaṅkara says that those who hold that in moksha there is the manifestation of a unique kind of knowledge and bliss must explain the sense of the word 'manifestation.'

*yepi āchakshate mokshe
vijñānāntaram ānandāntaram
cha abhivyaajyate iti taiḥ vaktavyaḥ abhivyaktiśabdārthaḥ*

Here the *Vārtika* is:

*yetu vyāchakshate mokshe
nityānandaikagocharā
jñānābhivyaktirityevam
svasiddhāntasamāśrayāt (4.4.324).*

Ānandapūrṇa says that the view-point of Bhāsarvajña is stated here. It is wrong. The view of Bhāsarvajña who came after Śaṅkara and Sureśvara cannot be referred to by both. All this shows that Ānandapūrṇa is more concerned with the view-points than with their authors.

Ānandapūrṇa while refuting the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school observes that if it is said that the Upanishads are not valid on the ground that they are contrary to the *Śābarabhāṣya*, then it can very well be said that the ritualistic section of the veda is not valid because it is contrary to the import of the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*. Thus he shows his greatest respect towards Śaṅkara.

Ānandapūrṇa wrote ten works; and they are:

1. *Khaṇḍanāṭikā (vidyāsāgarī)*
2. *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtikavyākhyā (Nyāya-kalpa-latikā)*
3. *Nyāyachandrikā*

4. *Brahmasiddhi-vyākhyā* (*Bhāvaśuddhiḥ*)
5. *Samanvaya-sūtra-vṛttiḥ*
6. *Pañchupādikā-vyākhyā*
7. *Mahāvidyāvidāmbanavyākhyā*
8. *Nyāyasāravvyākhyā*
9. *Kāśikā-vyākhyā* (*Prakṛiyāmañjarī*)
10. *Mokshadharmavyākhyā*.

By writing commentaries on the works on important schools of Advaita he provided much material for *manana*, arguing within oneself about the validity of the import of the Upanishads. Thus he rendered a valuable service to the cause of Advaita, particularly to those who long for liberation.

His *Vidyāguru* was an ascetic by name *Śvetagiri*. In the beginning of the *Nyāya-kalpa-latikā* and the *Vidyāsāgarī* he salutes him.

1. *Śrimate gurave*
śvetagiraye sthānnamaskriyā" (*Nyāyakalpalatikā*)
2. *vande munīndrān yatibrindavandyān śrīmadgurūn*
śvetagirīn varishṭhān (*Vidyāsāgarī*).

At the end of the *Nyāyakalpalatikā* also he salutes him.

"*śrīmad śvetagirim vande śishyadhīpadmabhāskaram.*"

At one place he refers to himself as *Abhayānanda-pūjyapādaśishya*. From this we may take that *Abhayānanda* was his *Dīkshāguru*. Both at the beginning and at the end of the *Nyāyakalpalatikā*, he offers his salutations to *Gokarṇeśvara*; and from this it is known that he lived in *Gokarṇakshetra*.

In the *Prakṛiyāmañjarī* he says that he wrote the work when the king *Kāmadeva* was ruling over *Gokarṇa*. This king flourished in 1350 AD. And we may take that *Ānandapūrṇa* flourished in 1350 A.D.

RAMADVAYACHARYA

by

S. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI

M.A.

Rāmādvayāchārya belongs to that galaxy of medieval authors who wrote independent dialectical works called *prakaraṇas* connected with the *Vedānta Śāstra*. *Vedānta-kaumudī*, published by the Madras University (1955) and an unpublished commentary on it by himself are the only works available in his name. A *prakaraṇa* may be smaller or bigger than the *Śāstra* to which it is connected, but it elaborates a few topics dealt with there. *Vedānta-kaumudī* fully answers to this definition.

His Date

Appaya Dīkshita of the 16th Century quotes from *Vedānta-kaumudī* thrice, once by the name of the author and twice by mentioning his work. Brahmānanda (17th century) the author of *Laghuchandrikā* discussed his *anumāna* in the establishment of *mithyātva* (illusoriness) of the universe. Moreover Dr. Dasgupta who was the first to notice the importance of *Vedānta-kaumudī* refers to two manuscripts of the commentary of the work, one in Asiatic Society of Bengal and the other in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. In both these manuscripts the copying date given is 1515 A.D. We can therefore take it that the upper limit of the date of *Vedānta-kaumudī* and its commentary (which are by the same author) is 1500 A.D. His reference to Janārdana who later became Anandagiri and his reference to later authors show that he probably lived about 1515 A.D.

Rāmādvaya in his discussions mostly follows the *Siddhāntas* of the *Vivaraṇa* school, but whenever he finds any difficulty he adopts the views of *Vāchaspati*. Following the *Siddhānta* of the *Vivaraṇa* school he adopts:

- (i) *niyamavidhi* in respect of injunctions regarding *śravaṇa*;
- (ii) rise of Brahman-realization directly from the Vedāntas;
- (iii) *jīvas* as reflections of *Brahman*.

Following Vāchaspati he accepts nescience as many and its location in *jīvas*.

Contents of *Vedānta-Kaumudī*

The work is divided into four chapters. Brahman-inquiry, the subject-matter of the first *Brahma-sūtra*, is elaborated in the first chapter. Following the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* of Śrī-Harsha, the author establishes the eligibility of the Advaitin who views the world as unreal, for taking part in philosophical discussions. He says that what is required in the discussions is only the acceptance of categories as they are and not their absolute reality. Explaining the self-validity of the *pramāṇas* he thinks that though the absence of defects is useful it does not conduce to validity being extrinsic. After an elaborate discussion he supports Vāchaspati's view that mind is the means of Brahman-knowledge; but finally he approves the position taken by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* that Vedāntas directly give rise to the intuitive knowledge. Taking up the Advaitin's stand in respect of illusion, the author condemns all other *khyātis* and supports *anirvachanīyakhyāti*. *Māyā* as a positive entity is established by perception, inference, and scripture. Among the qualities necessary for eligibility for Brahman-inquiry the author lays stress on *vairāgya* (freedom from desires). This he says is to be attained not only by performing the obligatory rites prescribed in the Vedas but also by voluntary charity of food and clothing beyond one's means. Interpreting the age-long saying that by death in *Vārāṇasī* one gets final release, he says that death there leads to final release through different phases and not directly. After an extensive discussion, the author establishes that *sannyāsa āśrama* is essential for Brahman-knowledge and is so taught in the scriptures. But once taken, there is no going back. Taking up the subject-matter of the *Brahma-sūtra* the author states that the identity of *jīva* with Brahman is the subject and the whole inanimate world with the multiplicity of the *jīvas* is unreal. The unreality of the universe is established on the ground that it is inexplicable either as different or as non-different from Brahman, its cause. In chapter II the author takes up the second *Brahma-sūtra* for discussion. He declares that the fact that Brahman is the cause of creation, sustentation, and dissolution of the world is to be established only by scripture and not by inference as held

by the Naiyāyikas. The author condemns the inferences of the Naiyāyikas establishing *Īśvara* as the cause as fallacious. Elaborating causality, the author rejects the views (i) that karma is the cause, (ii) that time is the cause, (iii) that nature is the cause, (iv) that *prāṇa* (vital air) is the cause, and (v) that *pradhāna* is the cause. Incidentally he criticises the views of the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Pāsupatas in respect of causation.

After thus explaining the *taṭasthalakṣhaṇa* he takes up the *svarūpalakṣhaṇa* and establishes on the basis of scripture and reasoning that Brahman is of the nature of reality, intelligence, and bliss. He also establishes the Vedāntic theory that the *mahāvākyas* give rise to an impartite sense (*akhaṇḍārtha*).

In the third chapter, the author discusses the proofs for the existence of Brahman. He holds that *Vedāntas* alone are the proofs. Incidentally he takes up other *pramāṇas* and discusses their definitions and scope. He rejects the *anumānas* given by Udayana in his *Kusumāñjalī* as fallacious. As regards verbal knowledge resulting from Vedic and non-Vedic texts the author favours *abhihitānvayavāda* of Kumārila in preference to *anvitābhīdhānavāda* of Prabhākara. Taking up the subject of authorship of the *Vedas* the author declares that the *Vedas* are not of human origin; even God cannot interfere in their subject-matter or sequence. They are beginningless. Though they perish in the deluge, there is God who remembers the *Vedas* of the previous creation and teaches them to Brahmā at the time of the first creation after the deluge.

In chapter IV the author takes up the fourth *Sūtra* for discussion. In reply to the contention of the *Mīmāṃsakas* that Vedic injunctions which tend to human activity (towards good) or abstention (from bad) alone are valid, and the Upanishads which reveal the ever-existent Brahman are not valid, the *Sūtrakāra* says that the Upanishads which are not connected with any *karma* and which do not set forth any activity are also valid since they also reveal Brahman whose knowledge gives the final *purushārtha*. The author incidentally defines the sixteen categories enumerated by Gautama. As regards the nature of *Īśvara* he accepts the *Vivaraṇa* theory that he is the *pratibimba* (reflection) of Brahman in *māyā*; he is all-pervasive.

PRATYAGSVARUPA

by

S. R. KRISHNAMURTI SASTRI

Nyāya, Vedānta Śiromaṇi

In order to keep alive the Advaitic tradition for the benefit of posterity, many Advaitic preceptors wrote treatises on Advaita; and among them Pratyagsvarūpa is prominent. His preceptor is Pratyak-prakāśapūjyapāda and Pratyagsvarūpa praises him as the source of the sacred river *vidyā* that removes *ajñāna*.

‘vidyānadīmūlam vidyūgurum’

Pratyagsvarūpa wrote only one work and that too is a commentary by name *Nayanaprasādinī* on the *Pratyaktattvapradīpikā* or *Tattvapradīpikā* of Chitsukhāchārya. The title *Nayanaprasādinī* is significant, as the study of this work leads to clear perception by removing blindness in the form of *ajñāna* and brings forth delectation to the heart.

ajñānatimirajetrī mānasanayanaprasādinī tīkā

The *Tattvapradīpikā* of Chitsukha closely follows the method of *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā* of Śrī-Harsha. To appreciate the place occupied by Śrī-Harsha, Chitsukha and Pratyagsvarūpa in the history of Advaita in the post-Śaṅkara period, it is necessary to consider some of the authors who preceded them in the immediate past—authors who were active in opposing the new philosophy of Śaṅkara. The latter opponents of Śaṅkara and his school fall into two main groups—the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. These two formed the main targets of the criticisms of the Advaitins in the five or six centuries immediately following Śaṅkara. In the field of Nyāya there was a revival of activity which was directed mainly against the concept of *jagan-mithyātva*. In the times before the 13th or 14th century, if we may draw a rough demarcation like that, the orthodox *darśanas* and particularly the Nyāya were

concerned with opposing the Buddhist schools. After this period when the influence of Buddhism waned, the attention of the orthodox schools turned in a more pronounced manner against each other. Different schools of Vedānta developed and the controversies in the field of philosophy were concerned with these differing stand-points within the fold of Vedānta. The renewed activity in the field of Nyāya may be said to have received a fresh impetus from the new technique developed by one Kulārka-panḍita in his *mahāvīdyānumāna*. Śrī-Harsha, Chitsukha, Ānandapūrṇa, and Pratyagsvarūpa appeared on the scene at this stage and opposed the Buddhistic and Nyāya schools. At the end of the 14th century, Advaita definitely triumphed over the other schools and reached its highest point.

While the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* following the *vitāṇḍa* type of discussion only refutes the view-points of other schools, the *Tattvapradīpikā* explains and establishes the Advaitic concepts also. It critically examines the view-points of the orthodox and heterodox schools. And, the Nyāya school comes in for a good deal of criticism. The *prāchīna-nyāya* works are replete with the discussions regarding the nature of the soul. The *Tattvapradīpikā* critically reviews them. While commenting on these portions, Pratyagsvarūpa refers to the works, and the authors, and he cites the relevant passages. One Nyāya writer Vādivāgīśvara, the author of the work *Mānamanohara* is severely criticised by Chitsukha and Pratyagsvarūpa. The *Tattvapradīpikā* examines the views of the Nyāya works that are not examined by the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*. And, Pratyagsvarūpa while commenting on these sections, gives the names of the works and authors. While the *Tattvapradīpikā* refers to a particular view-point and criticises it, Pratyagsvarūpa in his commentary gives all the possible arguments in favour of the opponent's view-point and later proves them to be unsound. The greatest contribution of Pratyagsvarūpa to Advaita lies in this that all the objections that are raised later by the dualistic schools have already been anticipated and answered by him.

Like the commentator Ānandapūrṇa-Vidyāsāgara, Pratyagsvarūpa also is indifferent to the identity of the authors of the views he examines. For example, while examining the Nyāya conception of liberation in the fourth section of the *Tattvapradīpikā*, Pratyagsvarūpa refers to a passage from the *Yogasūtra*-

bhāshya and says that Patañjali is the author of that passage,¹ which he is not. At the end of each *pariccheda*, Pratyagsvarūpa gives a verse summarizing the subject-matter of the entire chapter. Later Brahmānanda in his commentary on the *Advaita-siddhi* adopts this method.

The *Tattvapradīpikā* freely uses the *mahā-vidyānumāna*. And Pratyagsvarūpa employs this type of syllogism while discussing not only the Nyāya school but also the view-points of the other schools. As has been stated already, the *Tattvapradīpikā* deals with the views of the *prāchīna-nyāya*. And this provides an occasion for Pratyagsvarūpa to explain the theories of *prāchīna-nyāya*. While dealing with the theory of error and the concept of liberation of the Buddhistic school, Pratyagsvarūpa cites passages from the works of the Buddhistic school. A careful study of this work undoubtedly yields profound knowledge of both the orthodox and heterodox schools of thought. This author closely follows the *Vivaraṇa* school. The *Tattvapradīpikā* establishes that *tamas* is an object of visual perception. Pratyagsvarūpa raises the objection that this view is against the conclusive view of Advaita that *tamas* is an object of the witness-self (*sākshī*), and holds that the author Chitsukha shows his power of reasoning (*yuktivaibhava*) here.

Of all the concepts of Advaita, the concept of *avidyānivṛtti* is the most difficult one to understand. The *Tattvapradīpikā* deals with this. Three theories are prevalent in Advaita, and they are: (i) *avidyānivṛtti* is identical with Brahman. (ii) It is different from Brahman; but it is not real in the sense in which Brahman is, nor unreal in the sense of an absolute nothing, nor real and unreal at once. It is also not *anirvachanīya* because *avidyā* is *anirvachanīya* and so its removal must be something other than *anirvachanīya*. So *avidyānivṛtti* is a fifth kind. (iii) It is of the nature of the intuitive knowledge of Brahman that annihilates *avidyā*. All these three theories are advocated by Vimuktātman. Maṇḍana prefers the last view.

‘*vidyaiva vādvayā śāntā*
tadastamaya uchyate.’²

1. *Tattvapradīpikā*, Nirnaya-sagar press, 1915, p. 361.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 381.

Pratyagsvarūpa while commenting on this section sets forth an argument to prove the soundness of the last view. He says that annihilation of a particular thing as a separate category is neither seen nor intelligible except the rise of the annihilating factor. Knowledge of *Brahman* is the annihilating factor of *avidyā* and *avidyānivṛtti* is identical with knowledge of *Brahman*.

*na hi virodhyudayam antarēṇa virodhinivṛttirnāmānyā
dṛśyate yujyate vā.*³

Pratyagsvarūpa wrote only one work and that too a commentary. But this commentary can be considered to be an independent treatise on Advaita. And thus he occupies a unique place in the history of Advaita.

SANKARANANDA

by

P. C. SUBBAMMA

M.A., M.LITT.

As is common with the lives of our great men in the past, as regards Śaṅkarānanda also it is difficult to determine with any accuracy his date and to gather the details of his life. Yet from his writings it is possible to gather that Śaṅkarānanda was the disciple of Anantātman and Vidyātīrtha. Śaṅkarānanda along with Bhāratīrtha, and Vidyāraṇya, studied under Vidyātīrtha. He became a *guru* of Vidyāraṇya. Vidyāraṇya offers his salutations to his guru thus:

'namaḥ śrī śaṅkarānanda-guru-pādāmbujanmane'

Śaṅkarānanda's most important work is *Ātmapurāṇa* which is also known as *Upanishad-ratna* and contains the essence of the *Upanishads* in verse in the form of story and dialogue. He has also written a commentary on the *Bhagavad-gīta* and a *vṛtti* on *Brahma-sūtra*. Besides, he has written *Dīpikās* on several major and minor *Upanishads*. Not only this, but there are other independent works attributed to Śaṅkarānanda. For instance—*Yatya-nushṭhāna-paddhati*, *Vivekasāra*, *Śruti-tātparya-nirṇaya*, and so on. His magnum opus, however, is *Ātmapurāṇa*.

We shall now set forth briefly the teachings of the *Ātmapurāṇa*.

Śaṅkarānanda is mainly concerned with explaining the nature of Ātman; yet in order to generate in the minds of the aspirants an irresistible attraction towards the knowledge of Brahman, he introduces several stories from the major as well as the minor *Upanishads*. Most of the materials are drawn from Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Upanishads*.

Brahman or Ātman, not being conditioned by the three divisions, namely space, time, and matter, is homogeneous. The limitations that are caused by the above three factors exist only in the objects comprising the not-self. (1) The counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva pratiyogī*) is called space-division (*deśa-pariccheda*). This division is seen in a pot which exists in one place while there is the absence of that pot in other places, since the counter-correlateness (*pratiyogī*) of the absolute non-existence is in that existent pot. (2) The counter-correlate of the prior non-existence and of the posterior non-existence is known as the time division. This division is applied to the halves of a pot, since there are both the prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) and posterior non-existence (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*) in a pot before its production and after its destruction, respectively. (3) The counter-correlate of mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) is called the division of matter. For instance, a cloth is not a pot and *vice versa*. In this cognition, the non-existence of the cloth in the pot and the non-existence of the pot in the cloth is understood. Thus all the objects that come under the category of not-self are conditioned by three kinds of limitations. *Brahman*, being all-pervading, transcends the division of space. Since Brahman is eternal, the category of time is inapplicable to it. And Brahman, being the inmost self of all, is not conditioned by matter. So, *Brahman* is established as the transcendental Reality beyond all kinds of divisions.

The Self (Ātman) does not come within the range of mind and speech. Every word employed to denote an object, denotes that object in relation to a genus, or a quality, or an action. For instance, the word 'pot' denotes a thing which contains a particular form, or a quality, blue, etc; the word 'cook' denotes a man who is associated with the act of cooking. The Self (Ātman) does not have a genus; it is not related to any quality; it does not act. So, words cannot primarily convey Ātman. However, Brahman-Ātman is taught by the method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*, which consists in first super-imposing the world on *Brahman-Ātman* and negating it subsequently. In this teaching of Brahman-Ātman, exclusive-cum-non-exclusive implication (*jahad-ajahallakṣhaṇa*) is resorted to.

Is the universe which we perceive self-sustaining and self-established? The Upanishads affirm that there is a Being transcending

the universe and yet immanent in it. And that Being is Brahman, which is non-dual. This non-dual Brahman appears as the universe, and *avidyā* or *māyā* is the cause of the appearance of Brahman as the universe. This *avidyā* is doubly evil in that it veils the true nature of Brahman and distorts it in the form of *Īśvara*, *jīva* and the *jagat*. Brahman is said to be the source of the universe in that it is the substratum of *avidyā*, which is the immediate cause of the universe. *Avidyā*, being inspired by the reflection of Brahman in it, transforms itself into the form of the universe. It is thus the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmyupādāna*) of the universe. Brahman only illusorily appears as the universe; it is the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna*) of the universe. Brahman viewed in this aspect is *Īśvara*. While the Nyāya system holds that atoms are the material cause of the universe and God is the efficient cause, Advaita holds that Brahman as *Īśvara* is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

It is because of its association with *avidyā* and its product, intellect, that Brahman, which is supra-relational (*asaṅga*), appears as the individual soul. The latter in essence is Brahman. But, owing to *avidyā*, it identifies itself with intellect and its qualities, experiences pleasure, pain, etc., and undergoes transmigration. It is the mind alone that acts and thinks; but being falsely identified with mind, *Ātman*, which is pure consciousness, appears to act and think. *Avidyā*, thus, is the source of all evil. It is described as the one which is capable of bringing together two incompatible things (*aghaṭita-ghaṭanā-paṭīyasī-māyā*). *Avidyā* is termed *ajñāna*, *mūlaprakṛiti*, *pradhāna*, and *avyākṛita*. This *avidyā* is the cause of the superimposition of all the objects on Brahman or *Ātman*. It becomes operative in this way only by being itself superimposed on Brahman. It does not require another *avidyā* for its own superimposition on *Ātman*; for, to assume a second *avidyā* is to be involved in the fallacy of infinite regress. Hence it is admitted that *avidyā* itself is the cause of its superimposition on *Ātman*.

Avidyā, the root-cause of the universe, is one; yet it consists of various aspects, and these are known as *tūlājñāna* or *tūlāvidyā*. *Avidyā* which is present in *Ātman* and which is annihilated by the intuitive knowledge of *Ātman* is known as *mūlāvidyā*. And the various aspects of *avidyā* which are present in the consciousness

delimited by the objects and which are removed by the knowledge of the true nature of those objects are termed *tūlāvidyā*.

The entire universe is superimposed on Ātman through *avidyā*. The Upanishadic text '*neti neti*' negates the entire universe superimposed on Ātman, and Ātman the self-existent entity alone remains. The individual souls are identical with Ātman. But, owing to *avidyā*, they have lost sight of their identity with Ātman and undergo transmigration. By pursuing Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation, an individual soul attains to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. *Avidyā*, in his case, is annihilated and the individual soul becomes free from characteristics such as finitude, agency, etc., that are brought about by *avidyā*. He is a released soul and he remains as Brahman.

VIDYARANYA

by

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

M.A., PH.D.

Vidyāraṇya flourished in the fourteenth century A.D. as the family guru of Harihara I and Bukka, the founders of the Vijayanagara kingdom. He is regarded as having been the friend, philosopher and guide of the early rulers of Vijayanagara, and in the field of religion and philosophy, he is classed with the greatest of the post-Śāṅkara Advaitins.

The works that are attributed to Vidyāraṇya are *Pañchadaśī*, *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, *Drig-dṛiśya-viveka* and *Jīvanmukti-viveka*. The *Pañchadaśī* is a comprehensive manual of Advaita-Vedānta, enjoying great popularity with those who want to have a clear presentation of the truths of Advaita. As the *Pañchadaśī* is the *magnum opus* of Vidyāraṇya,¹ a brief exposition of its character and content would give an indication of the greatness of Vidyāraṇya and the special features of his teachings.

There are two types of Advaita-works: (1) those that are intended to serve as books of instruction for the follower, and (2) those that seek to show through dialectics that the philosophical positions that oppose Advaita are not tenable. The *Pañchadaśī* belongs to the first type. As Śrī Vidyāraṇya says even at the outset, the aim of his work is to teach the supreme truth in an easily understandable manner to those whose hearts have been purified through the worship of the lotus-like feet of the Guru (i, 2). It is not that argumentation and dialectics are not employed in the *Pañchadaśī*; but they are subordinated to the prin-

1. There is a tradition that the *Pañchadaśī* is the joint work of Bhāratī-tīrtha and Vidyāraṇya. Another view is that it is the work of Bhāratī-tīrtha who also bore the title 'Vidyāraṇya'.

cial aim of conveying the light of truth to the disciple. The reasoning based on the principle of co-presence and co-absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*), for instance, is had recourse to for showing that the self which is of the nature of consciousness is constant and therefore real, while the phenomena constituting the world are inconstant and therefore non-real (ii, 60 ff). The method of dialectical refutation of systems such as the Mādhyamika is resorted to (see e.g., ii, 30 ff). The central objective of the *Pañchadaśī*, however, is to provide guidance to the seeker through instruction. While sound logical reasoning helpful to an understanding of scriptural teaching is to be welcomed, quibbling should be avoided, (see viii, 67, 68; ii, 30).

When it is said that scripture is the basic authority for Vedānta, it does not mean that the Vedāntin's attitude is one of blind acceptance of, or unthinking belief in, the words of the Veda. The words are not mere sounds; they convey meaning; and the meaning should be understood. Reasoning is helpful in understanding the teaching of scripture. Although it is true that the ultimate Reality taught there is not graspable either through thoughts or through words, nevertheless logic is useful in a negative way in so far as it can assure us as to what is not real, and language is of service in indicating the nature of the Real. The final court of appeal is experience—the plenary experience which is the fruit of inquiry. In fact, the texts of scripture are but indicators of that experience. Thus, in Vedānta, the nature of the Truth is sought to be expounded on the triple basis of scripture, reasoning, and experience (*śrutyuktyanubhūtibhyaḥ*, v, 56 & xi, 89).

The *Pañchadaśī* is so named because it consists of fifteen chapters (*Pañchadaśa-prakarṇa*). The fifteen chapters are grouped into three quintads: *viveka-pañchaka* (dealing with the discrimination of the real from the non-real), *dīpa-pañchaka* (expounding the nature of the Self as pure consciousness), and *ānanda-pañchaka* (dwelling on the bliss-nature of Brahman). It is for the sake of convenience, stated that the three quintads have for their theme the three aspects of Brahman, *sat* (existence), *chit* (consciousness), and *ānanda* (bliss), respectively. But it should be borne in mind that such a statement could only be roughly true. The essential doctrines of Vedānta occur in almost every

chapter. There are, naturally, repetitions; but repetitions are necessary for enabling the reader to understand firmly the truths of Vedānta. Śrī Vidyāranya has succeeded in an eminent way in setting forth the essentials of Advaita in this great work of his—the *Pañchadaśī*.

The basic skill that the disciple should develop in himself is the ability to discriminate the real from the non-real. The *Pañchadaśī* indicates the various methods by means of which the discrimination could be gained. One of the most useful methods is the analysis of the three states of experience, viz., waking, dream, and deep sleep. As a result of such analysis one realises that the Self persists in all the states while the objects vary and are inconstant. The same conclusion may be reached by an investigation into the five sheaths (*kośas*) that cover the Self, as it were. The principle which is applied in this investigation is: what is grosser and more external and less pervasive is less real than what is subtler and more internal and more pervasive. Applying this principle one arrives at the truth that the Self is supremely real because it is the subtlest and the inmost being which is non-dual (see ch. iii). Just as the individual soul and its states could be analysed with a view to discovering the Self, the external objective world could also be analysed with the same end in view. Beginning with the grossest element, earth, we have progressively subtler elements; water, fire, air, and ether. But the Self is subtler than ether. One may think of the Self without ether, but not of ether without the Self. One may deny anything, but not the Self. To doubt the existence of the Self is as ridiculous as the doubt expressed by a man "Have I a tongue or not?" (iii. 20).

The Self is of the nature of pure consciousness; it is unfailing light, ever-present awareness. This is explained by means of apt analogies. Like the anvil in the smith's shop which serves as the basis for beating the metal into various shapes, without itself changing, the Self remains as the immutable witness of changes in the physical and the psychical orders; hence it is called the *kūṭastha* (see ch. viii). Just as the lamp set on a dramatic stage sheds light on all concerned during the performance, and shines also after everyone has left the theatre, even so the witness-consciousness manifests all things, viz., the egoity, the intellect, and the objects, and continues to shine even when they are non-exis-

tent. Just as the lamp on the stage illumines without moving and without being affected by the movements of the actors and the audience, even so the witness which is eternal and immutable manifests all things both within and without, and their absence too (see ch. x.). Just as the canvas is that whereon the various painted figures appear, both of inanimate things like mountains and animate beings like men and animals, so also on the consciousness which is the immutable Self, the variegated world appears (see ch. vi).

The bliss-nature of the Self (Brahman) is explained in great detail in the last five chapters. The Self is not only existence and consciousness, it is also bliss, the supreme value. The teaching of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī in the *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad* constitutes the basis for understanding the bliss-nature of the Self. The core of the teaching is that the Self is the seat of supreme love. Anything becomes dear, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the Self. There are, it is true, different notions of Self-hood, three of which may be distinguished: the secondary self, the illusory self, and the principal self. When a parent identifies himself with his son, for instance, the self-hood of the son in relation to the parent is secondary. The identification of the self with the body, etc., is illusory. The principal Self is the unconditioned non-dual reality. It is the Self in the principal sense that is of the very essence of bliss or love. But even when the self in the other two senses is loved, it is because of the mistaken or wrong identification with the true Self. Thus it is easy to see that the Self, whatever be the conception thereof, is the centre and seat of love. If there be love for any other object, it is for the sake of the Self to which that is subsidiary. It is a reflection of the bliss that is the Self that is experienced as happiness or pleasure in the objects. A right understanding of the happiness that is derived from the contact of the mind with the objects may serve as the door to the bliss that is Brahman. When an object is being enjoyed, the mind turns inward and becomes calm. In that state of mind the bliss that is the Self is reflected. It is this which is experienced as happiness or pleasure. The Brahman-bliss or a reflection of it is experienced in other states also. In deep sleep one experiences unqualified bliss; only that experience lies under the cover of nescience. Just before falling into deep sleep, and imme-

diately for a few moments after getting up from sleep, one has a taste of happiness prospectively or retrospectively. In the interval between two modes of the mind also, one experiences the reflection of bliss. The yogī enjoys bliss in *saṃādhi*. The jñānī realises directly the bliss that is the Self.

The bliss that is the Self (Brahman) is unexcellable and unconditioned. A calculus of bliss is given in the Upanishads. Starting with the unit-measure of human bliss, the higher levels are reached by multiplying each lower level of bliss by a hundred. One may thus go upto the bliss of the Creator Brahmā. But Brahman-bliss is beyond all calculation. And, the wise one's experience of the plenary bliss admits of no degrees. Having achieved all that was to be achieved, and having done all that was to be done, the illumined one rests in perfect contentment and peace (xiv, 58).

The nature of Brahman that is the Self is, as we have seen, existence (*sat*), consciousness (*chit*), and bliss (*ānanda*) (see also xiii, 63). Existence, consciousness, and bliss are not parts of Brahman, or its attributes; they constitute its essential nature (*svarūpa*). They are not three separate constituents: existence is consciousness, and consciousness is bliss. It is because the world of plurality is characterised by impermanence, inertness, and disvalue that in order to distinguish the non-dual Brahman from the world that Brahman is said to be existence, consciousness, and bliss. In Brahman's essential nature, however, there is no split, and no distinction. Brahman is free from any of the three kinds of differences, *sajātīya*, *vijātīya* and *svagata* (ii, 20-21).

How does it happen that the one Reality appears as the world of plurality? The Vedānta formulates the concept of *māyā* precisely to show that no satisfactory answer can be given to this vexatious question since causation itself is unintelligible.

There are three standpoints from which *māyā* may be envisaged, says Śrī Vidvāranya: (1) the standpoint of revealed experience (*śrauta*), (2) that of reasoning (*yauktika*), and (3) that of the ordinary men of the world (*laukika*). From the standpoint of the ordinary worldly men, *māyā* is real (*vāstavī*); they have no reason to doubt its reality. From the standpoint of those who

have realised the teaching of scripture, *māyā* is unreal (*tuccha*); for them, there is no world to be accounted for; *māyā* is that (*yā*) which is not (*mā*). And, for those who seek to understand through reasoning *māyā* is indeterminable (*anirvachanīya*) (vi, 130).

From the standpoint of reasoning, *māyā* is uncharacterisable either as real, or as unreal, or as both real and unreal. The world of plurality appears in Brahman on account of *māyā*, even as a snake appears in what is a rope. This is known as *vivarta*, transfiguration.

There is no use asking questions about *māyā*. The more we question, the deeper will the mystery become. *Māyā* is that which makes apparently possible what is inherently impossible (vi, 235). Wonder is *māyā*'s garment; inscrutable is its nature (vi, 139). What is necessary is that we should endeavour to transcend *māyā* (vi, 138). And, in this endeavour, the world of plurality in which we as empirical individuals live can be a help instead of serving as an obstacle (iv, 42).

The *jīva* is the non-dual Self appearing in a limited or conditioned form on account of nescience. In what manner is the appearance of the *jīva* to be understood? Śrī Vidyārāṇya who follows mainly the *Vivaraṇa* tradition, teaches a modified form of the reflection-theory or *pratibimba-vāda* which is referred to as *ābhāsa-vāda*. While the *Vivaraṇa* view regards the reflection as real and as identical with the prototype, the theory sponsored in the *Pañchadaśī* holds that the reflection (*ābhāsa*) is mere appearance, an illusory manifestation. The apposition between the *jīva* and Brahman, according to this view, is through sublation (*bādhā*), and not through identification (*aikya*).

The direct means to release, Advaita holds, is the path of knowledge (*jñāna*). As *moksha*, is the very nature of the Self, it is not an experience which is to be brought about through works (*karma*). The path of knowledge consists of 'hearing' (i.e., study, *śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) (i, 52-54).

What is the immediate instrument of release? Is it *śravaṇa* of the *mahāvākya* 'That thou art'? Or, is it continued meditation

(also called *prasaṅkhyāna*)? According to the *Bhāmatī* view, verbal testimony (*śabda*), of which the *mahāvākyas* form part, can yield only mediate knowledge, and not immediate or direct knowledge. If the mediate knowledge gained from verbal testimony is to be transformed into immediate experience, there should be continued meditation till this is achieved; and this is possible because the mind which is the instrument in meditation is a sense organ (*indriya*). The *Vivaraṇa* view maintains that the mind is not a sense organ, as it is an auxiliary to all *pramāṇas* and that verbal testimony can yield immediate knowledge if the object is immediate. To illustrate this point the story of the ten travellers is given (vii, 22 ff). There is no object more immediate than the Self. Hence, the *mahāvākya* "That thou art" imparts to the competent hearer the direct experience of the non-dual Self. Giving a citation from the *Vākyavṛtti*, Śrī Vidyāraṇya says, "The major texts are for the sake of imparting direct knowledge of Brahman. In regard to this there is no room for doubt" (vii, 70).

Meditation, however, is not without its great use. In chapter ix, '*Dhyāna-dīpa*', Śrī Vidyāraṇya compares it to *samvādi-bhrama*, delusion which culminates in a fruitful result. The man who mistakes the lamp-light for a gem and gets to the place whence the light comes, gains nothing, whereas the person, who mistakes the light of the gem for the gem itself, obtains the precious stone. Although both are cases of delusion, the latter is a fruitful one. When the attributeless Brahman is meditated upon, the content of meditation is not itself Brahman. But the contemplation leads to Brahman-realisation. Thus, for those who are not qualified for gaining true knowledge through enquiry, Śrī Vidyāraṇya recommends the yoga of meditation (*dhyāna*).

In more than one place in the *Pañchadaśī*, the state of Brahman-realisation is described in glowing terms, and the incomparable happiness of the *jīvanmukta* is praised. It is only from the standpoint of the unreleased that the continuance of the body of the *jīvanmukta* is explained as due to the residue of *prārabdha* (*karma* which is responsible for his present body), and illustrations, such as the continued rotation of the potter's wheel for a time even after the propelling rod has been removed, are offered. In truth, however, the *mukta* has no body, and there are no grades of *mukti*.

In the *Pañchadaśī* Vidyāraṇya reveals himself as a writer not only with great philosophical insight but also with equally great literary skill. The *Pañchadaśī* is not only a veritable mine of Vedāntic treasure, but is also a work with poetic charm that delights the reader. No wonder, it is one of the most favoured texts and has found a permanent place among the Advaita classics. And, Vidyāraṇya, its author, takes his rank with the best preceptors of Advaita after Śaṅkara. His contribution to Advaita is as immense as it is abiding.

GOVINDANANDA

by

T. R. SUBRAMANIAM

Mīmāṃsā Śiromaṇi

Among the commentators on the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara, Govindānanda occupies a unique place. His commentary known as *Ratnaprabhā* is being carefully read by the students of Advaita. The author is profoundly influenced by the views of Padmapāda and Prakāśātman. He has had access to the *Prakaṣārthavivarāṇa*, a commentary on the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara by Anubhūtiśvarūpāchārya, because there are many instances where he shows the influence of that work. It may be added here that Anubhūtiśvarūpāchārya also is a follower of the *Vivarāṇa* school. Anubhūtiśvarūpāchārya is rather devastatingly critical of Vāchaspatimīśra's interpretation of the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Amalānanda the author of the *Kalpataru* defends Vāchaspati's interpretation and replies to the criticisms of Anubhūtiśvarūpāchārya without mentioning his name. An express identification of the reply of Amalānanda as directed against Anubhūtiśvarūpa can be had in the *Ratnaprabhā*.

*prakaṣārthakāraistu pāṭhaka-prasiddaḥ
antodāttasvaraḥ pāribhāṣhika iti vyākhyātam, tadvyākhyānam kal-
patarukārair dūṣhitam.*¹

In the interpretation of the *Sūtrabhāṣya*, Govindānanda closely follows Padmapāda. The latter while commenting on the word *mithyā-jñāna* occurring in the *adhyāśabhāṣya* interprets it to mean nescience which is indeterminable and positive in nature. Vāchaspatimīśra, on the other hand, interprets it to mean superimposition or erroneous cognition.

mithyājñānam adhyāśaḥ

1. *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣyam* with the commentaries of *Ratnaprabhā*, *Bhāmatī* and *Nyāyanirṇaya* (Nirnaya-sagar Press, 1909), p. 317

His contention is that the author of the *bhāshya* speaks of *avidyā* which is indeterminable and positive in the *devatādhi-karaṇa*. And so in the *chatuṣsūtrī* portion it is not necessary to refer to nescience that is positive in nature. He, therefore, maintains that there are two kinds of nescience. One is positive in nature and the other is erroneous cognition or superimposition. And the latter kind is referred to by the word *mithyājñāna* in the *adhyāśabhāshya*. The correctness of this interpretation is substantiated by the *bhāshya* text—*tametam evam lakṣaṇam adhyāsam paṇḍitāḥ avidyeti manyante*. Vāchaspatimiśra while commenting on this text observes that the *superimposition* of the not-self on the inner self is alone the cause of all evil, not the delution of silver, etc., hence, that alone is *nescience*.

‘pratyagātmanyānātmādhyāsa eva sarvānārtha-hetuḥ, na punā rajatādivibhrama iti sa eva avidyā’.

From the above interpretation it would be clear that Vāchaspatimiśra considers superimposition itself to be one kind of nescience.

Govindānanda, on the other hand, interprets the word *mithyājñāna* to mean nescience that is positive in nature.

*mithyājñānanimittaḥ—mithyā cha tad ajñānam ‘cha mithyātve sati sākshāt jñānanivartyatvam ajñānasya lakṣaṇam.’*² And, in this light he interprets the text—*‘tametam evam lakṣaṇam adhyāsam paṇḍitāḥ avidyeti manyante’*. He says that *adhyāsa* or superimposition is termed *avidyā* because it is an effect of *avidyā*.

‘ākshiptam samāhitam uktalakṣaṇalakshitam adhyāsam, avidyākāryatvād avidyeti manyante’.

About the locus and content of *avidyā* Govindānanda’s view is not clear. Śrī Śaṅkara in his *bhāshya* on the *Brahmasūtra*—*‘tadadhīnatvādarthavat (1.4.3)* points out that *avidyā* is *paramēśvarāśrayā* and in it the individual souls rest.

‘paramēśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahāsuptiḥ, yasyām svarūpa-pratibodharahitāḥ śerate saṁsāriṇo jīvāḥ’.

Vāchaspatimiśra while commenting on this passage holds that the individual soul is the locus of nescience and Brahman is its content.

‘jīvādhikaraṇāpyavidyā nimittatayā vishayatayā īśvaram āśrayate iti īśvarāśrayetyuchyate na tvādhāratayā’.

Govindānanda, on the other hand, does not interpret the word *parameśvarāśrayā* and hence his view regarding the locus of *avidyā* is not known. He, however, refers to *avidyā* as *īśvare kalpitā*. From this we may take that according to Govindānanda Brahman is the locus of *avidyā*.

While commenting on the *Brahma-sūtra* ‘*asuddham iti chet na śabdāt*’ (3.1.25) Śrī Śaṅkara observes that the Vedic sentence ‘*na himsyāt sarvābhūtāni*’ conveys a general rule (*utsarga*) and the Vedic text ‘*agnīshomīyam paśum ālabheta*’ sets aside the general rule (*apavāda*). Vāchaspatimiśra observes that each of the two Vedic texts is a valid *pramāṇa*. And, one *pramāṇa* cannot contradict the other *pramāṇa* which is equally valid. So we cannot say that the Vedic text ‘*agnīshomīyam paśum ālabheta*’ sets aside the import of the Vedic text ‘*na himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*’. In fact the scope of each of the texts differs and so there arises no question of the one contradicting the other. The Vedic text ‘*na himsyāt sarvābhūtāni*’ imposes a prohibition with reference to killing of animals *out of desire*. The Vedic text ‘*agnīshomīyam paśum ālabheta*’ permits killing of an animal *in a sacrifice*. Thus the scope of each of the Vedic texts differs and there is no relation of *utsarga* and *apavāda* between the two. Govindānanda accepts this interpretation.

‘vastutaḥ tasya rāgaprāptahimsāvishayatvād vaidhahimsāyām apravṛtiteḥ’³

There is a discussion whether the Upanishadic text *ātmā vā are drashṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsītavyaḥ*’ conveys the sense of injunction with reference to *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, and if so what kind of injunction is admitted. This is discussed in the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* ‘*sahakāryantara-vidhi pakṣheṇa tṛtīyam tadvato vidyādivat*’. *Anubhūtisvarūpa*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 621.

in his *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa* holds that there is *apūrvavidhi*. *Prakāśātman* in his *Vivarāṇa* maintains that there is *niyamavidhi*. And, Vāchaspatimiśra maintains that there is no injunction at all. Anubhūtiśvarūpa in the *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa* while commenting on the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* referred to above criticises Vāchaspati as one who does not know the import of the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*. Govindānanda holds that there is *apūrvavidhi*; and he observes that some commentators who do not know the import of the *bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* say that there is no *vidhi* at all.

‘etat sūtrabhāṣyabhāvānabhiññāḥ sannyāsāśramadharmasra-
vanādaḥ vidhirmāstīti vadanti.’⁴

This charge is levelled against Vāchaspatimiśra.

As regards the nature of the individual soul, he admits the well-known theory of *pratibimbavāda* advocated by Padmapāda. While commenting on the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* ‘ābhāsa eva cha’ (2.3.50), Govindānanda observes that the consciousness reflected in *avidyā* and its effects such as intellect, etc., is the individual soul.⁵ And, while commenting on the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, ‘tadadhīnatvādarthavat’ (1-4-3), he says that the plurality of the limiting adjunct accounts for the plurality of the individual souls.

‘buddhyādyupādhibhedājñvāḥ. -

Govindānanda is an able commentator of Śaṅkara like Vāchaspatimiśra, Prakāśātman, and Amalānanda. On crucial points he differs from Vāchaspatimiśra, and in this he is very much influenced by Anubhūtiśvarūpāchārya.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 818.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 561.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

SANKHAPANI

by

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

M.A., PH.D.

In the Indian philosophical tradition the part played by a commentator is valuable and significant. His work is not merely one of interpretation and exposition of the original but also of throwing fresh light on the deeper significance of the text he is commenting on. Thus the commentary becomes as valuable as the original. By offering a novel interpretation, by placing the text in an entirely new perspective, the commentator makes a "break through", striking a new line of thinking which becomes in course of time a new school or tradition. Herein lies the significance of the work of a commentator. The literature on Advaita Vedānta abounds in innumerable original and independent treatises as well as commentaries. The *Brahmasiddhi*¹ which is the earliest among the works of the *siddhi-literature* is one such valuable and original treatise on the Advaita; and there is an elaborate commentary on it written by Śaṅkhaṇḍi.

Professor Kuppuswami Sastri, the learned editor of the *Brahmasiddhi*, points out that we do not have any definite information about Śaṅkhaṇḍi excepting that he was a Nambudiri Brahmin of Malabar. We do not know whether he wrote any other work in addition to his commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi*. Of the four commentaries known to have been written on the *Brahmasiddhi*, Śaṅkhaṇḍi's commentary appears to be the latest. The *Tattva-samīkshā* by Vāchaspathiśra is the earliest commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi*; but no manuscript of this commentary has so far been found. Chitsukha who lived in the 13th century wrote a

1. Edited by Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series No. 4, 1937.

commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* called *Abhiprāyaparakāśikā*. Ānandapūrṇa who lived in the 14th century wrote his commentary called *Bhāvaśuddhi*. So Śaṅkhapāṇi whose commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* appears to be the latest must have lived after Ānandapūrṇa.

Śaṅkhapāṇi's commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* is elaborate and exhaustive, clear and lucid. It is obvious that Śaṅkhapāṇi who is greatly influenced by Vāchaspati closely follows the *Tattvasamīkshā*. In the presentation of ideas and the elucidation of problems, he follows the same method adopted by Vāchaspati in his *Bhāmatī*. It is said of Vāchaspati that "he always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and directing his knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text."² This is equally true of Śaṅkhapāṇi. His commentary is replete with objections and answers to them, rebuttals and rejoinders.

Let us discuss in this paper Śaṅkhapāṇi's treatment of the Bhāṭṭa view of *bhedābheda* which he exposes to scathing criticism following very closely the arguments stated in the *Brahmasiddhi*.³

According to the Mīmāṃsā of the Bhāṭṭa school, the generic attribute (*jāti*) is in the individual object (*vyakti*). Though the generic attribute and the individual object are undoubtedly different from each other, they are not totally different. They are, according to them, different while being the same. If they were entirely different, they should be separable; but they are not, as admitted even by the Vaiśeṣikas. Not only this: if they are absolutely different, the one cannot be equated with the other, and there should be no identification of the two by placing them in co-ordination. Just because they are not totally different, it should not be said that they are absolutely the same. In the proposition, "This is a cow," the individual object is referred to

2. S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (Cambridge 1932), p. 108.

3. Only a few of the many arguments elaborately discussed by Śaṅkhapāṇi are mentioned in this paper.

by the word "this" and the generic attribute by the word "cow." If the generic attribute and the individual object are identical, then like "*hasta*" and "*kara*", "this" and "cowness" would turn out to be synonyms.⁴ They are not, however, synonyms. Thus, the generic attribute and the individual object are not totally different; nor are they absolutely the same. They are different, while being the same. The relation between them is identity in difference (*bhedābheda*).

We can restate the standpoint of the Bhāṭṭas in this way. Every object is of the nature of the generic attribute and the individual object (*sāmānya viśeṣhātmataḥ ekam vastu*); it is a universal-particular. Since the relation between the generic attribute and the individual object is one of difference-cum-identity, the object is of the nature of both identity and difference. The conception of a thing in this doctrine is that of a one-many (*ekam-dvyātmakam*).⁵

Following Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*, Śaṅkha-pāṇi argues that this way of looking at an object as a one-many does not satisfy the demands of reason. To say that an object is of the nature of both identity and difference is to bring together two incompatible factors in the same place and therefore is patently self-contradictory. A cognition which relates to incompatible factors in the same thing is *ipso facto* erroneous. The cognition of an object to the effect, "This is a post or a man", is erroneous because it relates to incompatible elements in the same thing.⁶ The cognition of an object in the dual form (*dvyātmakam*) as a universal-cum-particular is on a par with the dubitative cognition (*saṁśaya-jñāna*). When we say, "This is a cow," our cognition relates to the generic attribute which is the element of

4. Vide *Mānameyodaya*, Edited with an English translation by C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. S. Sastri (Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras, 1933), p. 234.

5. *Brahmasiddhi* (to be called hereafter BS) Part II, p. 169.

6. Vide Kuppaswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic* (Varadachary & Co., Madras 1932), Part III, pp. 339-40:

"A doubt is a cognition which relates to several incompatible attributes in the same thing, as in the dubitative cognition—'It may be a post or a man'."

anuvṛitti and the individual object which is the element of *vyāvṛitti*; it is in the form of the generic attribute and the individual object, and so it is dual in nature. In the same way, the dubitative cognition, "This is a post or a man," is dual in form in so far as the same object is cognised as a post and a man. There is co-ordination between the generic attribute and the individual object. Similarly in the dubitative cognition referred to above, there is co-ordination between post and man, the two forms of the object. Since the two are on the same footing, Śāṅkhapāṇi insists on the application of the same logic to both. If the dubitative cognition is declared to be erroneous on the score that it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing, the cognition of an object as a universal-particular must also be dubbed erroneous for no other reason than that it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing. If the Bhāṭṭas are bent upon treating the cognition of an object in the dual form of universal-cum-particular as valid, let them equally treat the dubitative cognition of an object which is in the dual form as valid. They are not, however, prepared to adopt this unwelcome position. In other words, the cognition of an object in the dual form of generic attribute-cum-individual object cannot be but invalid.⁷

It may be argued that the comparison between dubitative cognition and the cognition of an object as a universal-particular is not sound as there is an important point of difference between the two. In the one case we cognise an object as a universal *and* a particular. The object is of the nature of both. Our cognition testifies to the combination of two forms in the same place. In other words, our judgment in this case is *conjunctive*. In the case of dubitative cognition, there are alternative predications. The object, we say, is either a post or a man, and not both a post and a man. The dubitative cognition is expressed in a *disjunctive* proposition. Since the judgment is conjunctive in the one case and disjunctive in the other, the two cannot be placed on the same footing.

It is true that there is no simultaneous predication of two forms; but the two forms can be predicated of the object alternatively: that is to say, it is a post in one state and a man in

another state. If it be said that an object cannot be one thing now and something else at a different time for the simple reason that its nature is determined in one way by the causal conditions responsible for its genesis,⁸ Śaṅkhaṇḍī demands consistency in the Bhāṭṭa argument and insists on the application of this standard to the Bhāṭṭa conception of the object. How can that which is a generic attribute at one time be an individual object at a different time? If an object is "one" (*ekam*) at one time, how can it be "dual" (*dvyaत्मakam*) at a different time? If it is inconsistent to say that an object which is in one form now is in a different form at a different time, it is also inconsistent to say that an object which is "one" at one time is "dual" at a different time.

In another way also it may be argued that the identical treatment meted out to dubitative cognition and the cognition of an object as generic attribute-cum-individual object is not justifiable, as there is a fundamental difference between the two. Dubitative cognition is declared invalid, not because it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing, but because it is sublated by a subsequent cognition which is valid. There is first the dubitative cognition like "This object is a post or a man;" subsequently, let us say, we are in a position to determine the nature of the object and say that it is only a post and not a man. The dubitative cognition which is earlier becomes erroneous since it is sublated by a valid cognition which arises subsequently. But there is no such sublation in the case of our cognition of an object as both generic attribute and individual object; hence it is valid in spite of the fact that it relates to two incompatible factors in the same thing. According to this argument, (i) dubitative cognition is declared to be erroneous not because of the incompatible factors it refers to in the same thing; (ii) but it is declared to be invalid, because it stands contradicted by a subsequent cognition which is valid; and (iii) in spite of the incompatibility between the generic attribute and the individual object, the cognition of an object as of the nature of both is valid, since it is not sublated subsequently. It may, therefore, be argued that there is no parity between dubitative cognition and the cognition of an object as both generic attribute and individual object.⁹

8. *na hi vastu vikalpyate.*

9. *BS, Part II, p. 170.*

The issue that has now to be decided is whether the invalidity of dubitative cognition is due to the fact that it relates to incompatible elements in the same thing or to the fact that it stands contradicted by a subsequent cognition which is valid. Śāṅkhapāṇi answers that it is due to the former and not to the latter. If we are able to determine the nature of the object in one way after getting the doubtful cognition, it is undoubtedly true that the subsequent valid cognition sublates the earlier doubtful cognition and renders it invalid. But what are we to say when we are not in a position to determine the nature of the object? It is not always the case that dubitative cognition is followed by a determinate cognition which is valid. If it is not followed by a determinate valid cognition, are we to say that the object is a post in one state and a man in a different state? But it has already been pointed out that an object cannot be one thing now and something also at a different time. So the invalidity of dubitative cognition should not be decided by the test of contradiction by a subsequent valid cognition to which it is exposed; but it should be decided solely on the ground that it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing. If so, irrespective of the fact whether there is contradiction by a subsequent valid cognition or not, the cognition of an object as universal-cum-particular must be declared to be invalid, since it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing like dubitative cognition.

There is another reason also to show that the cognition of an object as both generic attribute and individual object is not different from dubitative cognition. We know how in the case of silver-shell illusion the cognition of silver is invalidated by the subsequent cognition of shell which is powerful. There is, on the Bhāṭṭa view, the cognition of the object as "one"; there is also the cognition of it as "dual". Of these two cognitions which are opposed to each other, whichever is powerful — whether the cognition of oneness or that of duality — will take the field by subsuming the other. In that case, the object cannot be "one" (*ekam*) as well as "dual" (*dvyaṭmakam*) in nature. If it be said that both the cognitions are of equal strength with the result that neither can score a victory over the other, it is undoubtedly a case of doubt. So, the Bhāṭṭa view of the object as a one-many is not satisfactory.

The Bhāṭṭas bring in the relation of difference-cum-identity in order to explain the relation between the generic attribute and the individual object, and so it is incumbent upon them to give definition of difference and of identity. Difference, the Bhāṭṭas could say, is mutual exclusion or mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*). Identity or non-difference could be defined in the opposite way: it is absence of mutual exclusion or mutual non-existence. In the light of these definitions we have to examine the generic attribute and the individual object. The question that has to be answered by the Bhāṭṭas is this: are the generic attribute and the individual mutually exclusive or not? If they are mutually exclusive like a pot and a cloth, then they are admittedly not one. The Bhāṭṭas are, therefore, at perfect liberty to say that the generic attribute and the individual object are different; but they cannot say that they are also the same. In order to establish their sameness or identity, the Bhāṭṭas could fall back upon the other definition and argue that the generic attribute and the individual object are not mutually exclusive, because by being placed in co-ordination they are cognised as non-different. In that case, it could be said that they are one. In short, the Bhāṭṭas could say either that the generic attribute and the individual object are different or that they are identical; but they could not say that they are both identical and different. So the conception of a thing as a one-many does not hold good.

LAKSHMIDHARA

by

P. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM

M.A., L.T.

Lakshmīdhara, the author of the *Advaitamakaranda*, a *prakaraṇa* work on Advaita Vedānta, has to his credit two other works, namely, a commentary on *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* and *Bhagavannāmakāumudī* dealing with *nāmasaṁkīrtana* as a means of attainment of *purushārthas* and with the meaningfulness of the Purāṇas. This is evident from the author's own statement in the latter work which is as follows:

*yena bhāgavatavyākhyā kritāṁṛitatarangiṇī
advaitamakarandaścha so'karonnāmakāumudīm*

Since *Bhagavannāmakāumudī* is commented upon by Ananta-deva Bhāratī who lived in the 17th century, Lakshmīdhara could not have flourished later than this period. Brahmānanda Bhāratī, the author of the *Purushārthaprabodha* has commented upon the work of Bhāratītīrtha, guru of Śrī Vidyāraṇya who lived towards the close of the 14th century A.D. Lakshmīdhara is quoted by Brahmānanda Bhāratī in his commentary on the *Vākyasudhā*, and hence the author may be placed in the early half of the 15th century.

It is suggested by the editor of the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts of the Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal Library (Vol. XIII, No. 7635) that Lakshmīdhara was the disciple of Anantānanda Raghunātha Yati and that after taking the order of sannyāsa he was known as Krishnendra as is made out by a manuscript of *Advaitamakarandavyākhyā* (No. 7641).

Sri S. Srikantha Sastri states that Lakshmīdhara was the son of Simhala, sister of Śrī Vidyāraṇya, and that he was probably identical with the patron of the Kannada Poet Madhura in the time of Devarāya I (1406 A.D.).

Ishṭārthakalpavallī, a commentary on *Anargharāghavanāṭaka* refers to the fact that Lakshmīdhara, the commentator came to be known as Rāmānandāśrama when he became a sannyāsin. He is described there as Mīmāṃsādvayapāragah and son of Yajñeśvara and Sarvāmbikā of Charakuri family in Guntur district. He is also credited with the authorship of *Śrutirājanī*, a commentary on *Prasannarāghava* and *Shāḍbhāshāchandrikā*, a Prākṛit grammar, and a few other works. But whether this Lakshmīdhara who flourished in the court of Tirumalaraya of Vijayanagar (1567-1575 A.D.) is identical with Lakshmīdhara, the author of *Advaitamakaranda* as claimed by the editor of the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts of the Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal Library (Vol. XII, p. 5102), needs examination, as the above information regarding his parentage, name of preceptor, name in sannyāsāśrama, names of works and the period in which he lived does not agree with the information contained in other manuscripts and printed work of *Advaitamakaranda*.

The author himself in the colophon to *Bhagavannāma-kaumudī* gives the name of his father as Narasimha and of his guru as Anantānanda Raghunātha. In the same work he mentions his other two works that have already been referred to.

From the above facts it appears that Lakshmīdhara, the author of *Advaitamakaranda*, son of Narasimha and disciple of Anantānanda Raghunātha assigned to the 15th century by the editor of Vani Vilas publication is different from the Lakshmīdhara of Cherukuru family who flourished in the court of Tirumalaraya of Vijayanagara in the later half of the 16th century.

The work bears a felicitous name, *Advaitamakaranda*, which as the author himself describes towards the end of the work, is sweet like the honey collected from the autumnal lotus (*Śara-dāmbhojasambhṛita*), capable of delighting the bees, viz., those learned in the śāstras (*vidvadbhṛingāḥ*). 'Advaitam' is *Brahman* and 'makaranda' is *rasa*, and the title gives the subject-matter of the work, the nature of *Brahman* that is identical with *rasa*. 'raso vai sah'. The nature of *Brahman* can be known only by 'anubhava' as the sweetness of honey is experienced only by one who tastes it and not by one who listens to an exposition about its nature.

The work contains twenty-seven verses dealing with the nature of *Brahman* that is not different from the soul. These verses are commented upon by *Svayaṁprakāśayati*, disciple of Kaivalyānanda Yogīndra, in a lucid and authoritative manner. The author invokes the blessing of his *ishṭadevatā* Śrī Kṛishṇa, the Blissful and Eternal (*anantānanda Kṛishṇa*), a term which can be taken to make an oblique reference to his teacher Anantānanda Raghunātha, though the commentator takes it only as a *devatānamaskāra* presumably because he was not aware of this fact, being separated by several centuries from the period of the author.

The central thesis of this work is '*brahmaivāham*'. The scriptural statements '*aham brahmāsmi*', '*ānandaṁ brahma*'; etc., find effective support in the reasoning contained in the second verse of this work. The non-difference of the soul and *Brahman* is often challenged by the realists on the ground of perceptual testimony like '*nāham īśvaraḥ*'. The commentator clearly brings out that there is no possibility of either the *bāhya* or *mānasa* type of perception relating to the soul as it is formless and beyond even the reach of mind.

That the soul is indestructible is established by the author after examining the several ways in which destruction of a thing can be brought about. According to Bauddhas, a thing is destroyed by itself (*svato nāśaḥ*). Secondly, a thing is destroyed by contact with something else as a pot is destroyed by a stick. Thirdly, a thing is destroyed when its substratum ceases to exist as the colour of a cloth when the cloth is destroyed. The first is countered by the '*pratyabhijñā*' that everyone experiences in forms like '*yo'ham sūptaḥ svapnam adrākṣham sa eva idānīm jāgarmi*'. The second type of destruction also is not possible because the soul is all-pervasive and impartible. The third type of destruction also is inconceivable because there is no substratum for the soul. It is only *guṇa*, *kriyā*, *jāti*, etc., that have an *āśraya* or substratum and the soul is not any of these.

That the knowledge of the universe is rendered possible only by association with an intelligent being is elucidated by the analogy of a pot, the existence of which is cognised only in the presence of light.

The author sets forth how the state of wakefulness, dream, and sleep pertain to the ego (*ahamkāra*) and not to the soul, the witness (*sākshī*) of those states. The commentator cites the *vyāpti*, the invariable concomitance '*yo yajjānati na sa taddharmavān*' in dissociating the soul from the sixfold transformation, viz., origin, existence, growth, change, decay, and cessation. *Kartritvam*, *sākshitvam*, etc., are only apparent attributes, the soul in reality being attributeless.

On the validity of *karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda that speaks about sacrifices and heaven, the author as an Advaitin can only concede a lesser degree of reality to such things, *Brahman* being the ultimate Reality.

As Dr S. Radhakrishnan observes, "In later Advaita the comparison of the world to a dream has been stretched to the breaking point." *Advaitamakaranda* says, 'In this protracted dream which the world is, projected in that great sleep of ignorance reading the self, flash forth the glimpse of paradise, emancipation, and so forth.'

The distinction of '*bhogya*' and '*bhoktā*' is held to be a sort of fictitious superimposition on the intelligent soul which is none other than *Brahman*. Any change noticed in the universe is of no consequence so far as their *adhishṭhāna*, the *Brahman*, is concerned in the same way as the waves on the surface of the ocean do not produce any the least effect on the deep and calm ocean, their substratum. As Bharatīrtha puts it 'Let the cloud of nescience break and pour the rain of universe. There is neither loss nor gain to the ether of consciousness'—

*'māyāmegho jagannīram varshatvesha yathā tathā
chidākāśasya no hāniḥ na vā lābhaḥ iti sthitiḥ.*

'*Sattā* (existence) is not an attribute of soul, says the author because there is no reality besides the soul which being one, cannot be supposed to have *sattā* as its attribute in the same way as there can be no '*nabhastva*' in '*nabhas*', space being one. '*Chit*' (knowledge) is not an attribute of soul but is the very nature of it. The knower and knowable are the same because the soul is self-luminous. '*Ānanda*' is not an attribute of soul but is the very nature of it. *Rasa* is equated with that. In fact *Sat*, *Chit* and *Ānanda* are not mutually exclusive aspects of *Brahman*, though

the terms denote different meanings primarily; the one is non-different from the other and the whole is understood in their secondary sense, one '*Sacchidānandaghana*.'

The author concludes by reiterating the non-difference of the soul and Brahman by alluding to the *mahāvākya* '*tattvam asi*' which conveys the grand truth of the Advaita, viz., the soul that is divested of the obsession about the remoteness of perception of *Īśvara*, the delimited nature of the soul and *māyā*-ridden diversity of worldly phenomena is that Brahman.

SADANANDA

by

T. P. RAMACHANDRAN

M.A., PH.D.

Professor Hiriyanra in his valuable edition of the *Vedāntasāra* by Sadānanda says that Sadānanda, the author of the work entitled *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, is different from Sadānanda, the author of the *Vedāntasāra*, (p. 17). It appears, therefore, that there have been at least two Advaita *āchāryas* bearing this name. The name of the book also is seen to be shared by two different Advaita works. Prof. Hiriyanra says that the *Vedāntasāra* printed along with the *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā* at Madras (1892) is by one Śivarāmabhaṭṭāchārya, (p. 17). This article is on Sadānanda, the author of the *Vedāntasāra*.

Very little is known about the life of this *āchārya*. But it is guessed that he must have lived in the early part of the 16th century. It is also surmised that he must have been the preceptor's preceptor of one of the commentators on the *Vedāntasāra*, viz., Nṛisimhasarasvatī. (See *Ibid.*, p. 17). In the *maṅgalācharaṇam* of the *Vedāntasāra* this Sadānanda refers to his own teacher as Advayānanda. It is not known whether our author wrote any work other than the *Vedāntasāra*. The *Advaitagranthakośa* published by the Deva Vāṇī Parishad, Calcutta, mentions three works other than the *Vedāntasāra* whose author also has the name Sadānanda. But it is not definitely known whether they were written by Sadānanda, the author of the *Vedāntasāra*, himself. We shall, therefore, expound his philosophy as gathered from the *Vedāntasāra* alone.

In presenting to the world this work known as *Vedāntasāra*, our author has done yeoman service to the cause of Advaita. He has presented within a brief compass the doctrine of Advaita in a style that is "clear and quite matter-of-fact". The work is very useful as a general introduction to the philosophy of Advaita and

Prof. Hiriyanna writes that firstly the relationship between Vedānta and Sāṅkhya is much older than is assumed in the above criticism, taking us back to the time of Bhāskara and even Bhartrihari and showing different phases in its development, and secondly, even though Vedānta has borrowed many elements from the Sāṅkhya, the doctrine in its essentials has remained unaffected by the Sāṅkhya elements in it (*ibid.*, p 18).

We shall now give an outline of the contents of the *Vedānta-sāra* mainly to indicate its methodology.

The *adhikārin* or the student who is qualified to enter upon the study of the Vedānta is a person (1) who has a general knowledge of what all the Vedas teach, (2) whose mind is well purified, and (3) who is equipped with the four-fold aid (*sādhana-chaturṭaya*). To acquire these qualifications the student has to undergo a course of preliminary training comprising (1) a general study of the Vedas and Vedāṅgas, (2) the practice of *upāsana*, and (3) an ethical discipline which consists of the avoidance of *kāmya* and *nishiddha-karmas* and the performance of *nitya* and *naimittika karmas* and *prāyaścittas*.

Tormented by the fire of worldly existence, a person thus qualified betakes himself to a *guru* who out of supreme compassion instructs him. The method of instruction consists in superimposing upon Reality what is not real (*adhyāropa*) and then denying what is not real (*apavāda*) with a view to establishing the Reality. This indirect method of instruction is based on the sound educational principle of proceeding from the familiar to the unfamiliar. The student is familiar with his own narrow self (*jīva*) and the universe around him (*jagat*). Hence the teacher initially presents the view of Reality that is connected with these concepts, viz., the *saguṇa Brahman*.

Common experience presents us with a world of diversity as existing outside of ourselves, the subjects. But no man knows the world as a whole and exactly as it is. We are, therefore, dissatisfied with our own knowledge. Our dissatisfaction implies that we are vaguely aware of a universal consciousness to which the whole world is presented as an object and which knows it exactly as it is.

What is the relation of this universal subject to the particular subjects? The fact that we are aware of the universal subject shows

that it must be somehow identical with ourselves in spite of the difference that we feel from it. Reflection shows that the only way of explaining the relation is that the identity between the universal and individual subjects is in respect of consciousness and the difference between them is in respect of what is presented to consciousness. This is the significance of using the term *samashṭi* (all-pervading) for the universal subject and *vyashṭi* (separate) for the individual subject. The relationship is illustrated by analogies such as those of universal space in relation to space divided into parts or reflected in different media or the forest in relation to a single tree.

On the basis of our common experience we can infer that the diversity of the world as a whole is reducible to a unity, a principle that contains within itself the elements of diversity. This principle is called *māyā* or, as our author invariably calls it, *ajñāna*. *Māyā* or *ajñāna* is the material cause of the universe. It is insentient (*jaḍa*), being dependent upon universal consciousness for its revelation. Hence it can produce the world only by being activated by consciousness (*chaitanya*). Hence *ajñāna* together with *chaitanya* is the full explanation of the world. This complex of *ajñāna* and universal consciousness is *Īśvara* or *saguṇa Brahman*. Just as the universal *ajñāna* represents the whole universe presented to *Īśvara*'s consciousness, we may speak of an individual *ajñāna* which represents the limited world presented to the individual consciousness and together with which the individual consciousness forms the complex known as *jīva*. Our author traces the course of evolution from *ajñāna* to the gross universe and shows how the *jīva* comes to possess a material outfit and how *Īśvara* is really beyond time, space, and causality. He also draws up a close parallelism between *Īśvara* and *jīva* during the course of evolution in order to show that the so-called difference between them is really a work of the adjuncts and is not essential to consciousness. That sets the stage for the second part of the teaching — *apavāda* or denial.

What is the reality of the world which is presented to consciousness? So far as our individual experiences are concerned the world is dependent on us for revelation but not for existence. We grant that it exists independently of our consciousness on the ground that other people also perceive it. But in the case of

Īśvara there is no second universal self by comparing with whose experience the world as a whole may be said to exist independently of *Īśvara*. The world as a whole is, therefore, dependent on *Īśvara*'s consciousness not only for revelation but also for existence. This is the significance of describing the source of the world as *ajñāna* or *māyā*. Since *ajñāna* is dependent on consciousness for its existence, it cannot be real like consciousness. *Ajñāna* or *māyā* is, therefore, just the appearance of *Brahman* or *chaitanya*.

We have already said that the difference between *Īśvara* and *jīva* is simply a difference in the adjuncts, viz., *ajñāna* in the two cases. To deny the reality of *ajñāna* is, therefore, to deny the *jīvatva* of the *jīva* and the *Īśvaratva* of *Īśvara*. When thus the differences superimposed on consciousness are denied, consciousness as such remains as the only reality. This conclusion which has been arrived at by reasoning is confirmed by the Upanishads through the *mahāvākya* 'tat tvam asi.' Our author delineates the method of arriving at the true import of this statement.

The knowledge imparted so far by the Upanishads, firstly through argumentation and then through revelation (the two steps together forming the discipline called *śravaṇa*) is only mediate. To enable mediate knowledge to become immediate experience *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are also required. *Nididhyāsana* culminates in *samādhi*. There are two levels of *samādhi* according to our author. In *savikalpaka-samādhi* the mind rests on the secondless *Brahman* whose form it has assumed, but without losing sight of the distinction between knower and known. Since *Brahman* is known at this stage only as an object in relation to a subject, *savikalpaka-samādhi* represents only the penultimate experience. The ultimate experience is *nirvikalpaka-samādhi*. In it the mind rests in an intense manner on the secondless *Brahman* whose form it has assumed, transcending the distinction of knower, known, etc. If *savikalpaka-samādhi* is to develop into the *nirvikalpaka*, the *sādhaka* has to overcome four obstacles, viz., *laya* (lapse), *vikshepa* (distraction), *kashāya* (passion), and *rasāsvāda* (satisfaction). When undisturbed by this four-fold obstacle, the mind becomes motionless like a lamp-flame in a windless place and rests concentrated on the partless spirit. This state of the mind is the *akhaṇḍākāra-vṛitti*. It is the final (*charama*) *vṛitti* of the mind. It is quite unlike a *vṛitti* in ordinary life. In percep-

tual experience first the mind assumes the form of the object (this being the *vṛitti*), thus removing our ignorance of its existence, and then the spirit reflected in the *vṛitti* (*phala*) reveals the nature of the object. In the case of *Brahman*-experience the mind of course must assume the form of the object. This is the significance of the statement *manasaivānudrashṭavyam* (by the *manas* alone is it to be seen) (*Bṛiha. U. IV. 4. 19*). But, since the object is no other than the self-revealing Self of the knower, the reflection of the Self in the mind is neither necessary for, nor capable of, revealing it. That is, the *phala* has no part to play in this context. This is the significance of the statement '*yan manasā na manute*' (what by the *manas* cannot be known) (*Kena U. I. 6.*). The part played by the *charama vṛitti* in *Brahman*-experience is purely negative. It simply removes the ignorance obscuring *Brahman*. With the removal of ignorance, the mental state called *charama vṛitti* which is itself a part of ignorance, is also destroyed. When the reflecting medium of the mind thus disappears, the *pratibimba* (*jīvachaitanya*) merges itself, as it were, in the *bimba* (*Brahmachaitanya*). This direct experience of the disciple is represented by the statement '*aḥam brahma asmi*'.

The author finally describes the condition of *jīvanmukti*. When the *jīvanmukta* is in *samādhi* diversity does not exist for him, and hence he is non-active. In the state of *vyutthāna* he perceives diversity but is not deceived by it, as he has once for all realized the underlying unity. He will engage in action that is uniformly and spontaneously good and will be indifferent to results. When the body 'of' the *jīvanmukta* falls off on the exhaustion of its *prārabdha*, He remains as the partless *Brahman*.

SADANANDA KASMIRAKA

by

LALITHA RAMAMURTI

M.A.

Sadānanda Kāśmīraka is the author of the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, one of the standard works on Advaita Vedānta of post-Śaṅkara school. This work is published in the Bibliotheca Indica series by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. The author has written another work called *Svarūpaprakāśa* and he refers to this work in the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*.¹ Prof. M. Hiriyanna, in his edition of the *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, says that that author is different from Sadānanda, the author of the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*. Very little is known about the author. Madhusūdanasarasvatī does not refer to Sadānanda Kāśmīraka by name. But there are passages in the works of Madhusūdanasarasvatī which are identical with those found in the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*. But we cannot say whether Madhusūdanasarasvatī quotes these passages from the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* or Sadānanda quotes from the works of Madhusūdanasarasvatī.

The arrangement of the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* materially differs from that of *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdanasarasvatī. The latter is written with the sole view of answering the objections raised against Advaita by the dualistic school of thought. The former, on the other hand, gives a succinct account with all fairness to the hostile schools, and then proceeds to refute them. For a student of Advaita who has not independently studied the other schools of thought through original texts, the present work is very useful. It consists of four chapters. In the first chapter the author criticizes the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika views of *āraṁbhavāda*, atoms, *samavāya*, etc., and also the Sāṃkhya views of Pradhāna

1. Vide p. 247.

and *saikāryavāda*. The second chapter is devoted to a critical review of the four schools of Buddhism and also of the Jaina and the Materialistic schools. In the third chapter, our author mainly discusses and refutes the nature of difference and also the concept of difference-cum-identity. He also deals with the indeterminable character of the universe and proves that the objects of the universe though not real can be adapted to the practical needs of life. The nature of the removal of *avidyā* is also incidentally discussed. In the fourth chapter he critically examines the theory that *jñāna* associated with *karma* is the means to liberation and sets forth in detail all the important concepts of Advaita.

According to Advaita there are two categories, *dr̥ik* and *dr̥iśya*. The other categories accepted by different schools of thought can be brought under these two. Of these, *dr̥ik* is Ātman which is Absolute. Although immutable, it appears to be three-fold owing to its unaccountable association with *māyā* or *avidyā* as *Īśvara*, *jīva* and *sākshī*. As regards the nature of *Īśvara* and *jīva*, three theories are put forth by the Advaitins and they are — *pratibimbavāda*, *avacchedavāda* and *ābhāsavāda*. Of these *pratibimbavāda* is propounded by Padmapāda and is elaborately dealt with by Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa*. The *avacchedavāda* is advocated by Vāchaspatimiśra and the *ābhāsavāda* by Sureśvara in his *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-vārtika*.² According to *pratibimbavāda*, the consciousness, that is, Brahman associated with, but transcending *avidyā*, is *Īśvara* and the pure consciousness that is reflected in the intellect in its gross and subtle states is *jīva*. The intellects are many and consequently the individual souls also are many. According to this view *Īśvara* is a complex of *avidyā* and consciousness. *Jīva* is a blend of consciousness and intellect in its gross and subtle states associated with *avidyā*. The conscious element is real by being identical with the original. The insentient element of *avidyā* or intellect is indeterminable either as real or as unreal.³ According to the *avacchedavāda*, consciousness unconditioned by *avidyā* is *Īśvara* and the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* is *jīva*. And in this view, *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*.⁴ According to

2. *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, pp. 247ff.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 243 ff.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

the *ābhāsavāda* the consciousness reflected in *avidyā* is *Īśvara* and the consciousness reflected in the intellect is *jīva*. But while according to the *pratibimbavāda* the conscious part in the reflection is real, according to this view, the conscious part in the reflection is neither sentient nor insentient, neither real nor unreal. However, the reflections, namely, the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are identified with the pure consciousness and are respectively viewed as the agent or enjoyer and the creator of the universe.⁵ And according to the other views the consciousness that underlies both the *jīva* and *Īśvara* is *sākshī*. And in all these three views, the individual souls are many owing to the plurality of intellect.

Apart from these three views, there is another view known as *dṛishṭi-sṛishṭi-vāda*. This is identical with the *ekajīvavāda*. According to this view, the consciousness when reflected in *avidyā* is *jīva* and since *avidyā* is one, the *jīva* also is one. And the other individual souls and the insentient universe are like objects in a dream state; they have only apparent reality. The one and the only individual soul attains liberation after getting the intuitive knowledge of Brahman from the preceptor who is also fancied by him as an omniscient being. This view is said to be the principal view of the Vedānta.⁶ Our author deals with all these four views and he seems to favour the *dṛishṭi-sṛishṭi-vāda*. He observes:

“*brahmaiva anādi-māyāvaśāt*
jīvabhāvamāpannassan muchyate”.

According to Advaita the infinite Brahman when associated with *avidyā* undergoes transmigration and when freed from *avidyā* attains liberation. And *avidyā* could be removed only by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Here arises the question of some importance—whether meditation is the real cause of the intuitive knowledge or whether it is merely an aid to the *mahāvākyas* leading to that result. The prevalent view in Advaita is that the *mahāvākyas* directly lead to the knowledge of Brahman. And our author holds this view. The objection to this view is that the innate nature of a sentence is to give rise to only mediate know-

5. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

ledge. Hence the Upanishadic texts also, in view of their being sentences, give rise to only mediate knowledge of Brahman and not to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. This objection is not valid because whether a sentence gives rise to mediate knowledge or immediate knowledge lies in the nature of the object concerned. If the object is mediate, then the sentence gives rise to only a mediate knowledge of the object. But here Brahman is always immediate and hence the *mahāvākyas* could give rise to the immediate knowledge of Brahman. And this intuitive knowledge annihilates *avidyā*, and Brahman which is self-luminous manifests itself. And Brahman free from *avidyā* is liberation. This intuitive knowledge brings about the annihilation of all deeds except the fructified ones. Till the latter are destroyed by experiencing their results, the realised soul continues to exist in the body. This is known as *jīvanmukti*. When in the end a *jīvanmukta* is dissociated with his physical accompaniments, he becomes Brahman itself and this is known as *videhamukti*.

The greatest contribution of Sadānanda Kāśmīraka lies in this that he had had access to all important Advaitic works of his predecessors and he had presented the Advaitic doctrines in a lucid way for the benefit of posterity. The style of the *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* is more lucid and less pedantic than that of the *Advaita-siddhi*. In simplicity of exposition and fairness to the other systems, it deserves to be placed with the *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* of Vidyāranya and the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Chitsukhāchārya.

PRAKASANANDA

by

T. P. RAMACHANDRAN

M.A., PH.D.

Prakāśānanda is supposed to have lived some time towards the latter half of the sixteenth century. He must have been an elder contemporary of Appayya Dīkshita, who lived in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in whom we find the earliest mention of Prakāśānanda's name.¹

Prakāśānanda's chief work is the *Vedānta-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* or *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*, in which he propounds the doctrine of *drishṭi-sṛishṭi*. There is a commentary on this work by Nānā Dīkshita, called *Siddhānta-Pradīpikā*, written at a time when the different parts of India had been pervaded by at least the third generation of the followers of Prakāśānanda. In addition to the *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* Prakāśānanda wrote many other works, such as *Tārā-Bhakti-Taraṅgiṇī*, *Manoramā*, *Tantra-rāja-Ṭīkā*, *Mahā-Lakshmī-Paddhati*, which show his attachment to the *tantra* forms of worship.

Prakāśānanda's distinction lies in propounding the doctrine known as *drishṭi-sṛishṭi-vāda* in Advaita. As Brahman is unchangeable, the multifarious phenomena of the world-appearance have to be explained in terms of the changeable but indeterminable principle called *māyā*. In the hands of the later followers of Śaṅkara this principle gradually thickened into a positive stuff through the evolution or transformation of which all phenomena were to be explained. Critics of Advaita naturally began to charge Advaita with an apparent dualism: of the unchangeable Brahman and a changeable stuff called *māyā*. And Advaita writers tried to

1. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 17.

explain that no dualism was involved in providing for the concept of *māyā*; but they did this in such a way that the positive character of *māyā* was never denied. Prakāśānanda for the first time tried an extreme solution to the problem posed by the critics. He denied the objective character of *māyā* and explained the world-appearance from a purely sensationalistic point of view. The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception (*dṛishṭi*). There are no objects corresponding to our perceptions and existing independently of our minds. All phenomena are subjective or imagined; so that the jug that I see had no existence before I perceived it, and it will also cease to be as soon as I cease to have the perception of it. It is the mind that creates its own objects.

The traditional Advaita view is that the objects comprising the physical world exist outside our minds, though with reference to Brahman the world of objects as well as the world of minds are illusory. One reason cited for the objective existence of physical phenomena is this. The same objects which one perceives are perceived by others also. There is, therefore, a common world of objects existing independently of any one's mind. The illusions of the *prātibhāsika* order alone are individual. The snake seen on the rope exists for the perceiver only and not for others. On the contrary, objects of everyday life, that is of the *vyāvahārika* order, such as tables and chairs, are common to all and therefore, objective or independent of individual minds. It is only for the *jñānī*, for whom the individual mind is no longer a limitation, that these objects are illusory. The *dṛshṭi-sṛishṭi-vādin*, however, insists that even for the common man the world of everyday experience is an illusion. According to him the mere fact that the experience of objects is common to all is no argument to prove that the objects exist independently of their minds. For, even at the level of dreams and illusions within waking life there may be similarity of experience, but on this ground we do not argue that the things perceived are objective. Each of ten persons may mistake a rope for a snake and run away. But the similarity in their perceptions does not imply that there is a snake out there in space and time. We have no hesitation in saying that the so-called snake is just an idea in the mind of each person. In the same way, why cannot we admit that the table or the chair that each of us perceives is just an idea in the mind of each of us?

Traditional Advaita holds that while *prātibhāsika* objects are modifications of the perceiver's own *ajñāna*, *vyāvahārika* objects are modifications of *māyā*, which is the common basis of the *ajñāna* of individuals. But the *drishti-srishi-vādin* denies any need to posit a common factor called *māyā*. According to him the objects comprising the *vyāvahārika* are, like the *prātibhāsika* objects, modifications of the individual perceiver's own *ajñāna*, in so far as they too are illusory superimpositions on their real ground (Brahman).

It might appear that the *drishti-srishi-vādin* takes up a position which is the same as the stand taken by the Vijñānavāda Bauddha. But the identity is only apparent. There is a fundamental difference between the two. The *drishti-srishi-vādin* remains an Advaitin in spite of his special theory of perception. Though both of them reduce the world of objects to mental activity, while the Vijñānavādin regards the mental activity as itself the final reality, the *drishti-srishi-vādin* assumes a permanent unchangeable substrate for this activity, namely Brahman. Mental activities are modifications of *ajñāna*, which has for its basis Brahman.

Drishṭi-srishi-vāda in its full-fledged form was apparently unknown to Advaitins earlier than Prakāśānanda. In the colophon to his *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* Prakāśānanda claims to be the first to expound this doctrine thoroughly:

*vedānta-sāra-sarvasvam ajñeyam adhunātanaḥ
aśeṣeṇa mayoktaṁ tat puruṣhottama-yatnataḥ*

But though Prakāśānanda was the first exponent of *drishti-srishi-vāda*, the origin of the doctrine could be traced even to Maṇḍana Miśra of the ninth century.²

Prakāśānanda seems to have derived inspiration from the *Yoga-Vāsishṭha* for his doctrine of the non-existence of things when not perceived (*ajñāta-sattvānabhūyupagamatva*).³ According to the *Yoga-Vāsishṭha* it is only ideas that have existence; there is no physical world apart from ideas. On the lines of the *Yoga-*

2. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 270

Vāsishtā Prakāśānanda says that all objects have only perceptual existence (*prātītika-sattva*). It is clear that in following the *Yoga-Vāsishtā* in this regard Prakāśānanda makes a departure from the Advaita tradition handed down from Śaṅkarāchārya. While both Prakāśānanda and the *Yoga-Vāsishtā* deny the existence of objects when not perceived, Śaṅkarāchārya not only admits their existence but also holds that they exist in the same form in which they are known. Śrī Śaṅkara's views on the matter are clearly set forth in his commentary on *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. 2. 28. His refutation of the Buddhistic school of Vijñānavāda in his commentary on the same sūtra applies as well to Prakāśānanda's *drishṭi-sṛishṭi-vāda*.

Moreover, Prakāśānanda fails to offer any positive proof in support of his thesis that the objects comprising the physical world have no existence apart from their perception. On the analogy of dreams and the illusions that occur in waking life he offers a hypothesis. Just as dreams and illusions are mere ideas without any real objects corresponding to them, the world of waking consciousness is a mere awareness (*vijñāna-mātra* or *bhāva-mātra*) and does not point to anything objective. Instead of presenting arguments in support of his hypothesis, he merely tries to show that there is no direct proof for the rival hypothesis, namely that objects exist apart from our awareness of them (*pratīti*). Prakāśānanda fails to appreciate the possibility of indirect proof for the independent existence of objects, for example, as given by Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the sūtra referred to earlier.

In the light of these facts it is not surprising that, apart from his pupil Nānā Dīkshita, Prakāśānanda failed to attract any notable following, and that the *drishṭi-sṛishṭi* school turned out to be just a temporary phase in the long history of Advaita.

To make our account of the special features of Prakāśānanda's philosophy more adequate let us note, though briefly, his views on some other topics in Advaita also.

1. The cause of the world: Prakāśānanda is not prepared to concede even a provisional place for the concept of causality in the explanation of the world. He regards it as inconsistent with the fundamental position of Advaita. Brahman cannot be called the cause of the world, for causality implies the duality of cause and effect, but there is nothing other than Brahman. Nor can

nescience (*avidyā*) be called the cause of the world. For, but for *avidyā*, we would not have the very notion of causality, and how can we apply to *avidyā* a category which is itself dependent on *avidyā*? Hence the theory of cause and effect is outside the scope of Advaita.

2. The relation of the world (*jagat*) to Brahman. In explaining this, traditional Advaita concedes a provisional place to *pariṇāma-vāda* and finally discards it in favour of *vivarta-vāda*. But Prakāśānanda does not accept even *vivarta-vāda* as the final explanation of the world. Since Brahman is the only reality, and since the world-appearance is nothing but Brahman, there is no need to explain the appearance of the world, as though the world is different from Brahman. Prakāśānanda argues that in accordance with the texts of the Veda, *māyā*, in terms of which the world is sought to be explained, is a fictitious non-entity (*tuccha*). Aspirants of middling intellect (*bālāḥ*) think of it as real, and for them only *vivarta-vāda* has any value. For talented aspirants the phenomenon of Brahman appearing differently (*vivarta*) simply does not exist.

*bālān prati vivarto'yaṁ brahmaṇaḥ sakalam jagat
avivartitam ānandam āsthitāḥ kṛtinaḥ sadā.*⁴

In taking such a stand Prakāśānanda has often to differ from Sarvajñāma Muni, Prakāśātman, and others, who developed a realistic conception of *māyā*, namely as transforming itself into the world of diversity.

It is thus seen that Prakāśānanda took an extreme position on most of the important points of Advaita. Naturally, therefore, his contribution failed to exert a permanent influence on the development of Advaita philosophy. But in judging the value of that special contribution we must go more by the intention behind it than by its result. It must not be forgotten that Prakāśānanda was as ardent about Advaita as any other Advaitin and that his exposition of Advaita did not compromise its fundamentals. In fact, it was his anxiety to save Advaita from a possible dualism as between Brahman and *māyā* that led him to take up a position of extreme idealism.

4. Quoted: *Ibid.*, p. 224.

RAMATIRTHA*by***P. V. SIVARAMA DIKSHITAR**

Vedānta-viśārada, Vedānta-śiromaṇi

Several are the great geniuses and original thinkers who have put forth earnest effort to spread the philosophy of Advaita, which is the quintessence of the Upanishads, the eternal fountains of true knowledge, by their classical and immortal works. Śrī Rāmā-tirtha may be ranked with the foremost among the teachers who contributed lucid expositions of and illuminating commentaries on Advaita classics.

In the domain of the Śāstras, it was the custom in the olden days to assess the importance of an author, not so much by the number of works he himself composed, as by the chain of commentaries that subsequent writers thought it necessary to write to bring out the wealth of ideas implicit in the author's works.

vyākhyānaparamparayaiva vikāśaḥ.

The special virtue of great classics is that they not only have their commentaries but also commentaries on the commentaries, which undoubtedly go to show the invaluable gift of the author of the original.

The special features of a commentary (*vyākhyāna*) are mentioned in the following well-known verse.

*padacchedaḥ padārthoktiḥ
vighraho vākyaayanā
ākshepaścha samādhānam
etadvyākhyānalakṣaṇam.*

As could be seen from this it is no easy task to become a commentator, because, considering the various intricacies of a work, the requirements to be fulfilled by a commentary demand

true talent. As a commentator, Śrī Rāmatīrtha fills the bill very well.

We find from the last sentences of all the works of Rāmatīrtha that he was the disciple of Kṛishṇatīrtha.

kṛishṇatīrthasishyarāmatīrthakṛite.

Śrī Kṛishṇatīrtha has been mentioned as his guru.

*‘śrīkṛishṇatīrthagurupādayugam namāmi’.*¹

Another work *Vedāntasāraṭīkā* also bears evidence to this fact:

*vedāntasāravivṛitim rāmatīrthābhidho yatīḥ
chakre śrīkṛishṇatīrtha śrīpādapaṅkaja śaṭpadaḥ.*²

But in the *Pañchīkaraṇa-vivaraṇa-vyākhyā* (*Tattvachandrikā*) it has been stated that Jagannāthāśramī was his guru.

jagannāthāśramā ye guravo ye kṛipālavaḥ.

And in the beginning of the *Vedāntasāraṭīkā* he says,

*vāṇīkāyamanobhiḥ śrīguruvidyāgurūn namaskṛitya
vedāntasāraṭīkāṁ kurve śraddhāvasāt yathābuddhi.*

Thus on the strength of the above references we come to the conclusion that Rāmatīrtha had two gurus, a Śikshāguru and another Dīkshāguru.

We may also consider a reference made by him to Viśvaveda’s *Siddhāntadīpa* in the *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā*, a commentary on the *Samkshepasūtrīka*, namely,

‘siddhāntadīpam purato nidhāya’.

From this, one may draw the conclusion that Śrī Viśvaveda the author of the *Siddhāntadīpa* was Rāmatīrtha’s sampradāyaguru. Therefore, considering all the above facts we may finally take it that Śrī Kṛishṇatīrtha was his Dīkshāguru, Jagannāthāśrama and Viśvaveda being the śikshāgurus; but there is nothing on record to dispute the conclusion that Kṛishṇatīrtha was the śikshāguru while the others were his sampradāyagurus.

1. See *Pañchīkaraṇa-vyākhyā*.

2. See *Vedāntasāraṭīkā-vidvanmanorañjinī*, p. 135 (Nirnayasagar Edn.)

(i) Śrī Anantadeva I, father of Āpadeva I, the author of *Mīmāṃsā-nyāyaprakāśa*, was the disciple of Rāmatīrtha. This can be ascertained from the sentence

*śrutam yat śrīrāmatīrthebhyaḥ
sampradāyasamāgatam.*

(ii) Śrī Purushottama Miśra was also the disciple of Rāmatīrtha. This can be known from the following śloka—

*ādareṇa bhagavatparāyaṇam
mūrtimantamiva bādarāyaṇam
rāmatīrthamiha naumi tam gurum
śradhayā diva ivāgatam gurum.*

This śloka is found in the *Subodhinī* which is a commentary on the *Samkshepasārīraka*. *Subodhini* has been written by Purushottama Miśra.

(iii) One Nārāyaṇa-priya who was the author of *Sneha*, a commentary on the *Kaivalyadīpikā*, has stated that he was the disciple of Rāmatīrtha.

The works of Rāmatīrtha so far published do not give us any clue to the exact period of the commentator. But the unpublished manuscript of his commentary on *Mānasollāsa* gives the date of the commentary as 1630 Vikrama Era (1574 A.D.)³ Nṛsiṃhāśrama belonged to the 16th century A.D. Rāmatīrtha was his contemporary. Thus we may come to the conclusion that Rāmatīrtha belonged to the later part of the 15th century and the earlier part of the 16th century. It is quite likely that Madhusūdanasarasvatī was a contemporary of Rāmatīrtha. This period, it may be stated, was a bright period in the history of our land as there was a large number of brilliant scholars throughout the country. Rāmatīrtha's style is lucid and simple. His expressions are forceful and at the same time vividly descriptive. By logical remonstrances he inculcates upon the readers morals of a higher order. His persuasive arguments infuse courage and confidence into them. Not only is his contribution to Advaita philosophy invaluable, but

3. See Ms. No. 1120, Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay.

also the manner in which he presents that philosophy is such as to cultivate detachment and discrimination in the reader.

The following are the works ascribed to Rāmatīrtha.

- (i) Commentary on the *Upadeśasūhasrī* of Śrī Śaṅkara.
- (ii) *Naishkarmyasiddhisārārtha*.
- (iii) *Pañchapādikāvivarāṇa-vyākhyā*.
- (iv) *Pañchīkaraṇa-vivarāṇa-vyākhyā* or *Tattvachandrikā* being a commentary on Ānandagiri's *Pañchīkaraṇa-vivarāṇa*.
- (v) *Mānosollāsa-vṛittānta-vilāsa* being a commentary on the *Mānosollāsa* of Sureśvarāchārya.
- (vi) *Vākyārtha-darpaṇam* —

This work explains the meanings of the mahāvākyas of the various Upanishads.

(vii) *Vedāntasāra-vyākhyā* also called *Vidvanmanorañjinī*, a commentary on Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra*.

(viii) *Śārīrakarahasyārtha-prakāśikā* being a *Vṛitti* on the *Brahmasūtra*.

(ix) *Samkshepasārīraka-vyākhyā* also called *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā*.

In this work at the beginning as well as at the end we find the following śloka—

*tasyāhamatrarjjupathena samyak
padānvayārtham prakāṣīkaromi
siddhāntadīpokitimavekshya mūla
śāstraśrutīrmūlanibandhanamcha.
siddhāntadīpam purato nidhāya
vedāntamantargrihasannivishṭam
samkshepasārīrakaratnapuñjam
prakāśamādāya mayā vivikṭam.*

*sarvajñātmanunipraṇītāmālam samkshepasārīrakam
dṛishṭāntarvibhavam puraskṛitamahāsiddhāntadīparchishā
unnīyārthavibhāgataḥ pratipadam sambandhavidyotinī
vyākhyā tasya satām manaḥ priyakarī vyākhyatṛichittaukasah*

From these verses it is clear that there was a commentary on *Samkshepasārīraka* called *Siddhāntadīpa*. Taking advantage of that commentary Rāmatīrtha declares that he has written this *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā*.

(x) *Chidānandalaharī*—This is mentioned in the commentary of *Vedāntasāra*.

Rāmatīrtha's devotion towards Śrī Rāmā is immeasurable. From the following śloka, the style of which is undoubtedly his own, one may observe that Rāmatīrtha viewed the Rāmāyaṇa from a unique philosophical angle.

vidyā sītā vryogakshubhitanijasukhaḥ śokamohābhipannaḥ
chetassaumitrimitraḥ bhavagahanagataḥ
śāstrasugrīvasakhyāḥ,
hatvāste dainyavālim madanajalanidhau
dhairyasetum prabadhya
pradhvastābodharakshaḥ patiradhigatachijjānakiḥ
svātmārāmaḥ.

NRISIMHASRAMA

by

N. VEEZHINATHAN

M.A., PH.D.

Nṛisimhāśrama was a pupil of Gīrvāṇendra Sarasvatī, and Jagannāthāśrama, who was a contemporary of Kṛishṇatīrtha, the preceptor of Rāmatīrtha. Rāmatīrtha has been assigned to the middle of the sixteenth century.¹ We may, therefore, conclude that Nṛisimhāśrama flourished in the second half of the sixteenth century. He wrote many works such as *Advaita-dīpikā*, *Advaita-pañcha-ratna*, *Advaita-bodha-dīpikā*, *Advaita-vāda*, *Bheda-dhik-kāra*, *Vāchārambhaṇa*, *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, and commentaries on the *Samkshepa-śārīraka* and *Pañchapādikā-vivaraṇa*, called *Tattva-bodhinī*, and *Pañcha-pādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā* respectively.

Nṛisimhāśrama is mainly concerned with stressing the fact of the identity of the individual soul with Brahman and the illusory character of the universe. The universe, according to Advaita, is neither real like Brahman, nor an absolute nothing like the horn of a hare, nor real and unreal at once; it is *anirvachanīya* or indescribable either as real or as unreal. This concept of *anirvachanīya* is termed '*mithyā*'; and *mithyātvam* is defined by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* as '*pratipannopadhau traikālikanishedha-pratīyogitvam*'. An object 'silver' (say) that appears in the nacre is *mithyā* because it is non-existent in the locus, that is, the nacre in which it appears. And, the characteristic of *mithyātvā* pertains to the object 'silver'. Nṛisimhāśrama² maintains this definition of *mithyātvā*. He defines *ajñāna* as the beginningless primal cause

1. See the article on 'The date of Rāmatīrthayati' by P. K. Gode in the *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. VI, part II, pp. 107-110.

2. *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, p. 12. *The Pandit*, Vol. XXV, May 1903. See Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 217.

of the universe and as one which is removable by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. It has Brahman as its content.

*'anādi upādānatve sati jñāna-nivartyam
ajñānam, nikhila-prapañchopādāna-brahma-gocharam
eva ajñānam.*³

Nṛsiṃhāśrama does not adopt any new line of argument in the interpretation of the Vedānta. In handling the dialectic on difference also Nṛsiṃhāśrama is only following the footsteps of his predecessors, Chitsukha and Śrī-Harsha, with some elaborations here and there.⁴ In his commentary on the *Samkshepaśārīraka*, however, Nṛsiṃhāśrama makes clear the Advaita position.

In the *Samkshepaśārīraka* Sarvajñātman holds that Brahman is truth, eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, subtle, existent, all-pervasive, absolute, and bliss.⁵ An objection may be raised as to the many qualities which are ascribed to Brahman as its essential nature. The qualities of truth, consciousness and bliss no doubt constitute the essential nature of Brahman. But the remaining qualities such as eternity, purity, etc., are not natural to Brahman. Whenever it is said that Brahman is eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), etc., it does not mean that eternity, purity, etc., are its nature; but the words only convey the absence of their opposites. And no quality involving the aspect of non-existence can be the nature of Brahman, as the latter is existent. On this ground, some hold that eternity, etc., are not natural to Brahman, like truth (*satya*), consciousness (*jñāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*).

Sarvajñātman merely refers⁶ to this objection and he raises⁷ a doubt as to its validity; but he does not endeavour to refute the objection. Nṛsiṃhāśrama while commenting on this verse has shown that there are no reasons in favour of the objection

3. *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, p. 43.

4. For more details see *A Critique of Difference*, by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Bulletins of the Department of Indian Philosophy*, University of Madras, No. 2.

5. *Samkshepaśārīraka*, I, 173.

6. *Ibid.*, I, 174.

7. *Ibid.*

and strong reasons against it. He points out that just as the words 'satya', 'jñāna', and 'ānanda' secondarily signify Brahman as of the nature of truth, consciousness, and bliss, so also the words 'nitya', etc., found in the Upanishadic passages secondarily signify Brahman as of the nature of eternity, etc. Moreover, if eternity, purity, etc., are not natural to Brahman, then the inevitable consequence would be that Brahman should be taken as transient, impure, etc. Hence it should be held that eternity, purity, etc., also are the essential nature of Brahman.

'nityam vibhum sarvagatam susūkshmam', 'asnāvīram śuddham apāpavidham', 'vimuktaścha vimuchyate', 'ekamevādvītyam' ityādiśrutibhiḥ nityatvādināmapyaviśeṣheṇa svarūpatvena avadhāraṇāt. 'nityatvādinām svarūpabahirbhāve svarūpasyanītyatvādidoshaprasaṅgāścha'.

According to Advaita, Brahman itself without undergoing any change appears as the universe. The Advaitins by postulating a Reality behind the universe differentiate their doctrine from the *śūnya-vāda* of the Mādhyamika. The latter holds that the world is non-existent. The Advaitins, on the other hand, hold that the world is neither existent nor non-existent, but different from being existent and non-existent. It may be said that although the doctrine of Advaita is not similar to the *śūnya-vāda* of the Mādhyamika, yet it is identical with the *Vijñāna-vāda* school of Buddhism. The latter admits the reality of consciousness alone. What is of the nature of consciousness is indeed indivisible; but by those whose vision is confused it is seen to be, as it were, differentiated into the perceived object, the perceiving subject, and perception. And these are false. The Advaitins also maintain that Brahman alone which is pure consciousness is real and it appears as the universe consisting of the knower, objects, and the empirical knowledge that is, the mental state. And the universe is not real. It is, therefore, argued that the *Vijñāna-vāda* and the doctrine of Advaita are similar.

The *Samkshepa-śārīraka* contains⁸ a refutation of this objection. Nṛsiṃhāśrama while commenting on the verse⁹ of the

8. *Ibid.*, II, 27.

9. *Ibid.*

Samkshepa-sārīraka makes clear that though the two doctrines seem to be similar, yet there are some characteristics which clearly mark the difference between the two schools. In the first place, the Advaitin holds that the four factors, namely, the knower, the object, the proof, and the empirical knowledge are different among themselves, while the *Vijñāna-vādin* denies any difference among them. In the second place, the four factors referred to above are created by the beginningless *avidyā* abiding in the eternal Brahman and they are real until the realisation of Brahman. But the *Vijñānavādin* neither admits an eternal Brahman, nor the beginningless *avidyā*. Never does he posit any reality to the universe. In the third place, Brahman which is pure consciousness is eternal and is different from empirical knowledge or the mental state which arises from the contact of sense-organs with objects and which is insentient. Brahman itself is the witness; without depending on any sense-organ, it perceives the universe. The *Vijñāna-vādin*, on the other hand, holds the insentient mental state itself to be consciousness and as it depends on the sense-organ for its origin it is mutable. Moreover, unlike the Advaitins who hold it to be eternal and unitary, he admits it to be momentary and manifold. From this it would be clear that the doctrine of Advaita and the *Vijñāna-vāda* differ so markedly that there can be no identity between them.

*‘vishayavijñānavyatiriktasvaparakāśasthasvarūpaḥ
sajātīyādibhedaśūnyaḥ paramātmā svādhyastam sakalam
prapañcham sādhyatītyasmābhiruchyate, na thathā
bauddhaiḥ, tanmate buddhivrittereva jādāyā
vijñānatvenāṅgīkārāt; etadvijñānasya kṣaṇikasya
kṣaṇikaprapañchasādhakatvād vijñānānām anekatvāccha
ato’pi na sāmīyam’.*¹⁰

Of all the concepts of Advaita, the concept of removal of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivṛitti*) is the most difficult. There are three views in Advaita regarding the nature of the removal of *avidyā*. The first view is that it is identical with Ātman. The second is that it is different from Ātman and yet not *anirvachanīya* but of a fifth kind (*pañcamaparakāra*). And the third view is that it is identical with the intuitive knowledge of Brahman that brings

about the annihilation of *avidyā*. These three views are advocated by Vimuktātman in his *Ishṭa-siddhi*. We shall now examine these views more closely.

The first view is that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is identical with Ātman. Those who disagree with this view hold that Ātman is ever-existent and so *avidyā-nivṛtti* which is identical with Ātman also is ever-existent. Since it is ever-existent, no attempt need be made by any aspirant to achieve this *avidyā-nivṛtti*. This is the first defect. The second defect is: if *avidyā-nivṛtti* is ever-existent like Ātman, then its correlate 'avidyā' could not have existed in Brahman. Consequently, there could be no transmigration at all.

The second view is that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is different from Ātman and yet it is not *anirvachanīya* but of a fifth kind. According to this view, *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not real; because if it were real there would be a real entity other than Brahman and this goes against the spirit of Advaita. It is not unreal, because if it were so it would be similar to an absolute nothing like a flower sprung from the sky and hence it cannot be achieved through knowledge. Further, being an absolute nothing, it cannot be considered as an ultimate value (*purushārtha*). It is not real and unreal at once for that would violate the law of contradiction. It is not *anirvachanīya* either; because its correlate *avidyā* is *anirvachanīya* and so its negation must be other than *anirvachanīya*. On these grounds it is held that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is of a fifth kind.¹¹

Nṛsiṃhāśrama points out¹² certain difficulties with regard to this view. In the first place, the Upanishadic texts that convey Brahman as non-dual are valid only when everything apart from Brahman is held to be *anirvachanīya*. According to this view, *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not *anirvachanīya*. So the Upanishadic texts that convey Brahman to be non-dual cannot be valid. In the second place, since *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not *sat* it cannot be considered to be an ultimate value. Nṛsiṃhāśrama holds that on these two grounds the view that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is of a fifth kind must be given up.

11. Vide Nṛsiṃhāśrama's preface to his commentary on the *Samkshepa-sārīraka*, IV, 12.

12. *Ibid.*, IV., 15.

The difficulties regarding the second view lead one to maintain the first view that *avidyā-nivṛitti* is identical with Ātman. Two defects have been pointed as regards this view. The first defect is: If *avidyā-nivṛitti* is identical with Ātman then it is ever-existent and so no attempt need be made by any aspirant to achieve it. Nṛsīmhāśrama answers¹³ this objection by pointing out that when intuitive knowledge arises there is the manifestation of Ātman which is of the nature of *avidyā-nivṛitti*. And when the knowledge does not arise, Ātman in its unconditioned nature does not manifest itself. Hence it is only by courtesy that *avidyā-nivṛitti* is said to be achieved by knowledge. So the first objective is not tenable.

*‘Jñāne sati avidyānivṛittirūpātmaphuraṇam tadubhāve tadasphuraṇam ityetāvataiva upachārāt sādhyatvokṭiḥ’*¹⁴

*‘jñānābhāve ajñānānuvṛittiḥ, jñānadaśāyam tu tadanuvṛittiḥ ityetāvataiva avidyānivṛittiḥ, jñānasādhyatopacārāt, taduktam āchāryaiḥ-tatkaivalyam ataḥ sādhyam upachārāt prachakshate’*¹⁵

The second objection is that as Ātman is ever-existent its correlate *avidyā* could not exist in Ātman. So there could be no transmigration at all. Nṛsīmhāśrama does not answer this objection. The answer to this objection lies precisely in the weakness of the view that *avidyā-nivṛitti* is of a fifth kind. *Avidyā* is held to be *anirvachanīya* and this would be possible only when its non-existence also is present in the same substratum at the same time.

The view that *avidyā-nivṛitti* is identical with Ātman is maintained by Śrī Śaṅkara himself in his ‘*Haristuti*’ wherein he says that Brahman (Hari) is of the nature of the annihilation of *avidyā*, the cause of the universe.

‘tam saṁsāra-dhīvānta-vināśam harimīde’.

The third view is that *avidyā-nivṛitti* is identical with the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. The intuitive knowledge of Brahman is the annihilating factor of *avidyā*. Apart from

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. Nṛsīmhāśrama’s commentary on the *Samkshepaśārīraka*, IV, 24.

the rise of the annihilating factor, it is not intelligible to hold anything like the annihilation of a thing. Pratyagsvarūpa emphasizes this point in his commentary '*Nayanaprasādinī*' on the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Chitsukha. This view is considered to be more logical than the other views. That ripe scholar Dr. Rāma Varma Parīkshit maintains that the Naiyāyikas also must subscribe to such a view. He holds that of the many causes that contribute to the origination of a pot the most important cause is the antecedent non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭa-prāgabhāva*). So according to the Nyāya school, pot is the effect of its non-existence. That school further holds that the pot which is created is of the nature of the annihilation of its non-existence. *Ghaṭa* is *ghaṭa-prāgabhāva-kārya*; and it is admitted to be of the nature of *ghaṭa-prāgabhāva-dhvaṁsa*. Similarly, *jñāna* is only a mental state. Mind is an effect of *māyā* or *avidyā*. Hence the mental state which is *jñāna* is also the effect of *māyā* or *avidyā*. *Jñāna* is *avidyā-kārya*; and it is intelligible to hold that it is of the nature of *avidyā-nivṛitti*.¹⁶

Nṛsiṁhāśrama, however, does not refer to the third view regarding *avidyā-nivṛitti*.

While it is correct to say that Nṛsiṁhāśrama has not put forward any new interpretation of the Vedānta, yet as a commentator he is superb. His commentary on the *Samkshepa-sūtrāraka* amply testifies to this observation.

16. *Ghaṭapragabhāvakāryasya ghaṭasya taddhvaṁsarūpatayā naiyāyikairāṅgīkṛtatvāt ajñānakāryasyāpi jñānasya taddhvaṁsarūpatvam sūpapannam iti śrīparīkshinmahārājāḥ*. See *Brahmānandīyabhāvaprakāśa*, published by The Private Secretary to His Highness The Maharaja of Cochin, 1951, p. 12.

RANGA RAJA*

by

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

M.A. (Madras), B.Sc. (Oxon), Bar-at-Law

Nilakaṇṭha Dīkshita, the famous litterateur, and minister of Tirumala Nāyak, refers in his *Nala-charitra-nāṭaka*¹ to one of his ancestors, Raṅga Rāja, as the author of several works, such as the *Advaitavidyāmukura* and the *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa*. This Raṅga Rāja is none other than the son of Āchān Dīkshita and the father of the celebrated Appayya Dīkshita. From the latter's acknowledgement of indebtedness to his father's instruction, it is evident that Raṅga Rāja was a scholar of no mean order; but the only reference to his works seems to be in the *nāṭaka* above-mentioned, and there is little direct knowledge of the works themselves. The Oriental Manuscripts Library at Mysore has the proud distinction of owning a fragmentary copy of the *Mukura*, under the title *Advaitamukura*.² The *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa* of which there is a single manuscript in Nandināgari script—again fragmentary—in the Tanjore Palace Library,³ is probably the work of Raṅga Rāja. It is here sought to give an account of the contents of the manuscript of the *Advaitamukura* as now available to us in the Mysore Library.

Like the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana, it is an attempt to reestablish Advaita by answering dualist attacks. The topics

An adaptation of the paper *The Advaitavidyāmukura*, published in *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, University of Madras, 1961.

1. See edition in the Bāṣamanorama Series, p. 3.

2. No. 3353.

3. No. 7064, in the Descriptive Catalogue by P. P. S. Sastri. The present paper owes much to the information supplied by this scholar and by Mr. M. Hiriyanna.

covered are almost the same as those treated in the *Siddhi*, in the first hundred pages (of the Kumbakonam edition). The arguments met are the same; and the similarity very often extends to the replies too. Such differences as there are belong to the order of treatment. The refutation of the superiority of perception, the application of the *apaccheda-nyāya*, etc., thus occur at the very end of Raṅga Rāja's exposition, while Madhusūdana finds a place for them early in his discussion. The pūrvapakshin's position is stated in one lot by Raṅga Rāja, while Madhusūdana lets it develop gradually in answer to various replies of the Siddhāntin. But the nerve of the argument is the same in both writers. It is impossible to judge conclusively on the material before us, which of these is indebted to the other; while the agreement not merely in the *pūrvapaksha* but also in the *siddhānta* precludes the position that each was absolutely independent of the other. It would appear necessary to postulate at least a common source of inspiration for both writers, a source we have so far not discovered.

Another tantalising problem set by the manuscript is that of Raṅga Rāja's identity with the Advaitavidyāchārya mentioned so frequently by Appayya in the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*. The name might have been applied to Raṅga Rāja, either because of his authorship of the *Advaitavidyāmukura* or because Appayya got his Advaitavidyā from his father.⁴ The matter could be settled if one could trace to the *Mukura* any of the doctrines attributed distinctively to the Advaitavidyāchārya. But the fragment we have of the *Mukura* does not treat any such topic and we are still left in the region of conjecture.

What we have of the first *pariccheda* is roughly divided into eleven sections. The first of these deals with the interpretation of scripture as favouring non-dualism. The well-known six marks of purport are mentioned and their consilience shown in respect of non-dualism. Duality though perceived is not ultimate. Scriptural affirmation of what is in the scope of perception would be repetitive and purposeless. It is not as though a new duality is affirmed; for there is no novelty about this duality; and the cogni-

4. The former alternative is more likely because of the use of the appellation "advaitavidyā-kriṣṭa" in some places; see *Siddhāntaleśa* (Kumbakonam edition); p. 272.

tion of duality is fraught with evil besides, as made clear in more than one unambiguous scriptural text. Opponents of non-dualism who indulge in the distortion of patently non-dualist texts like *tat tvam asi* come in for severe criticism by our author.

The pluralist seeks to establish the reality of the world on the ground of its being known, on the analogy of Brahman. The difficulty in all such arguments is that the *probans* "being known by a *pramāṇa* that apprehends absolute reality" is not established. Perception which apprehends the here and now cannot apprehend such reality as is unsublatable in all three times. That inference can apprehend it is yet to be proved. Scripture does apprehend it, but not as belonging to the world; further, it sublates any inferred absoluteness of the world. It is not as though Īśvara's immediate cognition of the world guarantees its reality; for His immediacy need be no more than that experienced by the juggler in respect of his tricks; knowing the illusory as illusory, He is not deluded.⁵

The next task attempted is the establishment of illusoriness by inference grounded on cognisability, inertness and finitude. The five definitions of illusoriness are mentioned and explained in much the same way as in the *Advaitasiddhi*.⁶ The discussion owes much to the *Tattvapradīpikā* and is much in the same style as the *Siddhi*.

The illusoriness of illusoriness is treated at some length. The sublator need not always be real, as, in the case of a rope, the snake-delusion is sublatable by a stick-delusion. The self too is the substrate of illusory illusoriness inasmuch as the Bauddhas and others have the delusion that it is illusory. But with this the self is not reduced to the same level as the world, since the reality of the former is due to self-hood and self-manifestation, not to sublated illusoriness. Illusoriness is on a par with knowability, etc., in its capacity to cover both itself and that of which it is predicated.. Illusoriness is part of the world; when the world is shown to be illusory because of cognisability, etc., illusoriness which is a part of the world is also shown to be illusory.

5. Cf. AS., p. 101.

6. AS., pp. 2-9.

The three *probans* — cognisability, inertness, and finitude — are examined in some detail. The discussion is not very different from that of the *Siddhi*. A point of some interest relates to yogic perception. The dualist is fond of exploiting this type of perception to cover cases of impossibility like the perception of the *tuccha*; our author is willing to concede this; yogins may perceive the *tuccha*, but they would perceive it as *tuccha*; i.e., as not practically efficient, unlike nacre-silver, etc.; in this there is no detriment of Advaita. It is true Chitsukhāchārya seems to deny yogic perception, but that is only an *abhyupetya-vāda*; for we must admit an omniscient Īśvara to whom everything is immediate.

The next section relates to the refutation of the allegation that the Advaitin's *probans* is affected by an adjunct. The matter covered is the same as that treated by the *Siddhi*, in the two sections on *sopādhikatva-bhaṅgaḥ* and *ābhāsa-sāmyabhaṅgaḥ*.⁷ The arguments are almost identical. Are these *probans* themselves illusory or not? If not, there is failure of non-dualism. If they too are illusory, how can they establish anything? This discussion covers the same ground as two sections of the *Siddhi*⁸ and employs nearly the same arguments.

The Advaitin seeks to strengthen his position by setting forth indirect arguments (*tarka*) in favour of the illusoriness of the world. One such argument is that if the world were independently real there would be no possibility of the cognition thereof, since no real relation is intelligible between knowledge on the one side and an inert reality standing over against it on the other. Our author is never tired of pointing out that Brahman's reality is self-manifest; it does not depend on the illusoriness or non-illusoriness of relation to anything else; and the illusoriness of the world follows not because its relation to knowledge is illusory, but because it is cognisable, inert, and so on. This is the basic ground. Hence it is that no parity can be made out between Brahman and the world even on the ground of indeterminability.

7. *As.*, pp. 19-20.

8. On *asatas sādhanakatvo-'papattiḥ* and *asatas sādhanakatvā-'bhāvaabādha-kam.*

The manifestation of particular objects at stated times and through specific means is held by the opponent to be a difficulty the Advaitin cannot lightly get over. The Advaitin replies that since self-manifest intelligence is beginninglessly obscured by nescience, whose existence is not inconsistent with *svarūpajñāna*, it is necessary for defined intelligence to go forth through sense-channels in the form of a long ray of light as it were, in order to pervade and take on the form of each object so that the ignorance enveloping it may be destroyed. Since the generation, going forth and pervasion of the psychosis is spatially and temporally determined, there may be *pratikarma-vyavasthā*. The position is not free from difficulties, but the *Mukura* successfully answers all the objections like the *Siddhi*. For a fuller discussion the author refers us to his *Vivaraṇaprakāśa*.

The pluralist too has recourse to *tarka* to disprove non-dualism. The consideration of the *pratikūla-tarkas* constitutes the next section. The *pūrvapakshin* also mentions conflict with scriptural texts about creation of the world, etc., by *Īśvara*. This is met, in the same way as in the *Siddhi*, by the analogy of the juggler, who resolves on and creates his magic world in a certain order and so on. The author of the *Mukura* brings in here a discussion of the relation of *Īśvara* and *jīva*, adopting the view of the first section of the *Pañchadaśī*, which treats both as reflections.

The final section of the first *pariccheda* is concerned with the refutation of the validity of perception, etc., in regard to absolute reality. Where there is perception of finites as real, it is the reality of Brahman that is manifest therein. Unsublatability in all three times cannot be known by perception which can tell us at best that sublation has not arisen so far, not that it does not exist. Practical efficiency, as has been often said, is no warrant for absolute reality, as even the rope-snake causes fear and trembling. The difference between the empirically real and the merely apparent consists in sublatability by Brahman-knowledge alone or anything short of that. We do not subscribe to the view that all scripture is superior to perception, but only that purportful scripture is so superior; purportfulness is determined by non-subsidiariness to any other purpose.

Though the manuscript is fragmentary and the present account is but a meagre outline, enough has been said, it is hoped, to show

the great interest of the work both from the historical and the doctrinal sides. It is not improbable that other fragments at least exist elsewhere. Though much of the dialectic survives in the monumental work of Madhusūdana, Raṅga Rāja's treatment has a directness and charm which make it worthy of being resuscitated and made better known. On the assumption that both derived from a common source of inspiration, the *Mukura* is likely to throw light on points that are obscure in the *Siddhi* despite Brahmanānda's voluminous comment. For this and other reasons, it is hoped that experts in the collection of manuscripts will bestir themselves to find a complete version of the *Advaitavidyāmukura*.

NRISIMHA BHATTOPADHYAYA*

by

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

M.A. (Madras), B.Sc., (Oxon), Bar-at-Law

Towards the close of the first chapter of the *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha*, its author, Appayya Dīkshita, devotes a considerable amount of space to the exposition of the view of a Kavitārkika-chakravartī Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya. Though the author's main purpose in that work is the statement of rival Advaita views and not any appraisal of these, yet he indicates, here and there, at least that amount of criticism of a doctrine, as is immanent in the formulation of a rival view. The exposition of the Chakravartī's views is remarkable not merely for its length, but also for the absence of any criticism thereof. One feels that the Dīkshita was probably in great sympathy with the doctrine expounded. This feeling is confirmed when one turns to the *Parimala* on the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, especially the position relating to such illusions as the yellowness of the shell and the bitterness of sugar. Here, the Dīkshita offers an interpretation of Vāchaspati, which, though quite consistent with what he says, is not quite clear from his own words or from those of his commentator, Amalānanda; and the words used by the Dīkshita, in his exposition, are practically those he puts in the mouth of the Chakravartī, in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*. Appayya Dīkshita's interest would warrant one in holding that the Chakravartī was an Advaitin of some eminence; and even a slight examination of his views, as set forth by the Dīkshita, confirms our impressions. It is all the more surprising that nothing more has come down to us about this Vedāntin, except the name and a second-hand exposition of his views.

An adaptation of the article 'A Little-known Advaitin', published in *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, University of Madras, 1961.

We shall now set forth the views of Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya as expounded in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*.

External sense-perception, for the Advaitin, consists in the intelligence that is specified by the internal organ flowing out through the sensory channel and taking on the form of the external object perceived. One of the many questions that arise in this connection is the need for this flowing out (*bahir-nirgamana*) of the psychosis (*vṛitti*). What exactly does it achieve? One answer is that it brings about the identification of the cognising intelligence with the object-intelligence or that it manifests the non-difference between the intelligence that perceives the object and the intelligence that is Brahman. Another answer is that the outgoing psychosis destroys the ignorance that envelops the object, and by thus removing the hindrance to knowledge brings about knowledge. This view has the merit of conforming to the general Advaita position that the function of psychosis is primarily negative, that knowledge is not produced so much as manifested by the removal of obstacles thereto. But it is not without its difficulties. One of these relates to a continuous stream of cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*) relating to one and the same object. Here, the first psychosis in the stream destroys the ignorance veiling the object. What about succeeding psychoses? What is there for them to destroy? If they do not destroy any ignorance, are they really psychoses at all? The discussion is of some interest and one answer goes so far as to say that the succeeding psychoses are not authoritative, relating as they do to what is already apprehended, and that, hence, the question is of little importance. With this difficulty we are not here directly concerned.

The problem of illusion, however, presents more serious trouble, for, it requires the co-operation of knowledge and ignorance. There can be no illusion except on a given substrate and this substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) must evidently be known. And the illusion itself is the product of ignorance; ignorance is its material cause (*upādāna*). If the act of cognition which makes us aware of the substrate destroys ignorance relating to the object, then there can be no cause for the illusion at all. If it does not destroy ignorance about the object, what else does it do? It may be possible to say that of the two aspects of an existent, existence and content, existence alone is apprehended by the first psychosis, and

that ignorance not being wholly dispelled, there is room for a second mental act which relates the *that* to a wrong *what*, superimposes an unsuitable content of the given substrate. The reply is not very satisfactory, for the question is as to what the ignorance relates to, in such a perception as 'this is silver', in the case of nacre. Does it relate to the this-ness of the confronting substance? If so, the psychosis does not dispel any ignorance. If not, and if the ignorance relates only to the content, the *what* of the perceived *that*, then the illusion should be of the form 'nacre is silver', not 'this is silver', as we find in experience. To get over this difficulty, a distinction is resorted to by some writers¹ between the substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the support (*ādhāra*) of the illusion, the latter appearing in the illusory cognition, not the former; in the cognition of nacre as silver, this-ness is the support and nacreity is the substrate, the latter being that to which the ignorance relates. The distinction is cumbrous and has little to recommend it. And greater plausibility attaches to the view of some others who resort to the well-known distinction between the obscuring and projecting powers of nescience and hold that though the psychosis relating to this does dispel ignorance in its obscuring aspect, ignorance continues to exist and function through its projecting aspect; hence the illusion.

Here steps in Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, saying that the whole question is misconceived, since there are not two psychoses at all, one relating to the *that* and another to the superimposition of an erroneous *what* on the *that*. What comes to us is essentially one cognition, relating to a *that* in conjunction with a *what*, not to the *that* alone or to the *what* alone. This is but reasonable, for we never cognise immediately the bare existence of anything. The knowledge of existence comes to us, if at all, only along with the knowledge, more or less determinate, of some property or properties. If the knowledge is very indeterminate, we have doubt; if it is determinate, but the properties are not really those of the object, there is illusion. The illusory experience is due to the contact of a defective sense with the object before us. What happens in such a case is that, because of the defect, the distinctive features of the object are not perceived and their place is taken by other properties supplied from memory. Thus, in the shell which

1. *Saṃkshēpa-śāstraka*.

is seen, but not as white, because of a defect in the sense of sight, yellowness is supplied from memory; so too, when the child finds its mother's milk to be bitter, the bitterness, though not previously experienced in this life, is supplied from the impressions of a former existence. The sense-element and the memory-element together constitute the object of a single act of cognition. That is why one says 'I see this to be silver',—'this sugar tastes bitter to me'. There is no such experience as that of the bare substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*), that being impossible in the case of the shell, for example, since the sense of sight which apprehends colour must apprehend the shell as possessing some colour or not at all. Nor is the *what* experienced immediately as such, as will be evident from such experiences as 'the lump of sugar tastes bitter.' The lump of sugar in so far as it is not experienced as sweet is the object of the tactile sense; the bitterness is a former taste-experience, which is synthesised with the present actually experienced sugar, in a single act of cognition. Nor does this view become indistinguishable from the view of the Naiyāyikas that what is perceived in error is what exists elsewhere; for, on their view, the illusory silver, being merely existent elsewhere, cannot be an object of immediate experience, whereas we do say that it is so experienced, not, however, as existing elsewhere, but as the content of the single psychosis produced simultaneously with it, by nescience, which is set in motion through the act of cognition. Again, in the experience of the shell as yellow, it is not the yellowness of the bile in the eye that is perceived; for, if that were the object of perception, neither the shell nor its relation would be the object of perception; and such a conclusion conflicts with experience. Nor does the yellowness go forth with the bile through rays from the eyes and envelop the object; for, once this is done, the shell should be perceived by all and sundry as yellow, as if it were gold-covered. The only hypothesis, then, which fits the perceptual nature of the superimposition and the non-perceptual nature of the *what* by itself would seem to be the recognition of a single psychosis embracing the perceived *that* and the remembered *what*. Any modern psychologist would recognize this synthesis of sensed and associated elements as characteristic of all perception. The only difference in the case of illusion would be that the functioning of the sense-organ is defective. Illusion is a defective variant of perception, not a correct perception of the *that*,

with an incorrect perception of the *that* and the *what* super-added to it.

It may be said that at least in those cases of illusion where similarity is the cause, as in nacre being mistaken for silver, the knowledge of the *that* is the cause of the illusion and must come before the illusion; for, knowledge of similarity presupposes knowledge of what are similar. The discussion of the whole question is interesting. The essence of the reply is that recognition of similarity is no part of super-imposition. A blue expanse of water is seen where there is but a sandy waste; water is super-imposed on sand and blueness is super-imposed on the water, which, if present, would be really colourless. There is no similarity which determines either of these super-impositions. Either the sense fails to perceive or the mind fails to attend to those details of the object which would clearly show it to be a sandy waste; and the blueness and wateriness of other experiences are cognized along with the *that* noted defectively by the sense of sight. So too, when nacre is mistaken for silver, all its properties except its glitter fail to be noted; and because of the glitter, silveriness is super-imposed thereon. What is called similarity and what determines the association with silveriness is really the partial identity with silver, in the matter of its glitter. Were the identity realized to be but partial, there would be but recognition of similarity, not super-imposition. A bar of steel lying in a treasury is thus mistaken for a bar of silver. Here, again, is a realization of the psychological truths that association is purposive and that association by similarity is in truth but a case of association by partial identity.

Vāchaspati Mīśra, in the *Bhāmatī*, seems to waver between two explanations of the experience of the yellowness in the shell. He mentions the yellowness of the bile which goes out through rays from the eyes; he mentions also the yellowness experienced on previous occasions in the heated ball of iron, etc. He leaves us in doubt whether the yellowness of prior experience is super-imposed or whether the identical reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the former experience of the yellow iron ball is super-imposed on the shell and the yellowness of present experience. The question in that context is whether there is any element of prior experience at all in the illusory cognition of the shell as yellow. So long as the identical reference at least comes from prior experi-

ence, the question is answered in the affirmative; and it need not be shown further that the yellowness itself comes from prior experience. But to treat the yellowness as present in the bile and cognized through that would lay the theory open to the criticism urged by the Chakravarti (whose criticism was probably directed against Vāchaspati himself). Appayya Dīkshita makes out, therefore, that criticism like that of the Chakravarti (whom he does not mention by name in the *Parimala*) may be directed against the Tārīkikas (who are *anyathākhyāti-vādins*) and not against Vāchaspati. For Vāchaspati, the yellowness too comes from prior experience, like that of the heated iron ball. The earlier commentator, Amalānanda, appears not to have noticed any such difficulty. Appayya Dīkshita's own interpretation of Vāchaspati's doctrine is not as satisfactory, as it is ingenious; for, if yellowness is not cognized from its presence in the bile, there is no reason for its being mentioned as present in the bile, which goes with the rays from the eyes. Even assuming that this was the view of the Tārīkikas, there was no need for Vāchaspati to mention it, except to approve or to condemn; and approval may not unreasonably be assumed, in the absence of condemnation.

On the assumption that Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya was criticising Vāchaspati, and that he was not noticed by Amalānanda, he should be assigned to some period between the latter and Appayya of Amalānanda. The present writer's attention has been drawn by Dīkshita. At the earliest, he might have been a contemporary his colleague, the Professor of Indian History, to two inscriptions² in a Viṣṇu temple at Śrī Kūrmam, Ganjam District. They commemorate the erection of a tower (*prāsāda*) and the gift of money for perpetually feeding a lamp, by the wife of one Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, a contemporary of King Anaṅga Bhīma and a famous performer of sacrifices (*sarva-kratu-suyājīn*). The date of the endowment for the lamp is Śāka 1205 (1283 A.D.). This is not an improbable date for our Kavītārīkika-chakravarti. In the absence of further details, it is not possible to be sure of the identification. It is to be hoped, however, that more details will be made available about one who made such significant and valuable contributions to Advaita thought.

2. Nos. 296 and 298 of 1896 from Śrī Kūrmam (Ganjam).

APPAYYA DIKSHITA

by

Y. MAHALINGA SASTRI

M.A. B.L.

Among the three great Draviḍa āchāryas who expounded the Advaita philosophy, the earliest is known only by quotations from his lost commentaries. The second was Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavat-pāda himself. Śrīmad Appayya Dīkshita was the third. He also forms another venerable trio along with ŚrīKaṇṭhāchārya and Haradattāchārya as an expositor of Śaivism. But the real mission of his life was the reconciliation of creeds, cults, and philosophies. He was a peace-maker who pleaded for harmony, tolerance and mutual goodwill and understanding. He was born in a very hot age of bigotry and vigorous proselytism. The fight was all about the Supreme God and the conception of Salvation. In actual life the warring sects were unified by an unquestioned allegiance to the śruti and the smṛiti. The sectarian disputes did not stop with the growth of polemical literature. Persecution of one sect by another with political backing was not of rare occurrence. The lives of the great leaders of either Śaivism or Vaiṣṇavism during the ten centuries from the 6th to the 16th, afford ample evidences of stormy times, when either of the creeds had to endure great hardships from the fury of the rival which for the nonce got the upper hand as the oppressor. Though the greatest saints did not discriminate between Śiva and Viṣṇu and declared them identical, the adherents of the creeds were mostly cantankerous and mistook acrimony for devotion. Waves of conversions rose and fell. It was Vaiṣṇavism that was aggressive in its proselytising tendencies, being impatient for universal expansion. South India was seized with one such fervour when Rāmarāya was regent of Sadāśiva, the nominal ruler of the Vijayanagar empire. Rāmarāya was completely under the influence of Śrī Tātāchārya, the Rājaguru. During his times and during the

times of the inheritors of the fragment of the empire after the battle of Talikota, mass conversions took place engineered by the Rājaguru under state patronage. Śrī Appayya Dīkshita in his *Nigrahāśṣṭakam* says that the leader of the Vaiṣṇavas had taken a resolute vow to stamp out Śaivism from the land. The *Prapannā-mṛitam*, a work of one Anantāchārya, which purports to record the history of Vaiṣṇavism and the lives of the āchāryas, refers to Śrī Appayya Dīkshita as living at Chidambaram, resplendent with fame and unassailable by controversialists, sectarian or philosophical, and proceeds to state that to refute his great works on Śivādvaita and Advaita Śrī Tātāchārya wrote a work called *Pañchamatabhañjanam* and Mahāchārya wrote a work called *Chaṇḍamārutam* and thus both of them defended the creed of Śrī Ramanuja against his attacks. This *Pañchamatabhañjana* Tātāchārya lived for about 75 years from 1508. He was not alive in 1585, for the ceremony of coronation of Venkatapati in 1585 was performed by his adopted son Lakshmīkumāra Tātāchārya who was at that time only fourteen years old. The elder Tātāchārya wielded influence in the court as Rājaguru during the reigns of Sadāśiva (1542—1567), Tirumala (1567—1574), and Śrī Raṅga (1574-1585). Śrī Appayya Dīkshita lived from 1520 to 1593 as will be shown below. He was younger to Tātāchārya by twelve years and outlived him by about ten years. Their lives ran together during the major part of the 16th century. During all the years of Śrī Tātāchārya's supremacy Śrī Appayya Dīkshita is not known to have had anything to do with the Vijayanagar Court. After 1585, when Venkatapati was reestablishing the glory of Vijayanagar and the younger Tātāchārya was the Rājaguru, Śrī Dīkshita was invited to the court and was held in great honour. During the thirty years after the middle of the 16th century, when the controversies raged high, Śrī Appayya Dīkshita enjoyed the patronage of Chinna Bomma Naik of Vellore, who soon after the battle of Talikota established himself as an independent monarch with considerably enhanced power and glory. Śrī Appayya Dīkshita lived the longest period under the patronage of Chinna Bomma, as his own literary references show. Śrī Dīkshita wrote not less than a dozen works on Śaivism during the period, of which the *Śivārkamaṇi-dīpikā* is his magnum opus, comparable in bulk and importance with his *Parimala*. Both are commentaries interpreting the *Brahmasūtra* of Vyāsa. *Parimala* aligns itself to the

Advaitic interpretation and the *Sivārkamaṇi-dīpikā* expounds the Śivādvaita philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭhāchārya. On the completion of this monumental work Śrī Appayya Dīkshita was bathed in gold by King Chinna Bomma. This significant event is referred to in the works of some contemporary poets and also in the Adaya-palam inscription dated 1582 A.D. From the inscription we learn that Chinna Bomma made endowments for the maintenance of a college of 500 scholars who studied *Sivārkamaṇi-dīpikā* under Śrī Dīkshita himself thus equipping themselves for the Śaivite propaganda work which had been organised with a view to stemming the tide of Vaiṣṇavite attacks and encroachments. Śrī Appayya Dīkshita was thus the guiding spirit of a great movement in which he banked upon the services of a large band of trained volunteers who could disseminate among the masses the philosophy and worship which gave supremacy to Śiva, in the face of Vaiṣṇavite onslaughts against it. He threw himself heart and soul into the mission for several years together in the prime of his life often facing occasions of grave personal danger, with undaunted courage and faith. He preached, organised and wrote incessantly, enlisted the cooperation of enlightened monarchs, undertook frequent travels and challenged his adversaries to stand their ground in open disputation. He brought to bear on his wide-spread activities his resourceful and versatile personality and tried his best to constitute an atmosphere of spiritual tolerance and goodwill in the place of the prevailing antipathies and narrow-mindedness. The *Nigrahāśṭaka* is a thrilling piece of passionate poetry gushing out of his heart charged with desperate courage and faith, in an extremely critical situation of belligerency with his religious adversary.

Śrī Dīkshita thoroughly investigated the Vedas, Āgamas and the Purāṇas and brought together authoritative statements which dealt with Śiva's supremacy in the trinity. He composed very charming works dealing with the glories of Śiva and his worship and wrote his own commentaries on them. His *Śikharīṇīmālā* and *Śivatattvaviveka*, his *Śivakarṇāmṛita*, his *Rāmāyaṇa-tātparyasaṁgraha*, *Bhārata-tātparyasaṁgraha* and *Brahmatarkastava*, his *Śivamahimakalikāstuti* and *Śivādvaitanirṇaya*, belonged to this category. Śrī Dīkshita relied to a large extent on the Purāṇic lore for supporting his conclusions conducing to the harmony of the sects and consolidation of a synthesis. He linked the Purāṇic teachings with the Upanishadic thought and proved

them identical. He did all this without resorting to strained subtleties of argument and without displaying the heat of controversial temper, but in a spirit of calm and dispassionate search for truth. The *Śivarahasya* refers to Śrī Dīkshita's historic mission as the resuscitator of *Śaivaśāstra* when it shall become practically extinct on earth, in these words "*śaivaśāstram tadā bhūmau luptam vistarayishyati*". It is no wonder that Śrī Dīkshita is known as *Śrīkaṇṭhamatapatishṭhāpanāchārya*.

After writing all these works which are partial to Śiva, Śrī Appayya Dīkshita declared with a ring of genuine regret that he was obliged by the circumstances of the times to plunge into prolonged sectarian controversies with the Vaishṇavas, while, left to himself, he would have been quite happy to have remained a steady exponent of Advaitic philosophy all through. His verse uttered in this mood can thus be translated—"whether it is Viṣṇu or Śiva who is the supreme deity spoken of by the Upanishads, etc., we are not very much worried about, because we are definitely committed to Advaitism. But it is impossible for one like me to keep quiet when men with perverted minds proclaim in abusive language their hatred toward Śiva—a hatred which consumes their hearts like a conflagration. To refute their offensive presumptions, I had to take up cudgels against them. But this does not in the least mean that I am not a devotee of Viṣṇu".

Śrī Dīkshita's impartiality is borne out by many facts. He was a great admirer of Śrī Vedānta Deśika. He wrote a commentary on the *Yādavābhyudaya*—the only commentary so far known and published. He is said to have written a commentary on *Pudukāśahasra* also. His hymn in praise of Varadarāja is well known. In the *Kuvalayānanda* he invokes the blessings of Mukunda at the commencement of the work. When Rāmarāya at the instance of Doddāchārya restored the worship of Govindarāja in the Chidambaram temple of Naṭarāja, Śrī Dīkshita welcomed with all his heart the event and wrote his *Hari-hara-stuti* in commemoration of it. The verses, by the alternating epithets definitely manipulated, suggest *Hari-hara-abheda*. In his *Ratnatrayaparīkshā*, he conceded Brahmatva to Viṣṇu also along with Īśvara and Ambikā, while it is well known that the other sects place Śiva only in the jīvakoti. In this work, he supports his stand by ample quotations from the Purāṇas—the *Kūrmapurāṇa* being not the least of them. His Viṣṇu-Gaurī synthesis was not an ingenious invention of his. He

claims for it the undoubted authority of antiquity and the sanction of all the sacred lore.

Even in philosophical speculations he did not think that the rival interpretations were entirely in the wrong, for he declares—*na sūtrāṇāmarthāntaramapi bhavadvāryamuchitam*.—(who can prevent different interpretations when the Sūtras are capable of yielding different meanings). Such was his tolerance in religious beliefs and such his ardent desire for the reconciliation of philosophic thoughts. He wrote the *Chaturmatasāra* to elucidate the philosophical thought respectively of the four prominent schools of interpreters of the Vyāsa-sūtras. The *Nayamañjarī* deals with Advaita; the *Nayamañimālā* with Śrīkaṇṭhamata, the *Nayamayūkhamālikā* with Rāmānuja's philosophy and the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* with Madhva's philosophy. His remarkable catholicity of outlook and thoroughness of method, his impartiality and absence of prejudice, his unerring sense of values and not the least of all, his earnest search for the truth, shorn of all bias or petty-fogging, are all evident in these writings—so much so, the Vaishnavas have adopted the *Nayamayūkhamālikā* as a manual for their reverent study, and the Mādhyas, the *Nyāyamuktāvalī*. From the heights of his philosophic enlightenment, Śrī Dikshita saw in the different methods of approach elements lending themselves to a reconciliation and not to mutual exclusiveness and hostility.

After he had done his best to settle the sectarian disputes, Śrī Appayya Dīkshita turned to writing works for the elucidation and uplift of Advaita philosophy. His greatest and most memorable work in this line is the *Parimala*, commentary on the *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda. *Kalpataru* is itself a commentary on Vāchaspatimiśra's *Bhāmatī*. *Bhāmatī* is a gloss on the Bhāshya of Śrī Śaṅkara. These four commentaries along with the original *Brahmasūtra* constitute the *Vedānta Pañchagranthi*, a formidable fortress of Advaita philosophy. Śrī Dīkshita was induced to write this commentary by Śrī Nṛsiṃhāśrama an esteemed elderly contemporary, himself an author of several works on Advaita. This celebrated work earned for Śrī Dīkshita the title of *Advaitasthāpanāchārya*. His *Nyāyarakshāmaṇi* and *Siddhāntakeśasaṃgraha* are very popular Vedāntic texts studied by students of Vedānta invariably. He enshrines in them rare concepts and comments in Advaita which he had learnt from his revered father.

Śrī Dīkshita's name and fame can rest for ever on any one of his works, but his writings are innumerable. He had been described as the author of one hundred and four works—*Chaturadhika-śataprabandhakartā*. Though many of his writings have not been recovered, the more important of them have been preserved to us and the majority of the survivors have been brought out in print, in grantha, Nāgari and Telugu characters.

Special mention must be made of Śrī Dīkshita's contribution to the growth of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra. Khaṇḍadeva the founder of the modern school of Mīmāṃsā wrote his *Kaustubha* a few decades after the life of Śrī Appayya Dīkshita. He reverentially refers to Śrī Dīkshita as Mīmāṃsakamūrdhanya, the most authoritative among the writers on Mīmāṃsā. The *Vidhirasāyana* and the *Kuvalayānanda* take us to the last patron of Śrī Appayya Dīkshita, Venkaṭapati-devarāya of Penukonda who ascended the throne of the Vijayanagar empire in 1585. Śrī Dīkshita wrote both these works at the instance of Venkaṭapati whom he refers to in highly eulogical terms. In the *Vidhirasāyana* Śrī Dīkshita clearly indicates that his life's work has been done and nothing more remains for him to be desired and that still he kept contact with courts of kings not for any benefit for himself, but for promoting the interests of others deserving his help. The chief among those whom he introduced to Venkaṭapati for patronage was Śrī Bhaṭṭoji Dīkshita. Bhaṭṭoji, the author of *Siddhāntakaumudī*, came to the south to study Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā under Śrī Dīkshita whose immortal works had already spread his fame in the north.

A very interesting story is told about the first meeting of Bhaṭṭoji with Śrī Dīkshita. Śrī Dīkshita was in musty clothes, looked very poor, and lived in an unostentatious house in his village. Bhaṭṭoji could not believe that he was the far famed Appayya Dīkshita before whom mighty monarchs bowed, who was the teacher of thousands of pupils and an author of a hundred works. But when the conversation proceeded he found that he was before the great man who was not only the unrivalled master of all the Śāstras but the maker of new pathways in all the Śāstras. This anecdote shows that Śrī Appayya Dīkshita remained practically poor in the midst of competing royal patronage. Bhaṭṭoji remained for some years in the south. He wrote *Tattvakaustubha* at the instance of Venkaṭapati and as a commemoration of his discipleship under Śrī Appayya Dīkshita.

There was no branch of knowledge including literary criticism and lexicon to which Śrī Dīkshita did not make valuable contributions. His *Kuvalayānanda* and *Chitramīmāṃsā* are the favourite texts of the students of *Alaṅkāra Śāstra*. Not less than fifty of his works are current, and it is a good fortune that almost all of his magnificent writings are not only in print but are ardently studied even today by pandits aspiring for eminence.

Śrī Dīkshita was not only a great śāstraic scholar, but also a poet of a very high order. His poetic style is elegant and charming, and his mastery of the verse form is wonderful. His expression is simple, natural and flowing. Great mystic efficacy is attached to his *Durgā-chandra-kalā-stuti* and *Ādityastavaratna*. His *Varadarājastava* scintillates with gems of *Alaṅkāras* and his gloss over it deserves to be classed as *Alaṅkāraśāstra*. There is an interesting story about his *Ātmārpaṇastuti*. It bears the alternative name of *Unmattapañchāśat*, which means, "Fifty verses composed during a state of madness". It is said that Śrī Dīkshita wanted to make self-examination of his sincerity and depth of devotion to God. He contrived to enter into an inebriate state by drinking a cup of the dhattūra juice, after instructing his disciples to observe his behaviour and write down his utterances under the influence of intoxication. His utterances took the form of a devotional outpouring in which he made self-surrender to God Almighty, describing his woes as one subject to the ills of mundane life and praying for the final release from the bonds of *Samsāra*.

His *Apīta-kuchāmbā-stava* is hallowed by a tradition. It relieved him of a fever which he caught during a tour to Tiruvannamalai. The *Hariharastuti* has a historical significance as already stated. The *Śivamahimakalikāstuti* incorporates *Mīmāṃsānyāyas* in a string of devotional verses. Mannargudi Raju Sastrigal has provided it with an erudite commentary explaining the *Mīmāṃsānyāyas*. The *Mānasollāsa* is a caution addressed in dejection and despair to one's own mind importuning it to make the best use of the birth as human being for the realisation of the true goal of life. His *Mārgabandhustotra* is a popular prayer for safety during journeys as his *Ādityastavaratna* is for health.

Śrī Dīkshita spent his last days at Chidambaram. Living at some suburban village, he came every day for Naṭarāja's darśana. He was running his seventy third year when he left the mortal

coil. A story is current handed over by tradition among the Dīkshitas of the temple of Naṭarāja, that one day Śrī Appayya Dīkshita was seen to pass over the Pañchākshara steps rather unusually and to the wonder of the spectators, to vanish into the image of Śrī Naṭarāja; and lo! the news was soon abroad that Śrī Dīkshita had passed away at his residence. Śrī Dīkshita's birth was due to the grace of Naṭarāja; and he, when leaving the earth, became one with Naṭarāja. The last words of Śrī Dīkshita are remembered in the form of a verse. "I am happy to die at Chidambaram which is a most holy place. My sons are learned and cultured. They have done some scholarly work. I am full of years and have no desires to be fulfilled. My only wish is to reach the lotus feet of Śiva." Immediately the vision of the ruddy light of the raised foot of Naṭarāja dancing in the golden hall rose before his mental eye and while he described the wonder with gushing joy in a half verse his eyes closed. His sons completed the unfinished verse declaring that the great soul reached the final beatitude at the conclusion of the teeming darkness of the night of Samsāra infested with frightful nightmares.

Śrī Dīkshita was held in high esteem and reverential awe even by his religious adversaries. There are contemporary references to him in the writings and utterances of Śrī Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkshita, Chinna Appayya Dīkshita, Samarapuṅgava Dīkshita, Guru Rāma Kavi, Bālakavi, Rājanātha Dīṇḍima Sārvabhaumakavi and others, and in the Adayapalam inscription. He was regarded even in his times as an Avatārapurusha. Legends grew around his life and they are preserved in Śrī Śivānandayati's *Dīkshitendra-vijayam*, a Champu Kāvya written in the later half of the 19th century.

Mannargudi Raju Sastrigal's *Chatuṣślokī-vyākhyā* has preserved a quotation from a lost biography of Śrī Dīkshita, giving the clue to his date. It is a tag of a verse and runs thus:

*vikrame bhūtaḥ prāpya
vijaye svargamāyayuh.*

Vikrama to Vijaya in the 16th century is 1520 A.D. to 1593 A.D. That Śrī Dīkshita lived full 72 years is clearly declared by Śrī Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkshita.

*dvāsapatatiṁ prāpya samāḥ prabandhān
śataṁ vyadhād appayya dīkshitendrāḥ.*

If we take his royal patrons chronologically they cover the same period of the 16th century A.D. His first patron Chinna Timma was the Viceroy of the Vijayanagar Empire in the south having sway over Tanjore, Madura, and Travancore, with his head-quarters at Trichinopoly, till about 1550. Śrī Dikshita according to his own statement wrote the commentary on the *Yādarābhyudaya* at Chinna Timma's instance. The second patron of his, Chinna Bomma, ruled at Vellore from about 1549 to about 1578. He is mentioned by Śrī Dikshita in more than one of his writings. The third and the last patron of his was Venkaṭapati of Pennugonda who began to rule from 1585. Śrī Dikshita refers to Venkaṭapati in his *Vidhirasāyana* and *Kuvalayānanda*. The Adayapalam inscription of 1582 refers to him as an author of a hundred works. Of his contemporary religious adversaries Tātāchārya lived from 1508 to about 1583. Vijayindra Bhikshu entered Samādhi in 1595 after a long life. His first patron was Chevappa of Tanjore and the last patron Venkaṭapati of Pennugonda. Vijayindra wrote one hundred and four works to rival Śrī Appayya Dikshita's one hundred and four works. He should have been an younger contemporary of Śrī Dikshita. Vijayindra was one of the greatest religious personalities of the age. It is said that he and Śrī Appayya Dikshita were intimate friends in spite of their academic rivalries. Śrī Vādirāja a co-pupil of Vijayindra and head of one of the Udipi mutis who lived from 1480 to 1600 also wrote works defending Dvaita against the attack of Śrī Appayya Dikshita.

Bhaṭṭoji the disciple of Śeṣha Kṛishṇa was a very much younger contemporary and disciple of Śrī Dikshita. The story about Śrī Dikshita meeting poet Jagannātha at Banares is untrue and unhistorical. Jagannātha came a century after Śrī Dikshita.

Śrī Śivānanda unconsciously gives us a clue to the true date of Śrī Dikshita. He says that Śrī Kṛishṇadevarāya and Āchārya Dikshita died in the same year 1529 and that when his grandfather died Śrī Dikshita was nine years old. He was evidently quoting these dates from a lost biography or a tradition based upon it, but the historical significance of the date escaped his notice.

MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI

by

V. RAJAGOPALAN

M.A.

vaṁśvibhūshitakarānnavanīradābhāt
pītāmbarādaruṇabimbaphalādharoshṭhāt
pūrṇendusundaramukhādaravindanetrāt
kṛishṇātparam kimapi tattvamaham na jāne

How can an ardent follower of Śaṅkarāchārya who believed and proclaimed that there is only one ultimate reality, that is, the nirguṇa Brahman, which is devoid of any attribute, be also an ardent devotee of Śrī Kṛishṇa? To many, it is a wonder as to how the learned monk, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who established the supremacy of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara by writing one of the accepted masterpieces of the Vedānta philosophy, the *Advaita-siddhi*, for refuting the objections raised against Advaita by Vyāsātīrtha, a follower of the dualistic school of Madhva, can proclaim Lord Kṛishṇa as the ultimate reality, or in other words, that there is no other ultimate reality except Śrī Kṛishṇa. A number of such doubts may arise in the minds of the readers of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's works. The path of knowledge or jñānamārga has been accepted to be the only direct path leading to salvation by the sage Bādarāyaṇa and his large followers of the Advaita school beginning with Āchārya Śaṅkara, who revealed the identity of the individual soul with the supreme Self by properly explaining the correct meaning of the scriptural texts which appear to be mutually contradictory. All the Advaitins have accepted that the ultimate Reality is nirguṇa or attributeless. But Madhusūdana considered Śrī Kṛishṇa as the Ultimate Reality and as the incarnation of the nirguṇa Brahman. Can any one by any stretch of imagination consider Śrī Kṛishṇa to be nirguṇa or attributeless? Has Madhusūdana given up the path of knowledge and become the advocate or the follower of the bhaktimārga or

the path of devotion? Or, should we take it that he was the follower of the bhaktimārga preached in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* till he became the follower of Śaṅkara's Advaita school later in life when he could have probably been very enthusiastic to establish the supremacy of the Advaita school by producing the most popular works like *Siddhāntabindu*, *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, *Advaita-siddhi*, and *Advaitaratnarakṣhaṇa*. There is no evidence for such a change in the meagre sketch of the life of Madhusūdana available to us in the introductions of his various works published so far. All that we come to know about him from these prefaces is that he took to sannyāsa very early in his life, and that he was ordained to sannyāsa by Viśveśvarānanda Sarasvatī. But in some of his works he has mentioned two others, namely, Śrī Rāma and Mādhava as his gurus:

*srīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām
pranamyā pādāmbhujapūṇyapāṁśūn
teshām prabhāvād ahamasmi योग्याḥ
śilāpi chaitanyam alabdha yebhyaḥ.*

*śrīmādhavasarasvatyo jayanti yaminām varāḥ
vayam teshām prasādena śāstrārthe parinishṭhitāḥ*

It is also said that his name was Kamalajanayana in the pūrvāśrama and that he was a native of Bengal. From his works we cannot say with any degree of certainty where he was born or by which name he was called before becoming a sannyāsin. His commentators like Brahmānanda also have not given us any hint to ascertain the native place of Madhusūdana. In the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, Madhusūdana has mentioned the name of a deity, nīlāchalanāyaka, the lord of the blue mountain.

*"aupaniśadāstu bhagavatā nīlāchalanāyakena
nārāyaṇenānugrihitāḥ"*¹

Arbitrarily many north Indian scholars have not only identified the nīlāchalanātha, the lord of the blue mountain with Lord Jagannātha of Puri, but also Madhusūdana as a resident of Puri. But a few scholars of Kerala consider that nīlāchalanātha can be more appropriately identified with Lord Kṛishṇa at Guruvāyūr (Guruvāyupuram) or with the Lord Kṛishṇa at Uḍipi where the

1. *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts, No. 3, p. 6.

deity in the temple is in the form of Bālakṛishṇa. Madhusūdana was an ardent devotee of Śrī Kṛishṇa and he had a very great fascination for Bālakṛishṇa and this is evident from a number of devotional verses composed by him in his works, *Gūḍārtha-dīpikā*, *Samkshepaśārīrakaṭikā*, *Bhaktirasāyana*, etc. From a study of his works, it is very clear that Madhusūdana was a very great devotee of Śrī Kṛishṇa and that he was more attracted by the *bālātra* aspect of Lord Kṛishṇa which is vividly described in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* to which he attached the same importance as to the three prasthānas. His fervent devotion for Kṛishṇa was so much as to make him believe that Pushpadanta's *Śivamahimna-stotra* or *Mahimna-stotra* as it is more popularly known is praising both Śiva and Kṛishṇa and induced him to write a commentary on the *Mahimnastotra* called *Mahimnastotraṭikā* with great skill.

*bhūtībhūshitadehāya dvijarājena rājate
ekātmane namo nityam haraye cha harāya cha.*²

While commenting on śloka 2, he states:

*'navajaladharaśyāmadhāmani śrīvighrahe
vaikunṭhavartini veṇuvādanādivividhavihāra-
parāyaṇe gopakiśore vā brindāvanavartini
kasya manaḥ nāpatati.'*

In this he has explicitly mentioned his great fascination for Kṛishṇa as a child. Only in Guruvāyūr and Uḍipi, Kṛishṇa is worshipped as a child. There is also every probability of Madhusūdana being either a native or a resident of Guruvāyur in Kerala or Uḍipi in South Canara. He wanted to attack the Dvaita school and establish the supremacy of the Advaita school. Unless he studied the works of Madhvāchārya and his followers who attacked the Advaita school, it could not be possible for him to refute their arguments. And it is more likely that to get access to the works of the Dvaita school, Madhusūdana must have taken pains to go to Uḍipi, where Madhvāchārya and his disciples in the different mutts were flourishing. At Uḍipi he might have been attracted by the beautiful idol of Bālakṛishṇa, installed by Śrī Madhvāchārya, or perhaps he could have taken a pilgrimage to Kālaḍi the birth place of Ādi Śaṅkara and remained there visiting the surround-

2. *Mahimnastotraṭikā*.

ing holy places. The Lord of Guruvāyūr could have fascinated him. Even now there are a number of Brahmin families in Cochin area, near Kālaḍi, called Gauḍa Sārasvata Brahmins. They have settled in Kerala for a number of generations. There is a tradition amongst them that they have migrated to Kerala from Gauḍa Deśa and that they belong to the Sārasvata community or the Brahman community, which was in charge of imbibing and imparting knowledge in ancient India. Madhusūdana and his disciple Gauḍa Brahmānanda too could have belonged to this community which migrated to Kerala and lived there.

In ancient India only Sannyāsins were considered to be qualified to study the Vedānta. But even in those days non-sannyāsins like Śrī-Harsha, the author of *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* and Vāchaspatimiśra, the author of *Bhāmatī*, did not only study the Vedānta, but also contributed to the sum total of knowledge by writing works on Advaita Vedānta. Renunciation, if at all, was resorted to only during the last days. It will not be incorrect to presume that Madhusūdana was an ardent devotee of Kṛishṇa following the bhaktimārga preached in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, and mastered the Vedānta, both the Advaita and its opponent schools afterwards. He was so much saturated with Kṛishṇabhakti that he identified the nirguṇa Brahman with the incarnation of Kṛishṇa. According to him there is nothing incompatible between the attributeless monism of Śaṅkara and the ardent devotion of Kṛishṇa who is no other than the Supreme Being Itself. He has synthesised the bhakti school and the path of knowledge and thus inculcated a new line of thought or approach in the Advaita school. Saguṇabrahmopāsanā or meditation on the Supreme Being with attributes has been prescribed by the Advaitins as a preliminary step for self-realisation. Śaṅkarāchārya himself composed a number of devotional hymns, though he considered and established the Supreme Being as devoid of attributes. His successors adorning the five mutts established by him in the different parts of India, are performing daily pūjā to the Lord Chandramāulīśvara and the goddess Tripurasundarī. All the sannyāsins, many of whom are released and yet alive (jīvan-muktas) are uttering the name of Śrī Nārāyaṇa. So there is absolutely no contradiction in being a devotee and at the same time a follower of the path of knowledge to realise the Supreme Being as identical with the self.

Madhusūdana's ardent devotion for Śrī Kṛishṇa was not at all affected by his belief that Brahman which itself took incarnations did so through *māyā*. The incarnations were those of the nirguṇa Brahman itself, but they were all unreal. Madhusūdana criticised all those who held the view that Brahman is eternal and yet assumes real incarnations, as unreasonable and groundless. He fully concurred with Śaṅkara's conception of jagat, jīvātmā and Paramātmā and also the path of knowledge as directly leading to 'moksha'. In the synthesis of bhaktimārga and the path of knowledge he followed the famous Sarvajñātmamuni, the author of *Saṅkshhepaśārīraka* who has offered salutation to nirguṇa Brahman called Murāri in the very first verse of his work which is a summary, in verses, of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra-bhāshya*.³ So nirguṇa-bhaktimārga cannot be called a new innovation of Madhusūdana.

There seems to be some apparent contradiction in his works about the path of devotion and the path of knowledge as means to *moksha*. In his *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, a commentary on Śaṅkara's bhāshya on the *Bhagavadgītā*, he believes the main teaching of the *Gītā* to be that nirguṇa Brahman could also be attained through loving devotion to the Lord. It is also supported by his *Bhaktirasāyana* which propounds that both bhakti and jñāna are the means to *moksha*, but both differ as regards their nature, their means, their goal, and the persons entitled to both (*adhīkārins*).

Bhakti is of the nature of a conditional modification of the mind experiencing beatification, while Brahmavidyā is of the nature of a conditionless modification of the inflexible mind illumined by the secondless Ātman. The means of bhakti is the hearing of the innumerable merits of the worshipful, while that of Brahmajñāna is the mahāvākyas like *tat tvam asi*. Their fruits are respectively intense love for God and the disappearance of ignorance which is the prime cause of all evils. All beings are eligible for bhakti, but only sannyāsins having the four-fold aid are fit for Brahmavidyā. But the bliss of bhakti is not the same or similar to svarga which is to be enjoyed in a particular place at a particular time and by a particular body. But like Brahmavidyā, it is enjoyable in all places at all times and

3. *murāreḥ paramapadam pranayādabhīṣṭavīmī*.

by all bodies. In his *Bhaktirasāyana*, devotion is mentioned as superior, because it accelerates the realisation of the truth more quickly than jñāna and that there is no difference in the conception of *moksha* achieved through either. According to him, the knowledge of Brahman is as essential for a devotee as it is for pursuing the path of knowledge. But the devotion helps one in securing the grace of the Lord by which the scriptures are revealed to him at the end of the *yuga* while he stays in the *Brahmaloka* after death and when the knowledge is thus obtained, he becomes one with Brahman along with Hiranyagarbha. Another benefit which one gets by the grace of God is that he is freed from undergoing the punishment for his sins without performing any propitiatory rites. To Madhusūdana, all beings including beast and birds are entitled to bhakti, but only the sannyāsins having the four-fold aid are fit for jñānamārga. He also considered bhakti as one of the aims of life, bhakti for bhakti's sake which is identical with Brahmānanda. In his *Bhaktirasāyana* he quotes the śloka from the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* that even sages who enjoy Brahmānanda and who are far from the shackles of saṁsāra dedicate themselves spontaneously to Viṣṇu without any aim or purpose. Or in other words even jīvanmuktas are devoted to God. He thus establishes bhakti as the highest goal of human life. So the path of devotion is prescribed for all by Madhusūdana, while the path of knowledge is restricted to sannyāsins. He is emphatically of the view that only by getting the knowledge of Brahman, either by being taught by the teacher who is a sannyāsin or by getting the revelation of knowledge along with the creator, one can get *moksha*.

About the date of Madhusūdana there are different opinions. Professor Burnouf and Professor Lassen assigned Madhusūdana to the middle of the 14th century A.D. But Mr. Telang holds the view that he must have flourished about the end of the 15th century or the beginning of the 16th century. For Madhusūdana has quoted a number of passages from Vidyāraṇya's *Pañchadaśī* and *Jīvanmuktiviveka*. Professor Winternitz also fixes his date as the beginning of the 16th century. In the life of Vallabhāchārya it is mentioned that once Śrī Vallabhāchārya went from Vāraṇasī to Prayāg where he stayed for a number of days performing the pārayāṇam of the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and there he happened to meet a very learned sannyāsin named Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who was not only an advocate of *māyāvāda* but also an ardent devotee of Śrī Kṛishṇa

and who showed him his work called *Bhaktirasayana* and his commentary on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the Gītā. Impressed by the great qualities of Madhusūdana, he entrusted his son Viṭṭhalnāth to the care of Madhusūdana for studying the various śāstras. Viṭṭhalnāth was born in samvat 1572 or 1516 A.D. So the date of Madhusūdana can be fixed as the beginning of the 16th century. But there is a tradition that Madhusūdana wrote a commentary on the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* of Appayya Dīkshita. It is conflicting with the fact that one of the students of Madhusūdana named Śeshagovinda was the guru of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkshita who studied Vedānta from Appayya Dīkshita. Śeshagovinda refers to Madhusūdana as follows:

*Yatprasādādhīnasiddhipurushārthachatusṭayam
sarasvatyavatāram tam vande śrīmadhusūdanam.*

Śeshagovinda and Appayya Dīkshita must have been contemporaries and Madhusūdana was senior to Appayya Dīkshita. Moreover, no such commentary of *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* attributed to Madhusūdana has come to light though mentioned by one or two collectors of manuscripts. There is also another tradition that Gadādhara, the famous Naiyāyika was a contemporary of Madhusūdana:

*navadvīpe samāyate madhusūdana vākpatau
chakampe tarkavīgīṣaḥ kātaro'bhūt gadādharaḥ.*

Gauḍa Brahmānanda who wrote a commentary called *Chandrikā* on the *Advaita-siddhi* of Madhusūdana was considered to be a co-student of Gadādhara. So Madhusūdana must have been an elder contemporary of the famous logician Gadādhara. All these evidences clearly establish that Madhusūdana must have flourished in the beginning of the 16th century.

Madhusūdana wrote a number of works on bhaktimārga and also on the Advaita Vedānta as propounded by Śaṅkara. His works are *Ānandamandākinī*, *Bhaktirasāyana*, *Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa*, *Mahimnastotra-vyākhyā*, *Harilīlā-vyākhyā*, *Bhāgavataprathamāślokatīkā*, *Vedāntakalpātīkā*, *Siddhāntabindu*, *Samkshepasūriraka-vyākhyā*, *Gūḍārthadīpikā*, *Advaita-siddhi* and *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*. There were also some others having the name of Madhusūdana who were the authors of works like *Anyāpadeśasatakam* and a commentary on *Mahānōṭaka*, but one can easily find out the

difference between the works of Madhusūdana who is a Vedāntin and others bearing the name of Madhusūdana.

Ānandamanāḥṛinī is an original poem of more than one hundred ślokas in praise of Lord Kṛishṇa. This work was his maiden attempt. One can easily appreciate the fervent devotion of the author to Śrī Kṛishṇa. His *Vedāntakāṇḍikā* is a small treatise on the Advaita Vedānta. He has discussed the nature of the Absolute, refuted the conception of liberation according to other schools, explained how the *avidyā* ceases to exist by the direct apprehension of Brahman arising out of hearing the mahāvākyas and ultimately explained the concept of *moksha* according to Advaita. The *Siddhāntabindu* is a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Daśaślokī* and is written by him for the benefit of his pupil Balabhadra. In this work, he has refuted the views of other schools, established the views of the Advaita school and has also presented the views of the various Advaitic āchāryas on important concepts of Advaita without going into details. His commentary on the *Saṅkshhepaśārīraka* is known as *Saṅkshhepaśārīrakasūrasaṁgraham*. Madhusūdana has expressed his views on the Brahmasūtras by commenting upon Sarvajñātmamuni's *Saṅkshhepaśārīraka* which is a brief but lucid commentary in verse on Śaṅkara bhāshya on the *Vedānta-sūtras*. *Advaita-siddhi* is his masterpiece. This work was written mainly to refute the charges raised against Advaita by Vyāsātīrtha. *Gūḍārthadīpikā* is a commentary on Śaṅkara's bhāshya on the *Ehagavadgītā* upholding Śaṅkara's interpretation but in some places deviating while advocating the path of devotion taught in the second six chapters. Bhakti and jñāna are the two banks of the river of Gītā according to him. His last work is *Advaita-ratna-rakshaṇa* where he has answered the unjust attacks of the Naiyāyikas and followers of Dvaita school in a vehement manner at times in abusive words. *Bhaktīrasāyana* is a great treatise on bhakti. *Mahimnastotraṭīkā* and *Harilīlā-vyākhyā* are commentaries on Pushpadanta's *Śivamahimnastotra* and Bopadeva's *Harilīlā* respectively for proclaiming the wonderful qualities of Śrī Kṛishṇa. He has exhibited his great skill by interpreting the ślokas in praise of Śiva as praising Lord Kṛishṇa.

In the firmament of Advaita philosophy getting light only from Śaṅkara who was resplendent like the sun, Madhusūdana shone like the moon excelling all the other philosophic stars and enlightening the people with ambrosial teachings worthy of his name.

DHARMARAJADHVARIN

by

P. NAGARAJA RAO

M.A., D.LITT.

In the great line of post Śaṅkara Advaita thinkers Dharmarāja has a definite and important place and his contribution to the aids for rational understanding of Advaita is considerable and significant. He is assigned to the 17th century A.D. He belongs to the village Kaṇḍramānikkam of the Tanjore district in South India. Dharmarāja was a great scholar of Nyāya and Vedānta and enjoyed great reputation as a scholar who wrote a number of works some of which have not yet been traced. His works include a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvachintāmaṇi*. His greatest work is the epistemological manual of Advaita called *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. His work has been the gateway for understanding the essentials of Advaita-Vedānta, from the point of view of epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*). His work is an excellent account of Advaita, under two heads, theory of knowledge and ontology. He develops the theory of knowledge portion in seven chapters and in the last two chapters he describes the ontological categories.

Dharmarāja's work has brought to the forefront the fact ignored by many that Advaita is not based on mere facile intuition founded on scriptural declarations. It is a system of thought that can be logically sustained and interpreted so as to secure, intelligibility to the reader. The pre-occupation of Indian thinkers with the concept of *moksha* has kept away from the view of many, rich logical material of the system. A study of the logical treatises of the system is not only capable of regaling the most ardent lover of metaphysics but also on occasions baffles the expert. The logical approach does not lead to any other end. Śrī Śaṅkara raises the question "whether Advaita can be established only by scriptural evidence or whether it can be proved by reasoning as well". He writes, 'How it is possible to prove the validity of Advaita by

reasoning' is shown in the chapter on Advaita.¹ The āchārya has always asked us to be critical and not accept things blindly. He holds "that any one who adopts any view without full inquiry will miss his aim of beatitude and incur grievous loss".²

In this context it becomes clear to us how important epistemology is for understanding any philosophical system. It is the "portal to metaphysics". What the *pramāṇas* cannot teach us is not knowledge in the normal sense. Scripture becomes authoritative only because its truth gets affirmed by experience. Dharmarāja makes a detailed study of all the problems of knowledge in his manual which continues to be the standard invaluable treatise on the subject.

Dharmarāja explains the following problems:—What is the nature of knowledge? What is its origin? How does it arise? What are its instruments? How is the sense-object related to the cognizer? What is the test of the validity of cognition? What causes illusion? How is non-existence known? What is the way to the knowledge of ultimate Reality?³

Knowledge in the primary sense of the term is pure consciousness beyond the relativity of the knower and the known. It illuminates all objects. It is self-luminous and self-existent. It is non-relative and non-dual. All the instruments of knowledge function because of it. The soul is the combination of the *sākshī* and *antahkaraṇa*. It is the complex form and it is the empirical soul which knows and moves in the world.

Knowledge in this system is expressed in the form of *vṛittis*, which is a blend of internal organ and *sākshin*. It is *antahkaraṇa* alone that undergoes modal transformations and it is termed *vṛittijñāna*. The *vṛitti* flows out in the case of external objects and gets itself determined by the object or it assumes the form of the object itself. When the *vṛitti* coincides with the object we

1. *advaitam kiṁ āgamamātreṇa pratipattavyam āhosvit tarkenāpi ity ata āha śakyate tarkenāpi jñātum..*
2. *tatra avichārya yat kiñchit pratipadyamāno nīśreyasāt pratihanyeta anartham cha iyāt.*
3. Swami Satprakashananda, *Methods of Knowledge* (according to Advaita), 1965, p. 15.

have knowledge. The fact that a single consciousness principle is delimited as object and as subject and as the knowing process leads to the avoidance of the problems of dualism.

It is difficult to cover all the important issues raised by the author. Nothing can replace the study of the manual itself. The system has accepted six instruments of knowledge. 1. *pratyaksha* (perception), 2. *anūmāna* (inference), 3. *śabda* (verbal testimony), 4. *upamāna* (comparison), 5. *arthāpatti* (presumption), and 6. *anupalabdhi* (apprehension of non-existence). Each of the *pramāṇas* is treated in detail. The chapter on perception is the most difficult. Brahman-realisation is likened to perceptual knowledge. It is not the perceptual knowledge which implies the intervention of the sense organ. It is self-knowledge. The problem whether 'mind' is a sense organ is discussed. The two schools, *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa*, hold different views on the subject.

The necessity for regarding *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* as independent *pramāṇas* is discussed along with the arguments to prove that they cannot be brought under inference or perception. The work of Dharmarāja has attracted the academic students of Advaita of our universities and it has been the subject of many English works. The contribution of Dharmarāja has given us a right royal approach to the study of Advaita. Among the important works in English that are based on Dharmarāja's book are Professor Datta's *The Six Ways of Knowing* (1932); Swami Satprakashananda's *Methods of Knowledge* (according to Advaita) with an introduction from Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan and foreword from Dr. Huston Smith (1965); N. K. Devaraja's *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's theory of Knowledge* (1962). Besides these works we have standard English translations of Dharmarāja's *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā* by Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Swami Madhavananda. Among the great interpreters of Advaita Dharmarāja occupies an illustrious position; and the study of his work confirms the rationality of the system and fullness of its treatment.

RAMAKRISHNADHVARIN

by

V. SWAMINATHAN

M.A., M.LITT.

Rāmakṛishṇādhvarin the author of the *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi* hailed from Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam, a village in the Nannilam taluk of Tanjore district.¹ He was the son of Dharmarājādhvarin who had established himself as a great writer on Advaita through his monumental work, *Vedāntaparibhāshā*. He was a Kaundinya by descent and a Ṛigvedin by religious discipline.²

Unlike in the case of some of the celebrated teachers of Advaita, the determination of the date of Rāmakṛishṇa is not beset with much difficulty. There is some positive evidence on the basis of which a fairly accurate date may be arrived at. In the *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi* Rāmakṛishṇa quotes Nṛisimhāśrama's *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, a commentary on the *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa*.³ Rāmakṛishṇa's date, therefore, may be taken as settled if evidences are conclusive enough in settling the date of Nṛisimhāśrama in-as-much as he was the grand-preceptor of Dharmarāja. Dharmarāja's mention of his grand-preceptor Nṛisimhāśrama⁴ and his disciples' victory over the upholders of difference in the opening verses of the *Vedāntaparibhāshā* is undoubtedly a reference to Nṛisimhāśrama, author of the *Bhedadhikkāra*. Nṛisimhāśrama himself gives

1. *tatra kaṇḍaramāṇikkagrāmaratnanivāsina. Tarkachūdāmaṇi*, Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library, No. 6217.

2. *dharmarājādhvarīndrena kaundinyena vipāśchitā. dharmarājādhvarīndrena bahvrichena vipāśchitā. Tarkachūdāmaṇi*, Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library, No. 6218.

3. *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi* with *Vedāntaparibhāshā* and *Maniprabhā*, p. 295. Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay, Saka 1850. Vide Madras Government Oriental Series, No. CLV, part II, p. 395.

4. *Vedāntaparibhāshā* with *Sīkhāmaṇi* and *Maniprabhā*, p. 11, Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay, Saka 1850.

Sam. 1604 (A.D. 1547) as the date of completion of his *Tattvaviveka*. Nṛisimhāśrama's *Advaitadīpikā* has been referred to by Appayya Dīkshita in his *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* one of the works of his early days. By the time the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* was composed Nṛisimhāśrama might have attained celebrity as a great authority and become of ripe old age as to have been referred to in respectable terms. Appayya Dīkshita's date has been settled, without any fear of controversy, as A.D. 1520—A.D. 1592. Rāmānanda who flourished in the later half of the sixteenth century quotes Nṛisimhāśrama's commentary on the *Pañchapādikā* in his *Bhāshyaratnaprabhā*.⁵ In view of all this and allowing a full span of life commensurate with the mass of his writings Nṛisimhāśrama might be placed between A.D. 1470 and A.D. 1550. Dharmarāja who comes two generations later may be assigned to the later half of the sixteenth century and consequently Rāmakrishṇa may be placed in the last and the first quarters of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively.

Rāmakrishṇa belonged to the illustrious line of teachers and pupils who had expounded Advaita with great zeal and had enriched Advaita literature with their inestimable contributions. Dharmarāja was a profound scholar in all the darśanas⁶ and in his life time he enjoyed a high reputation throughout the sub-continent as a versatile writer on Nyāya.⁷ It seems he held the title Nyāyābdihi (ocean of logic) and his *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi* a commentary on the *Tattvachintāmaṇiprakāśa* of Ruchidatta won the appreciation of his contemporaries as a work of great merit.⁸ His

5. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* with *Ratnaprabhā*, *Bhāmatī* and *Nyāyanirnaya*, p. 7. Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay, Saka, 1835.

6. *viśadāśeshatantrārthasārah*. *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi*.

7. *Vedāntasikhāmaṇi*, p. 3.

8. *nyāyābdihi tarkachūḍāmanimiha kurute*. *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi*. *tarkachūḍāmanirnāma kritā vidvanmanoramā*. *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā*, p. 11.

Some modern scholars are inclined to think that the *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* referred to in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā* is a direct commentary on the *Tattvachintāmaṇi*: but the statement 'yena chintāmanau tikā daśatikāvibhanjinī' when read together with the opening verse of *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* *daśānāmapitikanām bhaṅgam kurvan kvachit kvachit anumānaprakāśasya vivṛtim karavāṇyahaṁ* will dispel any doubt regarding its being a commentary on the *Prakāśa* of Ruchidatta.

other works on Nyāya are: (1) *Prakāśa*, a commentary on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara, and (2) *Yuktisaṃgraha*, an independent work on anumāna. His Nyāya works have almost sunk into oblivion, and he is now remembered only for the *Vedāntasīkhāmanī*. Dharmarāja studied under several preceptors⁹ among whom he mentions only one by name, viz., Venkaṭanātha¹⁰ a resident of the village of Velāṅguḍi in Kumbhakonam taluk. His grand-preceptor was the famous Nṛsiṃhāśrama the author of several polemical works on Advaita. Rāmakṛishṇa had the unique good fortune to study under his own father and to assimilate and master the entire mass of śāstraic learning from his father alone.¹¹

Rāmakṛishṇa was born in an atmosphere charged with living Vedic traditions and vigorous intellectual activity in the realm of śāstraic learning. The whole region of the Cauvery delta wherein is situated the village of Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam was adorned by numerous scholars who had distinguished themselves by their erudition in various branches of learning.¹² Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam itself was the home of śrotriyas who were well versed in the Vedas, devoted to the perpetual maintenance of the śrauta fires and the performance of śrauta sacrifices and highly proficient in the śāstras as to have blown up their opponents in debates.¹³ The living śrauta practices of his time did not fail to impress upon Rāmakṛishṇa. Realising fully, the place assigned to the karmakāṇḍa in the scheme of Brahman-enquiry, Rāmakṛishṇa substantiated some of the precepts of the karmakāṇḍa.¹⁴ For purposes of meditation and worship which presumes a personified God (saguṇa Brahman) he, like his father, chose Śrī Rāma.¹⁵ His strict adherence to Advaita did not in any way deter his belief in the efficacy of the karmakāṇḍa or worship of a personified God.

9. *Tarkachūḍāmani*.

10. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 11.

11. *Vedāntasīkhāmani*, p. 3.

12. *Tarkachūḍāmani*.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Vedāntasīkhāmani*, p. 3.

15. *Nyāyadarpana*, Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, R. 4699.

Endowed with a penetrative intellect coupled with critical vision and tutored by his father, a versatile scholar who inherited the mass of śāstraic wisdom from an illustrious line of teachers, Rāmakṛishṇa shaped into a sound scholar of a very high order. Even a cursory reader of his *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi* will be struck with his mastery over the subtleties of navya-nyāya. The *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi*, particularly its Śabdapariccheda, bears ample testimony to his versatility in Pūrvamīmāṃsā. His erudition in other systems of philosophy, orthodox as well as heterodox, is no less than that of his in Nyāya or Advaita even though his references to them in the *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi* are only occasional.¹⁶ As such, it is legitimate to expect from the facile pen of a many-sided genius as Rāmakṛishṇa, substantial contributions to the various schools of philosophical thought.

Only four works of Rāmakṛishṇa have come down to us so far. They are *Nyāyasīkhāmaṇi*, *Nyāyadarpaṇa*, *Vedāntasāraṭīkā*, and *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi*.

1. *Nyāyasīkhāmaṇi*:¹⁷ This is a commentary on the *Prakāśa* of Ruchidatta which itself is a commentary on the *Tattvachintāmaṇi*. The available manuscripts of *Nyāyasīkhāmaṇi* do not extend beyond the pratyakṣhakhaṇḍa and we have sufficient grounds to believe that Rāmakṛishṇa commented on the pratyakṣhakhaṇḍa alone. Manuscripts of Dharmarāja's *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* that have come to light so far, contain only the three sections, anumāna, upamāna and śabda. The absence of manuscripts of *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* for the pratyakṣhakhaṇḍa and the existence of manuscripts of *Nyāyasīkhāmaṇi* for the pratyakṣhakhaṇḍa alone establish, beyond doubt, that Dharmarāja commented upon the last three sections of *Prakāśa* and Rāmakṛishṇa on the pratyakṣhakhaṇḍa alone with a view to make the work complete. Further, each of the three sections of the *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* opens with separate invocatory verses; but the fact that the anumānakhaṇḍa alone opens with verses supplying some autobiographical information becomes intelligible only on the presumption that Dharmarāja commenced the *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* with the anumānakhaṇḍa

16. *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi*, pp. 75; 81-83; 109; 154; 184; 356; etc.

17. Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library, Nos. 6228-6229.

and deliberately excluded the *pratyaśaṅkhaṇḍa* from the purview of his commentary for reasons unknown. *Nyāyaśiṅghamaṇi* is a voluminous work displaying the author's skill in argumentation and command over the *navya-nyāya* terminology.

2. *Nyāyadarpaṇa*:¹⁸ This is a gloss on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras* offering detailed explanations on the *sūtras*. Unfortunately only a fragment comprising the second *pāda* of the first *adhyāya* and a portion of the third *pāda* has come to light so far.

3. *Vedāntasāraṭīkā*: This, as its name indicates, is a commentary on the *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda. Manuscripts of this work are extremely rare. We have not come across any notice of it except the one found in Volume I of Aufrecht's *catalogus catalogorum*. It is premature to say anything on the authorship and nature of this work without an access to the manuscript or extracts therefrom.

4. *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi*: This is a commentary on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā* of his father and enjoys wide popularity, even today, among those who study Advaita on traditional lines. In the *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi* the author sets himself to interpret and examine the *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā* on thoroughly critical lines besides offering comments on the text. He analyses every issue in a remarkable manner and arrives at the judgement only after wading through a long chain of arguments and counter-arguments. His approach to problems is characterised by originality and independence; when occasion arises he does not hesitate to disagree with the text and offer his own opinion.¹⁹ On several occasions finding the text, as it were, inadequate to bring about the desired purport he suggests corrections or interprets the text in such a way as to yield the expected purport.²⁰ The accuracy of the definitions as given in the *Paribhāṣhā* is tested by subjecting them to a severe criticism and when they fail the test he presents them in a revised form or offers new ones in their stead.²¹ On occasions when the text presupposes or passes over matters with a mere mention he takes pains to present the issue in as complete

18. Madras Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, R. 4699.

19. *Vedāntasīkhāmaṇi*, pp. 177, 180-82, 289, etc.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 23, 76, 89, etc.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-75, 87, 223, 255, etc.

a manner as possible.²² He has defined several important terms silently passed over in the text.²³ Whenever there is demand he supplements the text lest it should fall short of completeness and clarity.²⁴ He demonstrates through a long process of reasoning the untenability of the rival schools when the *Paribhāṣhā* dismisses them with a single stroke of the pen.²⁵ To establish a philosophical standpoint he adduces all possible proofs.²⁶ The *Vedānta-sīkhāmaṇi* is really a critical evaluation of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣhā* and while dealing with the text Rāmakṛishṇa has taken the attitude of rather a *vārtikakāra* than of a mere *vivaraṇakāra*.

His chief objective in writing the *Śikhāmaṇi* is to provide a sound logical basis to the Advaita doctrines as set forth in the *Paribhāṣhā*. Sometimes he establishes Advaitic doctrines on purely rationalistic grounds.²⁷ One of the striking characteristics of the *Śikhāmaṇi* is its employment of dialectical ways of reasoning and discussion. Rāmakṛishṇa's use of dialectics has a two-fold purpose—first, to explode the doctrines of rival systems of philosophy, and secondly, to establish Advaita on a firm pedestal. To demonstrate their untenability the doctrines of the opponents are resolved into so many possible alternatives and by a series of arguments each one of the alternatives is shown to involve self-contradiction or absurdity. Dialectical ways of reasoning in Advaita is as old as Śaṅkara. Rāmakṛishṇa, in his dialectics, effects a harmonious blending of the subtlety of Chitsukha and the force of Nṛisimhāśrama, the reputed dialecticians whose works have influenced his thought and style to a large extent. A study of the *Śikhāmaṇi* affords one a good training in Advaita dialectics and prepares him for a study of the advanced dialectical works of Nṛisimhāśrama, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Brahmānanda, and others.

The special feature of Rāmakṛishṇa's dialectics is that it is dressed in the style and language of *navya-nyāya*. Keeping

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-86, 105-114, etc.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 183, 238, 261, etc.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 124, 130, etc.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-62, 203-206, etc.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 93 and ff., 133-34, etc.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 90, 93-97, 348, etc.

himself abreast with the spirit of his times he found it necessary to use the language of navya-nyāya. The nyāya atmosphere pervades the whole of the *Śikhāmaṇi*. The definitions furnished by it are strictly in conformity with the navya-nyāya way of defining things. Rāmakṛishṇa deems it necessary to restate, in nyāya terminology, some of the definitions given by the *Paribhāṣhā* in ordinary language.²⁸ In his opinion a definition has to be formulated in accordance with the tenets of one's own school of thought.²⁹ A mere definition can never bring something into existence; only what is existing already could be brought within the scope of a definition.³⁰ In argumentation he makes effective use of the canons of logic. Sometimes he dexterously makes use of nyāya concepts as apt analogies in establishing his standpoint.³¹

Though in general he directs his talents in refuting the nyāya standpoints still he sometimes shows a sympathetic and accommodative attitude towards some nyāya concepts. He accepts the definition of Vyapti as enunciated by the Naiyāyikas also.³² Dharmarāja rejects thē kevalānvavī and kevalavyatirekī types of inference on the ground that the definition of the former violates the metaphysical position of Advaita and the latter, in essence, is not different from arthāpatti.³³ Rāmakṛishṇa however accepts, after suitably amending the definition, kevalānvavī without, in any way, affecting the Advaitic stand-point.³⁴ Kevalavyatirekī he admits as a variety of inference and draws the boundary of the provinces of kevalavyatirekī and arthāpatti.³⁵ Regarding anupalabdhi Rāmakṛishṇa has taken rather a bold stand which is opposed to the traditionally accepted Advaitic dictum '*vyavahāre bhattanayaḥ*'. He rejects the claims of anupalabdhi for its status of an independent pramāṇa.³⁶ His justification of his father's acceptance of prāgabhāva as a variety of abhāva is also against the

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 208, 209, 285.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 299.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 126, 147, etc.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 177, 179.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-82.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 289-90.

general Advaitic position as advocated by Nṛsiṃhāśrama, Appayya Dīkshita and a host of other writers.³⁷ In the definitions of ākāṅkshā and tātparya he effects a synthesis of the Advaitic and nyāya views after disclosing their inadequacy when taken individually.³⁸

The free display of reasoning, frequent recourse to inferential proof, mastery over the nyāya canons of argumentation and dialectics, adoption of nyāya style and language and the accommodative attitude towards some of the nyāya doctrines have made some of the modern scholars brand Rāmākṛishṇa as more of a naiyāyika of the controverting type than a true Advaitin.

A closer perusal of the *Śikhāmani* will make one realise how unsound and superficial this charge is. Our author is aware of the limitation of logic in transcendental matters; he never fails to cite the relevant śruti and point out the inconclusiveness of reasoning when his father bases his conclusions on mere reasoning.³⁹ His accommodative spirit in regard to the pramāṇas is not militant against the spirit of Advaita as the Advaitin admits the validity of the pramāṇas, other than śruti, only at the empirical level and is not much bothered about the empirical world and the pramāṇas that generate knowledge of it.⁴⁰ The Upanishads enjoin *śravaṇa* (determination of the purport of śruti), *manana* (verification of the purport of śruti with the aid of reasoning) and *nididhyāsana* (concentration on the truth arrived at through *śravaṇa* and *manana*) as means of Brahman realisation. Whether *manana* and *nididhyāsana* stand on a par with *śravaṇa* or are subservient to *śravaṇa*, it has to be admitted that *manana*, except in the case of a few personalities like Vāmadeva or Śuka, has a vital part to play towards Brahman-realisation. It will be of much interest to note what Śaṅkara has said on the role of logic in Advaita. Knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and jīva obtained by means of *śravaṇa* becomes unassailable by the exercise of

37. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-225, 255-257.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 312.

40. cf. *prāchīnaih vyavahārasiddhaviśayeshvātmaikya siddhau param sannahyadbhiranādarāt saranayo nānāvidhāḥ darśitāḥ. Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, Kumbakonam Edition, p. 3.

reasoning and meditation; *śravaṇa* by itself cannot produce conviction.⁴¹ In Śaṅkara's view not only does *śruti* ordain *manana* but it actually demonstrates the application of reasoning. The *madhukāṇḍa* of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* embodies an exposition of Advaita and the *Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa* is a critical examination of the *madhukāṇḍa* in the light of reasoning.⁴² Sureśvara observes that the two chapters of the *Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa* employ the two types of argumentation, *jalpa* (controversy) and *vāda* (disquisition).⁴³ The function of reason does not stop here; it has to play an effective part in *śravaṇa* also. Of the six canons of interpretation (*upakramopasaṁhāraṅkya*, *abhyāsa*, *apūrvatā*, *phala*, *artha-vāda*, and *upapatti*) that determine the purport of *śruti*, *upapatti* (intelligibility of the purport in the light of reasoning) though mentioned last is not the least in importance. Śaṅkara has stated in unambiguous terms the extent to which he relies upon reasoning in interpreting the *Brahmasūtras*.⁴⁴

It must be noted here that Rāmakrishṇa borrows only the methodology of *nyāya* and the Advaitic standpoint is not in the least affected by the *nyāya* elements found in his exposition. It will be worthwhile to note in this connection what he himself has said regarding the nature of his work.⁴⁵

Advaita regards *śruti* as the *pramāṇa* par excellence since it alone gives rise to the knowledge of what is supersensuous such as the oneness of *jīva* and Brahman. As such it excludes from its jurisdiction all that fall within the scope of other *pramāṇas*. Only those *śrutis* which are concerned with supersensuous matters are to be taken as *pramāṇa* and those that relate to things known by other *pramāṇas* are to be dismissed as mere matter of fact statements.⁴⁶ A mere definition cannot sublate that which has

41. cf. Śrī Śaṅkara's bhāṣhya on the *Bṛihadāraṇyako'paniṣad*, ii, iv, v.

42. *Ibid.*, iii, i, i.

43. *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika*, iii, i, xv; iv, i, ii.

44. *vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitarakopakaranā nīśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate. Brahmasūtrabhāṣhya*, i. i. i.

45. *anena matprabandhena vedāntārthāvalambinā. Vedāntasīkhāmani*, p 383.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 328.

been settled by śruti once for all.⁴⁷ The knowledge resulting from the *tattvamasi* vākya is pramā, since the vākyaārtha is something new and different from the padārtha.⁴⁸ A śruti supported by inference is more powerful than the one devoid of such a support and conversely an inference corroborated by śruti is more powerful than one which lacks such corroboration.⁴⁹ When anumānas of equal force neutralise each other, one has to surrender at the altar of śruti.⁵⁰ Anumāna can establish the cause of the universe as only a cause and not as a sentient being possessing omniscience and omnipotence.⁵¹ As the ultimate goal is Brahman-realisation śruti alone which is competent to generate it deserves full treatment. A detailed treatment of the other pramāṇas is relevant in a treatise on Advaita only in so far as they have an indirect bearing on Brahman-realisation.⁵² Anumāna is useful in ascertaining the illusory character of all that is other than Brahman implying thereby that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality.⁵³ Other pramāṇas are reliable only in so far as they are sources of valid knowledge relating to the empirical sphere.⁵⁴ Avidyā is the material cause of the objects present in dream-cognition and the internal organ is the efficient cause.⁵⁵ The acceptance of the *avidyāvṛitti* in erroneous cognitions such as 'this is silver' is to make intelligible the remembrance of 'silver' at a later time.⁵⁶

Ātman is the only absolute reality, and it is identical with Brahman, the cause of the worlds of name and form in diverse kinds. Ātman can be known (though not in its purest form), in some measure, as it is present in the notion of 'I'. Brahman, on the other hand, cannot be known as it never figures as the object of any cognition.⁵⁷ Jīvas are many; the view that main-

47. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

tains the oneness of jīva is open to serious objections.⁵⁸ *Avidyā* is the material cause of the universe and Brahman is its material cause in that it is the substratum on which *avidyā* is superimposed. *Avidyā* is synonymous with *māyā* and the two words signify one and the same entity.⁵⁹ It is a logically indeterminable positive entity⁶⁰ and is sublated by the immediate cognition of the oneness of Brahman and jīva. It possesses three distinct potencies which are responsible for projecting the universe as absolutely real to the lay man, empirically real to a philosopher, and phenomenally real to a jīvanmukta.⁶¹ The cognitions arising out of the mahāvākyas like *tattvamasi* are immediate.⁶² The śruti which prescribes *śravaṇa* as a means of Brahman-realisation does not purport any injunction with reference to *śravaṇa*.⁶³ Renunciation is not a necessary prerequisite for one who aspires for absolute liberation.⁶⁴

58. *Ibid.*, p. 335.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 93.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 381.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 367-68.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 375.

VENKATANATHA

by

B. SITAMAHALAKSHMI

M.A.

Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha wrote an excellent commentary —*Brahmā-nandagiri* on Śrī Śaṅkara's bhāṣhya on the *Gītā*. As is the case with all of our historical personages it is difficult to determine with any accuracy the date of Veṅkaṭanātha. His work does not contain even stray references to the biographical details of his life. A perusal of this commentary shows that our author criticises Madhusūdana Sarasvatī for having misconstrued some of the passages of Śrī Śaṅkara on the *Gītā* in his commentary on the *Gītā-bhāṣhya—Gūḍārtha-dīpikā*. From this we may conclude that Veṅkaṭanātha flourished after Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Dharmarājādharin the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā* speaks of one Veṅkaṭanātha as his guru:

*śrīmad veṅkaṭanāthākhyān
velāṅguḍinivāsinaḥ
jagadgurūnaḥ vande
sarvatantrapravartakān.*

From this we cannot conclude that Veṅkaṭanātha was the preceptor of Dharmarājādharin; for, the latter says in the following verse that his grand-preceptor was Nṛsiṃha.

*tam praṇaumi nṛsiṃhākhyam
yatīndram paramam gurum.*

Veṅkaṭanātha states that he is the disciple of one Rāmabrahmā-nandatīrtha otherwise known as Abhinava Śaṅkarāchārya. Hence these two personages cannot be identical.

The identity of Veṅkaṭanātha cannot be traced even through his other works. It is clear from his commentary on the *Gītā* that

he has written three more works, namely, *Advaitavajrapañjara*,¹ *Mantrasūrasudhānidhi*² and a commentary on the *Taittirīyo'pani-shad-bhāshya*.³ We shall now set forth briefly some noteworthy features of the commentary *Brahmānandagiri*.

According to Advaita, Ātman which is absolute bliss and consciousness when divested of *avidyā* is spoken of as liberation. *Avidyā* present in Ātman is the root-cause of all evils and its removal necessarily brings about the removal of all miseries. Ātman which is liberation is self-evident and it does not require any other thing for its manifestation. But, since it is veiled by *avidyā* and since *avidyā* could be removed only by the direct realisation of Ātman, the latter is said to be the means to liberation. From a study of the *Gītā* as a whole, it is possible for us to gather that in it three paths are recognised as paths leading to the realisation of Ātman. And, they are: the path of knowledge (*jñāna-yoga*), the path of devotion (*bhakti-yoga*), and the path of action (*karma-yoga*).

Of these three paths, the path of knowledge consists in realising the Absolute as it is in itself, pure and entire, unenveloped by any *upādhi* or veil. This is possible by pursuing Vedāntic study under a preceptor, reflection, and meditation. The aspirant must possess certain traits which are described as the four-fold aid of which control of intellect, and external senses is important.⁴ These are subordinate to the Vedāntic study. The prevalent view in Advaita is that the mahāvākyas of the *Upanishads* themselves give rise to the direct realisation of Ātman. This path is a difficult course of discipline because it aims at realizing the Absolute as it is in itself. It is because of this that this path can suit only those who live in the high intellectual plane and have definitely and decidedly transcended the sense region.⁵ But to average people this is not possible; they have not attained to that kind

1. *Śrīmad Bhagavad-Gītā* with the commentary *Brahmānandagiri*, Sri Vani Vilas Sastra Series, No. 12, p. 104.

This is referred to hereafter as 'B'.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 427.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 461.

4. *Gītā*, xii, 3-4.

5. *Ibid.*

reflection, and meditation. The point that is of profound importance here is that those who worship the personal God with devotion reach the abode of Hiranyagarbha and there they get the knowledge of Brahman by pursuing Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation, and thereby realize their identity with Brahman. Our author emphasises the view that Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation, alone could give rise to the knowledge of Brahman.

*‘nirguṇopāśanadvāraiva saguṇopāśanam mumukshoḥ mokshāya prabhavati, nānyathā; śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsanābhāve jñānā-nudayāt’*¹⁰

The *Gītā* passage—¹¹

*‘yogināmapi sarveshām
madgatenāntarātmanā
śraddhāvān bhajate yo mām
sa me yuktatamo mataḥ*

states that a devotee is superior to a jñānin. In the final analysis this passage means that bhakti is superior to jñāna. Our author says that this contention is wrong.

The Upanishadic passage—

*‘yasya deve parābhaktiḥ
yathā devē tathā gurau’*¹²

and the smṛiti texts such as—

*‘udārāḥ sarva eva ete
jñānī tvātmaiva me matam’*¹³
*‘bhaktyā mām abhijānāti
yāvān yaśchāsmi tattvataḥ
tato mām tattvato iñātvā
viśate tadanantaram’*¹⁴

affirm that bhakti is only a means to knowledge and it cannot be superior to knowledge. But what is intended to be conveyed in

10. B., p. 442.

11. VI. 47.

12. *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad*, 6, 23.

13. *Gītā*, vii, 18.

14. *Ibid.*, xviii, 55.

the *Gītā* passage 'yogināmapī sarveshām', etc., cited above is that the worship of the Lord is better than the worship of Gods like Rudra, Āditya, etc.

*jñānasādhanaatvenoktāyāḥ bhakteḥ phalatvena pradhānabhūtād jñānādādhikyāyogāccha; kiṃtu devatāntara bhaktiyogāpekshayā bhagavadbhaktiyogasya śraishṭhyamuchyate- yogināmapī sarveshām vasurudrādityaparāṇām iti bhāshyokteḥ.*¹⁵

Liberation, according to Advaita, necessarily requires the removal of *avidyā* present in Brahman. And, *avidyā* could be removed only by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. To speak of bhakti as directly leading to liberation is, therefore, misleading. What is termed bhakti is the striving for the intuitive knowledge of Brahman by means of and through devotion to a personal God. And, intuitive knowledge of Brahman alone is the means to liberation.

*'premarūpā kriyā baktiḥ jñānasyaiva sādhanam, jñānameva tu muktīm prati sādhanam iti gītāchāryasya bhagavato matam'*¹⁶

Faith is the basis of devotion. Beginning with faith and worshipping with devotion the personal God, the aspirant attains to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman and thereby he is liberated.

A perusal of this commentary *Brahmānandagiri* shows how very learned the author is besides being a very impartial critic. He is mainly concerned with emphasizing the fact that the Advaitic interpretation in accordance with the *bhāshya* of Śrī Śaṅkara is the only correct interpretation of the *Gītā*. Accordingly he misses no opportunity to criticise the interpretations of Śrī Rāmānuja and Śrī Madhva on the *Gītā* and the interpretations of Madhusūdanasarasvatī on the *Gītā-bhāshya* of Śrī Śaṅkara. His interpretations are always to the point and in consonance with Advaita. His style is easy and unpedantic. It is a pity that none of his other works are available. If they are lost for ever, then it is indeed a misfortune to the Advaita literature.

15. B, p. 306

16. Ibid., p. 578.

MAHADEVANANDA SARASVATI

by

N. S. RAMANUJAM

Nyāya-Vyākaraṇa-Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta Śiromani

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī, the author of the *Tattvānusan-dhāna*¹ is a disciple of Svayamprakāśānanda. According to Das Gupta², these writers flourished in the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries.

The *Tattvānusan-dhāna* serves as a refresher to the serious student engaged in *manana*. All the Advaitic concepts are dealt with in this work in a very lucid way. The author himself wrote a commentary on it by name *Advaita-chintā-kaustubha*.

Mahādevānanda's most important contribution is his treatment of the concept of *ajñāna*. According to Advaita, *Īśvara*, *jīva* and *jagat* are but the appearances of a transcendental entity called Brahman. The principle that accounts for this seeming diversification of Brahman which is the sole Reality is *ajñāna*. The conception of *ajñāna* is thus the pivot point of the Advaita.

Ajñāna is the first cause of the phenomenal world and consequently corresponds to the *prakṛiti* or the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhya system; but there are vital differences and metaphysically the two are completely distinct. The *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhya system is conceived of as the source of the universe by being independent of the *puruṣa*. But *ajñāna* is considered as the primordial cause of the universe by being dependent on Brahman. Śrī Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* '*tada-dhīmatvād arthavat*' (1.iv.iii) notices this distinction and points

1. Published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. 1922.

2. *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 56-57.

out that the Advaitins do not follow the line of argument of the Sāṅkhyas in accounting for the rise of the universe.

Ajñāna is superimposed on Brahman and it has Brahman as its locus and content. It has a two-fold power, namely, *āvaraṇa-śakti* or the power of veiling, and *vikshepa-śakti* or the power of revealing. By *āvaraṇa-śakti* it conceals Brahman and by *vikshepa-śakti* it reveals it in the form of Īśvara, jīva, and jagat.

Ajñāna is beginningless and it consists of three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. It is a positive entity (*bhāvarūpa*) and not an antecedent negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*). It derives its existence only from its superimposition on Brahman and it is held to be indeterminable (*anirvachanīya*) either as real or as unreal.³

It cannot be regarded as real, as it is removed by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Nor can it be considered as unreal, because it is determinately perceived in the form of 'I am ignorant'. An unreal thing like the horn of a hare is never experienced. It cannot be real and unreal at once on the ground that this conception is self-discrepant. Hence it is regarded as neither real, nor unreal, nor real and unreal at once, but *anirvachanīya* or indeterminable either as real or as unreal. Ajñāna is removable by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. It is thus *jñāna-nivartya*.⁴

This ajñāna itself is termed *māyā* and *avidyā*. Some Advaitins draw a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* and define the former as that which does not delude its abode, and the latter as that which deludes its abode. Mahādevānanda does not favour this distinction. He holds that ajñāna which is characterised by the predominance of radiant *sattva* is *māyā* and ajñāna which is characterised by the predominance of clouded *sattva* is *avidyā*.⁵ *Māyā*, *avidyā* and ajñāna are identical. Or, ajñāna in its aspect of *vikshepa-śakti* is spoken of as *māyā* and in its aspect of *āvaraṇa-śakti* is spoken of as *avidyā*.⁶ And, *māyā* and *avidyā* are identical.

3. *Tattvānusandhāna*, p. 27.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 32

6. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Mahādevānanda holds that the reflection of Brahman in avidyā and intellect is jīva; and, Brahman that transcends avidyā is Īśvara.⁷ This is precisely the view of the author of the *Vivaraṇa*. This view is known as *pratibimba-vāda*. Sarvajñātman in his *Samkshepaśārīraka* holds that the reflection of Brahman in avidyā is Īśvara and the reflection of Brahman in avidyā and intellect is jīva. In both the views the consciousness that underlies both Īśvara and jīva is the witness-self.

The jīva is three-fold owing to the difference in its limiting adjunct, as *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña*. The jīva when associated with avidyā, the intellect and the gross body regards itself as conscious of the waking condition and in this aspect it is termed '*Viśva*.' And the same jīva when associated with avidyā and intellect feels itself as conscious of the dream state and in this aspect it is called '*Taijasa*'. And when associated with avidyā and intellect in its subtle state, the jīva considers itself as conscious of the deep-sleep state and in this aspect it is termed '*Prājña*'. The waking state (*jāgradvasthā*) is one in which the direct apprehension of the various objects is simultaneous with the functioning of the sense organs. And this state is experienced by the jīva as *Viśva*.

When the meritorious or non-meritorious deeds which gave rise to the experience during the waking state are exhausted and when the deeds which cause the experience of the dream state begin to function, the belief in one's identification with the gross body is removed by a *vṛitti* of 'tamo guṇa' called sleep; and thereupon all the senses become absorbed by their ceasing to function. And thereupon the *Viśva* is also spoken of as having been absorbed. Then begins the dream state (*svapnāvasthā*) in which the knowledge of things is acquired without the functioning of the sense organs and is due to the latent impressions present in the mind. And this state is experienced by the jīva as '*Taijasa*'.

When the deeds which caused the dream state also are exhausted and when the intellect together with its latent impressions merge in avidyā, there appears the state of deep-sleep which is the resting place of the jīva which is exhausted on account of

its experience of both waking and dream states. Deep-sleep or *sushupti* is the cognition of avidyā only in the form 'I did not know anything'. One who has awakened from deep-sleep recollects 'I slept well; I did not know anything'. This recollection is impossible unless there was such an experience. It is clear that in the deep-sleep state there is the experience of bliss and also of avidyā. And this state is experienced by the jīva as '*Prājñā*'.⁸

By eliminating all the limiting conditions and by the knowledge of the pure Self there results liberation. The three-aspects of the jīva, viz., *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājñā* together with the three states of waking, dream, and deep-sleep are of the nature of avidyā and therefore not real. The absolute consciousness which is constant in, and also the witness of the three states is the fourth (*turīya*) and it is transcendent and real. And the pure Self which is the basis of the cognition 'I' is non-different from this. All the three states and the three aspects of the jīva are relevant before the rise of the true knowledge of Brahman and cease to be so after the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman.

Parallel to this conception of jīva, we have a three-fold view of the cosmic self as *Vaiśvānara*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, and *Īśvara*.⁹ It is essential to remember that the sentient element in all the three is identical and the only difference is in the limiting adjuncts. The consciousness that transcends these three is identical with Ātman which transcends the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep.

The aspirant, owing to avidyā has lost sight of his identity with Brahman. By pursuing Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation, he attains to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Whether the major texts of the Upanishads themselves give rise to the knowledge of Brahman or whether meditation (*nididhyāsana*) leads to the knowledge of Brahman, is a question of great importance in Advaita. The prevalent view is that the major texts of the Upanishads themselves give rise to the knowledge of

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Brahman. And, Mahādevānanda accepts this view.¹⁰ When such experienced conviction of unity arises in him he becomes a *jīvan-mukta*. After the final fall of his body, he becomes Brahman itself.

Mahādevānanda has not introduced any new line of argument in the interpretation of Advaita. As has been said in the beginning his work serves as a refresher to a student engaged in *manana*. He has had access to all the important Advaita works before his time; and by presenting the Advaita concepts in a lucid and admirable way for the benefit of posterity, he has rendered solid service to the cause of Advaita.

GANGADHARENDRA SARASVATI

by

T. S. NARAYANA RAO

B.E.

Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī is the author of the *Svārājya-siddhi*,¹ a manual of Advaita. In the concluding verse of this work he gives his date as 1748 Vikrama Śāka (*vasvabdhimunyavanimānaśake*). This corresponds to 1792 A.D. No further details of the author are available except that his guru was one Rāmachandra Sarasvatī and his parama-guru Sarvajña Sarasvatī.

The work *Svārājya-siddhi* deals with all the important concepts of Advaita especially with the means to realize the self-luminous Ātman free from the veil of *avidyā*. It consists of one hundred and sixty-five verses divided into three chapters which are termed *adhyāropa-prakaraṇa*, *apavāda-prakaraṇa* and *kaivalya-prakaraṇa*. The author himself has written a commentary on this work and it is known as *Kaivalyakalpataru*.

Brahman, the ultimate Reality, is one without a second, and it is free from any attributes. The attributeless nature of Ātman is arrived at by adopting the method of superimposition and negation (*adhyāropa* and *apavāda*). This, in main, is the theme of the first chapter known as *adhyāropa-prakaraṇa*. This chapter contains fifty-four verses. The author deals with the illusory nature of bondage and discusses in detail the sense of the words *tat* and *tvam* in the sentence *tat tvam asi*. Thirteen views as regards the nature of the sense of the word *tvam* are referred to and critically examined. And, the view of the Upanishads that the sense of the *tvam* is Ātman which is identical with truth, consciousness, and bliss is established.

1. Published by Śrī Nateśa Śāstri, Āryamata Samvardhanī Press, 1927.

As regards the nature of the sense of the term *tat* the author first states that it is Brahman which is the material and the efficient cause of the world. Of course, this is the primary sense of the term *tat*. He refers to the view-points of ten different schools of thought as regards the cause of the universe and then critically examines them. He concludes by pointing out that the secondary sense of the term *tat* is the attributeless Brahman which is truth, consciousness and bliss.

The second chapter entitled *apavāda-prakaraṇa* consists of sixty three verses. In this chapter, the author establishes the indeterminable character of the universe and the non-dual nature of Brahman; and he does so on the basis of the *Chāndogyopanishad* text—'*vāchārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadhēyam, mṛittiketyeva satyam*'. The universe appears owing to *avidyā* which is present in Brahman or Ātman. Brahman is the cause of the universe in that it is the substratum of *avidyā* and its modification, the universe. Brahman is the transfigurative material cause (*vivarto'pādāna*) of the universe, while *avidyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmanūṣdāna*). *Avidyā* and the universe belong to the same order of reality; both have empirical reality. Brahman and the universe, on the other hand, belong to different orders of reality. While Brahman is absolutely real, the universe is only empirically real. Just as the snake superimposed on a rope disappears by the knowledge of the rope, so also the universe superimposed on Brahman disappears by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

The Advaitin postulates a two-fold definition of Brahman, one called *svarūpa-lakṣhaṇa* and the other *taṭhasthalakṣhaṇa*. The object of defining a thing is to differentiate it from everything else and this result is attained generally by reference to a property that is distinctive of it. To give an example, water is defined by reference to its liquidity—a feature which is found in it and in none other. This is an instance of *svarūpa-lakṣhaṇa*; for this characteristic is an essential feature of the object defined. *Taṭhasthalakṣhaṇa*, on the other hand, differentiates an object from the rest by reference to a property which is not its essential nature. For example, a house of a person Devadatta is defined by reference to the crow perching on its roof—a feature which is only external to the house and not a part of the nature of the house. Though the two types of definition differentiate the object defined

from the rest, yet the *svarūpalakṣhaṇa* alone gives us a notion of the nature of the object defined.

The Advaitin defines Brahman by utilising the *tatḥastha-lakṣhaṇa* as the source of the universe. The author has selected passages from the five principal Upanishads, namely, the *Aitareya*, the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, the *Taittirīyaka*, the *Chāndogya* and the *Māṇḍūkya*, to show that Brahman is the source of the universe. This is *tatḥastha-lakṣhaṇa* in that the characteristic of being the source of the universe is not really present in Brahman, but is only brought about by *avidyā* abiding in Brahman. This definition only distinguishes Brahman from certain entities, but does not give us a notion of its nature. And that is done by *svarūpalakṣhaṇa*. The Upanishadic texts such as '*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*' define Brahman as of the nature of existence, consciousness, etc.

The author next proceeds to discuss the import of the five major texts of the Upanishads, namely, *prajñānam brahma* (*Aitareya*), *aham brahmāsmi* (*Bṛihadāraṇyaka*), *sa yaśchāyam puruṣhe, yaśchasāvāditye, sa ekaḥ* (*Taittirīyaka*), *tat tvam asi* (*Chāndogya*), and *ayamātma brahma* (*Māṇḍūkya*). The words such as *tat* and *tvam*, etc., constituting the sentences primarily convey *Īśvara* and *jīva*. *Īśvara* is mediate and omniscient. *Jīva* is immediate and ignorant. In view of the conflicting attributes which they have, there cannot be any identification between the two. Hence secondary signification is resorted to. The two words secondarily signify the absolute consciousness which is the essential nature of both *Īśvara* and *jīva*. The identity of the essential nature of *Īśvara* and *jīva* is the import of the major texts of the Upanishads. This identity is not identity involving duality, but it is identity-in-itself (*svarūpābheda*). In the Upanishadic text—'*nirañjanaḥ paramam sām-yaṁupaiti*', the word *sāmya* conveys the sense of identity and the word *paramam* conveys that that identity is identity-in-itself. The intuitive knowledge of the identity of the essential nature of *Īśvara* and *jīva* arising from the major texts of the Upanishads annihilates *avidyā* along with its products.

The third chapter *kaivalya-prakarana* consists of forty five verses. This chapter deals with the nature of release. The intuitive knowledge of Brahman is the sole means to release. Vāchaspatimiśra, the author of the *Bhāmata* holds that *nididhyāsana* is

principal among the means that gives rise to knowledge. Prakāśātman, the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, holds that *śravaṇa* is principal and the other two are its auxiliaries. From this it is clear that Prakāśātman holds that the Upanishadic sentences themselves give rise to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. This is the prevalent view; and this author maintains the same.

One who has attained to the knowledge of Brahman continues to live till his *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted by experiencing its results. This state is known as *jīvan-mukti*. Our author explains the state of *jīvan-mukti* in this chapter known as *kaivalya-prakaraṇa*. The outpourings of *jīvan-mukta* are set forth in fifteen verses in this chapter² and these verses, according to the commentary *Kaivalya-kalpataru* constitute a section termed *jīvan-mukti-gītā*. These verses explain in an admirable way the highly evolved state of the infinite bliss enjoyed by the liberated souls. When the *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted by experiencing its results, the *jīvan-mukta* is dissociated from his physical accompaniments and he becomes Brahman itself. This is known as *videha-mukti*.

PARAMASIVENDRA SARASVATI

by

V. JAGADEESVARA SASTRI
Vedānta Śiromaṇi

There have been many great saints and mystics in our country, in every century. But it is only a very few, who have not only been distinguished and great souls on their own, but have also been formal heads of established monastic institutions whose mission is to cater to the spiritual needs of mankind.

The Kāñchī Kāmakoti Pīṭha is an ancient one, having been adorned by great saints and sages in an unbroken line from Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. Among the great souls who adorned the illustrious Kāmakoti Pīṭha, Śrī Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī, who was a great saint and author of works on Advaita, was the fifty-seventh āchārya. He had several śishyas. One of his śishyas was the famous jīvanmukta of our land Śrī Sadāśiva Brahmendra Sarasvatī.

Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī was a contemporary of Trayambaka-makhi, Śaṅkaranārāyaṇa-makhī, Śrī Rāmendra and Śrī Varadarāja. This can be known from the statement of Paramaśivendra himself at the end of his *Daharavidyāprakāśa*:

*eshā trayambakamakhinaḥ
śrī rāmenḍrasya varadarājasya
śaṅkaranārayaṇamakhivarasya cha
abhyarthanāvaśat rachitā*

Paramaśivendra has written several works. Mention may be made here of a few:

- (1) *Daharavidyāprakāśa*, (2) *Śivagītā-tātparyaprakāśikā*, and
- (?) *Vedānta-nāma-ratna-sahasra-vyākhyā* or *Svarūpānu-sandhāna*.

Among the works of Śrī Paramaśivendra *Vedānta-nāma-ratna-sahasra-vyākhyā* is a very important one. It is in the nature of an encyclopaedia of the words that are applied to Brahman in the Upanishads. Śrī Sadāśiva Brahmendra Sarasvatī in his *Ātmānusandhāna* has dealt with several names that were described by Paramaśivendra in his work referred to above. Śrī Sadāśivendra declares as follows:

*śrīmatparamaśivendradeśikānām vāyam mudā advaitānanda-
mādhvikamaṅghripadmamupāśmahe śrī deśikokta vedānta-
nāmasāhasramadhyagāṅkāśchinnāmamaṇīn padmadāmabhir-
grathayāmyaham*

The work *Vedānta-nāma-ratna-sahasra-vyākhyā* is available in manuscript [D. 15508] in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. We shall now explain the aim of this work.

According to Advaita, the intuitive knowledge of Brahman is the means to liberation. The performance of rituals purifies the mind of the aspirant and generates in his mind the desire to know Brahman. Possessed of the fourfold means, namely, *nityā-nitya-rastu-viveka*, *ihāmutrārthabhogavirāga*, *śama-damādi-sādhana-sāmpat* and *mumukshutvam*, the aspirant resorts to a preceptor and pursues *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. By *śravaṇa* is meant the ascertainment that the final import of the Upanishads is the absolute Brahman. *Manana* is arguing within oneself, after knowing definitely what the Upanishads teach with a view to convince oneself that that teaching alone is true. *Nididhyāsana* is the profound meditation upon the identity of the individual soul and Brahman.

It has been said that the knowledge of Brahman is the sole means to liberation. And that could arise only from the major texts of the Upanishads like *tat tvam asi*, etc. The knowledge thus arising from the texts is not effective in dispelling *avidyā*, because the intellect of the aspirant who has such a knowledge is confounded by latent impressions arisen from enjoyment of worldly objects (*vishaya-bhoga-vāsanā*), doubt regarding the validity of the Upanishadic passages (*pramāṇāsambhāvanā*), contrary notion as regards the import of the Upanishadic texts (*prameyāsambhāvanā*) and an unconscious reassertion of old habits of thought (*viparītabhāvanā*) incompatible with the truth since learnt. The

four-fold means removes *vishayabhogavāsanā*. *Śravaṇa* and *manana* remove *pramāṇāsambhāvanā* and *prameyāsambhāvanā*. And, *viparīta-bhāvanā* could be removed only by *nidīdhyāsana*. The latter consists in the meditation on one's nature as free from body, senses, etc.

Our author states:

'ātmatatva-sākshātkāravato'pi anekasatasahasrajanma vāsanā-vaśāt anuvartamānā dehādyātmabuddhirūpā viparītabhāvanā madhye madhye punaḥ punaḥ anuvartate; ataḥ tannirāsāya viraktasya kṛita-śravaṇasya tyaktasarvaishāṇasya labdhasākshātkāravato'pi nīrantaram dehendriyādi-dṛiśya-prapañcha-pravilāpana-purassaram svarūpānusandhānam kartavyam' (p. 3).

Meditation upon one's nature as free from body, senses, etc., and as identical with Brahman should be pursued with the help of the words of the Upanishadic texts which convey the true nature of Brahman.

'tasmāt ātmānantādīśabdaiḥ svarūpānusandhānam kartavyam' (p. 7).

Words like *satya*, etc., found in the Upanishadic texts convey in an affirmative manner the nature of Brahman as *satya*, etc. And words like *asthūla*, etc., found in the Upanishadic texts convey in a negative way the nature of Brahman as free from duality, etc. The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* prescribes a method of gathering the unrepeatable words found in the affirmative Upanishadic passages in the aphorism—*ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya* (3.3.11), and applies the same consideration to the words found in the negative Upanishadic passages in the aphorism—

akṣharadhiyām tvavarodhaḥ sāmānya-tadbhāvābhyām-aupasadavat taduktam (3.3.33).

Our author states:

taduktam sūtrakāraiḥ : 'ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya' iti ānandādayaḥ śabdāḥ vidhimukhena brahmasvarūpam pratipādayitum pravṛittāḥ; anye asthūlādayaḥ śabdāḥ dehendriyādidṛiśyaprapañchanishedhamukhena pravṛittāḥ—tadapyuktam-akṣharadhiyām tvavarodhaḥ sāmānya-tadbhāvābhyām aupasadavat taduktam. (p. 7).

In this way our author has collected one thousand words in the alphabetical order from the principal Upanishads and also from the *Nṛsiṃhatāpinyupaniṣad*, and has shown how those words convey Brahman.

ataḥ nāmnām sahasram īśāvāsyādyāsu tāpanīyāntīsu śrutishu buddhisaukāryāya akārādīkshakārāntatayā saṁgrihīam (p. 11).

The words that are affirmative in character cannot convey Brahman through primary signification. Every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing as associated with a certain genus, or act, or quality, or mode of relation. But Brahman which transcends both speech and mind, which is free from all qualities, has no genus, possesses no qualities, does not act, and is related to nothing else; therefore the primary signification would not hold good. The words that are affirmative in character convey the nature of Brahman only through secondary signification. The words that are negative in character negate all duality in Brahman and thereby indicate that the latter is devoid of any relation, quality, part, etc. It should be noted here that the words that are negative in character merely negate the forms brought about by *avidyā* in Brahman. They do not, like the affirmative ones, refer to some form and convey it as the essential nature of Brahman.

Thus, by collecting and giving the meaning of one thousand words from the Upanishads, Śrī Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī has rendered a solid service to the cause of Advaita, particularly to those who, having reached the higher stage of *manana*, are desirous of overcoming *viparītabhāvanā* by meditating upon the nature of Brahman conveyed by the numerous words constituting the Upanishads.

NALLAKAVI

by

C. SIVARAMAMURTI

M.A.

The mellifluous poetry of early Sanskrit poets has almost completely appropriated to itself all attention and appreciation. Among the works of later poets probably Jayadeva's lyrical compositions from the *Gītagovinda* alone have won an unprecedented popularity. But later compositions have generally never evoked the enthusiasm that early poets have always commanded.

Sanskrit, being the language of culture in India embodying the texts in every field of science and thought, has always been cultivated, and enjoyed the patronage of rulers and scholars alike.

Among the later day Sanskrit writers the polymath Appayya Dīkshita wrote over a hundred books on a variety of subjects. His nephew Samarapuṅgava Dīkshita is the author of *Yātrāprabandha*, a beautiful composition. But it is Appayya's grand-nephew Nilakaṇṭha Dīkshita who is the most outstanding for originality of thought and beauty of composition. This was in the seventeenth century when Tirumala Nāyaka of Madurai patronised art and literature. During this period of the Nāyakas of Madurai and Thaṅjāvur several poets enriched Sanskrit literature. Rāmabhadra Dīkshita and Ratnakheṭa Dīkshita are great names. Sadāśiva Brahmendra who composed beautiful songs of devotion and sublime thought wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* for the benefit of the beginners in the field of Vedānta.

Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkarāchārya himself had composed such simple songs as *Bhaja-govindam* for the easy comprehension of difficult thoughts by even the simplest of folk. His poetic presentation of Advaitic ideas in verses like those in *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* is to cater to the taste of intellectually better equipped disciples who are yet not ripe enough to fully comprehend his masterly com-

mentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavadgītā*.

It is in this strain that several later day compositions have tried to make difficult philosophic tenets appeal to the layman. There are instances of even allegorical dramas like the *Prabodha-chandrodaya* of Kṛishṇamiśra.

It is in this line of compositions that we have the *Advaitarasamañjarī* of Nallākavi who lived in the 18th century. This poet was the author of *Subhadrāpariṇayanāṭaka* and hailed from the village Kaṇḍaramāṇikya which had also produced earlier the famous poet Uddaṇḍa. Nallākavi also wrote a farce *Śṛiṅgūrasarvasvabhāṇa*. Born of Bālachandra Dīkshita he had the good fortune to study at the feet of Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī. He thus came in contact with and obtained the blessings of the most renowned of the disciple of Paramaśivendra, i.e., the author of the *Brahmatattvaprakāśikā*, an inimitable *vṛitti* on the *Vedānta-sūtra*. To this satīrthya he specially offers his salutation:

vedāntasūtravṛittipraṇayana
svyaktanaijapāṇḍityam
vande avadhūtamārgapravartakam
śrī sadāśivabrahma.

Nallākavi's authorship of the *Advaitarasamañjarī* is doubted, and it is attributed to Sadāśivabrahmendra, but there appears to be no reason to doubt the explicit statement of Nallākavi as the author of this work and his special respect for Sadāśivendra whom he salutes as he commences his work.

It is as a humble follower in the footsteps of Sadāśivabrahmendra and even Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda himself that Nallākavi composed his *Advaitarasamañjarī* which he himself rightly describes as a sweet pill of immortality to help take in the difficult import of the *Upanishads* which are the bitter though sure remedy for the malady of the cycle of births and deaths:

bhavarogasyaushadhamiti pātum
kaṭumaupanishadabhavamasau
virachayya amṛitaghaṭikām
vitaraṭi nallākaviḥ sudhiyām.

As in the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra*, *Advaitapañchaka* or *Śataślokī* or *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi* or *Praśnottararatnamālā* of Bhagavatpāda, the verses in the *Advaitarasamañjarī* individually unravel in a simple but effective way the well-known thoughts and parables expounded in the texts of the Vedānta. His own simple commentary, replete with appropriate quotations from the *Upanishads*, Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*, *Śaṅkshepa-śārīraka*, *Jñānavāsisikṭha*, *Pañchadaśaprakaraṇa*, *Sūtasamhitā*, *Anubhūtiprakāśikā*, *Vārtikasūtra* and other books, further clarifies the import of the verses.

Following the lead of Śaṅkara, Nallākavi has this verse:

*adhyāsavisphuradanēkavidhātmabhedaṁ
ajñānam āśritavataḥ sulabhā na muktiḥ
ādarsagehamabhitaḥ pratibimbitāntaḥ
dvāram gatasya na bahirgatirarbhakasya,*

which closely resembles the thought expressed in

*viśvam darpaṇādriśyamānanagarītulyam nijāntargatam
paśyannātmani māyayā bahirivodbhūtam yathā nidrayā
yaḥ sākṣhātukurute prabodhasamaye svātmānamēvādvayam
tasmai śrīgurumūrtaye nama idam śrīdakṣiṇāmūrtaye.*

Nallākavi is such a staunch Advaitin that he is out for claiming Advaita in what is obviously a combination of two. He feels that even the distinctly different parts of the body of Ganeśa like the elephant's head and human body have come together as one to show the path of Advaita, and in his initial invocatory verse he prays to Ganeśa to unravel to him all the truth of Advaita as he manifests Advaita even in his body make-up:

*advaitameva paramārthatayā vivektum
aṅgīkṛitadvipānarākṛitisanniveśaḥ,
advaitagocharam aśeshaviśeshamantar-
āvishkarotu varado mama vignarājaḥ.*

His simple treatment of his subject to bring home the teachings of the *Upanishads* as in his verse

*śantyādisādhanaavataḥ puruṣhottamena
samprāpyate nijapadam varadeśīkoktyā
chorairaranyasaraṇim gamitena puṁsā
deśo niḥ hi tadabhiḥṇa giraiva gamyaḥ*

is made very clear in his commentary where he quotes the *Chhāndogya*

*‘paṇḍito medhāvī gāndhārānevopasampadyeta
evameveha āchāryavān purusho veda’.*

While offering the truth of great parables in simple verse as in his

*kūṭastha-nitya-sukha-bodhatanoh pratīchaḥ
bandho vimochanamiti bhramadurvilāsaḥ
vandhyāsutasya vapurādiguṇaprapañchaḥ
tatpañchatā cha sutarām parikalpanaiva*

he scrupulously gives his source by quoting the verse from the *Jñānavāsishṭha*—

*chidvyoma kevalam-anantam-anādimadhyam
brahmaiva bhāti nijachittavaśāt svayambhu
ākaravāniva pumāniva vastutastu
vandhyātanūja iva tasyu tu nāsti dehaḥ.*

That Nallākavi can give a humorous twist to even a philosophical tenet is clear in his verse—

*viśvam samastamapi vibhramamātrametat
ātmaiva sannayamananyasukhaprakāśaḥ
sphūrtyaiva viśvamapi satyamitīṣhyate chet
ko nāma śūktirajatena dhanī bhavenna,*

where the last line cannot fail to bring a smile on the lips of even a rugged philosopher.

The poet discusses the various problems of Advaitic thought in his simple effective verses taking up a theme for each. These are the ones like the *rajjusarpa*, *ghaṭākāśa*, *śūktirajata*, *vandhyāsuta*, to mention a few. He gives telling and clear examples to drive home a truth. The illusion of a circle of fire is only as long as a lit faggot is whirled vigorously to produce that illusion. When it is stopped the circle disappears. It is even so with this illusory circle of births and deaths that make the whole series appear a reality in right earnest till it is stopped by true realisation that puts an end to nodding.

Basing on the *bhāṣya* of Bhagavatpāda

*‘tasmānnāvagata brahmātmabhāvasya
yathāpūrvam saṁsāritvam, yasya tu*

*yathāpūrvam saṁsāritvam nāsau
avagatabrahmātmabhāvaḥ'*

Nallākavi says:

*ālōkyatām bhuvanachakramalātachakram
atyantavibhramaviḥṛimbhītamasthīraṁ cha
daivādbhramasya viratau samupasthitāyām
nālōkyate kila pureva punastadeva.*

It is the defect of the eye that perceives the moon twined, tripled or multiplied. Even so it is a lack of true perception that helps one to see diversity where only the one Ultimate exists. Nallākavi in commenting on his verse

*ekopi sannayam anekatayā vibhāti
bhūmā svakalpitatamaḥpaṭālānushaṅgāt
indurdvītīyarahitopi cha sadvītīya-
bhāvena bhāti purushasya nijākshidoshāt*

aptly quotes a well-known passage to illustrate effectively his point

'nahyayam sthāṇoraparādhāḥ yadenamandho na paśyati.'

He gives the telling example of *chitrapaṭa* or a painting with different lines and colours composing different elements of the picture composition in spite of the divinity of all of which it is after all a canvas all through. Quoting

*'nāsyātmano'ntar bahirvā chaitanyādanyad
rūpamasti; chaitanyameva tu nirantaramasya
svarūpam, yathā saindhavaghanasya antarbahiścha
lavaṇarasa eva nirantaro bhavati na rasāntaram'*

he explains it in his verse

*'ādhyāsikasphuraṇabedhatirohito'pi
chiddhāturekarasatām na jahāti jātu
nānācharācharavichitracharitrato'pi
chitraḥ paṭo na paṭabhāvampāsyati svam.'*

Ingeniously he explains *rasavad brahma* of Śaṅkara's exposition:

*'bāhyānandasādhanarahitāpyañoḥa
nireshaṇā brāhmaṇāḥ bāhyarasaalābhādiva*

*sānandā dṛiśyante vidvāṁsaḥ;
nūnam brahmaiva rasaḥ teshām;
tasmādasti tat teshām ānandakāraṇam
rasavad brahma'*

by fully utilising the double entendre or multiplicity of connotation of the word *rasa* and illustrating the attainment of the divine stream of Gaṅgā instead of the willo' the wisp of a mirage as exactly what is attained by seers who discard the illusion of the outer world for realising Brahmarasa or Supreme bliss.

*viśvam mṛishā virasamityavadhīrya dhairyāt
āsvādyate munibhirantarasaḥ rasātmā
uchchāvacham marumarīchirasaḥ nirasya
samsevate sumatibhiḥ surasindhupūraḥ.*

As a contrast he gives the example of the fool who without understanding the true import of the universe as Bliss suffers through his very ignorance. He compares him to a little child who unable to understand the true import of his own shadow on the wall imagines it to be a spirit and shudders:

*ānandavisphuraṇa rūpamapi prapañcham
anyam vibhāvya paritāpamupaiti mugdhaḥ
dīpādishu svavapushaḥ paridṛśyamānām
chāyām vigāhya parimuhya kiṁ na bālaḥ.*

Nallākavi describes the attitude of one who has realised the truth in a telling verse where he compares the enlightened one unperturbed by the complexities of the illusory world to the one wide awake recalling his wild dreams but never frightened by the image of wild animals pursuing him:

*mithyā samullasatū nāma jagadvichitram
etāvatāpi mama tattvavido na hāniḥ
svapne bhayaṅkaragajādīnirīkṣhaṇepi
na svāpnikatvamanusandhato'sti bhītiḥ.*

The wise one who has realised this truth and is untouched by these illusions can still carry on in this world as usual to fulfil his normal obligations to society like one who is fully aware that his face is where it is and not in the mirror and yet uses the mirror like any other:

*atyantametadasadityapi cha vyavasyan
 adhyātmaḍṛiṣṭīranuvartata eva lokam
 nāstyatra vaktramiti niśchayavānapi drāk
 ādatta eva mukuram mukhadarśanāya.*

If such a one prefers often to go into a trance or contemplation it is because of a force of habit as there is nothing more for him to do to attain anything as he has already realised the Truth. In this he is like the emperor who has all that he could wish for but still uses the elephants and horses in his play of chess to win his game just to while away his time and because of a force of habit:

*sarvātmatāmupagato hi munissamādhim
 pūrvānuvṛittamayate samayāpanuttyai
 paryāptasarvavibhavaḥ kshitipo hi kāla-
 niryāpanāya jushate chaturāṅgameva.*

Such an enlightened one, free from all volition motiva'ed by desire, is amused by scriptural injunctions and prohibitions; even as one lazy beyond measure and completely averse to action enjoys to hear utterances of 'do and don't'. Such a saint is truly an emperor among sages and his movement at will cannot be questioned as in the case of an emperor at the peak of his power acting according to the dictates of his mind:

*tattvānuchintanaparo munisārvabhaumaḥ
 svacchandato vyavaharannapi nānujojyaḥ
 sāmrajyametya yathāruchi vartamānaḥ
 rājā prajābhiranuyoktum aśakya eva.*

One who has experienced the illusory nature of wordly splendour is not lured by its grandeur just as even a passionate youth is not drawn by the blandishments of a boy acting the heroine:

*prāpañchikastu vibhavaḥ paramādbhuto'pi
 dhīram na rañjayati ḍṛiṣṭatadīya, tattvam
 strīveshabhūshitatanuḥ purusho vilāsaiḥ
 tajñam yuvānamapi rañjayitum hi nālam.*

On the other hand, having firmly established his mind in the Truth of the Absolute, the seer has no more any concern for

worldly enjoyments like one lofty in spirit blessed with a fortune by great good luck can never lower himself again to miserly beggary.

*antarnirantara nirūḍhanijātmatattvaḥ
na prāgiva vyasanitām vishayeshu dhatte
bhāgyāt kutaśchidapi labdhanidhirmanasvī
kṛm pūrvavat kṛpaṇatām urarīkaroti.*

Finally Nallākavi justifies the quotation in his commentary

*āryatā hr̥dyatā maitrī
saumyatā samatā jñatā
samāśrayanti tam nityam
antaḥpuramivāṅganāḥ*

by describing how all the great ātmaguṇas or saintly qualities come of their own accord to adorn the seer who has realised the Bliss of the Absolute, just as one who has won over the king as a friend is surrounded and served by the retinue of the royal household—

*adhyakshitasvamānamalam̐kriyāvad
ādhyātmikāśśubhaguṇāḥ svayamāviśanti
svadhonite suhṛdi rajani tasya bhṛityā
ye te'pi cha svayamupetya tamāśrayante.*

In concluding with this verse this brief discussion of Nallākavi's charming poem on Advaita, one cannot help feeling that the one ocular presentation of this thought expressed by the poet is in the personality of our beloved and revered Bhagavatapāda Śrī Chandrasekharendra Sarasvatī himself, who, having realised the Absolute and beaming with all the ādhyātmika guṇas, is moving amidst us all with no other purpose except that of leading us on to the 'blessed other shore', as he is the embodiment of mercy, and we are the kittens to be carried to safety according to the *mārjārakiśora-nyāya*.

SADASIVA BRAHMENDRA SARASVATI

by

N. RAGHUNATHAN

M.A., B.L.

Sadāśiva Brahmendra Sarasvatī, the *mahāyogin* and *jīvan-mukta*, became a legend in his own lifetime. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw a great flowering of the spirit in the Tamil country, especially in the Tanjore region under the enlightened rule of the Nayak and Maharashtra dynasties. Under the aegis of Sahaji (1684-1711) flourished a brilliant galaxy of poets and makers of music, scholars and thinkers who were noted alike for their personal purity and acuteness of intellect. Many of them, including it is believed Sadāśiva's father, were settled in Sahajirājapuram, a royal grant for the encouragement of learning. Great saints sojourned among them, providing the inspiration to the higher life. In Sadāśiva, all the varied talent of that time of awakening seems to have met and blended harmoniously. His output as a poet and writer in the Vedāntic tradition was slender. But he touched the imagination of the people in a unique way, only Bodhendra and Śrīdhara Veṅkaṭeśa, affectionately known as 'Ayyāvāl', being comparable to him in this respect.

Many miraculous tales are told about him, but few concrete facts are known. He was the disciple of Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī, the fifty-seventh head of the Kāñchī Kāmakōṭi Śaṅkarāchārya Pīṭha, whose greatness he repeatedly extols. Paramaśivendra seems to have been a contemporary of the great poet Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkshita (born in 1612 A.D. or earlier); for his disciple Rāmanātha was a contemporary of Rāmabhadra Dīkshita, the accomplished poet and grammarian, who was a pupil of Nīlakaṇṭha, and won his praise. And Rāmanātha's pupil Nallā Adhvarī, a younger relation of Rāmabhadra Dīkshita, acknowledges in his *Advaita-rasamañjarī* Sadāśiva as his spiritual preceptor after his Guru Paramaśivendra. So we may take it that Sadāśiva was

born about the same time as Rāmabhadra, in the early years of the seventeenth century.

He mastered all the Śāstras at an early age and was a formidable debater. But a mild word of rebuke from his Guru, says tradition, made him a maunī. He spent his time mostly in the secluded peace and charm of the Kaveri banks as an *avadhūta*; only occasionally emerging, to bestow his grace on some fortunate individual such as Malhari Pandita, who requested him to bless his patron Serfoji (1911-29), who was childless, or Vijaya Raghunātha Tōṇḍaimān of Pudukkoṭṭah, or passing through the countryside like a silent benediction, radiating kindliness and compassion. He seems to have lived far beyond the Vedic span of a century and attained beatitude at Nerur near Karur on the Kaveri.

And now for a brief survey of his works: Appayya Dīkshita's works had great influence in that age of intellectual ferment and vigorous polemic. His *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* is a survey of the development of Advaitic doctrines after Śaṅkara. Sadāśiva made a verse compendium of it, evidently to serve as a refresher to the serious student engaged in *manana*. His commentary, *Kesara-vallī* is an integral part of the work. It supplements the text, as well as elucidating it. The verses convey, as the author justly claims, a depth of meaning in simple words. Indeed all his expository work is both concise and lucid.

Of his method in this work we can give but one instance here. The first section of the text treats of a question of Vedic exegetics—whether the study of the Vedānta is enjoined as an *apūrva vidhi*, a *niyama vidhi*, or a *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*. Three verses are devoted to the statement of the first and the last views and to the conclusion (Vāchaspati Miśra's), which is that there is no *vidhi* at all involved here. But as there are as many as nine varieties of the view that it is a *niyama vidhi*, the five major ones are set out in as many verses; while the minor varieties are relegated to the commentary, or altogether omitted, as being but derivatives or extended applications. Thus the seventh verse puts forward the *Vivarana* view that the injunction is restrictive, aiming at confining the study of the Vedānta to the traditional mode under a *guru* by a proper *adhikārī*. And the commentary mentions three possible violations of this injunction, which are prohi-

bited by implication. These are (a) that an intelligent man might be tempted to rely on his own powers of mind to intuit the Vedāntic truth, instead of studying and reflecting on it as revealed by the Upanishadic texts; or (b) he might dispense with the guidance of a *guru*; or (c) that a dullard might be content to study Vedānta through uncanonical expositions in the vernacular.

In such summary statement there is naturally no room for scholastic subtleties. But this may have the advantage of highlighting the main threads of argument. This is found to be eminently the case in the *Brahma-tattva-prakāśikā*, the brief but splendid gloss on the *Brahma-sūtra*. While faithfully adhering to the *Bhāṣhya*, Sadāśiva makes no attempt to follow the master into the fascinating by-paths. To take an instance at random, in explaining the *sūtra*, "It (the *Prāṇa*) is designated as having five functions, like the mind" (ii-iv-ii), Śaṅkara, after examining and rejecting as unsatisfactory a number of alternative reasons why the word 'five' in the *sūtra* as applied to mind should be taken literally, concludes that it is intended merely to suggest, not a specific number, but plurality. Sadāśiva skips the discussions and simply states the conclusion, and he brings out the *Bhāṣhya* view of the *sūtra* in these pithy words: "Because of its special and manifold functions, *prāṇa* is subsidiary to the soul, resembling the mind in this respect."

The *Bhāṣhyakāra* is occasionally laconic when from the context the meaning is fairly clear; as for example in III, ii, 25, especially when it is considered along with the succeeding *sūtras* 29 and 34 where the word *karmanī*, which he leaves unexplained, obviously refers to the act of wrapt worship (*saṃrādhana*), which has the adjuncts (*upādhis*) of *dhyāna*, etc. In fact the *Bhāmatī* and its sub-commentaries simply pass over the word. But Sadāśiva, following the *Ratnaprabhā*, elucidates *karmanī* as *dhyānādyupādhanau karmanī*. Apparently he anticipated that there might be people like Thibaut, who, puzzled by the fact that "*karmanī* is as good as passed over by him", confidently concluded, "It certainly looks here as if the *Bhāṣhyakāra* did not know what to do with the words of the *sūtra*".

Commenting on II, ii, 37, the *Bhāṣhyakāra* reviews and refutes the schools that maintain that the Lord is only the efficient cause

of the universe, not the material cause. Though he includes the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga in this indictment, and in this is followed by the *Bhāmatī* and its sub-commentaries, Sadāśiva in his gloss does not refer to them but takes the attack as mainly directed against the Māheśvaras. This is in all probability due to his view, set out in his work on the *Yoga-sūtras* (described below) in commenting on the *Yoga-sūtra* IV, 3. His view is that the Sāṅkhya does not recognise Īśvara at all, holding that the subserving of the interests of the *puruṣa* alone is the teleological cause of the restarting of the heterogeneous activities of the *guṇas* in *pradhāna* after *pralaya*; while the yogis, though they do regard Īśvara as the final cause, acting in the interests of the *puruṣas*, assign to 'dharma' and 'adharma', the role of efficient cause, which is a rather negative one in this system. If the view here put forward is right, it should be clear that Sadāśiva could take an independent line when he felt it necessary.

While thus unobtrusively condensing, elucidating, supplementing and qualifying, his main aim in his gloss is to give the student a bird's-eye view of the system. He brings out the coherence of the thought and the cogency of the argument, showing how, as the teaching develops through all its ramifications, the central thesis, the Brahman-ātman equation, is never lost sight of. Particularly helpful is his practice of bringing out the logical connection (*saṅgati*), between *adhyāya* and *adhyāya*, *pāda* and *pāda*, *sūtra* and *sūtra*. His method of exposition is to set out under each *sūtra* the subject, the doubt that necessitates the enquiry, the consequences that would flow from either of two possible conclusions, and the leading arguments in support of the *prima facie* view and the view that is ultimately arrived at. In beautifully simple verses he sets out the kernel of every major section. The *Vṛitti* is thus an ideal handbook for the student.

The *Yogasudhākara*, an extremely valuable gloss on the *Pātañjala-sūtras*, is undoubtedly Brahmendra's work. But this is the one major work of his, in which he does not anywhere mention Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī as his Guru. He pays homage, instead, to an *unnamed guru* by whose grace, he says, he got the *vidyā* and, having "churned it in his mind" (*vilōḍya*), wrote this *Vṛitti*. Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī has not left any work on Yoga. The references to Yoga and Kaivalya in his *Dahara-vidyā*-

prakāśikā suggest, rather, that his primary preoccupation was with the Upanishadic vidyās. Brahmendra may have studied Ashtāṅga-yoga under some other *guru*. We need not be surprised that one who attained the summits of Vedāntic realisation should have practised Ashtāṅga-yoga, for the Bhagavatpāda repeatedly points out that the Advaitin accepts such teachings of the yoga and other similar 'smṛitis' as are not opposed to the Vedānta, and often refers to the fruits of Ashtāṅga-yoga.¹ But Brahmendra, with his Vedāntic background, and from personal *anubhava*, seems to have reached conclusions regarding 'Īśvara-praṇidhāna' and the state of Kaivalya, which are not strictly in conformity with the orthodox doctrine as expounded in the Vyāsa Bhāṣhya and Vāchaspati's gloss, *Tattvavaiśārādī*. While verse 63 of *Ātmavidyāvilāsa* says that he is transmitting the Upanishadic vidyās taught by his guru Paramaśiva, his familiarity with *Pātañjala* yoga is clear from other ślokas.

Modern scholars have been puzzled by the seeming inconsistency between *Yoga-sūtra* I-23 and *Yoga-sūtra* II-1. 'Īśvara-praṇidhāna' and 'kriyā yoga', terms which occur in the latter *sūtra*, are interpreted by the *Bhāṣhya* and the *ṭīkā* as pointing to the well-known *Gītā* teaching of karma yoga. But 'Īśvara-praṇidhāna' in *Yoga-sūtra* I-23 is taken by them to mean 'special adoration' (*bhakti-viśeṣam*). Brahmendra, however, interprets the term in the same way in both contexts, as meaning loving devotion only. Sadāśiva was a student of the *Bhāgavata* and wrote a *Bhāgavata-sāra*. This probably had a decisive influence on his taking to the *avadhūta* life. He, it seems, made a collection of all the texts bearing on 'Pāramahansa-yacharyā'. His interpretation of *kriyā-yoga* seems to be based on the rather specialized and restricted significance that term has in the eleventh skandha (see especially Ch. XX-6 to 9, and Ch. XXVII-1 & 9). Taking all the *yoga-sūtras* bearing on the subject together, he thinks three grades of authorities are distinguished. To him who cannot free himself from the lure of the world, *karma-yoga* is prescribed as part of *niyama* (see comment on II-28, 32 and 45).

1. Vidyāranya in his commentary on *Aparokshānubhūti*, however, only grudgingly concedes a subordinate and ancillary use for *Pātañjala* yoga in the case of *manda-adhikāris*.

Yoga-sūtra II-1 has in view the man whose mind is rather better controlled though not yet completely purified. *Yoga-sūtra* I-23, applies to the man who has fully succeeded in that. When the mind is purified by devotion to "the Paramaguru who has in sport assumed an exceedingly winsome form", says Sadāśiva Brahmendra (on *yoga-sūtra* II-1), prema-bhakti, the intensified and exclusive devotion referred to in I-23, comes naturally. Pleased with that, the Lord grants the devotee the one-pointed concentration he yearns for, and that leads in due course, to *kaivalya*.

How exactly this works is thus explained in his comment on I-29. Intense and sustained *praṇava-japa*, which is the praise of the Lord, when accompanied by loving concentration on Him, leads successively to the cessation of verbal activity (including *japa*), the inclining of the mind, by the grace of the Lord, towards quiescence and the detachment of the mind even from Him, for it achieves direct perception of the self (*pratyāsatti*). Recognising the similarity (*sādrīśya*) between the self, "its own master", which in its pristine state is free spirit (*asaṅga-chidrūpa*) and Īśvara, who is eternally and unchangeably that, it reminds the self of its true status; and then, its task done, it sinks down, like fire that has consumed its fuel. When *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* have destroyed subliminal impressions, the *pratyak-chiti* (pure spirit) shines forth, established, says Brahmendra, in language reminiscent of the Upanishads, in its own glory (*sve mahimni niranantaram nirvighnam avatishṭhate*). From the above, it will be seen that Brahmendra's view of *kaivalya* is closer to the Vedāntic conception of *mukti*, which is eternal bliss, than that of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, where it means a passionless and passive isolation for the *puruṣa*.

This impersonal joy that goes with super-consciousness is in fact the key-note of all the creative work of Brahmendra. His poems and songs represent this totality of experience. Flashes of poetry illuminate the philosophical poems, even as mystical ecstasy communicates itself through an unforced lyricism in the *kīrtanas*. And the golden thread of *bhakti* runs through them all.

While in a sense all his poems are in adoration of the Guru, whom he looked upon as his God, the short *Navamaṇi-mālā* is specifically in praise of Paramasivendra, "who from the purest compassion bestowed on me the dazzling gem of the *Ātmavidyā*".

In the *Svapnoditam*, he describes how the duality of seer and seen disappeared, "when by the grace of the moon, my Guru, I was submerged in the swelling sea of the *chit* and I saw nought but Self". In the beautiful *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-dhyānam*, he describes the glorious form of the Paramaguru and how He should be meditated upon as the Nirguṇa, the One without a second. But the most important work of Sadāśiva in this class is his brilliant *Guru-ratna-mālikā* in eighty-seven verses which he wrote at the instance of Ātmabodha, his fellow-disciple and successor of Paramaśiva on the Śaṅkara pīṭha. Following the *Puṇyaśloka-mañjarī* of his *parama-guru*, Sarvajña-sadāśiva-bodha, fifty-sixth head of the Kāñchī pīṭha, he celebrates that long and brilliant succession of yogis and *jīvan-muktas*.

The age in which Sadāśiva lived was one of keen theological controversy. His own Guru was a master of polemic. In his *Dahara-vidyā-prakāśikā*, and his commentary on the *Śiva-gītā*, Paramaśiva, while paying his homage to Viṣṇu, vigorously maintains the supremacy of Para-śiva, as "the Paramātmā seated in the heart". At the same time, as his special contribution to the literature of Nāma-siddhānta, he collected from the Upanishads and other sacred texts, in his *Svarūpānusandhāna* which is not yet published, more than a thousand names connoting Brahman, with extensive commentaries thereon. Of this latter work Sadāśiva offers a selection in his short poem *Ātmānusandhāna*. His heart was drawn to Śiva, "*yoginām paramam gurum*", even as Appayya's was; but he remained unshaken in his *Advaitic* conviction, which is incompatible with the kind of sectarian mentality that depreciates Viṣṇu at the expense of Śiva and *vice versa*. His poems on Parameśvara in the *Navaratnamālā*, the *Svānubhūti-prakāśikā* and the *Śiva-mānasa-pūjā* show ecstatic devotion. But in these, as in the *kīrtanas*, his mind passes with effortless ease from surrender to the Divine Personality to absorption in the Bliss of Brahman.

About twenty-five of his *kīrtanas* are available; half a dozen of these sing Rāma,—“He sports within me in the cave of the heart, with Peace, the daughter of Videha, for his companion”. He devotes an equal number of songs to the Vanamālī, Nanda's darling. And the bliss of the Unconditioned Absolute is celebrated in a dozen songs. It is not possible to explain in words, the charm of songs like "*mānasasañchara re*", "*sarvam brahmamayam*", or

"*chintā nāsti kila*". They rain down a gentle influence on the heart, laying all doubts, lulling the ego, and bringing the passionless peace that rejoices the sophisticate and the simple alike.

It is in the *Ātmavidyā-vilāsa*, which enshrines the quintessential experience of the *mukta*, that Brahmendra's soul engages in its loftiest flight. There are two versions—one in sixty-two lovely Āryā verses, which is far better known, and perfect as a pearl; though the other, in forty-six verses, like another poem, the *Bodhārya-prakaraṇa* attributed to Brahmendra, is not without flashes of beauty, it is versified philosophy rather than metaphysical poetry.

The *Ātma-vidyā-vilāsa* is a spiritual autobiography, from which the merely contingent and ephemeral have been excluded. The quest, the practice and the perfection are all recorded, not systematically, but with the higher logic of poetry. It is the canticle of praise by the soul that has found itself, returned to its own home, its long odyssey done—the nightmare travail on the phantom sea of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa*. To him who knows their use all things are useful. The world of phenomena, when it ceases to be a snare, is a source of delight; the Self-realised is become as a child again.

tvamaham-abhimāna-hīno
modita-nānājanāchāraḥ
viharati bālavadeko
vimala-sukhāmbhoniḍhau magnaḥ.

He is a *rasa-jña*, tasting the eternal sweetness of the *chit*. Nature—"red in tooth and claw" for us—ministers to him, the fine river sand a softer bed than eiderdown:

viñāna-nadī kuñja-grihe
mañjula-pulinaika-mañjutara-talpe
śete kopi yatīndraḥ
samarasa-sukha-bodha-vastu-nistandraḥ.

He no longer takes; he gives. Bringing us wisdom and joy like some supernal sun and moon, cooling the consuming fire of passion like the breeze of heaven, he realises for us the transcendent glory that is symbolised by the song of the cuckoo, the dance of the peacock, the serenity of the swan. He knows *samādhi* with and without object, he has practised *tapas* and *vairāgya*; he has borne without resentment the jeers and flouts of the ignorant. But all that is

past. He neither praises nor blames, neither rejects nor requests. He is always and everywhere at home, nothing is alien to him. He is the king established in his own kingdom, the Peace that passeth understanding; he who, being nothing, is everything:

*vastunyastamitākṣhīla-viśvavihāre vilīnamanāḥ
rājati parānapēksho rājākṣhīla-vītarāgāṇām.*

It was this *pūrṇatva*, plenitude of light and bliss, that made men say, who had a fleeting vision of that Śuka-like spirit:

sadāśīva-brahma-rūpam brahmādrākṣham chirepsitam.

SOME PRE-SANKARA ADVAITINS

(i)

ATREYA BRAHMANANDI AND DRAVIDACHARYA

by

POLAGAM SRI RAMA SASTRI
Śāstra-Ratnākara

These two personages who are among the early expounders of the pure Advaitic tradition were born in the beginning of this *yuga*. Of these two, Brahmanandī wrote a work called *Vākya* in *sūtra* form and it was an exposition of the purport of the *Chāndogyopanishad*. Dravidāchārya embellished that work by his *bhāshya* on it. On account of this, these authors came to be known as *Vākyakāra* and a *Bhāshyakāra*, respectively.

In the *Chāndogyopanishad*, from the first to the fifth *adhyāya* the following topics are expounded for the benefit of persons of inferior and not-so-inferior qualifications: three kinds of *upāsanas* namely, *aṅgāvabaddhopāsanā* which leads to the fruits of karma, *svatantrapratīkopāsanā* which bestows material welfare, and *ahaṅ-grahopāsanā* which leads to *krama-mukti*. In the sixth, seventh, and eighth *adhyāyas* are expounded in order *sadvidyā*, *bhūmāvidyā*, and *prājāpatyavidyā*. These have their fruition in *sadyomukti* or immediate release. These relate to the realisation of nirguṇa Brahman which is *sacchidānanda* and are expounded for persons of superior qualification. In the eighth *adhyāya*, for the benefit of persons of intermediate qualification, *daharavidyā* which relates to saguna Brahman is explained again. Thus two kinds of Brahman are treated of in the *Chāndogyopanishad*, the qualified Brahman to be worshipped and the Brahman free from any qualities which is only to be known and realised.

In his *Vākya-grantha* which is an exposition of the *Chāndogyopanishad*, Brahmanandī too clearly brings out, in accord with the Upanishad, the two-fold character of Brahman. Dravidāchārya also in his *bhāshya* on the *vākya*, very clearly expounds the

two-fold Brahman and his exposition is in line with the Upanishad and the *vākya*. Unfortunately, these two works are not available.

However, thirty statements of the *vākya* and twenty of the *bhāshya* are available having been quoted in the works of early writers. Of these, eight statements of *vākya-grantha* and nine of the *bhāshya* are found quoted in Advaitic works. Twenty-two of *vākya-grantha* and eleven of the *bhāshya* are quoted in the writings of Śrī Rāmānuja and others. Thus from both the *vākya* and *bhāshya* we are now in possession of only fifty statements. They have been set forth in the work entitled *Draviḍātreya-darśanam*.

Śrī Śaṅkara and others have quoted in their Advaitic works from the *bhāshya* of Draviḍāchārya in the context of the explanation of the *mādhvavidyā* and *saṁvargavidyā* found in the third and the fourth chapters of the *Chāndogyopanishad*. Śrī Rāmānuja and others quote from the *vākya* and *bhāshya* passages in the context of the *antarādityavidyā* set forth in the first chapter of the *Chāndogyopanishad*.

Though Śrī Śaṅkara has not quoted *verbatim* from the *vākya*, yet in his exposition of the *antarādityavidyā* in his *Chāndogyabhāshya*, and in the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa* devoted to an examination of it in the *sūtrabhāshya*, he has expressed the same ideas in similar language. Thus, we find that Śrī Śaṅkara has given expression in his works to ideas similar in language to passages in the *vākya* and the *bhāshya* and having the same meaning. Such parallel passages have been indicated in the work *Draviḍātrēya-darśanam*. They have also been separately tabulated in that work for purpose of comparison under the heads of *Brahmanandi-Bhagavatpāda-Vākya-Sāmarasyam* and *Draviḍāchārya-Bhagavatpāda-Vākya Sāmarasyam*.

The *vākya-grantha* gives six meanings to the *antarādityavidyā* passage in the *Chāndogyopanishad*: *tasya yathā kapyāsam pun-ḍarīkam evamakshinī*. In his *Chāndogyopanishadbhāshya* Śrī Śaṅkara gives the conventional (*rūḍhi*) meaning of the word *kapi*. In the work *Draviḍātrēya-darśanam* it has been shown that this interpretation is not affected by the criticism made against it by others. Śrī Rāmānuja and others adopt three other meanings of the word from the etymological (*yaugika*) point of view taking them from the *vākya-grantha*. It has to be emphasised that all

meanings, the conventional and the etymological are those stated in the *vākya* itself.

In his *vākya-grantha*, the *Vākyakāra* observes that for the *anugraha* of the aspirants, the Lord's form which is resplendent (*jyotirmaya*) is imperceivable by the sense of sight, but can be perceived only by those of pure mind who worship concentrating on the form of the sun (*āditya-maṇḍala*). This same meaning accepted by the *Vākyakāra* is conveyed by Śrī Śaṅkara in the exposition of the *antarādityavidyāvivarāṇa* of the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa* and of the *Chāndogyopanishad*. The *Vākyakāra* says:

syādrūpam kṛitakam anugrahārtham tachchetasām aiśvaryāt; rūpam cha atīndriyam antaḥkaraṇa-pratyaksham tannirdeśāt. Dravidāchārya's bhāshya on this passage is: *añjasaiva viśvasrī-jorūpam tattu na chakshushā grāhyam manasā tvakalushēṇa sādhanāntaravatā grihyate.*

Śrī Śaṅkara writes in the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa*:

syāt paramēśvarasyāpi icchāvaśāt māyāmayam rūpam sādhakānugrahārtham. In the *Chāndogyabhāshya* he says: *dṛīsyate nivṛitta-chakshurbhiḥ samāhita-chetobhiḥ brahmacharyādi-sādhana-peksham.*

'It is seen by those whose eyes have been turned inward and whose minds are steadfast by reason of the practice of brahmacharya, etc.

It is to be noted that corresponding to the expressions of the *Vākyakāra*, *taccetasamanugrahārtham*, *aiśvaryāt* and *kṛitakam*, Śrī Śaṅkara uses the words *sādhakānugrahārtham*, *māyāmayam* and *icchāvaśāt*. Similarly, where the *Vākyakāra* says *atīndriyam antaḥkaranapratiyaksham*, the *Bhāshyakāra* explains it as *na chakshushā grāhyam manasā tvakalushēṇa sādhanāntaravatā grihyate*, and Śrī Śaṅkara's expressions for them are respectively *dṛīsyate nivṛitta-chakshurbhiḥ*, *samāhitachetobhiḥ* and *brahmacharyādi-sādhana-peksham*.

Thus, while the expressions in the *vākya*, the *bhāshya*, and Śrī Śaṅkara's explanations are in accord, not disposed to agree to this, Śrī Rāmānuja and others have altered the words *rūpam chātīndriyam* into *rūpam vā atīndriyam*. They also maintain that the

statement *syād rūpam* is the *pūrvapaksha* and that *rūpam vā atīndriyam* contains the *siddhānta*. They also say that the form of the Lord is not unreally assumed by Him, but that it is His real nature. The Vākyakāra says in the previous sentence that it is assumed for purpose of *anugraha* and he follows it in the succeeding sentence that that form is supersensuous, but perceivable in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. There is nothing irreconcilable in the Lord's form being the result of an assumption and also supersensuous and cognisable by the pure mind. Where is the distinction of *pūrvapaksha* and *siddhānta* between two positions which are not contradictory to each other? Dispassionate consideration will show that this has not been taken into account in a partisan view of this matter. That the Lord's form is eternal has nowhere been stated in the *vākya*. All this has been clearly brought out in the work *Draviḍa-treyadarśanam*.

In his *bhāshya*, Draviḍāchārya says that *bhagavadrūpa*, the Lord's form is *yathābhūta*, that is, it is existent, and goes on to observe that form is not spoken of a *devatā* which is formless; for *śāstra* speaks only of what is. It is *yathābhūta-vādī*. It informs us of what has *sattā*. True, there is no instruction of *rūpa* in respect of what is *arūpa*, formless. The meditation on the form of the Lord is not based on *adhyāsa* or supposition as in the meditation of mind as Brahman, etc., but it is the meditation of the existing *rūpa*. Śrī Śaṅkara too following the same text speaks in the same manner. This is what he says: There is no non-validity in respect of the texts which refer to the subject of *upāsana*. Hence *Śāstra* which speaks of *upāsana* refers only to the actually existing *ātmā*, *Īśvara* and *devatā*, etc. While explaining the third brāhmaṇa of the first adhyāya of the *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, he observes, 'As that which is indicated as Paramātmā, *Īśvara* and *devatā* is non-empirical, it deserves to be spoken of as actually existing'. Similarly in the *bhāshya* on the sūtra—*svāpyayasaṁpatyoh anūtarāpekshamāviśhkrītam hi* Śrī Śaṅkara says: That where this *Īśvara*'s nature is described, it refers to a different state like *svarga*, etc., and it is the locus of the *saguṇavidyā*.

The empirical reality of the Lord's form subsists till the direct realization of Brahman. It is not transcendental (*pāramārthika*), non-sublatable in all the three periods of time like the qualitless Brahman. This view is based on the passage *laukikam tadvadevedam pramāṇamtvātmaniśchayāt*, given at the end of the *bhāshya*

in *samanvayādhikaraṇa*. Sri Rāmānuja and others maintain, however, that the Lord's form is *pāramārtikam*. They rely on the following passage in Bhāskara's *bhāṣhya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*:

paramēśvarasya sarvaśaktitvāt upāsakānugrahāya rūpopādāna-sambhavāt, kiṁ māyāmayaṁ rūpaṁ? neti brūmaḥ, pāramārtikamevaitat, yathābhūtajñāpakam hi śāstram.

Attracted by this view, they delude themselves into believing that the same may be the view of the Vākyakāra and the Bhāṣhyakāra.

But that is not correct. Even as the Vākyakāra upholds the theory of *vyāvahārika*, so does the Bhāṣhyakāra too. In the context of the explanation of the *sādvidyā*, taking up the Śruti *vāchārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam*, Vākyakāra discards the theory that a thing should be either *sat* or *asat* only, and establishes on the basis of śruti the theory of the *vyāvahārikasatya* of the world which is neither exclusively *sat* nor *asat*. *na samvyaavahāramātratvāt*. This conclusion of the Vākyakāra is clearly explained in the *Samkshepa-śārīraka*, in the commentaries on it and in the *Kalpataru*. It is pertinent to ask those who proclaim that they are followers of the position of the Vākyakāra, why they have rejected the statements establishing the *vyāvahārikatva* of the world and quoted in the *Kalpataru* and the *Samkshepa-śārīraka*.

While explaining the *sādvidyā* the Vākyakāra says *yuktam tadguṇakopāsanāt*. He considers that *antarguṇaka brahmaprāpti* is a proper consequence of *antarguṇakabrahmopāsanā*.

The Bhāṣhyakāra too explains this passage as follows:

antarguṇam pratyakguṇameva bhagavatīm paradevatām bhajata iti tatra tadguṇaiva devatā prāpyate.

Here the word *tadguṇakam* in the *vākya* is explained as *antarguṇa*. And, the expression *antarguṇa* in the *bhāṣhya* is explained as the *pratyagātman*. *Antaḥ* (inner) is a correlate of *bahiḥ* (outer), i.e. inner as opposed to outer. So we get the equation: *tadguṇakopāsanāt antarguṇakopāsanāt pratyagrūpabrahmopāsanāt*. By the 'tatkratu nyāya' it is proper to say *tadguṇaiva antarguṇaiva pratyagsvarūpaiva*. By this *pratyagsvarūpa* the *paradevatā*, the supreme deity which is *parabrahma-rūpa* is attained.

This reasoned conclusion of the Vākyakāra and the Bhāshyakāra is established beyond doubt. That the consciousness of the non-difference of the *pratyagātman* and *Brahman* arises from the knowledge of the identity of the two which is the purport of the mahāvākya *tattvamasi* is expounded by both of them.

The same is explained by Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Chāndogyaopanishad*. That this is the view of the bhāshya of Draviḍāchārya is clearly stated in the *Samkshepaśārīraka* also.

Explaining the mahāvākya *tattvamasi*, the Vākyakāra puts it in the form of a sūtra *siddhantu nivartakatvāt*. The Bhāshyakāra explains it thus: A prince brought up among hunters thinks that he is a hunter. But when he is told on the basis of proper reasons that he is a prince, he realises his true nature. Even so the jīva thinks that he is a *saṁsārī*. But when a guru tells him of his *brahmabhāva* of which he was ignorant so long, he realises his true nature upon the removal of that nescience. Thus is established the validity of the declaration *tattvamasi*. The vākya is not to be understood as illumining what was not luminous itself. No other light can illumine what is already luminous. Thus this elucidation of Draviḍāchārya in the form of the story is found in several Advaitic works.

The fact that Advaita sannyāsins specially worship Draviḍāchārya at the time of Vyāsapūjā, proves his association with the propagation of the Advaita sampradāya.

And so, it is concluded with the prayer that every one may derive benefit according to his capacity by the study of the Advaita darśana which is the central teaching of the Upanishad, proclaimed in the *Jñānavāsishṭha* by the great sage Vasishṭha, enunciated by Bādarāyaṇāchārya in his *Brahmasūtra*, clearly explained by Vṛttikāras like Upavarsha, made definite by Gauḍapādāchārya in his Kārikās on the *Māṇḍūkyaopanishad*, established by Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda who stands for the pure Advaita sampradāya in his bhāshyas, etc., annotated on in their *ṭīkā*, *vārtika*, etc., by āchāryas like Padmapāda and Sureśvara, by the authors of *Samkshepaśārīraka* and *Vivaraṇa* and by Vāchaspati Miśra, expounded in simple language by Śrī Vidyāraṇya and which has been transmitted through a holy and beginningless tradition and which dowers its votaries with supreme joy and eternal peace.

(ii)

PRITHVIDHARA

by

SRI ANANTANANDENDRA SARASVATI SWAMI

In the last part of the first Ullāsa of the work *Tattvachandrikā*¹ by Vellalakula Umāmaheśvaraśāstrī, we come across the following passage:

ekonaśatam bhāshyānyanārshāṇi prithvīdhara-abhinavagupta-praṇītāni tatkālam vidyamāna-kartrikāṇi chhinnānīti prasiddham.

It appears from the above that Prithvīdhara, Abhinavagupta and ninety seven others, had written *bhāshyas* on the *Brahmasūtra*, that the authors were living in the time of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya and that those *bhāshyas* were so completely refuted by Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya that they ceased to gain further currency. In the opinion of the author of *Tattvachandrikā*, Prithvīdhara who was the author of one of *anārsha bhāshyas* is more respected than Abhinavagupta; for he mentions his name first in accordance with the *Pāṇini-sūtra* '*abhyarhitam pūrvam*' which states that a revered person must be referred to first.

While we know of Abhinavagupta as the author of several works on *Tantras*, nothing is known of *Prithvīdhara* or of his works. The only two references to him that have been traced are in the Catalogues of Aufrecht. In his catalogue² of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, Aufrecht describes a work *Dvādāśa-mahāvākya-vivaraṇa* by one Vaikuṇṭha-

1. *Tattvachandrikā* has been printed at M/s. G. Ramaswami Chetty Printing Works, Madras in the year 1907. Another name of this work is *Rāmānujabhāshya-bhañjanī*. Manuscripts of this work are available in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, and Theosophical Society Library, Adyar

2. *Catalogi Codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae Codices Sanscriticos*. Th. Aufrecht (1864).

puri in which the name of Pṛithvīdhara is found among the best of disciples of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya. Vaikuṇṭhapuri also ascribes to Pṛithvīdhara the foundation of the order of sannyāsins in Kali-yuga. The well-known ten orders of the Advaita sannyāsins are: (1) *tīrtha*, (2) *āśrama*, (3) *vana*, (4) *araṇya*, (5) *parvata*, (6) *sāgara*, (7) *sarasvatī*, (8) *giri*, (9) *bhāratī*, and (10) *purī*. The sannyāsins of these orders are the śishyas of Pṛithvīdhara.

prithvīdharāchāryaḥ tasyāpi śishyāḥ daśa:—

*tīrtha-āśrama-vana-araṇya-giri-parvata-sāgarāḥ
sarasvatī-bhāratī cha purī nāmāni vai daśa.*

He is also reported to have written a commentary on Śrī Sūkta published in Banaras.

From the above it may be inferred that after his *bhāṣya* was refuted by Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, Śrī Pṛithvīdhara like Maṇḍana and others became a disciple of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya.

While the other disciples like Sureśvara, Padmapāda and Hastāmalaka wrote Vārtikas, Vivaraṇas and so on to expound the principles of Advaita as established by Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, the constitution along with the administration of the Advaita Sannyāsins was undertaken by Pṛithvīdhara in whom the great teacher apparently discovered the capacity for organization and all the qualities required to inspire reverence, obedience and faith necessary for the maintenance of discipline.

The other reference to Pṛithvīdhara is found in Aufrecht's Catalogue³ of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Leipzig University Library. In the course of describing the manuscript *gurupādādinamaskāra* Aufrecht says⁴ that Anubhūtiśvarūpāchārya, Tṛoṭaka and Pṛithvīdhara are mentioned in the manuscripts. By the kindness of Prof. Dr. Johs Schubert of the Leipzig University, a micro film copy of the manuscript was obtained. The reference to Pṛithvīdhara in the manuscripts runs thus:

3. Katalog Der Sanskrit—Handschriften Der Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts of Universitat Bibliothek zu Leipzig. Von Theodor Aufrecht (1901).

4. Manuscript No. 231 Script of 1807.

*anubhūtiśvarūpāchārya—nirātrotakāchārya
śrīṅgeriprithvīdharāchārya.*

Here too Prithvīdhara is stated to have been one of the disciples of Śrī Saṅkarāchārya and from the context it appears that Prithvīdhara after constituting the ten orders of Advaita sannyāsins was himself ordained as the head of the Śrīṅgeri Mutt.

We have to pay homage to Prithvīdharāchārya who was held in such esteem by Śrī Saṅkarāchārya that he was entrusted with the organisation and administration of the sannyāsins who from his time to this day have so worthily discharged their functions by writing works on Advaita and propounding the teaching of Advaita philosophy.

It is also, I think, necessary that further and careful search should be made to find out more about the respected āchārya, Śrī Prithvīdhara, and his works especially his *bhāṣhya* on the *Brahmasūtra*.

Whatever be the fact about Prithvīdhara—having been the first head of the Śrīṅgeri Mutt, we have a definite and undisputed fact that Prithvīdhara was the author of an *anārsha bhāṣhya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, that he established the order of Advaita sannyāsins and that he was very highly respected. Further research is however necessary especially to trace his *bhāṣhya* which should have been considered so valuable that he was placed above Abhinava-gupta by Umāmaheśvara when referring to the authors of the *anārsha-bhāṣhyas*.

ANANDAGIRI

by

K. BALASUBRAMANIA SASTRI

Sāhitya-Mīmāṃsā-Vyākaraṇa Śiromaṇi

Ānandagiri, otherwise known as Ānandajñāna, is an erudite commentator on Śrī Śaṅkara's bhāṣhyas on the Upanishads, the *Bhagavad-gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra*. It is a matter of satisfaction that we are able to get some information about the author from his works themselves. In his *Īśāvāsya-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*, Ānandagiri says that the *pariṇāma-vāda* of Bhāṣkara has been rejected by him in his *Tattvāloka*.

*bhāskarābhimataḥ pariṇāma-vādaḥ tattvālokē nirasta eva asmābhiḥ.*¹

Again in his *Taittirīya-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa* he refers to *Tattvāloka*.²

From these we may conclude that Ānandagiri and Janārdana are identical. And, Janārdana must have been Ānandagiri's name in his previous stage of life (*āśrama*).

Apart from *Tattvāloka*, he wrote another work entitled *Tarkasaṅgraha* published in the Gaekwad Oriental series. It is a critical examination and a systematic refutation of the Vaiśeṣhika system from the stand-point of the Advaita school. The Vaiśeṣhika school has been the pioneer of all the dualistic philosophers. Ānandagiri himself in the *Tarkasaṅgraha* observes that this effort is to establish on the basis of reasoning and scripture the one without a second.

*ekarasam hi vastu pramāṇato nyāyataścha pratipādayitum prayatnaḥ.*³

1. Ānandāśrama Edition, p. 15.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

3. *Tarkasaṅgraha*, Gaekwad Oriental series, p. 10.

And, at the end of this work he affirms that his arguments against the Vaiśeshika school could very well be extended to the other schools of thought and it would be clear then that their theories and definitions of the categories accepted by them are false.⁴

Following Chitsukha, the author of the *Tattvapradīpikā*, and Śrī Harsha, the author of the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, Ānandagiri in his work *Tarkasaṅgraha* is mainly concerned with proving the non-real character of the phenomenal universe. It is one of the maxims of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeshika* school that an object is real if it can be defined and proved. Ānandagiri, therefore, in order to prove that there is no reality apart from Brahman, takes up each and every object admitted by the Vaiśeshikas for critical examination. He refutes all definitions of the *Vaiśeshika* system intended to justify the reality of the categories of experience and shows that the world and all world-experiences are merely appearances and are indescribable either as real or unreal. Now, since all appearances must have something for their cause and since that which is not a real thing cannot have a real thing as its material cause, and since they are all indescribable in their nature, their cause must also be of that nature, the nescience of the substratum.

He then proceeds to point out that nescience which is the material cause of the universe is associated with Brahman, the pure consciousness. And, owing to its association with Brahman, Brahman appears as the *all* (*sarva*) and it becomes as the *all-knower* (*sarvajña*). Brahman could not be regarded as omniscient or the knower of all (*sarvajña*) without its association with nescience. Thus there is the one Brahman and there is one beginningless nescience in connection with it, which is the cause of all the infinitely diverse appearances through which the former appears impure and undergoes transmigration, *as it were*, and again appears liberated, *as it were*, through the direct experience of the real nature of the self. In fact there is neither bondage nor emancipation.

Ānandagiri refers to *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* of Śrī-Harsha in his *Taittirīya-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*. Śrī-Harsha flourished in the

latter half of the twelfth century. We may take Ānandagiri as having flourished in the beginning of the thirteenth century. At that time, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school was active in opposing the *jagan-mithyātvā-vāda* of Śrī Śaṅkara. By proving on the basis of reasoning that the universe is indescribable either as real or as unreal, he rendered a solid service to the cause of Advaita. His position as an interpreter of Śrī Śaṅkara's philosophy is evident from the number of excellent commentaries which he wrote on the commentaries of Śrī Śaṅkara.

BRAHMANANDA

by

T. V. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR

Vedānta-viśārada, Vedānta-śiromaṇi

In the history of Indian philosophy, the influence of Buddhism waned by the end of the tenth century and Advaita definitely triumphed over all the other schools—both heterodox and orthodox. Later, the theistic and pluralistic schools of Śrī Rāmānuja and Śrī Madhva developed and they turned against Advaita in a pronounced manner. Among the followers of the Mādhva school, Śrī Vyāsātīrtha is the most prominent. Adopting the Navya-nyāya method, he opposed the philosophy of Śrī Śaṅkara in his work *Nyāyāmṛta*. Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* answered all the objections raised by Śrī Vyāsātīrtha. Later, the views set forth in the *Advaita-siddhi* have been criticized by Śrī Rāma Tīrtha in his work *Taraṅgiṇī*. And, Brahmānanda answered the criticisms raised in the *Taraṅgiṇī* in his commentary on the *Advaita-siddhi* known as *Laghuchandrikā*. This work is also known as *Gauḍa-brahmānandīya*. Criticizing this work from the stand-point of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, Anantālvār wrote a work called *Nyāya-bhāskara*. The late Palamaneri Śrī Pañchāpa-geśa Śāstrī, the preceptor of the present writer wrote a work called—*Brahmānandīyabhāvaprakāśa*¹ criticizing the *Nyāya-bhāskara*. The work *Laghuchandrikā* is widely read by all the students of Advaita. He wrote another commentary on the *Advaita-siddhi*; and, it is known as *Guruchandrikā*. This commentary is available upto the first *parichchheda* of the *Advaita-siddhi*. Apart from these two works, he wrote other works also which are as follows:

1. This work has been published by The Private Secretary to His Highness The Mahārājā of Cochin, (1961).

Nyāyaratnāvalī: Śrī Śaṅkara desirous of helping all human beings in attaining liberation composed the *Daśaślokī* in order to impart briefly the knowledge of Ātman. Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote a well-known commentary on it entitled *Siddhānta-bindu*. Śrī Brahmānanda wrote *Nyāyaratnāvalī* on the *Siddhānta-bindu*. In the beginning of the commentary, Śrī Brahmānanda says that a unique commentary is composed by him.

*vichitrarachanā kāchit
brahmānandena rachyate.*

All the theories of the Advaita-vedānta are set forth in this commentary with great clarity.

Vedānta-sūktā-muktāvalī: This is a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. This work throws light upon the *Brahma-sūtra* by clear and luminous exposition. The *Navya-nyāya* method is adopted in the interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra*.

Mīmāṃsāchandrikā: This work is an authentic exposition of the *adhikaraṇas* of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*; and this work amply testifies to the fact that Brahmānanda is an authority on the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* school also.

Advaita-siddhānta-vidyotani: This is at once a manual and a polemical work on Advaita. The important concepts of Advaita like *anirvachanīya-khyāti*, *bhāvarūpājñāna*, *avidyā-nivṛitti* and similar other concepts are dealt with. This work follows the pattern of *Tamovāda*, *Śaktivāda*, etc., of the great logician *Gaḍādhara*. Only the first *parichchheda* of this important work is available.

Apart from these six works, it is known that he wrote another work called *Mithyātvānumānapakshavichāra*.

In the Advaitic tradition, it is often said that the systematic explanation of the Advaita starts from *Gauḍa* and ends with *Gauḍa*:

gauḍādi gauḍāntam vedāntadarśanam.

It was Gauḍapāda who at first set forth in his *Kārikās* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* the quintessence of the *Upanishads*, that is, Advaita. Advaita-darśana is the most noteworthy among the darśanas. Śrī Śaṅkara enriched it by his commentaries on the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtra*, and also by various manuals on Advaita and hymns

on the personal God (Īśvara). Preceptors of Advaita wrote not only commentaries on Śrī Śaṅkara's works, but independent treatises on Advaita. And, Brahmānanda who hailed from Gauḍadeśa proved in his works the validity of the import of the Upanishads by refuting, on the basis of reasoning, the objections raised against Advaita by other opposing schools. It is with this in view that tradition holds that Advaita begins with *Gauḍa*, that is, Gauḍapāda, and ends with *Gauḍa*, that is, Brahmānanda who hailed from *Gauḍadeśa*.

Brahmānanda has distinct views on the Advaita; Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Yoga schools; and we shall now briefly set forth some of them.

In an erroneous cognition of silver in a shell, six factors are involved; and they are: (i) indeterminable silver, (ii) general characteristic of silver, that is, silverness, (iii) identity of silver with the object in front of the perceiver, that is, the *this* element, (iv) identity of silverness with the *this* element, (v) the knowledge of relation of the *this* element to the silver, and (vi) the knowledge of the relation of the general characteristic of the *this* element, that is, *this-ness* to silver. The *Laghuchandrikā* and the *Nyāyaratnāvalī* deal with this point in great detail.

When we comprehend the insentient objects, there arises manifestation in respect of them. This manifestation is not possible without the identification of the self which is pure consciousness. The superimposition of the self on the insentient objects is essential if the latter were to become manifest. The insentient objects become contents (*vishaya*) of knowledge only when they are identified with the self which is pure consciousness. Or to state the same in other words, insentient objects are objects in the sense that they are identified with consciousness. This is technically stated as *chittādātmyam vishayatā*. In a cognition of a particular object three factors are referred to; and, they are: *prakāratā*, *viśeshyatā*, and *saṁsargatā*. These three factors come within the purview of the definition of *vishayatā* referred to above. Brahmānanda establishes this theory on the basis of reasoning; and, he cites the text of Udayana as authority. Udayana's passage runs as follows:

prakāśasya sataḥ tadīyatāmātranibandhanaḥ svabhāvaviśesho vishayatā.

We have already referred to a work on the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* by Brahmānanda. As regards the process through which the sense of a sentence is conveyed the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā holds the theory of *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā advocates the theory of *abhihitānvaya-vāda*. According to the former school, a word conveys its sense as well as its relation to the sense of some act. And, the words themselves convey the sense of the sentence. According to the Bhāṭṭa school, words convey their senses and then cease to function. The senses of the words in combination convey the sense of the sentence. This view known as *abhihitānvaya-vāda* is three-fold.

For example,

- (i) the suffix (*pratyaya*) conveys the sense of *arthabhāvanā*;
- (ii) the root (*dhātu*) conveys the sense of *arthabhāvanā* and the suffix merely indicates it (*dyotaka*);
- (iii) both the root and the suffix convey the sense of *arthabhāvanā* as associated with the sense of the root (*dhātvartha*).

Pārthasārathimīśra and other followers of the Bhāṭṭa school hold that the first view alone is correct. But Śrī Brahmānanda in the *Nyāyaratnāvalī* proves that the third alternative alone holds good.

As regards the injunctive statements of the *Veda*, the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* school holds that *arthabhāvanā* alone is the *mukhya-viśeshya* or the primary substantive. But Śrī Brahmānanda holds that *artha-bhāvanā* is only adjectival (*viśeṣaṇa*) and *śabda-bhāvanā* alone is the primary substantive.

From a careful study of the *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, it is known that Śrī Brahmānanda has distinct views on the *Yoga* system also. According to the *Yoga* school, *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* is the highest *Yoga*. *Yoga* means subjugation of all the mental states. In the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* all the mental states are subjugated; this is the view of the followers of the *Yoga* school. Śrī Brahmānanda, on the other hand, says that even in the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* there is the mental state in the form of Ātman. But this mental state is not manifest then. This is the difference between

asaṁprajñāta-samādhi and *sushupti* wherein there is the manifestation of the *avidyā-vṛitti* in the form of Ātman.

Ancient preceptors wrote treatises on Advaita with a view to establish the unity of the self. In order to establish this they advocated several theories which differ among themselves. They do not, however, stultify the non-dual nature of the self. Śrī Brahmānanda does not have any leaning towards a particular theory. In fact he is more concerned with proving that all theories are correct in so far as they do not contradict the primary import of the *Upanishads*, namely, the oneness of the self.

Śrī Brahmānanda has the greatest respect for the ancient preceptors of Advaita. While interpreting the word *vedāntaśāstra* occurring in the *Siddhāntabindu* he says that five treatises constitute the *vedānta-śāstra*; and, they are: the *Brahma-sūtra*, Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on it, the *Bhāmatī*, the *Kalpataru* and the *Parimala*.

*vedāntaśāstreti - śārīrakamīmāṃsā - rūpachaturadhyāyī -
tadbhāṣhya - tadīyaṭīkāvāchaspatya - tadīyaṭīkā - kalpataru -
tadīyaṭīkāparimalarūpa granthapañchaka ityarthah.*

Śrī Brahmānanda is the disciple of Śrī Nārāyaṇatīrtha. In the preface to our author's work *Advaita-siddhānta-vidyotani*, the editor says that Nārāyaṇatīrtha flourished in 1790. We may, therefore, believe that Śrī Brahmānanda flourished during the last decade of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century. Śrī Viṭṭaleśa wrote a commentary on the *Laghu-chandrikā*. He is the preceptor of the great logician Krishṇam-bhaṭṭa who wrote commentaries on *Jāgadīśi* and *Gādādharī*. He says:

*śrī pāṇḍuraṅga hṛidaye
saṁvidrūpaḥ prakāśatām
yena me samprasīdeta
brahmānandasarasvatī.*

Let Śrī Pāṇḍuraṅga who is pure consciousness shine in my heart; so that I could understand the import of the statements of Śrī Brahmānanda Sarasvatī.

There could be no more fitting tribute to Śrī Brahmānanda than this one which emanates from the preceptor of Krishṇam-bhaṭṭa one of the greatest logicians that India has ever produced.

UPANISHADBRAHMENDRA

by

V. RAGHAVAN

M.A., PH.D.

An account of Upanishadbrahmendra in this Volume is appropriate in more ways than one. Apart from the fact that the Maṭha bearing his name has its own importance in Kāñchi, there have been close contacts between the Upanishadbrahmendra Maṭha and the Kāmakoti Pīṭha in the comparatively short period during which the former had come into existence.

Elsewhere,¹ more than once, the present writer has dwelt on the life and works of Upanishadbrahmendra. In his paper, on Upanishadbrahmendra in the *Journal of the Music Academy*, Madras,² in which, for the first time, a detailed account of this Sannyāsin-author has been given, the present writer has shown that our author was originally called Rāmachandrendra — a name found in the colophons of several of his works, as also in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* — and that later he came to be called Upanishadbrahmendra by reason of his systematic and successful effort to write commentaries on the one hundred and eight Upanishads. It has also been shown in that paper that Upanishadbrahmendra flourished in the 18th century A.D. The cyclic year and its details mentioned by him at the end of his commentary on *Muktopanishad* work out to 1751 A.D. Another dated work of his is the *Paramādvaitasiddhāntaparibhāṣā* (1709 A.D.).

In civil life, he was named Śivarāma and was the son of Lakshmī and Sadāśiva of Vādhūla Gotra, of Brahmapuram on the

1. The *Tattvasaṅgraha—Rāmāyana* of Rāmaabrahmānanda, *Annals of Oriental Research*, University of Madras, Vol. X, Pt. 1.

2. Vol. XXVII, 1956, pp. 113-150; XXVIII, 1957, pp. 151-2.

banks of the Pālār. He was born by the blessings of God Kari-nātha and Goddess Śivakāmasundarī enshrined at Krishṇanagarī or Śāttancheri on the banks of the Pālār; he says that it is on the prompting of this Deity Lord Śivakāmīśa that he composed the commentaries on the one hundred and eight *Upanishads*. In more than one place in his works, he mentions that the place of his stay in Kāñchīpura, which is on the way of Kailāsanātha temple, was called Agastyālaya or Agastyāśrama. As a Sannyāsin, he was the disciple of Vāsudevendra.

Upanishadbrahmendra was a bibliophile and all his writings, as also other works in Vedānta and Bhakti, were copied and preserved in his Maṭha. The present writer had occasion to examine first-hand in connection with his *New Catalogus Catalogorum* work a large number of Upanishadbrahmendra's works which the present Swāmiji of the Maṭha, Śrī Ishtasiddhīndra, was kind enough to lend him. Manuscripts of Upanishadbrahmendra's works are also found in the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library, the Adyar Library, and the Oriental Library, Mysore; and many of them bear alternate and longēr or shorter names and also the author's own glosses. After a careful examination of all these, as also the mutual cross-references found in his own works, a complete list of his works has been compiled and presented elsewhere.³ Some of these works have also been brought out in print by the Adyar Library.⁴ On this occasion a brief analytical account may be given of his works and an appreciation of the contribution he made through his works and life.

It is proper to begin with the *Upanishads* the ultimate basis of the two other texts of authority in the *Prasthānatraya* and also of all further expositions in Vedānta and Bhakti. The most important and sustained work of Upanishadbrahmendra, which gave him this sēcond name, is his commentaries on the one hundred and eight *Upanishads*, all of which have been published by the Adyar Library. The author says that Kṛishṇasūri, Rāmānanda,

3. *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, University of Madras, Vol. II, pp. 364-7.

4. His commentaries on the *Upanishads* in different collections, 1920, 1921, 1929, 1935-6, 1950, 1953: on the *Bhagavadgītā*, 1941; *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya-siddhāntasamgraha*, (A. L. Bulletin, XIII, ii-iii); *Karmākarmaviveka* (*Ibid.*, xxv, pp. 436-46); *Tattvapadārthaikaśataka* (*Ibid.*, xxi, pp. 145-160); *Upanishadaviveka* (*Ibid.*, XXIX, pp. 203-58).

PRECEPTORS OF ADVAITA

Īśvara, Hari and Kṛishṇadāsa prompted him to write the *Upanishad*-commentaries.⁵ All his works giving the author's name as Rāmachandrendra were written before the *Upanishad*-commentaries and this is borne out also by his mentioning some of them in the *Upanishad*-commentaries. On many of his earlier works thus written, he wrote glosses later, as Upanishadbrahmendra. His work in the field of *Upanishads* is valuable particularly in regard to the minor ones, on which we have no other commentaries.

A second major work of Upanishadbrahmendra in the *Upanishadprasthāna* is the collection of one thousand and eight *Mahāvākyas* from all the *Upanishads* — the *Ashṭottarasahasramahāvākyāvali* — and expositions of these in a series of commentaries, the *Prabhā*, the *Lochana*, the *Vivarāṇa*, and the *Kiraṇāvali*. Even at the beginning of his commentary on the *Upanishads*, he has shown that the *Mahāvākyas* are not just four, but many more.

In the *Gītā-prasthāna* he has given us a lucid gloss on the *Bhagavadgītā* closely following Śaṅkara's *Bhāshya*.

In the *Sūtra-prasthāna*, there is a short work of his in the form of an *adhikaraṇa*-index and a concordance of the *Sūtras* and topics, following Śaṅkara's *Bhāshya*. In this he correlates the four chapters and the four *Pādas* of each chapter, with aspects of the *Pranava* and phases of the *Brahman*, a favourite analysis of his which he uses for the songs too which he composed in sets according to this classification. Deriving his ideas from the *Māndūkya* and Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās*, and from the *Nāḍabindu-panishad*, he equates the four chapters of the *Sūtras* thus:

<i>Samanvaya</i>	<i>Avirodha</i>	<i>Sādhana</i>	<i>Phala</i>
<i>Akāra</i>	<i>Ukāra</i> ,	<i>Makāra</i>	<i>Ardhamātrī</i>
<i>Sthūla (Virāṭ)</i>	<i>Sūkshma (Sūtra)</i>	<i>Bīja</i>	<i>Turya</i>

The four *Pādas* of each chapter are equated with the further sub-divisions resulting from the admixture of the phases in the second principle of classification, *Virāṭ-virāt*, *Virāṭ-sūtra*, and so on. The colophon of I. i of his index of the *Adhikaraṇas* runs:

5. *Sāmānya Vedānta Upanishads*, Adyar edn., p. 377, end of his commentary on the *Muktopanishad*.

*akārasthūlānīśākāramātrārūḍhādya-
pādasyādhikaraṇasamkhyā—11,
iti varuṇe prathamah pādaḥ.*

In the further colophons, we come across equations of other Pādas or the Sūtras with *Nāda*, *Bindu*, *Kalā*, *Kalātīta*, *Samī*, *Sāntyaīta*, *Unmanī*, *Purī* (*Vaikhari* ?), *Madhyamā*, *Paśyanī* and *Parī*.

Upanishadbrahmendra's work on the *Brahma-sūtra* should not be judged by the above concordance alone; at the end of this short work, he says that he wrote a commentary on the Sūtra, following Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* of course, in 3500 granthas. The manuscript of this remains to be identified and studied; it may be in the form of a commentary on the *Saṅgraha* of the Sūtra mentioned above; it is at its end that the author mentions the commentary.

*brahmasūtra-brahmatāra-siddhānta-vivṛitiḥ kṛitā
bhāṣyasaṅgrahasiddhāntavyākhyānagranthasaṅgrahaḥ
pañchaśato'parilasat trisahasraṇitirbhavet.*

The independent Vedāntic *Prakaraṇas* of the author may now be noticed. Over a dozen of these are known, and as in the case of other works, here too the texts bear the author's own commentaries. The *Tattvampadārthaikyāśataka* in one hundred *Anuṣṭubhs*, published in the *Adyar Library Bulletin*, with an Introduction by the present writer, brings out the full implication of the great *Mahāvākya*, *tat tvam asi*, working out, step by step, the manifestation of the Brahman as the *Saguṇa* Brahman, the individual souls and the universe through *Māyā*, the three *Guṇas*, etc. The work may be studied on the background of the older texts, *Pañchīkaraṇa*, *Vākyavṛitti*, etc.

The other *Prakaraṇas*, with his own commentaries, are *Karmākarmaviveka* with *Naukā*, *Tripāttattvaviveka*, *Paramāksharaviveka*, *Paramādvaitasiddhāntaparibhāṣhā*, *Paramādvaitasudarśanaviveka*, *Bhedatamomārtāṇḍaśataka*, *Liṅgabhaṅgamuktiśataka*, *Sattāsāmānyaviveka* and *Vivṛiti*, *Svarūpadarśanasiddhāñjana*, *Kaivalyāśṭaka* and *Siddhāntaślokatraya*.

From what has been said already in connection with his concordance of the *Brahma-sūtra* and its *Adhikaraṇas*, it would be

clear that our author had a fancy for correlations and equations of the different phases of Brahman, of spiritual pursuit and indeed of the texts of Vedānta with the phases of *Praṇava*. On the path of *Sādhana*, he was a worshipper of *Praṇava* and *Nāda*, which as we shall see below, led him to music. *Tāra* (*Praṇava*) and its four aspects figure all over his commentaries and *Prakaraṇas*. A certain number of works of his is especially devoted to this approach:

Antaḥpraṇavavivṛiti, *Bāhyapraṇavavivaraṇa*, *Brahmasūrashoḍaśabhūmikā*, *Brahmapraṇavārthaprakāśashoḍaśabhūmikā*, *Brahmapraṇavadīpikā*, *Virāṭpraṇavavivṛiti*, exposition of *Praṇava* and its phases as signifying *śṛṣṭi*, *sthiti* and *saṁhāra*, and a series of devotional formulae related to the phases of *Praṇava* which will be mentioned in a further section.

The tradition of combining Bhakti towards forms of Saguṇa Brahman, with Advaita has had a long history. Many Advaitic writers have not only composed appealing *Stotras* but also written treatises on the doctrine of devotion and the efficacy of reciting and adoring the Lord's Name (*Nāman*). Upanishadbrahmendra's other works, to be dealt with now, belong to this field of Bhakti, *Nāmasiddhānta* and music compositions on his *Iśṭadevatā*. *Bhaktisvarūpaviveka* is on the general doctrine of Bhakti. The *Bhāgavatasamgrahastuti* summarises the stories of the twelve *Skandhas* of the *Śrīmad Bhāgavatapurāṇa* in the form of a *Stotra*, comparable to the *Nārāyaṇīya*. Another devotional work of his is the *Śivamānasapūjā*.

Upanishadbrahmendra's *Iśṭadevatā* was Rāma. In *Rāma-Bhakti* literature, he takes a conspicuous place. He wrote a commentary on the *Adhyātmārāmāyaṇa*, a treatise on Rāma's worship called *Rāmārchanachidvidyāchandrikā*, a *Rāmārchana* embodying the meaning of the Upanishadic Mahāvākyas and a hymn *Rāmachandradayāśṭaka*.

On the Lord's Name as Saviour (*Tāraka*) and its recital, he wrote the *Nāmārthaviveka* or *Upeyanāma-viveka* (text and commentary) in which, besides dealing with all the doctrines of this school, Upanishadbrahmendra enunciated the idea that the name Rāma is composed of the vital syllables of both the *Nārāyaṇa aṣṭākṣarī mantra* (RĀ) and the *Śiva Pañchākṣarī mantra* (MA).

The present writer has recently edited this work, with a critical Introduction, in the *Adyar Library Bulletin*.

A sequel of this is the practice of *Bhajana*, singing songs in praise of the Lord and also formulae describing the Lord in a string of epithets and expressing devotion to the Lord, *Nāmāvalis* and *Divyanāmasamkīrtanas*. What Upanishadbrahmendra did in this line could be classified into three groups. While all of the compositions in this category are on Rāma, one set comprises longer poetic pieces to be rendered in elaborate music and following the model of the *Gītagovinda* of Jayadeva and the *Krishṇalīlā-taraṅginī* of Nārāyaṇatīrtha, viz. the *Rāmāśṭapadī* and the *Rāmatarāṅga* with *Rāmatarāṅgaśloka*s and *Rāmatarāṅgachandrodaya*.⁶ Another comprises a number of *Rāmagītas* giving expression to his ideas on the phases of *Brahman-Sūtra*, *Bīja*, *Turya*, etc. The third set is represented by the *Nāmāvalis* which are found under the names *Nārāyaṇatāranāmāvali*, *Praṇavanāmāvali*, *Vyāvahārikapraṇavanāmāvali*, and so on. The largest corpus of our author's compositions in this group is the *Divyanāmasamkīrtana* consisting of vocatives addressed to Rāma both as Supreme Brahman and as Saṅga Brahman. A complete Index of this mass of Upanishadbrahmendra's *Divyanāmasamkīrtanas*, with mention of the Rāgas used, is given by the present writer in his paper on our author in the *Journal of the Music Academy*, Madras, already referred to. In these, as also in his *Upeyanāma-vireka*, he says that devotion to Rāma must be done in *Advaitabhāvanā*, with the contemplation of one's self being identical with the Supreme Being:

svānanyadhiyā tannāmasmṛitiḥ syāt;
rāmo'ham ahameva rāma iti bhāvayet.

At his Agastyeśvara Āsrama, he had put up a flag, as it were, inviting everybody to step in, participate in the great *Satra* of devotional singing of the songs and *Nāmāvalis* composed by him, which was going on incessantly there, and appease their spiritual

6. On all these contributions of Upanishadbrahmendra to music, see the present writer's paper *Upanishad Brahma Yogin, His Life and Works* in the *Journal of the Music Academy*, Madras, XXVII, pp. 113-150; XXVIII, pp. 151-2.

hunger. Of this *Muktisatra* established by him, he says in the beginning of *Rāmātaraṅga*:

*Kāñchyāmagastyeśagrihāgneyasiṁhāsānopari
pratiṣṭhītam muktisatram dhvajasthāpanapūrvakam
madīyasiddhasaṅkalpam jñātvā ye bhūsurādayaḥ
niraṅkuṣāste kurvantu matlāraṅgādikīrtanam
ahanyahani satrānnabhuktitastrīptireshyati
saktīnmatsatrabhuktyā tu samtrīptirjāyate sadī.*

With all this activity, Upanishadbrahmendra proved quite an inspiration in his time to the votaries of the twin paths of devotion and music. In fact tradition current in the world of Karnatic music says that during his visit to and stay in Kāñchi, the great composer Muttusvāmi Dikshita (A. D. 1776-1835), who wrote his songs in Sanskrit, was asked by Upanishadbrahmendra to set the tunes to the latter's *Rāmāśṭapad*. The manuscripts of the songs of Tyāgarāja (A. D. 1767-1847), the other great Karnatic composer, and other literary materials that belonged to him, which are preserved now in the Saurashtra Sabha, Madurai, contain the *Śrīmukha* or call sent by Upanishadbrahmendra to Tyāgarāja, asking the latter to visit Kāñchi. The influence of Upanishadbrahmendra and his ideas and even expression on Tyāgarāja, who also adored Rāma with music, is clear, and this has been already pointed out by the present writer in his Introductory thesis in the *Spiritual Heritage of Tyāgarāja*⁷ and his critical Introduction to the *Upeyanāmaiviveka*.

There are some more songs⁸ of Upanishadbrahmendra which show that he went on pilgrimage to the Coḷa-maṇḍala and sang on the deities at Chidambaram, Tiruvayyāru (Tyāgarāja's place) and Śrīvāñcham.

Upanishadbrahmendra was thus ceaselessly active. He is one of the most prolific writers in the recent history of Advaita and Bhakti. An authentic exponent of Śaṅkara's Advaita, he yet introduced several minor ideas and correlations; and this he worked out on the basis of what were already found in the earlier authen-

7. Second revised edn., R. K. Math, Mylapore, 1966.

8. *Journal of the Music Academy*, Madras, XXVIII, pp. 151-2.

tic literature, but they became a special characteristic of his writings. With his piety and spiritual exercises, he combined a practical outlook which explains not only the collection of manuscripts in his Maṭha, but also the care taken by him to mention at the end of each work of his its extent in terms of the number of *granthas*. Many of his works still remain to be studied and a connected account of his ideas will form a useful piece of research.

KALIDASA

by

K. CHANDRASEKHARAN

M.A., B.L.

Describing Kālidāsa Śrī Aurobindo said, "He is a true son of his age in his dwelling on the artistic, hedonistic, sensuous sides of experience, and pre-eminently a poet of love and beauty and joy of life. He represents it also in his intellectual passion for higher things, culture, the religious idea, the ethical ideal, the greatness of ascetic self-mastery; and these too he makes a part of the beauty and interest of life and sees as admirable elements of its complete and splendid picture".¹ Further, according to him, Kālidāsa, 'in creed was a Vedāntist and in ceremony perhaps a Śiva-worshipper'.² The term Vedānta has become identified with Advaita, and thus great intellectuals like Śrī Aurobindo have hardly doubted in dubbing Kālidāsa an Advaitin.

Any careful student of the poet will not fail to discern his deeper convictions based on Advaitic thought, though none can dogmatise his having passed through the discipline of a systematised philosophy. Advaita itself was later much developed into an unshakable system by no less a *Drashṭā* and Master-mind than Śaṅkara. Some of the axiomatic doctrines of Advaita like *brahma satyam, jagan mithyā*, (Absolute is real; World is an illusion); or the process of elimination in arriving at Truth by the method of '*neti, neti*' (Not this, not this), rarely receive any echo in the poet's phraseology or philosophical dissertations. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the conclusion that no other poet of the classical age has so much elevated the spirit in man as of an indivisible part of the One Supreme Reality. The one sovereign thought ever ruling him was that of the immanence of Spirit

1. *The Foundations of Indian Culture*, p. 344.

2. *Kālidāsa* by Śrī Aurobindo, p. 14.

(*sarvātmabhāva*). Kālidāsa has picturesquely expressed what the *Chāndogyopanishad* has proclaimed in no equivocal terms as:

*esho'ṇimā aitadātmyamidam sarvam
tat satyam sa ātmā.*

(The subtle essence, all this is of the nature of That. That is Truth, That is the Self). We find him, in his eulogy of Brahmā, bringing home to us the idea of the All-pervading Spirit as actuating everything of the manifest Universe:

*dravaḥ saṁghāta-kāṭhinah
sthulaḥ sūkshmo laghurguruh,
vyaktāvyaktetaraśchāsi
prākāmyam te vibhūtishu.*³

(You are in liquid form as well as in the hardest material; you are perceptible to the senses as well as too subtle and beyond perception; you are light as well as heavy; you are the cause as well as the effect; you are thus manifest in everything, according to your own pleasure). Nothing in animate or inanimate nature, neither human nor animal, strikes him as of a different origin or existence from an all-powerful Reality. Hence his further elaboration of the same thought when he perceives an unity of spirit in every object and substance:

*tvameva havyam hotā cha bhojyam bhoktā cha śāśvataḥ,
vedyam cha veditā chāsi dhyātā dhyeyam cha yatparam.*⁴

(You are the oblation as well as the sacrificer; you are the food as well as the eternal enjoyer of it; you are the aim of knowledge as well as the knower; you are the supreme object of meditation as well as the meditator). Needless to remind ourselves of a parallel passage in the *Gītā* where the Lord tells Arjuna how the same Supreme Brahman dwells in all:

*brahmārpaṇam brahmahavir-
brahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam
brahmaiva tena gantavyam
brahma-karma-samādhinā.*⁵

3. *Kumārasambhava*, II, 11.

4. *Ibid*, II, 15.

5. *Bhagavad-gītā*, iv, 24.

(The oblation, the act of offering, the fire, the officiating priest, every work is the same Ātman and tends towards the same goal).

It is not by a process of ratiocination that Kālidāsa reaches the kernel of Advaita. He does not proceed by the established path but ever crosses to his destination by the green meadow of poetry. In the language of simile and metaphor, by imagery and example, he makes us believe in a higher existence than what meets our eye here below. Again he will not be satisfied with salvation for the individual alone but for the entire universe. Insentient beings like trees and rivers appear to him possessed of the Universal Spirit. Otherwise he would not have drawn so much upon them for enlivening our conception of the beauty of life. To him both Ūrvaśī and a gliding river happen to present the same engrossing content for decorations of his imagination:

*taraṅgabhrūbhaṅgā kṣhubhitavihagaśreṇi-raśanā
vikarshantī phenam vasanamiva samrambha-śīthilam,
padāviddham yāntī skhalitamabhisandhāya bahuśo
nadībhāveneyam dhruvamasahanā sā pariṇatā.*⁶

(The wavelets reminding quivering eye-brows, the flock of white cranes in serried flights appearing like the girdle of pearls round the waist, the foam-embroidered waters flowing back as if the frills of her skirt are withdrawn, the winding zig-zag course reminding her quick steps indicating exasperation at my lapses—all these make me believe Ūrvaśī has assumed the form of the river). Kālidāsa has here represented Purūravas, the hero, as searching for his sweetheart and mistaking the river for his partner. Apart from the beauty of the imagery, one cannot be lost to a sense of sameness in both Ūrvaśī and the river that the king entertains by this comparison. Kālidāsa could feel with as much intensity of sympathy for true lovers in their pangs of separation as he would for the Chakravāka pair lost to each other by the blinding darkness of the night. They only forcibly remind us of the poet's expansive heart ready to embrace the entire life within him. A truer Advaitin in experience is hard to imagine.

One may perhaps dismiss this as pure imagination, beautiful no doubt, but possessing nothing more in it to convey a conscious-

6. *Vikramorvaśīya*, IV, 28.

ness of the Unity of Spirit in all life around. Still, one can provide stronger evidences to prove how Kālidāsa unmistakably tries to show that life around is one and the same except that it has assumed different forms and shapes. Everything proves, on ultimate analysis, to be permeated by no less a spirit than what the human beings imagine they exclusively possess. A situation is created by the poet in the play, *Śākuntalam*, when the kokil's voice is chosen in reply to the sage's request by the forest creatures, especially trees, to shower their benediction on the young wife leaving her parental abode for her husband's.

*anumatagamanā śākuntalā
tarubhīriyam vanavāsabandhubhiḥ,
parabhṛitavirutam kalam yathā
prativachanīkṛitamebhīrīdṛṣam.*⁷

(*Śākuntalā* has been permitted to take her leave by these her kinsfolk of forest-dwelling trees; with the kokil's sweet note, the reply of these trees has been signified). It is worthy of notice that the words used are *vanavāsabandhubhiḥ*, the forest-dwelling trees who are her kin. They certainly convey the normal attitude of the poet towards insentient beings as having very little of a difference so far as their behaviour is concerned, from that of the humans. In this context it may be fruitful to recollect the verse in the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* where Vyāsa while chasing his son Śuka cries 'My son', 'Oh my son', which cry was replied to by the trees, which bespeaks of their identification with the sage Śuka owing to the indwelling spirit being the same:

putreti tanmayatayā taravo'bhineduḥ.

The consciousness of an immanent Spirit in all creatures, dumb as well as vocal, animate as well as inanimate, influenced the poet's outlook so much that whenever an opportunity presented itself for his emphasis of it, he showed no tardiness or indifference to declare it. He did it in his own way, which is the poetic way, singularly refreshing both in its choice of subject and picture of portrayal. To add one more instance how nature and man reciprocate each other and how sympathy in joy and

7. *Śākuntalam*, iv, 10.

sorrow can be shared with each other, we can take the scene where Aja, at the sight of his queen's sudden passing away, was plunged in the deepest gloom, while the birds in the neighbourhood were affected by his pathetic condition.

*ubhayorapi pārśva-vartinām
tumulenārtaraveṇa vejitāḥ,
vihagāḥ kamalākarālayāḥ
samaduḥkhā iva tatra chukruśuḥ.*

(*Raghuvamśa*, 8-39)

(When the attendants about the royal pair raised their wail of pain, the frightened birds dwelling in the nearby lotus-pools expressed by their clamorous sounds their sympathy in his bereavement).

It is Kālidāsa's own inimitable method of comparing the beauty of the human with that of other beings in nature, point by point even, and with a sense of adequacy in having comprehended all life by such a soulful survey. We know that the Yaksha, pining for his beloved in a distant land, could not but decipher his love's varied charms distributed, as it were, among many objects in nature.

*śyāmāsvaṅgam chakitahariṇīprekshaṇe dṛiṣṭipātam
vaktrachchhāyām śaśini śikhinām barhabhāreshu keśān,
utpaśyāmi pratanushu nadī-vīchishu bhrūvilāsān
hantaikasmīn kvachidapi na te chaṇḍi sādṛiśyam asti.*

(*Meghasandēśa*)

(Oh thou petulant one! Nowhere do I find all the different charms gathered up in a single being as in you; because the tender creepers bear only the delicacy of your figure; the deer share the tremulousness of their eyes alone with yours; the moonlight partakes the glow of your ivory cheeks; the burden of the peacock's plumes reminds your heavy tresses, the ever dancing wavelets have caught the quiver of your brows). Unless one has experienced so great an intensity of life as to feel an absence of completeness without actively mixing in spirit with all, he could not have set a great store by the companionship and sympathy with others, even if they happened to be insentient beings. Sage Kaṇva is represented as one whose power was in no way less than that of

a Viśvāmītra, if he wanted to create things. But what happened actually was, the spirits of the forest endowed Śakuntalā with costly silks, fine cosmetics and bright jewels—all because of their eagerness to participate in the parental fondness of Kaṇva for bestowing on his loving daughter, at her departure, the good things of life.

Not satisfied with the gifts of the forest-spirits to the maiden whose parting caused such a wrench in the hearts of the forest dwellers, the poet would move us to the core by the rarer gift of sympathy from the mute world around, when he makes the deer swallow not their mouthfuls of grass, the peacocks complete not their dances and the creepers restrain not their tears in the falling of leaves on the ground.

udgalita-darbha-kavalā
mṛigyaḥ parityaktanartanā mayūrāḥ,
apasṛita-pāṇḍupatrāḥ
munchantyaśrūṇīva latāḥ.

(*Śākuntalam*, iv-12)

This is Kālidāsa in his fullest measure of comprehension of the one Universal Spirit pervading all life.

May be an unimaginative critic or a stickler for accuracy will require more specific instances to show the poet's unshakable belief in the Advaitic thought. We can satisfy all such doubters by pointing to them the many verses of his where he refers to the One indivisible and inscrutable Ātman, which yet for the sake of apparent manifestation assumes the Trimūrti aspects of creation, protection and annihilation.

namo viśvasṛije pūrvam
viśvam tadanu bibhrate,
atha viśvasya saṁhartre
tubhyam tredhā sthitātmane.

(*Raghuvamśa* 10-10)

(You create the world first, then you strive to guard it against danger and finally destroy it—all these are your own triple aspects.

Again he describes the Supreme Spirit in these words:

*rasāntarāṇyekarasam yathā divyam payo'snute
deśe deśe guṇeshvevam avasthāstram avikriyaḥ.*

(*Raghuvamśa* 10-17).

(Just as the rain, however tasteless, acquires varied tastes by falling on different spots of the earth, so also changeless as you are, you still assume attributes according to your own pleasure). One can perceive that this idea is not far removed from the statement in the *Kāthopaniṣad* (ii, 15):

*yathodakam śuddhe śuddhamāsiktam tīdṛgeva bhavati
evam muner vijānata ātmā bhavati gautama.*

(O Gautama, as pure water poured on pure water becomes verily the same, so also does become the Self of the man of knowledge who understands).

If Advaita postulates the supreme merit of knowledge as by itself the goal of all life's strivings, then Kālidāsa unerringly suggests such an achievement. When he wrote of Raghu campaigning against the Persians and leading his army by the land-route, he observes:

*pārasīkān tato jetum pratasthe sthalavartmanā,
indriyākhyāniva ripūn tattvajñānena saṁyamā.*

(*Raghuvamśa*, 4-60).

(Then he set out to conquer the Persians by the land-route even as a disciplined person would seek to conquer his senses by the power of reasoning and deliberation). Mark the word *tattvajñānena* (by knowledge of Truth) used by the poet. No greater indication is required to prove that the path of knowledge (*vichāramārga*) was preferred by the poet. Apart from the knowledge of geography he had, the fact of the existence of perhaps a sea-route also to reach the same place gives the further emphasis of a choice by him of the route which was less risky or more advantageous to travelling.

Captivated by solitude and environmental tranquillity, the poet never tires of taking his kings to the forest for a life of rest and meditation after they had had their fill of worldly enjoyment and material comforts. Moreover fascinated by yoga as a sure disciplinary method for the attainment of liberation, he invari-

ably talks of some of the monarchs resorting to the practice of yoga for attaining ultimate release from all earthly bonds:

*anapīyipadopalabdhaye
raghurāptaiḥ samyāya yogibhiḥ.*

(*Raghuvamśa*, 8-17)

(For securing the timeless life, Raghu sought the company of Yogis of genuine calibre). One can trace a suggestion in the *Pañchadaśī* of Vidyāraṇya, that Yoga may be equated to an *upāsana* for reaching the *Nirguṇa*-Brahman (Formless One).

*nirguṇabrahmatattvasya
na hyupāsterasambhavaḥ,
saguṇabrahmaṇvātra
pratyayāvṛittisambhavāt.*

(*Upāsana* is not impossible because of its application to *nirguṇa* Brahman. For, as in the case of *Saguṇa*, *Upāsana* can be practised, but only by the method of frequent and repeated dwelling upon it.)

For obtaining self-knowledge, Śāstra requires the seeker to attempt first total destruction of all *pūrva-saṁskāras* (past deeds) by the fire of one's own knowledge. Kālidāsa very pertinently points out how Raghu tried to have himself purified in the fire of his own thought.

*itaro dahane svakarmanām
vavṛite jñānamayena vanhinā.*

(*Raghuvamśa* 8-20).

(The other [Raghu] attempted to burn out every bit of his accumulated past *saṁskāras* in the fire of his knowledge). One has only to remember the *Gītā* verse in order to be convinced of the accuracy of the poet's observation.

*yasya sarve samārambhāḥ
kāmasaṁkalpavarjitāḥ,
jñānāgnidagdha-karmāṇam
tamāhuḥ paṇḍitam budhāḥ. (4-18)*

(One whose actions have all no personal motives of self-advance and whose past deeds have all been burnt in the fire of knowledge, him alone would the wise call a sage, the best-equipped).

The road to salvation is not a smooth one. It is beset with many a pitfall. The traveller needs poise of mind and a balanced judgment if he has to tread it with safety and sureness of purpose. The mind of a Sthitaprajña has been deemed as of utter need if one wants even in this life the satisfaction of Realisation. For that he must strive to be unaffected by both joy and sorrow, gain and loss, pleasure and pain. Kālidāsa has made a *Sthitaprajña* of Raghu by his constant reminder of the idea of gold and mud as of no different consequence to him.

*raghurapyajayat guṇatrayam
prakṛitistham samaloṣṭakāñchanah,*

(*Raghuvamśa*, 8-21).

(Raghu with equal disdain of both gold and a clod of clay, conquered the three *Guṇas* by adopting a changeless outlook).

Perhaps it may be said that Kālidāsa felt *sannyāsa-āśrama* as of dire need for a seeker of the Immortal Self. Otherwise he would not have referred to the king's taking to *sannyāsa*:

*sa kilāśramamantyamāśrito
nivasannāvasathe purādbahih,*

(*Raghuvamśa* 8-14)

(Having entered upon the last *āśrama* [*sannyāsa*], he began staying away from the city out-skirts).

We are not sure whether Kālidāsa shared the view of some of the Advaitins who have chalked out a course of preparation wherein *Sannyāsa* occupies prominence for attainment of liberation.

*ātmajñāna-śeṣatvāchcha sannyāsasya
sarvatrātmajñānaprakaraṇe sannyāsasya
vihitatvāt śravaṇādyaṅgatayā cha
ātmajñānaphalatā sannyāsasya siddhā.*

(*Vivaraṇa*, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, p. 694)

(It is affirmed that for Self-realisation in its context the efforts of listening, contemplating, etc., will have their fulfilment only through *sannyāsa*).

One senses even a crowning thought in Kālidāsa towards the state of *Brahma-bhāva*. Speaking of a later monarch of the Raghu

line by name Kauśalya, he writes describing his final resolve to become a *Brahmanishṭha* by pursuing meditation and tapas.

*yaśobhīḥ ābrahmasabhaṁ prakāśaḥ
sa brahmabhūyaṁ gatimājagāma.*

(*Raghuvamśa*, 18-28)

(With his fame reaching even the Brahmaloka, he followed the path to become actually one with Brahman).

Detachment and selfless action which alone can lead one gradually to the acquisition of the true spirit of Advaita are frequently dwelt upon by this national poet of India. In two epithets he describes Dilīpa, the earliest king of the Raghu line, thus:

*agridhnurādade so'rtham
asaktaḥ sukhamanvabhūt.*

(*Raghuvamśa*, 1-21)

(One who earned wealth without avarice and enjoyed life without attachment). He feels detachment is the only passport to the shining land lit by the eternal sunshine of Ānanda.

Unique as was Kālidāsa's perception of love, his sense of values did not abandon him even in a situation of conflicting ideals. It is evident, from his narration of the love-episode of Śiva and Umā having its summation in a spiritual union, how the moorings of his culture aided him on to prefer purity to the appeal of the flesh, constancy to the lure of passion. At the same time he was not for renunciation and austerity without the necessary preparation of a mature mind. In a verse of his where Vaśishṭha counsels Aja to get reconciled to the inevitability of fate's workings, there is an intriguing thought expressed by the poet in the line:

*tadalabdhapadaṁ hṛidi śokaghane
pratiyātamivāntikamasya guroḥ.*

(His heart crushed under the sorrow did not receive the words of consolation; they [the words of advice] returned, as it were, to the preceptor himself). Evidently Kālidāsa was amused at the sage advice of Vaśishṭha without his finding out whether premature consolation would work its way into the heart of the king, lacerated as it was by grief. Further, it is clear that the poet wants to impress on his readers that however wise Vaśishṭha might

be, he could not really comprehend the depth of true love practised as a Yoga by both Aja and Indumatī. Otherwise the poet would not have ended their love episode as having its culmination in their regained union in the halcyon bowers of svarga. The purpose of Kālidāsa in presenting the picture of Aja's love may be to remind us that mere austerity and renunciation by themselves will not always take one to any great Understanding. There may be other paths such as that of love which should not be forgotten by those who pin their faith on Knowledge. Tolerance has, according to him, a place in any scheme of striving for the higher life, especially to one imbued with the spirit of Advaita.

Even as Vālmīki and Vyāsa before him had conceived of a greater glory awaiting man treading the straight path of Dharma, Kālidāsa harped on the significance of a full life, which would not discard intense living and yet would care for the watch-word of 'Ripeness is All'. Ānandavardhana, the arch-priest of literary criticism, has not in vain placed Kālidāsa along with the two epic poets. It is true Kālidāsa like Shakespeare lifts his head to the Heaven of heavens and only "spares the cloudy border of his base to the foiled searching of mortality".⁸ In appreciating Kālidāsa we cannot forget the culture in which he was born and brought up. Dr Radhakrishnan recalls the culture that was given to Kālidāsa thus: "This culture is essentially spiritual in quality. We are ordinarily imprisoned in the wheel of time, in historicity, and so are restricted to the narrow limits of existence. Our aim should be to lift ourselves out of our entanglement to an awareness of the real which is behind and beyond all time and history, that which does not become, that which is, absolute, non-historical being itself....The end of man is to become aware by experience of this absolute reality".

No other poet known to us in Sanskrit had so well benefited by this culture. No other thinker ever has enabled generations after him to ruminate with profit on this superior culture which gave Kālidāsa insight into a world that is seemingly diversified, yet remains One.

8. *Shakespeare (Sonnet)*, by Mathew Arnold.

9. Introduction by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan to Sushil Kumar De's edition of *Meghasandēśa*, p. 12.

KRISHNAMISRA*

by

U. VENKATAKRISHNA RAO

M.A.

*hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpīhitam mukham
tattvam pūshannapāvṛiṇu satyadharmāya dīśhṭaye.*

Poets are fond of using a dramatic and allegorical style. The Purāṇic churning of the Milky Ocean is to be understood thus: God Viṣṇu is the Milky Ocean and the various gems churned out stand for His Manifold virtues. Inquiry about the nature of God is the churning; the *Vedas* and the *Brahmasūtra* can be referred to as the churning rod and the rope. The *pūrva-pakshins*, holding the *prima facie* view, are the asuras, and *siddhāntins* are the devas establishing the final decisive view. The *amṛita* or nectar churned out is the salvation or *moksha* which makes us overcome the cycle of births and deaths. The drama *Prabodha-chandrodaya* is a similar allegorical representation of the Advaita doctrine taught by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. Tradition records that the holy Paramahansa, the author Krishṇamiśra who flourished in the latter part of the 11th century A.D. found the traditional method of teaching the *Prasthāna-trayī*, the *Gītā*, the *Brahmasūtra* and the Upanishads ineffective when he had to teach a dullard and hit upon this dramatic mode of the allegory of a war between virtue and vice, ultimately ending in the triumph of *Prabodha Chandra* or the 'Moonlight of Knowledge'.

Poets all the world over are fond of such allegorical representations. Dante in the *Divine Comedy* suggests that a leopard may stand for lust, a lion for pride, and she-wolf for avarice, and leads his readers into an imaginary paradise. John Bunyan allegorically

characterises man's progress in this world as Pilgrim's progress and introduces persons named Worldly-wise, Prudence, Superstition, Faith, etc.¹ Purandaradāsa the famous mystic saint of Karnāṭaka of about the 16th century compares man to sleeping pilgrim round whose head hovers the God of death. (The same idea comes here in iv, 26, as we shall see later). The saintly author of the *Śaṅkalpa-sūryodaya*, Vedānta Deśika, interprets the *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa* as a myth representing the human soul in the form of Sītā, imprisoned in the Aśoka Vana in Laṅkā by a Rākshasa with ten heads standing for the five *karmendriyas* and as many *jñānendriyas*, being later united with its Lord Rāma through the help of the Vedāntic Teacher Hanumān.

darpodagra-daśendriyānana-manonaktañcharādhishṭhite
dehesmin bhavasindhunā parigate kashṭām daśūmāsthitaḥ,
adhyatve hanumatsamena guruṇā prakhyāpitārthaḥ pumān
laṅkāruddha videharājatanayānyāyena lālapyate. (i, 72).

The story of the drama spread over six acts can be summarised thus: Kāma and Rati converse in the Vishkambha or introductory scene and depart. Īśvara begets through *Avidyā* a son named Manas. He later marries Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti, the first wife becomes the mother of Mahāmoha, while Viveka is born of the latter. The first act ends informing that Mahāmoha and Viveka were inimical to each other, the first with his retinue trying hard to fasten man to worldly moorings, while the latter did his best to switch him on to God. The second act shows us Mahāmoha ruling over his retinue in Vārāṇasī. Chārvāka, one of his spies, comes and reports that Kali's efforts have succeeded in weaning people away from Vedic studies, but there persists the fear that *Vishṇu-bhakti* might some day make her efforts vain; Kāma, Krodha and others are accordingly ordered to nip *Vishṇu-bhakti*'s efforts in the bud. Report also arrives (through Mada and Māna) that Vairāgya (Renunciation) has already succeeded in alienating Dharma from Kāma (Lust) but Śānti and her mother Śraddhā are trying to effect an alliance between Viveka and Upanishad-devī. Mahāmoha accordingly orders Kāma to capture Dharma

1. English poets like Chaucer personified the seven deadly sins, virtue, love, etc., symbolising the forces helping man or ensnaring him as he makes his pilgrim's progress in this world.

on the one side while Krodha and Lobha (Greed) should conquer Śānti (Peace) and drag Śraddhā into the camp of the heterodox systems of philosophy.

The third act, starts with the search by Śānti of her mother Śāttvika Śraddhā; she finds Tāmasa (Demoniac) Śraddhā with the Kāpālīka. These are Mahāmoha's servants. From their conversation Śānti learns that Śāttvika Śraddhā has been forced to take refuge along with Vishṇu-bhakti in the hearts of the saintly seers. The Kāpālīka evidently under instructions from Mahāmoha sends his Mahā Bhairavī Vidyā to capture Śraddhā and Dharma. The next act opens with an introductory conversation between Śraddhā and Maitrī (Friendship). Bhairavī, we are informed, had captured Dharma but Vishnu-bhakti succeeds in rescuing her and Śraddhā has now arranged to send her on to Viveka. This latter king prepares for war, sending Vastu Vichāra to fight against Kāma, Kshamā against Krodha, and Santosha against Lobha. He himself leads his army for a final assault and encamps in the temple of Ādi Keśava at Kāsī.

Vishṇu-bhakti and Śānti come up on the stage in the next act at Chakratīrtha, and Śraddhā, who has been fishing secretly for information about enemy, submits her report. Viveka has been victorious and Mahāmoha has gone into hiding somewhere. From incoherent reports, the depressed Śrī Manas, worried about the deaths of his nearest relatives, is about to commit suicide, when Vaiyāsakī Sarasvatī succeeds in consoling him. Fortunately at this juncture, Vairāgya, Vishṇu-bhakti, and Maitri arrive with reassuring reports, and Mind is somehow consoled and stilled.

The last act reveals Śānti attending on Upanishad Devī, while Śraddhā is doing everything possible to reassure Viveka. Upanishad Devī explains how she was tortured in the Buddhist Vihāras till a stroke of goodluck made her enter into Gītā Āśrama. She assures Purusha that he is Paramēśvara and embraces Him. Prabodha is born and the shackles binding Purusha are snapped. Vishṇu-bhakti pronounces final benediction.

The very fact that the imitations of this type of composition are unnecessarily too long containing ten acts and overweighted with philosophical discussions is enough to make us realize the

novelty of the type introduced into dramatic literature. The intelligent dramatist kept to his limitations with a due sense of restraint, introduced humorous scenes here and there to keep up the interest of the audience, limiting philosophical episodes to the barest possible minimum. The author seems to have had experience of the army camps and studied political intrigues from the point of view of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* also. The introduction informs us that the author's patron Gopāla reinstated Kīrtivarma and installed him on his throne, even after the latter was overthrown by the Chedi King Karṇa. This Śāntarasa-dominated drama was then enacted at the time of the reinstallation of this Kīrtivarma. But history does not furnish us with more definite information about this Gopāla, but the fact remains that the dramatist had intimate knowledge of the theatre, and what is more important from our point of view, of directing military operations also like Kauṭilya of olden days. Though Bharata in his *Nāṭya-śāstra* had posited only eight rasas, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta tried hard to install Śānta on its pedestal and Kalhaṇa in his *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī* (I, 23) had slightly earlier declared:

*kṣaṇabhaṅgini jantūnām sphurite parichintite,
mūrdhābhishekaḥ śāntasya rasasyātra vichāryatām.*

Others tried to introduce Vātsalya and Bhakti rasas; but Kṛṣṇa-miśra succeeded in effecting a harmonious alliance of bhakti (which plays an important role in his drama) with Śānta along the lines indicated in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*.

Even the number of the acts in this drama is six representing perhaps the number of the Vedāṅgas, the auxiliaries to the Vedic study. It deserves to be noted that the first three acts describing the *nāstika* or the heterodox darśanas like the Chārvāka, Jaina and Bauddha are purposely left unnamed in the colophons at the end of the respective acts (perhaps true to their name *nāstika*); while the last three (initiated by the conversation of Maitrī and Śraddhā) are respectively named Viveka, Uddyoga or preparations set up by Viveka (Discrimination), Vairāgya Prādurbhāva or birth of Renunciation and Jīvanmukti or Redemption even when living—'liberation-in-life'. This is nothing but saying that Vairāgya and Viveka are the two wings required by the bird, Jīva, to soar into philosophical realms and reach *jīvan-mukti*. Again

if Tāmasika Śraddhā plays a more important role in the first acts, Sāttviki Śraddhā looms large in the Gītā Śloka (vii, 14):

*daivī hyeshā guṇamayī mama māyā duratyayā,
māmeva ye prapadyante māyāmetām taranti te.*

God's *māyā* is no doubt very difficult to get over; but to one who succeeds in winning His Grace, the hurdles of *māyā* may be got over. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (XI, vi, 46) teaches us a trick to hoodwink *māyā* by using only the Lord's Prasādam:

*tvayopabhuktasraggandharvāso'laṅkāra charchitāḥ,
uchchhishṭa bhojino dāsāstava māyām jayemahi.*

This fact becomes clear to us when we read this conversation between Śraddhā and Śānti in the beginning of the last act:

*śraddhā—evametat, yathātmānam anusandhatte,
tato deva eva svārāt cha saṁrāt cha bhavati.
śāntiḥ—atha devasya māyāyām kīdrīso'nugrahaḥ?
śraddhā—nanu nigraḥ iti vaktavye katham
anugraha iti śakyate vaktum;
devo'pi sarvānarthabījāmiyam māyā
sarvathā nigrāhyeti manyate.*

The context is the Praveśaka or the introductory scene which clearly informs us that Śraddhā has dragged Manas away into temptations like Madhumatī—which would ensure him firmly into the net of Samsāra—and switched him on to *Tattvabodha* or Appreciation of Right Truth. This will naturally lead him on to *Svārājyasiddhi* or Realisation of His own Infinite innate Bliss. The way in which Upanishad Devī enters into the Gītā Āśrama in the Daṇḍaka Forest where she finds shelter reminds one of the famous *Krishṇa-karṇāmṛita* sloka:

*agre dīrghataro'yamarjunataruḥ tasyāgrato vartanī
sā ghosham samupaiti tatparisare deśe kalindātmajā,
tasyāstīratamālakāntisalile chakram gavām chārayan
gopaḥ krīḍhati, darśayishyati sakhe panthānam
avyāhatam.*

This Upanishad Devī succeeds in making the Purusha realise that he is the Parameśvara Himself.

*asau tvadanyo na sanātanaḥ pumān
bhavānna devāt purushottamāt paraḥ,
sa eva bhinnāḥ tvadanādimāyayā
dvidheva bimbam salile vivasvataḥ.*

Viveka readily confirms this identification which man as a Doubting Thomas finds hard to believe with the help of the Mahā-Vākya—*tat tvam asi*.

*esho'smīti vivichya neti padataśchittena sārddham kṛite
tattvānām vilaye chidātmani pariññāte tvamarthe punaḥ,
śrutvā tattvamasīti bādhitabhavadhyānam tadātmaprabham
śāntam jyotīranantamantaruditānandaḥ samudyotate.*

It deserves to be noted that this dramatist has characterised knowledge as the Moon while his imitator Vedānta Deśika identifies it with the Sun. Both are substantially correct in their own way almost exactly like the characterisation of the Lord as *sūryakoṭipratīkāśa* and *chandrakoṭisuśītala*. If the one regards the Lord as the Light of all lights, he has got to compare Him either with the moon or with the sun as these are the two luminaries providing us with light in this world. The former seems to have felt that the sun would be unapproachable because of his dazzling light and preferred to compare him with the moon, while the latter seems to have thought that the moon could not be found during the day-time and what is more important, derives its light from the sun. The Upanishads had already declared that the five sources of light in the world, viz., Sun, Moon, Stars, Lightning, and Fire all derive their light only from the Great Power-House, God.

*na tatra sūryo bhāti na chandratāarakam
nemā vidyuto bhānti kuto'yam agniḥ,
tameva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam
tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti.*

(Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, vi, 14)

It is quite natural that the latter three are obviously not so effulgent as the former two, which alone have been singled out by these two great dramatists. Vedānta Deśika preferred the Sun and styled his drama *San̄kalpa-sūryodaya*.

To continue our main argument, it must be noted that the dramatist Krishnamisra has taken judicious care to balance the serious element of Śānta with lighter humorous episodes like the conversation between Kāma and Rati, Kāpālikas, etc. The episodes invented by his fertile imagination like *Jñātimātsarya* or hatred of uterine brothers, ministers, spies, ambassadors, preparations for war on both sides, siege and survival of the single hero who hides himself desperately to save himself—all these easily remind us of the Bhārata war in which Duryodhana hides himself in the Vaiśampāyana lake. One of the characters, Dambha grandiloquently declares that when he was about to leave Brahmā's assembly, the latter washed his thigh with cowdung and humbly requested him to sit thereon.

Even the bare list of a few imitations of this ingenious drama serves to focus light on the originality of this fertile brain. *San̄kalpasūryodaya* (Viśiṣṭādvaitic), *Ubhayagrāsarāhūdaya* (Dvaitic), *Anumiti-pariṇaya*, *Ānanda-chandrodaya*, *Kumudachandra*, *Kshemachandra-prabodha*, *Jīvanmukti-kalyāṇa*, *Chaitanya-chandrodaya* (*Gauḍīya Vedānta*), *Prabodhodaya*, *Vidyā-pariṇayana*—these (some among them unpublished in the various libraries here and there) deserve mention. It is difficult to guess whether this dramatist originated this new type of drama particularly because Aśvaghoṣa, the Buddhist poet who flourished under Kanishka (about 78 A. D.) is credited with a drama in which the best disciple Śāriputra listens to the master's teachings to be finally converted. We cannot make any definite surmise as only fragments of the drama which is supposed to have contained nine acts are found. Even if it is argued that Aśvaghoṣa must have been the innovator, no drama of this type is found for nearly a thousand years and Krishnamisra in 1090 A. D. should receive the entire credit for inaugurating a new type the originality of which proved infectious among all sections of Vedāntic schools.

As observed earlier, the style in the drama is not heavy and is interspersed here and there with humorous ideas. The last act is pure philosophy with Upanishadic quotations and a few of them have been already quoted in connection with the explanation of the philosophy connected with *tat tvam asi*. The famous Vedic hymn *dvā suparṇā sayujā sakṛāyā* comparing the Jivātmā

(individual soul) and Paramātmā, the Divine soul, to two birds perched on the same tree, the former eating the fruits of the tree and singing while the latter shines without partaking of the fruits is slightly paraphrased in VI, 20, by removing the irregularities of Vedic grammar thus:

*dvau tau suparnau sayujau sakhāyau
samānavṛiksham parishasvajāte
ekastayoḥ pippalamatti pakvam
anyastvanaśnan abhichākaśiti.*

The following śloka

*yasmadvīśvamudeti yatra ramate yasmin punarlīyate
bhāsā yasya jagadvibhāti saha-jānandojjvalam yanmalah
śāntam śāśvatam akriyam yamapunarbhavāya bhūteśvaram
dvaitadhvāntam apāsya yānti kṛtinaḥ prastaumi tam
pūrusham (vi, 14).*

is, as anybody can see for himself, fully soaked in Upanishadic style and ideas. Similarly the ślokas uttered by Sarasvatī in the previous act like

*na kati pitaro dārāḥ putrāḥ (v, 27), and
tvat saṅgāt śāśvato'pi praṇayaajaladharo'paplutaḥ (V, 33)*

represent echoes of philosophic thought and are very easily understandable. Perhaps the fourth act is the best in regard to style as the ślokas are lyrical, rivalling easily those of the moralist Bhartrihari. Ślokas like

*vipulapulināḥ kalloliniyo nitāntapatajjharā-
masṛiṇitaśilāḥ śailāḥ sāndradrumā vanabhūmayāḥ
yadi śamagiro vailāsyikyo budhaiścha samāgamāḥ
kva piśitavasāmayyo nāryaḥ tathā kva cha manmathaḥ
(iv, 12)*

and

chandraśchandanam indudhavalā rātrīḥ

easily remind us of Bhartrihari's *Nītiśataka*. Ślokas like

*phalam svechchhālabhyam prativanamakhadam kshītīruhām
(VI, 19),*

*dhanam tāvallabdhām kathamapi tathāpyasya niyato
 vyayo vā nāśo vā tava sati viyogostyubhayathī
 anutpādaḥ śreyān kimu kathaya pathyo'tha vilayaḥ
 vināśo labdhasya vyathayatitanām na tvanudayaḥ*
 (IV, 22)

*mṛityurnṛityati mūrdhna śasvaduragī ghorā jarārūpiṇī
 tvāmeshā grasate parigrahamayaiḥ gridraiḥ jagadgrasyate
 dhūtvā bodhajalaiḥ abodhabahulam tallobhajanyam rajaḥ
 santoshāmritasāgarāmbhasi mananmagnaḥ sukhām*
 jīvati (iv, 26)

remind one easily of Bhartṛhari's *santosha eva puruṣasya param
 nidhānam*. The climax of Devotion is reached when we read the
Bhagavadgāṇḍaka at the end of Act IV starting with

*jaya jaya bhagavan amarachayachakra chūḍāmaṇisreṇi nīrā-
 jito pānta pādadvayāmbhoja.....bhaktasya lokasya saṁsāramoha-
 chchhidam dehi bodhodayam deva tubhyam namaḥ*

is sufficiently exhilarating though it might not reach the subli-
 mity of the Śyāmalādaṇḍaka. It is certainly briefer and equally
 musical and appropriate in the context.

The Advaitic Māyā, anirvachanīya or inexplicable as it should
 be, does not deprive man of his capacity to be ethical nor does
 it stand in the way of human culture and progress. Dr Radha-
 krishnan is sometimes criticised as having toned down the impli-
 cations of Māyā but he seems to have had his cue for this from
 Krishnamisra who has clearly exhibited its (Māyā's) ability to
 combine the most heterogeneous elements into an individuality,
 unique and unsurpassed in the annals of philosophy. If the Bud-
 dhists had erred by postulating a nihilistic view by declaring the
 world to be a mere phantom or *asat* as a *khapushpa*, and drove
 us all into despair, Śrī Śaṅkara (as interpreted by Kṛishnamisra)
 toned that view that there is no reason for us to despair since
 the world has certainly a relative significance and subsists to all
 intents and purposes only in order to enable us to attain some-
 thing higher and more real and what is more important also
 beyond evil. Kṛishnamisra tries to show that error and evil in
 our struggle for existence can be overcome and we can be led
 on to higher and higher ideals of existence in our spiritual ladder
 as explained in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*.

SOME AUTHORS OF WORKS IN REGIONAL LANGUAGES

(i)

JNANADEVA

by

A. G. JAVADEKAR

M.A., D.LITT.

Jñānadeva (1275 A.D. to 1296 A.D.) was one of the greatest geniuses of Mahārāshṭra. In him we find a rare combination of first rate poetry, lofty philosophy, deep mystical experience and exalted saintlihood. All this appears to be almost a miracle when we take into consideration that he lived a short span of life of less than twenty two years. He ended his life with a sense of fulfilment of his mission by voluntarily entering into yogic samādhi in the presence of a multitude of relatives, friends, and followers.

Jñānadeva was a contemporary of the king Rāmadevarāya of Yādava dynasty. Devagiri — the present Daulatabad — was Rāmadevarāya's capital, and he ruled from 1271 to 1309 A.D.

Jñānadeva's ancestors were Kulkarnīs of Apegaon (eight miles from Paithan, a great centre of Sanskrit learning) whose duty was to look after the revenue. The king Rāmadevarāya as well as this family were worshippers of Śrī Viṭṭhal of Paṇḍarpur.

To understand the background of Jñānadeva's birth under unusual social conditions, one must go back to the life of his father Viṭṭhalpant.

Viṭṭhal was a well-educated clever boy with ascetic tendencies. While alone on a pilgrimage, he happened to halt at Ālandī, thirteen miles from Poona, on the bank of Indrāyaṇī. Sidhopant, the Kulkarnī of the place, seeing this bright chap gave his daughter

Rukmiṇī to him in marriage. As the parents of Viṭṭhalpant did not live long, the young couple lived in Ālandī. Viṭṭhalpant was more interested in the life of the spirit than of the household. One day he left the home without his wife's permission, and took Sannyāsa initiated by Rāmāśrama, also known as Śrīpāda, of Benares. He was renamed as Chaitanyāśrama. While on pilgrimage to Rameśvara this Rāmāśrama visited Ālandī. There he happened to see a pious woman circumambulating an Aśvattha tree. She saw this revered sannyāsin and bowed down to him who, as is customary, blessed her that she would give birth to sons. On hearing this she burst into tears, as she was verily the wife of Viṭṭhalpant, pining for her husband. Rāmāśrama suspected from the enquiries made that the recently initiated sannyāsin was no other than this woman's husband. Instead of proceeding further on his pilgrimage he went back to Benares and ordered Chaitanyāśrama to go back to his wife.

Rukmiṇī got her husband back and was naturally overjoyed. But a sannyāsin reverting to household life was never known or heard of before. The couple was excommunicated and they had to live a very wretched life outside the town. They gave birth to three sons Nivṛitti, Jñānadeva, Sopāna, and daughter Muktābaī. They were indeed spiritual gems each excelling the other in a way, yet the whole family was subjected to great harassment and humiliation. Viṭṭhalpant sought from the Brahmins atonement for his transgressing the traditional stages of life. They advised him to give up life! In the hope of securing happiness for their innocent children, both Viṭṭhalpant and Rukmiṇī obeyed the Brahmins by deserting the children and throwing their own selves in the sacred Ganges.

The plight of the young children however, did not at all improve. They were asked to bring a certificate of purification from the Pandits at Paṭhan. They undertook the journey only to find themselves ridiculed at their hands. It is said that Jñānadeva made a passing buffalo to recite Vedas, whereafter they were given the required certificate without the need of performing the thread ceremony.

While returning from Paṭhan, the children halted at Nevase in the Ahamadnagar district. *Jñāneśvarī*, a unique Marāṭhi com-

mentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, was written here. Writing this at the age of fifteen is the greatest of Jñānadeva's miracles.

Chāṅgadeva, a haṭhayogin came to see Jñānadeva at Ālandī. As the legend goes, while he came riding on a tiger with a serpent as a whip in his hand and uprooting trees on his way by the yogic powers, these children were enjoying early sunbath sitting on a small wall. In order to humble the pride of the yogin, Jñānadeva is credited with another miracle of making the wall walk. Some other miracles also have been attributed to him.

Jñānadeva met Nāmadeva, a tailor at Paṇḍarpur, a great devotee of God Viṭṭhal. With Nāmadeva these brethren had great intimacy and all of them travelled upto Benares and visited many holy places. Their other famous contemporary saints from different social positions were—Goroba the potter, Sāmvatā the gardener, Chokhā Meḷā the untouchable, and Parisā Bhāgavata the Brahmin.

Jñānadeva expressed his wish to enter voluntarily into Samādhi, having felt that his mission of life was over. A great festival was arranged at Ālandī. Jñānadeva sat on the Āsana prepared and cleaned by the sons of Nāmadeva. *Jñāneśvarī* placed in front, he closed his eyes, bowed down thrice and was engrossed fully in the Divine love. Nivṛttinātha put the slab on the entrance to the place of Samādhi.

Besides *Jñāneśvarī*, also known as *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā* (a title given by Janābāi, a maidservant of Nāmadeva), Jñānadeva also wrote *Amṛtānubhava*, *Chāṅgadeva-Pāśashṭhī*, *Haripāṭha*, *Namana* and other miscellaneous *Abhaṅgas*. There are other works regarding which Jñānadeva's authorship is doubtful.

Jñāneśvarī was delivered extempore and taken down by Sachchidānanda Bābā. It contains about nine thousand Ovis. This is the first great work in Marāṭhi as yet unexcelled in its felicity of expression, beauty of poetic imagination, grandeur of philosophic thought and extremely enchanting in style. Many languages have their own great works, for reading which, one must learn but those languages. Similarly if it is only to read *Jñāneśvarī* one should learn Marāṭhi. The object of *Jñāneśvarī* is to spread divine joy, to annihilate the dearth of discriminative

intelligence and to enable the spiritual aspirant to have a glimpse of the Highest Reality.

Jñānadeva divides the *Gītā* in the following way. The first three chapters deal with the path of action. From fourth to eleventh describe devotion through action. Twelfth to fifteenth are devoted to the path of knowledge. The *Gītā* proper, according to him, ends here. The 16th Chapter classifies the qualities which help or hinder knowledge. The last two chapters deal with some incidental questions. Of these the eighteenth is regarded as *Kalaśādhya* which sums up the whole *Gītā*.

Though Jñānadeva extols each of the paths of *Karma*, *Bhakti*, *Jñāna* and *Pātāñjala* yoga as if it were *the* path, he is truly himself when he describes Devotion in rapturous terms. *Jñāneśvarī* and *Gāthā* (*Abhaṅgas* or devotional lyrics) of Tukārāma are the two gospels of lakhs of Wārkarīs who regularly visit Paṇḍarpur.

Unlike *Jñāneśvarī*, which is bound by the teaching of *Gītā*, Jñānadeva's *Amṛitānubhava* forms his independent work written at the initiation of Nivṛittinātha, who was his elder brother as well as Guru in the lineage of the Nātha Sampradāya. It originates with Śiva and passes through Śakti, Matsyendranātha, Gorakhanātha, and Gahinīnātha by whom Nivṛittinātha was initiated at Tryambakeśvara in the mountain of Brahmgiṛi. Through Nivṛittinātha the influence of Nātha-sampradāya came down to Jñānadeva.

Amṛitānubhava contains over eight hundred Ovis. Its original name is *Anubhavāmṛita*. It is an exposition of the Immortal Nectar of Divine experience. It describes the spiritual experience of the realized soul from the Absolutistic standpoint. Jñānadeva advocates a theory of Sphūrtivāda and refutes all Dualism, subjective Idealism, the Buddhistic Nihilism and the Vedāntic Nescience. As a matter of fact, more than one third of the work deals with the refutation of Ignorance. The work concludes with the delineation of the secret of *Akritrīma Bhakti* or natural or spontaneous devotion.

The work is of such a great philosophical significance that about a dozen commentaries (mostly in Marāṭhi) have been written on it. No other work in Marāṭhi has received such a privilege. The earliest commentary was written by Ekanātha (1533—

1599 A.D.) but is not available though some quotations from it are found in Kibe's commentary *Jyotsnā*.

Śivakalyāṇa's commentary (1635 A.D.) is known as *Nityānandaikya-Dīpikā*. According to him *Amṛitānubhava* goes beyond the viewpoints of *Pariṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda*. It could be understood by those who have attained perfect vision. Śivakalyāṇa in interpreting *Amṛitānubhava* takes the standpoint of the great Advaita work—*Samkshepasārīraka* of Sarvajñātman.

Prahādbuvā Badve (died 1718 A.D.) has written Sanskrit verses on *Amṛitānubhava*, the gist of which is the self-illumination of the Reality which is self-proved and is beyond any *Pramāṇas* as well as transcending the dualism implicit in knowledge and ignorance.

Vīreśvara Vallabha wrote in 1795 A.D., following Śaṅkara in his interpretation of the *Amṛitānubhava*. Viśvanātha Kibe writing his commentary *Jyotsnā* in 1882 has shown how Jñānadeva differs from Śaṅkara and Vidyāraṇya in not accepting illusion as the cause of the universe.

Harihara's commentary called *Rāshṭrabhāṣya* (date not known) partly in Sanskrit and partly in Marāṭhi is written from the standpoint of *Brahmavilāsa*.

Nirañjana (1782—1855 A.D.) in his introduction to his commentary says that *Amṛitānubhava* is written for a *Jīvan-mukta*. By this perhaps he means that the work is written from the standpoint of a *Jīvan-mukta* for whom no *upādhis* exist.

Jīvanmukta—yati writing a Sanskrit commentary in 1919 A.D. says that Jñānadeva's aim in refuting *Māyāvāda* is to establish *Ajātivāda*.

There are other more recent works by Jog, Sakhare, Kene Rajaramabuva Brahmachari, Dasganu, Khasnis, Garde, Panduranga Sharma, Dr Londhe, Pangarkar, R. D. Ranade, S. V. Dandekar, Dr. Pendse, V. M. Potdar, N. R. Phatak, Chapkhande, Gulabrao Maharaj and others. A recently published work *Divyāmṛitadhārā* by Moreshvar or Babamaharaj Joshi is worth mentioning. That is an excellent commentary on the first nineteen Ovis of the twelfth chapter of the *Jñāneśvarī*.

Of these Pāṇḍuranga Sharma thinks that Jñānadeva's philosophy is more in the line of Rāmānuja. According to Ranade Sphūrtivāda is Jñānadeva's original contribution to philosophic thought. Londhe labels Jñānadeva's philosophy as 'dual monism' and Dandekar as perfect monism, being more thorough-going than Śaṅkara's. Dr. Pendse opines that Jñānadeva exposes only Śaṅkara's philosophy in a poetic way. Similar is Pangarkar's view. Potdar shows the similarity of Jñānadeva's philosophy with that of *Yogavāsishṭha*.

Though from the above brief sketch some idea of Jñānadeva's philosophy can be formed, a summary statement is essential.

Jñānadeva rejects all *pramāṇas* including the *śabda* which for all the Vedāntins is the only efficacious one for the revelation of Reality. He relies on his own exalted experience. The so-called valid sources of knowledge derive their illumination from Reality, and not vice versa. Sun enlightens everything and so does the self-luminous Reality. The Absolute does not prove itself by any means of proof, nor allows itself to be disproved. It is self-evident, beyond proof or disproof. It is therefore groundless to believe that the word can gain greatness by enabling the Ātman to experience itself. (*Amṛtānubhava* VI, 93-95).

If it be said that word is necessary to remove Nescience which covers Reality, Jñānadeva says that as the very name *avidyā* declares, it is not *vidyamāna*, i.e. existent. Therefore to destroy a thing which does not exist is like breaking the hare's horn or plucking the sky-flowers. The word is futile bothways. It can destroy neither the non-existent nescience nor can reveal the self-luminous Reality. It is comparable to a lamp lit up at daytime.

The designation of the Ultimate Reality as *Sat*, *Chit* and *Ananda*, though true so far as it goes, cannot be regarded as metaphysically adequate. These are human modes of apprehension, not the thing-in-itself. The three terms stand for the same reality, but they indicate more what Reality is not than what it is. The dualism of *Sat* and *Asat*, *Chit* and *Achit*, *Ananda* and *Duhkha* are alike transcended in the Absolute. This Absolute is not, therefore, to be regarded as a void as the Mādhyamika holds. Criticising *Śūnyavāda*, Jñānadeva says: if the extinguisher of the lamp is extinguished along with the lamp, who will understand

that the lamp is extinguished? A man sound asleep in a lonely forest is neither perceived by others nor by himself, but he still exists. Absolute is the foundational pure self-consciousness beyond the relative dualism of knowledge and ignorance, subject and object, being and nothing.

The self-luminous Reality and its self-awareness form as it were a twin designated by Jñānadeva as God (*Śiva*) and Goddess (*Śakti*) who give birth to the whole universe, *without undergoing limitation* (*Nirupādhika*). As the ocean assuming the form of garlands of waves, enjoys itself, so Reality naturally manifests itself in the two forms and enjoys itself. Knowing oneself or enjoying oneself requires only an epistemological dualism which does not violate the ontological unity of consciousness or Reality. The reference to God and Goddess which are two names for the same Reality are not to be identified with the Sāṅkhya Puruṣa and Prakṛiti nor the Vedāntic Brahman and *Māyā*.

The lover himself has become the Beloved. Though they appear as two, there is only one Divinity, just as the word is one though the lips are two, or the fragrance is one though the flowers may be two, or sound is one though the sticks are two, or the sight is the same though the eyes are two. Śiva is eternally accompanied by Śakti because they are not two but one.

The one Reality manifests itself in the triad of the knower, the known and the knowledge. That is the origin of the universe. While for Śaṅkara this differentiation is due to Nescience and is illusory, for Jñānadeva that is the natural expression of Reality.

Refutation of Ignorance is almost of central importance in his philosophy. Śaṅkara's doctrines of *Māyā* and *Adhyāsa* and *Vivarta* which reduce God, man and the world to phenomenal status have raised severe reactions among the Vedāntic schools.

Jñānadeva has taken great pains to criticise *Ajñāna*. For him knowledge and ignorance are relative terms and hence there cannot be a prior ignorance to be later on destroyed by knowledge. The very description of ignorance depends upon knowledge. The existence of ignorance is illusory like the light of a glow-worm. It is incapable of enlightening either in light or in darkness. Knowledge which is said to be destroying ignorance is but a reappearance of ignorance in another form. Both are fictions of the mind.

The further points in the refutation of *Ajñāna* are as follows: Ignorance has no foundation, is unknowable and ineffective. It can neither co-exist with knowledge nor can be independent. It cannot be proved by any *pramāṇa*. It cannot dwell in pure *Ātman*. It cannot be inferred from the experience of the objective world. If ignorance has power of presentation, it is futile to call it ignorance. The word *Ajñāna* is constituted by prefixing 'A' to *Jñāna*. Thus to understand *Ajñāna* in terms of *Jñāna* or vice versa is malapropism. Ignorance cannot be born out of knowledge, but if it did it will be a still birth. Śruti declares that the world is illuminated by His light (*tasya bhāsā sarvamidaṁ vibhāti*). *Ātman* cannot meet ignorance even as Sun cannot meet darkness.

Jñānadeva maintains that the world is the sport of *Ātman* (*chidvilāsa*). He expands himself and shines forth as the world. The observer, in the guise of the objects comes to visit Himself. The universe including the individual selves is not an enchanting deception of *Aviḍyā*, but the expression of the Divine Love and Joy. World is not a diminution but a unique expression of the fulfilment of perfection. Jñānadeva says that the diversity found in the world results in the deepening of the unity. The enrichment of gold is through the golden ornaments.

The finiteness of the individual implies that the Reality determines itself in order to realize itself in various forms. So the aim of the individual life is to realize this status of dignity and act up to its real worth. Advocating 'natural devotion' Jñānadeva says that it consists in realizing how God manifests Himself through one's being. It is a culmination of Yoga and *Jñāna* and transcends them.

Bhakti has an intrinsic or absolute value. What is termed *sva-samvitti* by philosophers, and Śakti by the Śaivas is better termed Bhakti for Jñānadeva. Bhakti or love is the very nature of God. The present writer is of the opinion that Jñānadeva's philosophy is a development mainly from the combination of Śaṅkarācārya's Advaitism and Gorakhanātha's *Siddha-siddhānta-paddhati*, though anti-illusionist thinking of others might also have influenced him. Refutation of *ajñāna* is not the same as the refutation of *Māyāvāda*. Standing on the Absolutistic plane even Śaṅkarācārya would not accept *ajñāna*. But a philosopher's task is to explain also the every day experience of the common man. It is a diffi-

cult task to show logically the consistency between Brahman on the one hand and the world on the other. To the extent that it is an emanation from Brahman it could be regarded as *Chidvilāsa*. But no thinking person will give the world-experience the same value as Brahman. To explain this deficiency in value one intelligent method is that of postulation of a mysterious *māyā*. What is *chidvilāsa* to the transcendentalist is *māyā* to the phenomenalist. They can appreciate each other's truth only by exchange of their standpoints and thus there is no antagonism between the two positions. As a matter of fact these are the two view-points within one Absolutistic system.

(ii)

NISCHALADASA

by

V. L. SETHURAMAN

M.A.

Nischaladāsa, a veteran saint and Vedāntic scholar of the early period of the Nineteenth Century, has written a remarkable and beautiful treatise on Advaita philosophy, by name *Vichāra-sāgara*. This has been written by him in Hindi, the language of the place where he lived. This work deals with all the topics relevant to the realization of the real nature of Ātman. All the tenets of Advaita have been propounded in strict conformity to the texts on Advaita Vedānta, particularly the *Pañchadaśī*.

The work has become popular not only because its exposition of difficult themes in Advaita is both lucid and facile; but also because it is useful to those who are not conversant with Sanskrit language, grammar, and literature and who know only Hindi. Its style is also elegant. Further one of the best ways of bringing home the truth of Vedānta, namely, the conversational method has been adopted by the author in this work. The work has seven divisions called *taraṅgas* or waves, appropriately to the title *Vichāra-sāgara*.

Sādhu Nischaladāsa composed the *Vichāra-sāgara* in verse form. It contains 527 *Kārikās* or verses divided into seven *taraṅ-*

gas. Śrī Pīṭambarāji has written a *ṭīkā*, being a commentary on the *Kārikās* of Śrī Nīśchaladāsa. The *ṭīkā* himself has written detailed notes called *ṭippaṇa* on the *Vichāra-sāgara* along with the *ṭīkā*. The Lahore edition (1938) of the *Vichāra-sāgara* contains three parts. The first is the original work, namely the *Kārikās* of Śrī Nīśchaladāsa. The second is the *ṭīkā* written on the original *Kārikās*, and the third, namely *ṭippaṇa* being the detailed notes on the original *Kārikās* of *Vichāra-sāgara* and its *ṭīkā*.

True to his name, Nīśchaladāsa wrote this monumental work out of a firm and unshakable conviction about the one and only reality of Brahman.

Not many details are available of the life history of Nīśchaladāsa. A short and beautiful account of him given in the Lahore edition of the text (1938) with its *ṭīkā* and *ṭippaṇa* reveals that he was a great saint and a sound scholar in Advaita Vedānta. He was well versed in the Vedas, and had a clear knowledge of *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nyāya*, *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, and other philosophical systems. Nīśchaladāsa has himself stated in this work that he composed it in Hindi to enable laymen who did not know Sanskrit to understand Advaita easily. He composed this work at Kihadouli, a village which is situated 18 *krośas* from Delhi. He is also the author of the great work called *Vṛitti-prabhākara*. Till his 70th year, he was said to be moving in all the nooks and corners of India and leading the life of a student, philosopher, teacher and expounder of the tenets of *Adhyātma Śāstra*. He died in 1864 A.D. in a village near Delhi. His family preceptor was the great Dādhuji.¹

The contents of the *Vichāra-sāgara* can be summed up as follows. The first *taraṅga* or wave, starts with the benedictory verse extolling the unity of *jīva* and Brahman. The greatness of the work, the four-fold essentials of a work, namely the *adhikāri* the *sambandha*, the *vishaya* and the *prayojana*, the three means of realizing Ātman, namely *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*, the indirect means to obtain the real knowledge, the direct means to know Brahman, are all dealt with in the first wave.

1. *Vichāra Sāgara*, Lahore Edition (1938), p. 6.

The four-fold essentials which are mentioned in the first wave are once again established in the second wave, after meeting satisfactorily the incidental doubts. The *pūrvapakshin* here raises an objection. Since each and every type of misery can be removed by a distinct means, there will be no necessity for the knowledge of Brahman to nullify miseries. Further the desire for an object comes to one only when the object is already known to him, and since Brahman is not at all known previously, one could not have any desire at all to know about it. The difference between *jīva* and Brahman is well-known, and so they are two distinct things. Bondage is true, since there are no valid reasons to admit the idea of superimposition, and bondage can be removed by *karma* alone. So what is the use of studying this Vedāntic text? This objection is answered thus: misery cannot be uprooted by anything except the knowledge of Brahman. Bondage is unreal, and this cannot at all be removed by any karma, but only by *Ātmajñāna*. So the *prayojana* or the usefulness of the work is established. And, thus *anubandha-chatusṭaya* is established fully in the second wave.

The qualifications and characteristics of preceptor and pupil are given in the third wave. A student must go in search of the preceptor, obey his commands, do the utmost service to him, and propitiate him by all means. This alone will be the means of getting the true knowledge of the Ātman. The methods of propitiating the preceptor are laid down in this chapter. The knowledge of Ātman may also come from the Vedas and works based upon them, even though they are not real. These are all dealt with in this wave.

The best and the most commendable method of infusing the difficult tenets of philosophy into the minds of the pupils is to convey them in the form of dialogue set in the background of a story. This method has been adopted in the succeeding waves. For example, knowledge of Brahman is imparted through the following story. A king by name Śubhaśānti, desirous of seeking the knowledge of the Ātman, wanted to entrust the kingdom to his three sons, Tattvadṛisṭi, Tarkadṛisṭi and Adṛisṭi, and go to the forest. When the three sons came to know about his intention, they themselves started first in quest of real learning. They roamed in several places and finally came to the vicinity of a great sage who was teaching his disciples on the banks of the Ganges, and

became his disciples. Thereupon they obtained the true knowledge from their preceptor.

In the fourth wave, the *Uttamādhikāri*, Tattvaḍṛiṣṭi, got his doubts cleared by the preceptor. There is a detailed exposition of the identity between *jīva* and Brahman, the knowledge of which is the destroyer of sorrow and the cause of the attainment of bliss. The world is not real just like the serpent appearing in a rope. How does a rope appear as snake? This has been clearly explained in this wave. The theory of error (*khyātivāda*) also has been explained here. As regards the non-difference of *jīva* and Brahman several objections have been raised and answered. The author finally establishes in this wave that the knowledge of Brahman can be attained directly from the Vedas and the instructions of a teacher.

The fifth wave starts with the conversation between the *Madhyamādhikāri* by name Aḍṛiṣṭi and the preceptor. He starts by raising this point that the teachings of the preceptor and Vedas are false, and by means of these false things, how will the universe disappear? This has been answered thus. A person who has been seemingly affected by poison in his dream or obsession which is not real, really feels pain and gets also the after-effects. From letters which are not real, we get the real knowledge. From the reflection of the image which is not real, the knowledge of the real object i.e. the original is obtained. In the same way we can get the real knowledge of Brahman from the Vedas even though they are not real. Further, a good dream as well as a bad one, even though they are not real come true at times.² So the knowledge of Brahman can be got from the Vedas and the teachings of the preceptor. The nature of *jīva*, *Īśvara*, and *māyā*, *sūkshma dṛiṣṭi*, *sthūla dṛiṣṭi*, the nature of the five *kośas*, the creation and destruction of the universe, *prāṇavopasānā*, etc., are all dealt with in this wave.

In the next wave Tarkadṛiṣṭi, the *kanisṭhādhikāri* raises objections regarding the identity of the two states, namely, the waking state and the state of dream. The preceptor establishes the similarity of the two states. The other points that are dealt with in this wave are: the individual soul is identical with Brah-

2. See *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, ii, 1-14.

man which is free from birth and death and which is of the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss; Brahman associated with *avidyā* is the source of the universe; the intuitive knowledge of Brahman alone is the means to liberation.

In the seventh wave, the characteristics of a person who has obtained the knowledge of Brahman are described. The eight limbs of *yoga*, namely, *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are all defined and described in detail. The Vedas and Purāṇas are the means of realising the one and only reality, namely, Brahman. The Vedas, the Upanishads, the Purāṇas, the Upapurāṇas, the śaḍaṅgas, and other śāstraic texts have non-dualism as their main theme, and these works are mentioned so that they may be treated as authority in establishing this system of philosophy. In this wave, Tarkarishṭi after having asked a number of questions, comes to the conclusion that all Śāstraic texts are the means to obtain the intuitive knowledge. Finally he becomes the preceptor of his father Śubhaśānti and clears his doubts. Thus all of them attain to the supreme human end.

Thus the tenets of Advaita philosophy are conveyed in these seven waves of this work with charm and elegance. This work has been translated into Sanskrit and Tamil, and it is indeed very useful to the students of Advaita philosophy.

(iii)

TANDAVARAYAR

by

T. P. MEENAKSHISUNDARA1.

M.A., B.L., M.O.L.

Tāṇḍavarāya Svāmikal is very popular among the Advaitins of Tamil land whether literate or illiterate. His famous work in Tamil *Kaivalya-navanītam* (Butter of Kaivalya-Moksha) is so named as the author himself explains, because he has taken the cream of wisdom from the various pots of milk of jñāna entrusted to succeeding generations by the great sages and seers of this sacred land. Its language is so simple and its exposition is so concrete and full of homely illustrations, that it is so popular

amongst even the illiterate men and women of Tamil land. Many a widow and many an old man forget the miseries of this world and immerse themselves in the joy of this knowledge. It is popular in the Kerala country and also on the borders of the Andhra deśa. In addition, there is a popular translation in Malayalam almost echoing the words and phrases of the original. When in the last century somewhere in 1865, Murdock published for the first time a classified catalogue of Tamil printed books he assured us that this book was one of the highest authorities on Śaṅkara's Vedānta in the Tamil land. There is also a translation in Sanskrit with the same name by one Śaṅku Kavi. This Śaṅku Kavi states that he is a disciple of Kṛṣṇānanda whom some identify with Kṛṣṇānanda the author of *Siddhānta-siddhāñjana*. The German Missionary Dr. Graul considered this so very important as to be translated into German language. The Ramanāśrama has sponsored a translation into English thus placing this book before the International audience.

Tāṇḍavarāya Svāmikal was called Tāṇḍava or Tāṇḍavamūrti by his parents as is made clear by himself. He speaks of Venkaṭeśa Mukundan as his Guru. But this refers to Viṣṇu, the lord of Venkaṭa hills. At the end of the book he speaks of Nāraṇaguru of Nannilam, a place in the Tanjore district. In the first verse of his work he uses Nannilam as referring to the highest of *Sapta bhūmis* in the spiritual ascent. In another verse the poet tells us that this Nārāyaṇa or Nāraṇa had come to reveal to the author the truth in the latter's yogic state. The Malayalam translation will explain it as the Guru revealing in the dream of the student. The author has described how he has himself through the teachings of his Guru attained to the state of jīvan-mukta.

The book consists of two parts, one *tattvaviḷakkappaṭalam* where the Vedānta truth is expounded and the second *sandeham telidal paṭalam* where various doubts which arise are cleared. He states that this book is intended for those who were not so intelligent as to be able to read the Śāstras. This book starts with a person who has achieved the *sādhana chatuṣṭaya* and who thereafter rushes away from the world to his Guru who welcomes him with joy. The Guru tells him that as soon as he knows himself he will be a free man. Naturally the disciple raises the question "Do not I know myself?" The Guru begins to explain the

difference between the body and the one who has the body. Through various examples the Guru convinces the student that the latter is not the body and proceeds to explain in a gross way by speaking of *āroṇa* which is the real *bandha* where one sees something else. *Apavāda* is the removal of this *āroṇa* and is therefore really *moksha*. The real Brahman is mistaken for this world of the body in the *āroṇa* state. The Guru thereafter described the evolution of the world emphasising at every step the *jīva* in the body and *Īśvara* in the Universe. The *samashṭi* outlook leads us to *Īśvara*: *vyashṭi* outlook leads us to *jīva*. If this *āroṇa* of evolution is analysed according to the *śāstras*, *moksha* will result. But one who cannot realise this is advised, to reduce the series of effects into the series of causes. This *āroṇa* consists of two *śaktis*, one which creates illusion—*vikshepa śakti* and the other *āvaraṇa śakti* which hides the real truth. The *ādhāra* or the basis, consists of two parts, what is common to all and what is special. What is common is the meaning of what we denote by the usage of the word “this”. This never disappears. What is predicated of this is what is special and this will certainly disappear at the dawn of knowledge. What really is, is the Brahman. When this is hidden *jīvātmā* appears. When this disappears then Brahman will be realised. The various illusions may even lead to salvation and then disappear along with others. You burn a corpse with a burning stick, but finally the burning stick is also reduced to ashes. Therefore the *vikshepa* is not so bad as *āvaraṇa* which hides the truth. *Māyā* has to be removed by *māyā* itself. The Guru continues to describe the five *avasthas* and gives us the story of the *daśaman* or the tenth man found out after crossing a river. Then begins the discussion about the meaning of *mahāvākya*. The identity of *jīva* with Brahman is asserted through *bhāgatyaṅga-lakṣaṇā*. Thus the student realises the *ānanda* of this unity. *Tāṇḍavarāya* follows *Vidyāraṇya*’s exposition.

We are told that this book has really helped many a thirsting soul to drink deep of the Advaita truth.

If *Krishṇānanda* belongs to the eighteenth century *Tāṇḍavarāya* must be earlier and people see a reference to this book in *Tāyumanavar*’s verses. *Tāyumanavar* belongs to the seventeenth century and if the above assumption is correct this book could not be later than the early half of the sixteenth century.

(iv)

POTANA

by

D. RAMALINGA REDDIAR

M.A, B.L.

In the history of Telugu literature, old and medieval, we find several great poets who have enriched the language with their works. But there are only a few poets who are remembered by a grateful public even to-day. Among them, Bammara Potana is perhaps the most outstanding poet. Bammara is his surname and this is the village in which he was born. Though some scholars may not agree, it may be said that this village is located near Warangal in Telengana (Hyderabad area). Warangal is also known as Orugallu in Telugu and Ekasilānagara in Sanskrit.

Bammara Potana is said to have flourished in the 15th century A.D. We do not know much about the details of his life; but several interesting stories dealing with his life and work are current in the Telugu country. However, the following details can be given with an amount of certainty.

Potana was not rich. He led a humble and pious life. His parents were Kesana and Lakkamaṁbā. It is said he lived on agriculture, rejecting the riches offered by the kings. As a result, Potana had to face the wrath of a king by name Sarvajña Singa-bhūpāla. The King wanted Potana to dedicate his *Bhāgavata* to him; but Potana refused to do so and he dedicated the work to his favourite God, Śrī Rāma. This clearly brings out the great quality in him. Even though he was poor, he never cared for the riches or the patronage of the kings.

It is also unfortunate that we do not know much about his educational attainments. He has called himself '*Sahaja Paṇḍita*' which means 'one who has self-acquired scholarship'. In the colophon, it is mentioned as follows:

sahaja pāṇḍitya pōtanāmātya praṇītambaina.

From this, it is evident that he did not study under any great scholar of the day. He might have acquired scholarship by self-

study. Whatever the truth might be, it can be said that Potana was a great scholar well-versed in both Sanskrit and Telugu. He had such a mastery over the Telugu language that he used several expressions with consummate skill.

Potana is said to have written the following works in Telugu:

1. *Vīrabhadra-vijayamu*
2. *Nārāyaṇa-śatakamu*
3. *Bhoginī-daṇḍakamu*
4. *Mahābhāgavatamu*

Of the above, *Bhāgavatam* is definitely the most celebrated work. *Vīrabhadra-vijayam* is a poem of four cantos containing 1046 verses and prose passages. This deals with the well-known story of Dakshayajña. It is believed that this poem must have been composed by the poet in his teenage. Still it does not lack vigour, or poetic beauty.

Potana is famous for his sweet and melodious poetry. Though he has used a considerable number of Sanskrit compounds, they are at once sweet and pleasing to the ear. His style, though at some places appears to be flamboyant, arrests the attention of the reader. He is quite popular with the pandit and peasant as well. This is evident from the fact that even the unlettered recite some of the stanzas from his works. Potana is a people's poet.

Among all the works of Potana, his *Mahābhāgavatam* deserves special mention. It is due to this immortal work, that he is remembered with great respect even to-day. It is interesting to note that several later poets had paid their profound respects to Potana. It is also worthy to note that only in Telugu country *Mahābhāgavatam* is read with interest and reverence. Even in Telugu, *Mahābhāgavatam* would not have attracted the reader had it been written by some one other than Potana. This is enough to prove that Potana was a great poet. Besides, he was a true devotee of Rāma. His sincere devotion to God, his sweet poetry, and above all his pious, humble, and independent life are also responsible for the popularity of the *Mahābhāgavatam*. It is really astonishing to find in one and the same person, namely Potana, true devotion and genuine poetry.

Let me quote a stanza from his *Bhāgavatam* to indicate his style:

*mandāra makaranda mādhyamunodelu
madhupambhu pobhun madanamulaku
nirmala-mandākini nelakalādhāgu
rayam cha chanuntaraṅginalaku
lalitarasāla pallavikādi yai choku
koyila seruṇe kuṭajamulaku
pūrṇendu chandrikā sphuritā chakoraka
maruṅṇe saṁdhrīṇi hāramulaku*

In the introductory verses in the *Mahābhāgavatam*, he says as follows:

*palikeḍidi bhāgavatamaṭa
palikumbeduvāḍu rāmabhadruḍaṭa
ne palikina bhavahara magunaṭa*

'It is Rāma who prompts me to write the *Bhāgavatam*. I shall not write anything other than this story'. In the colophon also, he says: "*Śrī Paramēśvara karuṇākalitakavitā...*" Such was the humility and true devotion of Potana!

Though *Bhāgavatam* is generally regarded as Potana's work, he is not the author of the entire work. He was helped by three other poets — Gaṅgana, Siṅgana and Nāraya. Of these, Nāraya seems to be the disciple of Potana. It should be remembered that the major portion of the work was written by Potana himself and that it is the best part of the poem.

Potana's *Bhāgavatam* is not a mere translation of the original Sanskrit *Bhāgavata*. The size of the Telugu version is almost the double of the original. Besides following the original, Potana drew from the commentaries also whatever that could be given to the reader. Further, he included the different stories relating to Śrī Kṛṣṇa as found in *Harivaṁśa*, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, and other works. Whenever he got an opportunity, Potana, out of his abundant devotion to the Almighty, composed several verses in His praise. Thus the Telugu version contains several additions which are not found in the original.

As already mentioned, Potana's *Bhāgavatam* is very popular in the Telugu country. Especially, stories like *Kuchelopākhyānam*,

Gajendramoksham and *Rukmiṇī Kalyāṇam* are very popular and are being widely read. Some of the beautiful verses like 'ala vaikunṭhapurambulō', 'śirikiṇjeppaḍu...', 'lāvokkintayuledu...', 'Ghanuḍābhūsuruḍegenō...' can be easily compared with the best pieces written in any language. The above stories as depicted by Potana can be recommended for translation into other languages.

The popularity of the *Bhāgavatam* can be well gauged from the fact that more than three hundred manuscripts are available in the libraries like Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal library and the library of the Telugu Academy, Kākināḍa. *Bhāgavatam* has been printed several times; the first edition was brought out in 1840 by Vedam Vekatachala Sastri; the latest being that of Andhra Pradesh Sahitya Akademi, Hyderabad. The National Book Trust has brought out a book in Telugu on Potana by Sri N. Venkata Rao. Several well-known writers, past and modern, have written and published valuable articles on various aspects of the *Bhāgavatam*. All these will clearly show that this classic has attracted the writers and the readers alike.

Though we find the element of Bhakti in almost all stanzas in the *Bhāgavatam*, we find at some places the elaborate description of a particular type of Bhakti, namely *dāsya-bhakti* or *madhura-bhakti*. For instance, *madhura-bhakti* can be well seen and appreciated in the *Bhramara Gīta* or *jala krīḍā* in the Tenth Canto. The passages relating to the Gopikas searching for Lord Kṛṣṇa are at once poetic and beautiful. One cannot but quote this verse in this connection.

punnāga kāṇave punnāgavaṁditu
 dhilakaṁba kāṇave dhilākanitula
 ghanasāra kāṇave ghanasāra śobhitu
 bandhuka kāṇave bandhumitra
 manmata kāṇave manmatā kārūni
 vaṁsaṁba kāṇave vaṁsadharuni

In the story of *Rukmiṇī Kalyāṇam* Potana describes in detail the two sentiments — *śṛīṅāra* and *bhakti*. To a casual reader, it would appear that in the hands of Potana *śṛīṅāra* got the upper hand. But a careful study of the story would reveal the fact that *bhakti* is the end of *śṛīṅāra* and that Potana has proved this in unmistakable terms.

Rukmiṇī writes a beautiful letter to Kṛishṇa wherein she sought the Lord's help in fulfilling her desire. At one place, she says 'What use is there of these ears if I could not hear your sweet words?' This can be interpreted as a devotee's prayer to the Almighty.

We also find in some places the Advaitic approach. Without referring to Rāma or Kṛishṇa, Potana addresses the Almighty in some verses. The following stanza may be quoted in this connection:

*yavvaniche janiñchu jagame'vvanī lapolanundu īnāma'
yavvaniyundu dīndu parameśvaruḍevvado.*

This can be regarded as the universal prayer.

Potana believes in the existence of one God, Īśvara, though Rāma is his personal and favourite God. This has been well illustrated in the story of Gajendra.

Gajendra, the mighty elephant, was caught by the cruel crocodile and he suffered a lot. The elephant tried his best to get to the shore; but he could not. Potana compares this state of helplessness of the elephant to that of a man (*dehī*) who is encircled by the illusion (*moha*) and is unable to get rid of it. Naturally, he then turns his eyes to the Almighty, the most powerful, and seeks His help. Potana in the following stanza describes the state of helplessness of the man and his complete surrender (*śaranāgati*) to God.

*lāvokkintayū lēdu
dhairyaṃ vilolāmbaiyye, Prānambulun
ṭhāṇṇul dappenu, mūrcca-vacce
tanuvundassen śramaṇbayyaḍin
nīvetappa itaḥ param beruga
mannimpan dagundīnūnin
rāve īśvara, kāvave varada
saṃrakshiñcu bhadṛātmakā.*

In conclusion, it may be said that Potana, through his immortal work, has popularised the Bhakti movement and the Advaitic thought among the devotees, particularly the Andhras.

SRI SANKARA AND SANKARITE INSTITUTIONS

by

SWAMI ANANTANANDENDRA SARASVATI

*śruti-smṛiti-purāṇānām
 ālayam karuṇālayam
 namāmi bhagavatpādam
 śaṅkaram lokaśaṅkaram.*

Great credit is due to Śaṅkara and his school for having fought strenuously against the upholders of self-existence of the material world and brought the whole universe under the sway of God to whom it owes not only its organisation but also its very being. Śaṅkara understood that the independent existence of another being would imply limitation of God.¹

Or let us, more truthfully, say that in honouring the memory and work of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya we are just honouring ourselves.²

Devotional offerings to Śrī Śaṅkara and receiving blessings from His Living Representatives in His various Pīṭhas during auspicious occasions such as Śaṅkara Jayanti, Vyāsapūjā, Vijaya-daśami, etc., would go a great way in spiritually elevating us. Some of the institutions directly established by him thrive even to-day under Āchāryas glowing with spiritual lustre, while some are vacant and some have ceased to exist. However to remember all the holy places where Śrī Bhagavatpāda started institutions is a spiritual asset for the devotees. Besides the institutions about which we can get some evidence of their being established directly by the great Āchārya, many institutions

1. J. F. Pessein, *Vedanta Vindicated*, p. 8.

2. Extract from Arthur Isenberg's Sankara Jayanti address at Madras on 18th May, 1956.

have sprung up from the original roots and thrive with vigour in serving Hinduism.

Traditional evidence recorded by eminent personages may give us a glimpse of such institutions so that we may not only contribute our humble mite towards the upkeep and renovation of such institutions but also benefit ourselves spiritually.

1. *Guruvamśa-Kāvya*³ of Śringeri written under the direction of Śrī Sachchidānanda Bhāratī Swāmi, Head of the Śringeri Maṭha (1770-1814), says that Śrī Śāṅkara established five mutts at Benares, four for his disciples and one for Himself. The author has himself written a commentary on this work.

*vāraṇasīm yogivaro'dhigamya
bhujairiva śrīhariresha śishyairiḥ
sahātmanā pañcha maṭhānamīśhām
prakalpya tasthau katichiddināni.*

(Sarga 3; Verse 23).

In the commentary it is said:

*ātmanā saha amīśhām
śishyāṇām pañcha maṭhān prakalpya.*

2. The following extract from the Annual Report of the Archaeological Department of Mysore for the year 1928 written by the Director of Archaeological researches in Mysore and published under the auspices of the University of Mysore contains reference to the *Guruvamśa-mahā-kāvya* at p. 15.

Guruvamśa-Mahā-Kāvya: History of Teachers of Śringeri Maṭh: Author. Lakshmaṇa Śāstrī, son of Viśveśvara Śāstrī, under the orders of Śrī Sachchidānanda Bhāratī, disciple of Śrī Nara-simha Bhāratī. The author is contemporary of Soma Śekhara II (1714-1739) of Keladi when Sachchidānanda Bhāratī (1705-1741) adorned the pontifical seat at Śringeri.....It may be reasonably presumed that he faithfully copied all traditional informations about the successive teachers of Śringeri..... The author says that He set up Five Maṭhs and mentions the names of Śringeri, Kāñchī, Badari, Kāśī and Jagannāth.

3. Published by Guru-bhakta-sikhamani Sri T. K. Balasubramania Iyer, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam.

From this extract, it may be presumed that the text of *Guruvamśa-kāvya* and its commentary to which the Director had access mentions clearly the names of the Maṭhas which the Āchārya probably planned while staying at Benares.

3. *The Cochin State Manual* gives the information that some Maṭhas tracing their origin to the direct disciples of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya such as Sureśvara and Padmapāda with Nambudiri Sannyāsins as their heads are found in Trichur in Kerala. Outside Trichur there is a Nambudiri Sannyāsi Maḍam called Tirukkekkat Maḍam which is also said to have been situated originally at Trichur. One of them is called Naḍuvile (Central) Maḍam. One of these has been converted as Brahmasva Maḍam, i.e., Vedic Centre for Nambudiri Brahmins. Professor K. Rama Pisharoti, M.A., in an article on *The Age of Śaṅkara in the Light of Kerala Legends* published in *The Hindu*, dated July 4, 1932, states that these Maṭhas might not have been established at the time of Śrī Śaṅkara, that it was likely that even before Śrī Śaṅkara's time, these places were traditional centres of Vedic learning, and that Śrī Śaṅkara converted them as his Maṭhas. But he confirms the tradition that the direct disciples of Śrī Śaṅkara were the first presidents of these Maṭhas. This opinion that Śrī Śaṅkara converted such institutions of saintly scholars which existed before his time as monasteries to foster his Advaita philosophy finds an echo in a work called *Kāñchī-māhātmyam*,⁴ which states that Devī Kāmākshī, the presiding deity of Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha was worshipped by the Yatis:

*upāsate manasyevam
bhūmau kāñchyām yatīśvarāḥ
[Kāñchī-māhātmyam, Chapter 31.]*

4. The Chingleput Gazetteer, published by Charles Stuart Crole Esq., I.E.S., in the year 1879, says that Śrī Śaṅkarāchāriar paid particular attention to Kāñchīpura, where He worked many miracles and founded a Mutt or a monastery.⁵

Note—(a) This Maṭha has all along been maintained mainly by payments of certain portion of the produce from the cultivable

4. Printed in Karvetnagar during the last century.

5 Pp. 86-7.

lands in the country. This payment which went under the name of "Merai" in some Taluqs round about Kāñchī was recognised by the High Court which says: "We think the evidence justifies the inference that this payment of the disputed merai hau a lawful origin and was not merely voluntary."⁶

(b) The Collector of Tanjore recommends that the allowance of Rs. 6743-5-0 due to Śrī Śāṅkarāchāriar's Maṭha at Kumbakonam which is now paid in the shape of an *assignment of land revenue* be disbursed hereafter direct from the Sub-Treasury at that station.....In any case the Government considers that the method of payment by beriz deduction is much to be preferred and accordingly directs that the land revenue assignment be resumed and that the allowance of Rs. 6743-5-0 be paid in future by beriz deduction.⁷

5. There is an inscription dated Vikrama Samvat 1941, Śālivāhana Śaka 1806 (1884 A.D.) in the Brahmendra Mutt, Śivālaya Ghāt, Benares, which refers to *Jagadguru Śāṅkarasya pāraṁparyakramāgata-śishya sanmārganishṇata Chandraśekhara-nāmā...indramaṭābhidham* indicating thereby that a paraṁparā of Śrī Śāṅkarāchārya with *Indrapaṭṭa* existed in the last century at Benares.

jagadguroḥ śāṅkarasya
pāraṁparyakramāgataḥ
śishyah sanmārganishṇataḥ
chandraśekharanāmakaḥ
tasya śishyo viśvanātha
yatīndro yoginām varah

6. *Vide* judgement of Sir John Wallis, Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Ayling in Second Appeals Nos. 1282 and 1283 of 1917 on the file of the High Court, Madras—Sri Kanchi Kamakoti PeetaJhipathi Swami Avergal Sikkudayar Swami Avergal, Sri Sankaracharyaswami vs. Manali Saravana Mudaliar and another (Srotriendars of three Srotriem villages in Chengleput District).

The Lord at Kanchi is generally called Tiru Ekambam Udayar and the Lord at Tanjore Periya Udayar (Great Lord). The Āchārya is called Sikku Udayar or Chikka Udayar—the Canarese equivalent of Siriya Udayar.

7. Extract from G.O. No. 178 (Revenue, Miscellaneous), dated 1st March 1894.

*kāśyām śvālaye ghaṭṭe
kāśīrājagurormaṭhe*

*svakīye nivasan svīyam
anyam maṭham udāradhīh*

*babandha grāvabhīr-mūlāt
divyaṃ indramaṭhābhidham.*

6. In Benares itself there is a Maṭha known as the Sumeru Maṭha otherwise called Pādukā Maṭha, under the royal patronage of His Highness the Mahārājā of Benares. It is now presided over by a Bengali daṇḍi-sannyāsin. In an appeal issued on behalf of this Maṭha for funds for repairs, the following statement appears under the signatures of the persons in the list given below: "During his stay at the holy city of Kāśī (Benares), *Paramahansa Parivrajakāchārya Jagadguru the Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya* Maharāj established the Sumeru Maṭha"..... List of the Signatories in the Appeal issued on behalf of the Sumeru Maṭha:—

1. *Srimat Svami Ramesvarananda Tirth Dandi*, 'Omkar Math', Benares.
2. *Srimat Dattatreyananda Sarasvati*, *Guru Dattatreya Math*, Benares.
3. *Srimat Sivanath Puri*, *Mahant Maharaj*, *Sri Sri Annapurna Mandir*, Benares.
4. *Srimat Mahabir Prasad Maharajji*, *Proprietor*, *Sri Sri Bisvesvar Mandir*, Benares.
5. *Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Pramathanatha Tarkabhushan*.
6. *Mahamahopadhyaya Srijut Pandit Ananda-Charan Tarka Chudamani*.
7. *Mahamahopadhyaya Srijut Pandit Vama Charan*, *Nyaya-charya*.
8. *Mahamahopadhyaya Srijut Pandit Padmanath*, *Vidya-vinode*, M.A.
9. *Sjt. Pandit Shyama Kanta Tarka Panchanana* (*Kashi Naresh Sabha Pandit*).
10. *Sjt. Pandit Gopi Chandra Sankhya Thirtha*, *Professor*, *Brahmana Sabha*, Benares.

proof of the view held by the Āchārya that due performance of rites is an integral feature of His teachings.⁸

9. The late Sri S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri says in his book *Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya* that Śrī Saṅkara established several mutts, the most notable of which are perhaps those of the Śāradā Pīṭha and the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha and finally departed from this world at the early age of thirty-two.⁹

10. The late Dr. Sir C. P. Ramaswami Iyer in his brochure, *World Religions—A Study in Synthesis*, says that Śaṅkara established mutts or centres of religious learning and practices in the North, South, East and West of India, and that *Srīnagar*, *Dwāraka*, *Purī*, *Śrīṅgeri* and *Kāñchī* were his far-flung spiritual capitals.

11. *A History of South India* published by the Oxford University Press, Madras, 1955, states that Śrī Śaṅkara founded a number of Maṭhas in different parts of India, the best known being those at Śrīṅgeri, Dwāraka, Badrinath, Purī and Kāñchī.

12. The Bulletin of the Institute of Traditional Cultures, (UNESCO) 1957, published by the University of Madras, referring to the Śrīṅgeri Mutt, says "One of the *five* maṭhas established by Śaṅkarāchārya of the 8th Century A.D."

13. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Professor of Philosophy, University of Madras says: He (Śrī Śaṅkara) set up at cardinal points of the country monastic institutions which would safeguard the spiritual interests of the race. Of these institutions five are the most important. Except the one at *Badari* in the Himalayas, the other four were in the peninsular part of India, at *Purī*, *Dwāraka*, *Śrīṅgeri* and *Kāñchī*.¹⁰

14. *Śrī Jagadguru Aṅka of Prabhūth*, Mangalore, 1958, says that the Āchārya established mutts at *Śrīṅgeri*, *Dwāraka*, *Badrikāśrama*, *Purī*, *Kāñchī*, etc. (p. 4).

8. See the English portion of *Bhakta-kusumāñjali* printed at Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, and published on the occasion of the Nakshatra Mahotsava of Śrī Chandrasekhara Bhārati of Śrīṅgeri.

9. *Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya*, p. 2 (G. A. Natesan & Co., Madras).

10. Broadcast talk printed in the book *Contribution of the South to the Heritage of India*, p. 10 (Published by the Publications Division of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961).

15. *The Thūrtthāṅka* of the Magazine *Kalyan* for the year 1957, published by the Gita Press, Gorakhpur, mentions at page 547 under the heading—*Jagadguru Śaṅkarāchārya kā pīṭha aur upapīṭha*, and sub-heading—*Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya-dvārā-sthāpita-pañcha-pradhān-pīṭha*, that *Jyotir-pīṭha*, *Govardana-pīṭha*, *Śūradā-pīṭha*, *Śringeri-pīṭha*, and *Kāmakoti-pīṭha* are the five important *pīṭhas* established by Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya. Besides these it mentions fifteen more *maṭhas*:

(1) *Kūḍali Maṭha*

Kūḍali is at the confluence of the river Tungā and the river Bhadrā in the district of Shimoga in Mysore state.

Note: That this Maṭha was an independent Maṭha and that it was entitled to use Addapallaki and other paraphernalia was held in Appeal No. 22 of 1847 on the file of the Court of Huzur Adalat, Mysore. This order was confirmed by the Commissioner, Mysore, in his order dated 1st June, 1849.

The judgement also quoted that the Paravana of the Phalguna Bahula, 6 of the year Krodhana, is to the effect that the Kūḍali Svāmi should always be on tour and that the Śringeri Svāmi should ever remain at Śringeri worshipping the deity.¹¹

Mr. B. Suryanarayana Rao, B.A., M.R.A.S., in his "*History of Sivaganga Mutt*, 1914, states that after the defeat of Maṇḍana-misra, Sarasavānī who was coming with Śaṅkarāchārya was inclined to stay at Kūḍali, which is at the confluence of the rivers the Tungā and the Bhadrā and that He installed her there (p. 30). *Śārīraka-mīmamsā-bhāṣya* printed in and published by the Venkatesvara Press, Bombay, in the year 1931 in its *Bhūmikā* written by Mahavidvan Venkaṭāchala Śarma, son of Paṇḍita Dharmādhikārī Śrī Venkaṭasubramanya Śastri and grandson of Paṇḍita Dharmadīkārī Kāśī Sesha Nāgesvara Śāstriar of Mysore has the following observations in Sanskrit regarding this Kūḍali Mutt ^{11a}

11. Extract from the Judgement in Appeal No. 22 of 1847 in the Court of the Huzur Adalat, Mysore.

11a. The Kūḍali Mutt has jurisdiction in the North Western portion of Mysore and the Southern portion of Maharashtra.

“*anyasmai pustakasannyāsāsramam daduḥ tataḥ keshuchiddi-
vaseshu vyatīteshu uktaḥ svāmī (yātrām gataḥ svāmī) deśayātrātaḥ
pratinivṛitya kūḍalīmāgatya enam vṛittāntam (mahājanaiḥ śrīṅgeri-
maṭhīya vṛthādhīpatye sthāpitasyānyasya sannyāsino vṛittāntam)
śrutvā rājyasthāne (hujūras) lekhanasya nivedanāt pakṣhadravya-
mapi teshāmāhvāpanadvārā vichāritam. tena cha asmābhiḥ
tatratyairmahājanaiḥ haṭhena dattaḥ pustakasannyāsah satyaḥ itya-
vagatam. tathāpi upadeśasannyāsādhikamanena deyam, pustaka-
sannyāsibhistu grāme (śrīṅgeri grāme) eva sthitvā śrī śārādā
matripūjām kurvadbhiḥ maṭhe niyamanishṭhayā sthātavyam śaṅ-
karāchāryaparamparāgataiḥ svāmibhiḥ deśasaṅchārādikam kurvad-
bhiḥ kūḍalyām (lagyām) sthātavyam” iti.*

*idam prāchīna lekha-pustaka-rājaśāsana-patrikā-lekhādyanuro-
dhena saśiśekhar-dāmodara-saṅkeśvarīya-vidyāśālāyāḥ adhyāpakena
likhite “śrī saṁsthānasankeśvar maṭh karavīr va saṅkeśvar chā
itihās” iti nāmnā prasiddhe mudritapustake sphashṭam. (p. 34).*

It may be stated here that the Śivagaṅgā and Āvaṇi Mutts have been paying annually some amounts to the Kūḍali Mutt. This is evident from the letters from Śivagaṅgā Mutt dated Khara, Kārtika Śuddha 15, Śālivāhana Śaka 1633, 1711 A.D. and the letter bearing Vyaya, Śaka, 1635, 1713 A.D. and from the letters from Āvaṇi Mutt dated Vyaya, Māgha Śuddha 15, Śālivāhana Era, 1635, 1714 A.D. and Jaya, Śālivāhana Śaka 1636, 1715 A.D.

(2) *Śivagaṅgā Maṭha.*

(3) *Āvaṇi Maṭha* (Kolar District, Mysore).

(a) The present occupant of the Āvaṇi Maṭha in his letter dated 18-9-1961 from his camp at Thathahalli to Gurubhaktamani A. Ramaswami Ayyar, Mallesvaram, gives the following details about the origin of this Āvaṇi Maṭha.

About 500 to 600 years ago, one of the direct successors of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya, probably the tenth in the line of the Śrīṅgeri Maṭha established at Śrīṅgeri, as was the custom, went on tour and pilgrimage of northern parts of the country and visited Kāśī and other places. Due to lack of proper communication it took a long time to return to the head-quarters. By the time he returned, the authorities at Śrīṅgeri thinking that the āchārya might not return

at all gave *pustaka-sannyāsa* to a brahmin and installed him on the gadi. The former one came to know of this as he neared Śrīṅgeri; and, he sent word about his return. But the authorities there did not receive him because of the fear of dethroning the one they themselves had established in his place. Though the former āchārya had every right to claim for the recognition of the position he was still occupying, he did not do so, as he thought that it would not be in keeping with his position as a sannyāsin to fight for the mundane position. He, therefore, settled down at Kūḍali.¹² After some time he went on tour to Rāmesvaram and other kshetras in southern parts. This time he did not want that the incident which took place when he had been to Kāśī and other kshetras should recur. Moreover, it was not possible for one to get back to headquarters early due to vastness of the country and lack of adequate means of communication. Hence he appointed one of his disciples at Kūḍali ordering him to tour the parts surrounding it and he went on tour to Rāmesvaram and other kshetras of the south. Visiting Rāmesvaram and other kshetras he came to Kolar (then Kolaharapuri) via Kāñchī, Kālahasti, Tirupati and other places. Finding the place at Antargaṅgā on the Śātaśrīṅgaparvata at Kolar a congenial place for performing meditative worship, he established a maṭha there. Thus an institution came into being there. After a couple of centuries, due to political reasons at the time of Moham-medan rule, this Maṭha moved to Avanti kshetra, now called Āvani from the time of Britishers' rule at Mysore, where the sage Vāl-miki had his āśrama and where Sītādevī gave birth to Lova and Kuśa. Since then the institution continues to have its head-quarters at Āvani. And, as the Maṭha has its head-quarters at Āvani or Avanti for the last few centuries, the Maṭha also came to be called Āvani Maṭha although it was originally established at Śrīṅgeri by Ādi Śāṅkarāchārya.

(b) The āchārya of this Maṭha in the 18th century was on tour in the Southern districts of Madras State. While travelling in the Trichy district, the Maṭha collected *agrasambhāvanā*, etc., from the residents of the villages on the banks of the Akhanda Kāveri. When it was brought to the notice of the Maṭha that this was not

12. Later this had to go to a Court of Law. *Vide* the judgement in favour of the Kūḍali Maṭha of the highest court at that time.

proper, the Maṭha returned the *agrasambhāvanā* thus collected to the Kāmakoti pīṭha. The Maṭha wrote a letter to the Kāmakoti pīṭha stating that it was going on pilgrimage to Rāmeśvaram, and it would be passing through Rāmnād, Śivagaṅgā and other places. The letter further stated that the Maṭha would not collect *agrasambhāvanā* in these places, and after visiting Rāmeśvaram, Tirunelveli and Anantaśayanam, it would return to its place.

(4) *Virūpāksha Maṭha* (Hospet Taluk, Bellary District).

(5) *Pushpagiri Maṭha* (Cuddapah Taluk, Cuddapah District).

One Kokkondrum Venkaṭaratnam Pantulu in his work *Śāṅkara-maṭhatattvaparakāśikārthasaṅgraha* written in favour of the Śringeri Maṭha quotes from a work called *Pushpagiri-maṭhāmnāya-stotra* the following verses which mention the circumstances and give the dates for the establishment of the Virūpāksha and the Pushpagiri Maṭha.¹³

tataḥparam gajādrīndu rūpake śakavatsare
vidyāraṇyaguruḥ kāñchīnagaryām sa babhau mahān
paṇḍākshetre vasanmaunī bhaktarakṣaṇatatparah
mūkam vāchālamakarot mūḍham paṇḍitamuttamam
daridram dhaninām śreshṭham vandhyam putravatīm tathā
yasyāṅghridhyānamātreṇa dvijāssyuh vedapāragāḥ
tam vande ham sadā bhaktyā vidyāraṇyagurūttamam
tasya sisyaḥ mahāprājñau chandraśekhara bhāratī
nṛsiṁhabhāratī chaiva dvāvīmau lokapūjitaḥ
tuṅgaśṛṅgagirau pīṭhe chandraśekharabhāratīm
viniveśya tatassarvam vidyāraṇyaguruḥ svayam
puṇyakshetre virūpākṣe maṭhamekam manoharam
prakalpya tatra sachchishyam narasiṁhendrabhāratīm
nivāsayāmāsa tataḥ śubhakṛitvatsarottame
vaiśākha kṛishṇapakshasya tritīyāyām vidhordine
visṛījya kāñchīnagaram sahaśvaram savāhanam

13. The āchāryas of these two Mathas wear *kirīta* and *karna-patra*; and, the Śringeri āchārya wears the *kirīta* alone. These honours probably accrued from the connections of these institutions with the illustrious Vidyāraṇya the founder of the Vijayanagar empire (*karnāṭaka-siṁhāsaṇa-pratishṭhāpanāchārya*). The āchāryas of the Kāmakoti Pīṭha, having *Indra-sarasvatī-paṭa* are accustomed to use all the honours of the *Indrasthāna* such as *ambāri*, etc.

vidyāraṇyaguruḥ svāmī kailāsūlayam avīṣat
 tadārabhyābhavat pīṭhadvayam vandhyam budhaiḥ sadā
 virūpākshamahāpīṭhe nṛsiṃhendraguroḥ param
 surendrānandanāthaścha tataśśaṅkarabhāratī
 nṛsiṃha bhāratīndraścha tataśchidghanabhāratī
 tataḥparam śaṅkarendro vidyāraṇyasarasvatī
 nṛsiṃhabhāratī chātha punaśśaṅkarabhāratī
 sachchhishnyassachchidānandaḥ śrī vidyāraṇyabhāratī
 tato vidyāśaṅkarākhyāḥ sachchidānandabhāratī
 tataḥ sadānandaguruḥ śrīmachchhaṅkarabhāratī
 tasya śishyo bhavat vidyānṛsiṃhendra sarasvatī
 śishyaprārthanayā lokam paryatan karuṇākaraḥ
 devatāyatano'petam puṇyakshetram budhaiḥ stutam
 śrīpushpaśailamāgatya nadītīramupāśritaḥ
 taponiṣṭhagarishṭhānām idam yogyasthalam bhuvi
 ityūlochia nṛsiṃhendro navabāhugūṇendunā
 prakāśite śakapatau kalpayitvottamam maṭham
 sarvajitvatsare prāpte vaiśākhe sitapakshake
 saptamyām bhārgave vāre śubhalagne surārchite
 sthānādishaḍbalayute nṛsiṃhendrasarasvatī.
 pīṭhe śrīpushpaśailākhye pravishṭobhūnmahātapāḥ
 virūpākshasya pīṭhasya śaṅkarendrasarasvatīm
 samastajagatām pūjyam śishyamevamakārayat
 tatpushpagiri pīṭheśa nṛsiṃhendra sarasvateḥ.

- (6) *Śaṅkeśvara Karavīra Maṭha*—one at Poona, the other at
 Śaṅkeśvara, the third at Kolhapur and the fourth at
 Satara.
- (7) *Rāmachandrapura Maṭha* (Rāmachandrapura, Hosanagara
 Taluk, Mysore State).
- (8) *Hariharapura Maṭha* (near Śringeri).
- (9) *Bandigadi Maṭha*.
- (10) *Yadanūru Maṭha* (Kasargode Taluk, South Canara
 District).
- (11) *Kodaṇḍarāma Maṭha* (Hebbairu Village, Tumkur Taluk,
 Mysore State).
- (12) *Svarṇavalli Maṭha* (Sirsi Taluk, North Canara District).

- (13) *Neiamavu Maṭha* (North Canara).
 (14) *Yoga Narasimhasvāmi Maṭha* (Hole-Narasipur, Mysore State).
 (15) *Balakuduru Maṭha* (Udupi Taluk, South Canara District).

16. Besides the pīṭhas and maṭhas mentioned above, the *bhūmikā* written by Mahāvīdvān Venkaṭachala Śarmā referred to already gives the names of many maṭhas describing them as *Śrī Śaṅkarāchāryādividyā-dharma-pīṭhādhipa-paramparāgatamaṭhāḥ*:

1. Sumeru Maṭha, 2. Paramātma Maṭha, 3. Sumeru Maṭha at Kāśī, 4. Havyaka Maṭha, 5. Koppala Maṭha, 6. Śrī Śalam Maṭha, 7. Rāmeśvaram Maṭha, 8. Ghanagiri Maṭha, 9. Honnahalli Maṭha, 10. Kaivalyapura Maṭha, 11. Mulabagalu Maṭha, 12. Sirali Maṭha, 13. Gṛidhrapura Maṭha, 14. Nṛisimhavādi Maṭha, 15. Molavana Maṭha, 16. Patana Maṭha, 17. Kāśī Maṭha, 18. Tirtharājapura Maṭha, 19. Gangotrī Maṭha, and 20. Tirthahalli Maṭha. Among these there is a maṭha called *Rāmeśvara Maṭha*. This may, perhaps, explain the fact that Śrī Śaṅkara established maṭhas at the four corners, *chār-dhāms*, of India, Rāmeśvaram being situated at the southern corner of India, just as Dvāraka, Badrinath, and Jagannatha in the western, northern and eastern regions of the country.

Sarasvatī or Śāradā Devī who was following Śaṅkarāchārya after her husband's defeat stopped on the banks of the Tuṅga-bhadra on the north-western part of South India. In consequence of her stopping there, a Śaṅkarite Institution might have come into being there (not the southern cardinal point) for the up-keep of Her Pūjā.

It may be stated here that almost all the Āmnāyas, including the Āmnāya found in the *Unpublished Upanishads* published in Adyar, the Jagadguru Aṅka of Prabhāt, Mangalore, 1958, and the *Yati-sandhyā* published by the Dvārakā Pīṭha, mention Rāmeśvaram as the kshetra of the southern region. Almost all these Āmnāya versions mention Ādivarāha (Kāñchī) as the *devatā* of the southern region. While enumerating the one hundred and eight *vaishṇava-divya-deśas*, Ādivarāha is found to be situated in the Kāñchī Kāmākshī temple.¹⁴ The three places, one on the banks

14. See *Kalyāṇ, Tīrthāṅka*, p. 507.

of the Tungabhadra, and the other two at Kāñchī, and Rāmeśvaram, are specially sacred as being respectively the stopping place of Śāradā Devī, the abode of Ādivarāha inside the Kāmākshī temple, and the kshetra of the southern region.

According to the Āmnāya text of the Dvārakā Maṭha, Śrī Viśvarūpāchārya (Sureśvarāchārya) was anointed in Dvārakā and Śrī Prithvīdharāchārya in Śrīṅgeri. According to the same Āmnāya, the maṭha at Dvārakā is designated as Śāradā maṭha or Śāradā Pīṭha. According to the Āmnāya text of the Śrīṅgeri Maṭha, Śrī Sureśvarāchārya was anointed in the Śrīṅgeri Maṭha and this Maṭha is designated as Śāradā Pīṭha.

Kāñchī is the spiritual centre of the earth; and, this is clear from the following śloka in the *Kāñchī Māhātmyam*:

*kāñchīpuram samālokya
nananda kamalā muhuḥ*

*ādhibhautikam amhoghnam
nābhisthānam bhuvah param*

(Adhyāya, 31)


The Sthala-purāṇa *Kāmākshī-vilāsa* states that Kāñchī is the girdle of the earth (I, 56). And the work *Śaṅkarābhyudaya* states: *atha kshiteradbhutakāñchīmaikshata*. Historically, even at the time of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, Vedic Culture (Hinduism) extended from Central Asia to Indonesia; and, Kāñchī would thus have been the centre of the Hindu world.

In the various Āmnayās, Ūrdhvāmnāya mentions Śukadeva as one of the Brahma-nishṭhas or Brahmacharis of that Āmnāya and Kāśī or Kāśikā as the Saṁpradāya. There is one Maṭha called Śukadeva Maṭha in Kāśī or Vārāṇasī. It is not clear whether this Māṭha has any connection with that Āmnāya.

Further, this *bhūmikā* gives under the heading—*Maṭhīya-śrīmukha-birudāvalī*, the Śrīmukhams and Birudas of some of the maṭhas; and, they are as follows:

मठीयश्रीमुखबिरुदावलीभेदा :—

श्रीकाञ्चीकामकोटिपीठाधिपानाम्—चन्द्रमौलीश्वर ।



“ स्वस्ति श्रीमदखिलभूमण्डलालङ्कारत्रयस्त्रिंशत्कोटिदेवतासेवित श्रीकामाक्षीदेवीसनाथ श्रीमदेकामनाथ श्रीमहादेवीसनाथ श्रीहस्तिगिरिनाथ साक्षत्कारपरमाधिष्ठानसत्यव्रतनामाङ्कित काञ्चीदिव्यक्षेत्रे शारदामठसुस्थितानामतुलितसुधारसमाधुर्यं कमलासनकामिनी धम्मिल्लसंफुल्ल-मल्लिकामालिका निष्यन्दमकरन्दझरीसौवस्तिकवाङ्निगुम्भविजृम्भणानन्दतुन्दिलितमनीषिमण्ड-लानामनवरताद्वैतविद्याविनोदरसिकानां निरन्तरालंकृतीकृतशान्तिदान्तिभूम्नां सकलभुवनचक्रप्र-तिष्ठापक श्रीचक्रप्रतिष्ठापकाचार्याणां श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यवर्य श्रीमच्छंकरभगवत्पादा-चार्याणामधिष्ठाने सिंहासनाभिषिक्त श्रीमच्चन्द्रशेखरेन्द्रसरस्वतीसंयमीन्द्राणामन्तेवासिवर्य श्रीमन्महादेवेन्द्रसरस्वती श्रीपादैः ”

पुष्पगिरिमठाधिपानाम्—

(पादहीनांगुलद्वयसमचतुरश्रमुद्रा)—श्रीविद्याशङ्कर ।

श्रीशृङ्गगिरिश्रीविरूपाक्ष-
श्रीपुष्पगिरिश्रीआलम्पुरि-
श्रीविद्याशङ्करकरकमल-
सञ्जातश्रीविद्यानसिंह-
भारतीस्वामिनः

“ (श्रीमत्परमहंस परिव्राजकाचार्यवर्य पदवाक्यप्रमाण पारावारपारीणयमनियमासन-
प्राणायामप्रत्याहारध्यानधारण समाध्यष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठान निष्ठागरिष्ठतपश्चक्रवर्त्यनाथविच्छिन्न
गुरुपरम्पराप्राप्त सम्प्रदायकषड्दर्शनस्थापनाचार्य व्याख्यानसिंहासनाधीश्वर सकलवेदार्थप्रकाश-
कसांख्यत्रयीप्रतिपालकसकलनिगमागमसारहृदयवैदिकमार्गप्रवर्तक सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रादिराज-
धानीविद्यानगरमहाराजधानी कर्नाटकसिंहासनप्रतिष्ठापनाचार्य श्रीमद्राजाधिराज महाराजगुरु-
भूमण्डलाचार्य तुङ्गभद्रातीरवासऋष्यशृङ्गगिरि पुरवराधीश्वर) श्रीशृङ्गगिरि विरूपाक्ष श्रीपुष्पगिरि
पिनाकिनीतीरवास श्रीशैलश्रीआलम्पुर्यादि समस्तपीठाधीश्वर श्रीमदभिनवोद्दण्डविद्यानृसिंह-
भारती गुरुपादपद्माराधक श्रीमदभिनवोद्दण्डविद्याशङ्करभारतीकरकमलसंजात श्रीमदभिनवो-
द्दण्डविद्यानृसिंहभारतीस्वामिनः ”

विरूपाक्षमठाधिपानाम्—

(सार्धागुलद्वयसवर्तुलाकारपुष्पमुद्रा)—श्रीविद्याशंकर ।



“ श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यवर्य पदवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारपारीणथमनियमासनप्राणा-
यामप्रत्याहारध्यानधारणसमाध्यष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठाननिष्ठागरिष्ठ तपश्चक्रवर्त्यनाथविच्छिन्न गुरु-
परंपराप्राप्तषड्दर्शनस्थापनाचार्य व्याख्यानसिंहासनाधीश्वरसकलवेदार्थप्रकाशकसांख्यत्र-
यीप्रतिपालक सकलनिगमागमसारहृदयवैदिकमार्गप्रवर्तकसर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रादिराजधानी विद्यानग-
रमहाराजधानी कर्नाटकसिंहासनप्रतिष्ठापनाचार्य श्रीमद्राजाधिराज महाराजगुरुभूमण्डलाचार्य
तुङ्गभद्रातीरवास ऋष्यशृङ्गगिरिपुरवराधीश्वर श्रीशृङ्गगिरिविरूपाक्ष श्रीविद्याशङ्करदेवदिव्यश्रीपाद-
पद्माराधक श्रीमदभिनवशङ्करभारतीस्वामि करकमलसंजात श्रीमदभिनवोद्दण्ड वृत्तसिंहभारती
स्वामिभिः ”॥

शृङ्गगिरि (ङ्गेरी) मठाधिपानाम्—(वर्तुलंगुलद्वयसनक्षत्रमुद्रा)



“ श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यवर्य पदवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारपारीणयमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारध्यानधारणा समाध्यष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठाननिष्ठतपश्चक्रवर्त्यनायविच्छिन्न गुरुपरम्पराप्राप्त षड्दर्शनस्थापनाचार्य व्याख्यान सिंहासनाधीश्वर सकलनिगमागमसारहृदयसांख्यत्रयी प्रतिपादक वैदिकमार्गप्रवर्तक सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रादिराजधानीकर्नाटकसिंहासन प्रतिष्ठापनाचार्य श्रीमद्राजाधिराज गुरुभूमण्डलाचार्य ऋष्यशृङ्गपुरवराधीश्वर तुङ्गभद्रातीरवास श्रीमद्विद्याशङ्करपादपद्वाराधक श्रीमदभिनवसच्चिदानन्दभारतीस्वामि करकमलसंजात श्रीशृङ्गेरी श्रीवृत्तिह-भारतीस्वामिभिः ’ ॥

आमनिमठाधिपानाम्—
(अर्धगुलद्वयसचतुरश्रमुद्रा)—श्रीविद्याशङ्कर ।



“ (श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यवर्य पदत्राक्यप्रमाणपारावारपारीण यमनियमासन प्राणायामप्रत्याहारध्यानधारणसमाध्यष्टांग योगानुष्ठाननिष्ठागरिष्ठतपश्चक्रवर्त्यनाथविच्छिन्न गुरुपरम्पराप्राप्त षड्दर्शनस्थापनाचार्य व्याख्यानसिंहासनाधीश्वरसकलवेदार्थप्रकाशकसाङ्ख्यत्रयीप्रतिपालक सकलनिगमागमसारहृदय वैदिकमार्गप्रवर्तकसर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रादिराजधानीविद्यानगर महाराजधानीकर्नाटकसिंहासनप्रतिष्ठापनाचार्य श्रीमद्राजाधिराजगुरुभूमण्डलाचार्य तुंगभद्रातीरवास ऋष्यशृङ्गपुरवराधीश्वर) श्रीशृङ्गेरी श्रीविद्याशङ्करदेवदिव्य श्रीपादपद्माराधक श्रीशृङ्गेरी श्रीविद्यारण्यभारतीस्वामिनां करकमलसंजात श्रीशृङ्गेरी श्रीमदभिनवोद्दण्डविद्यारण्यभारती-स्वामिभिः ” ॥

करवीरमठाधिपानाम्—



“ स्वस्ति श्रीमत्समस्तसुरवृन्दपूजित पादारविन्द शिवप्रतिबिम्बवर्य श्रीमत्परमहंसपरि-
 ब्राजकाचार्य पद्मवाक्यप्रमाण पारावारपारीण थमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहार ध्यानधारणा
 समाध्यष्टाङ्ग योगानुष्ठाननिष्ठ तपश्चक्रवर्त्यनाद्यविच्छिन्नशुपरम्पराप्राप्त षड्दर्शनसंस्थापना-
 चार्य व्याख्यानसिंहासनाधीश्वर सकलनिगमागम सारहृदयसांख्यत्रय प्रतिपादक सकलनास्ति-
 कमतोच्छेदपूर्वक सकलधर्मसंस्थापनैकधुरीणवैदिकमार्गप्रवर्तक सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र श्रीमहाराजधानी
 ऋष्यशृङ्गपुरवराधीश श्रीमद्राजाधिराज गुरुभूमण्डलाचार्य श्रीमच्छङ्कराचार्यन्वय संजाताभिनव
 पञ्चगङ्गातीरवास कमलानिकेतनकरवीरसिंहासनाधीश्वर श्री (सच्चिदानन्द) विद्यानृसिंहभारती
 करकमलकिञ्जल्कोद्भव श्रीमदभिनव (सच्चिदानन्द) विद्याशंकरभारतीस्वामिभिः” ॥

17. Śrī Nūraṇi S. Anantakrishna Sastri, in the *Bhakti-kusumāñjali* printed at Śrī Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam and published on the occasion of the Nakshatra Mahotsava of Śrī Chandrasekhara Bhārati of Śringeri observes:

‘sahasrāṇi sahasraśo ye rudrā adhibhūmyām’ iti śatarudrīya-vākyaṃ śaṅkarabhagavatpādapratishṭhāpita-tattatpradhāna-upapīṭhādhyakshān dharmāchāryāneva gocharayati

ātmano digvijayayātrāprasaṅgena tatra tatra bahūni pīṭhāni bhagavatpādaiḥ pratishṭhāpitāni sāmpratamapi paramparākrameṇa kechana kechana tapasvipravarā adhitishṭhantyeva. tatra cha bhagavataḥ sadāśivasya pañchānanatā bhagavato guruvaryasya sāntevāsinaḥ śrī dakṣiṇāmūrteḥ sākshāt bhagavatpādasya vā sāntevāsinaḥ sthūlaśarīrāṇi prāchya-dakṣiṇa-pāśchātya-udīchya-ūrdhvāmnāyarūpāṇi vā pradhānāni pañchapīṭhāni. idam tu na vivādāspadam—yadukta-anyatama-pīṭhādhisṭhānamūtreṇa dharmāchāryāḥ sarve’pi śivāvatūratām svakṛityairabhivyañjayanti

18. “It is necessary now to add a few words about the commentary, *Chandrikā*, which is printed here. . . . The second śloka alludes to the author of the *Chandrikā* as the glory of Sarvajñāśrama by which term we have probably to understand the Sarvajña-Pīṭha or the pontifical seat of the Advaita Maṭha in Conjivaram.”

[Professor M. Hiriyanna in his Introduction to the *Naishkarmya-siddhi* (Bombay Sanskrit and Prākṛit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1925), p. 33.]

19. The report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission, 1962, page 15, says:

“Sankaracharya and Establishment of Mutts.”

It was Adi Sankaracharya (8th century A.D.) who first began to establish Hindu Mutts as we know them today. He propounded the theory of absolute Monism, i.e., the Advaita non-dualistic School of Philosophy, combated the doctrines of Buddhism and Jainism and re-established the religion of the Vedas and the Upanishads. According to tradition, he inaugurated several mutts or seats of learning in four corners of India, namely, Sringeri (Sharada Peeth, in Mysore) and the Kamakoti Peetha

in Kanchi in the South, Badarinath in the Himalayan region in the North, Jagannath or modern Puri in the East and Dwaraka in the Western Gujarat.

(Signed) C. P. Ramaswami Ayyar, (*Chairman*),
Sankar Saran,
Mahabir Prasad,
P. Kameswara Rau,
Swami Harinarayanand,

C. P. R. for Venkatasami Naidu,	Authorised by
„ K. C. Sen,	the concerned
	members to sign for them.

20. Justice P. Satyanarayana Rao in his judgment in C.M.P. 2591 of 1951, reported in 1952 I.M.L.J., 557, says “Tradition has it that after conquering the rival faiths, He established the Advaita System of Philosophy and founded four mutts or seats of learning in the four corners of this vast sub-continent—Sringeri (Sarada Peeta) in Mysore in the South, with which it is familiar knowledge, the name of that great Vidyaranyaśwami is associated: Badarinath in the Himalayas in the North, Jagannath or modern Puri in the East, and Dwaraka in the Bombay Presidency in the West. In each of these mutts as their heads, he installed His principal disciples and He himself assumed the headship of the Sarvagna Peeta or the central seat of knowledge at Kanchi, the modern Kanchipuram. This central Peetam was first removed to Tanjore and then to Kumbakonam from where it continues to function even today.

21. Sir Subrahmania Ayyar, Acting Chief Justice and Justice V. Bhashyam Ayyangar in their judgment (1903) reported in I.L.R. 27, Madras, 435, say “Not less than seven mutts being among the most celebrated owe their origin to the great Advaita Philosopher, Sri Sankarachariar.”

(Probably the reference is to the First Edition of Ghosh's Hindu Law).

22. Mahāmahopādhyāya Śivanātha Śarma writes as follows:

Naravīrasthāna

Śrīnagar

Kashmir

bhagavacchaṅkaravishaye pañcha daśa vā pīṭhavirachanā astu: evam dharmasya saṁskṛiteḥ sāhityasya cha sarvathā uddhāra eva na hrāsaḥ; ataḥ śobhanam kāryamidam praśaṁsanīyam.

Mahāmahopadhyāya Śivanātha Śarmā

23. *anumān* se yah *mālūm* hotā hai ki *bhārat* ke *pradhān* *pradhān* *sthānom* *mem* in *das śishyom* ke *nām* *par āchāryapīṭh* *sthāpit* kiye gaye. *unmem* jis *pīṭh* ke *āchāry* *kā ācharaṇ śāstra-* *sammāt* *prachalit* *huīm* *ve* *abtak śrī śaṅkarāchāry* ke *nām* *se sammānit* kiye *jāte* *haiīm*.

das nām *se prasiddh śishyom* ke *āspad* *se hī* *in pāñc pīṭhom* *ke āchārya bhī* *prasiddh* *hote* *haiīm*. *isse* *yah utsāh* *ke sātḥ* *kahā* *jā* *saktā* *hai* *ki* *ye pāñc pīṭh* *bhī ārambh* *se hī* *das nāmī* *praśishyom* *ke nām* *se hī* *prasiddh* *huye* *haiīm*.

mum̐bayī-prāntīya-varṇāśrama-svārājya - saṅgha - adhīśaksha- *mānyaśrī-Ramīpatimīśramahodayaḥ. (Bombay).*

24. According to Sadāśivarath, the premier authority on Śilpa śāstra in Purī-Jagannātha there is a maṇṭapa called Mukti-maṇṭapa in the Purī-Jagannātha temple in which learned Brahmins of the sixteen śāsanas (inām villages) around Purī Pargana (Pahṅga) alone can be the members. The Śaṅkarāchārya of Bali Govardhana Maṭha will be the President of the Mukti-maṇṭapa-Sabhā and the Swāmī of the Śaṅkarānanda Maṭha will be the Vice-President. There is a temple chronicle (*Maṇḍala-pañji*) in Jagannātha. According to Śrīmān Rath, in leaf No. 7 of bundle No. 3 in the Dwārakānāth Pattjatri Mahāpātra's private library, reference is made in it to the honours ordered by Rājā Rāmachandra Dev to the Śaṅkarāchārya Maṭhas. It has been already noted in this article that among the Śaṅkarāchārya Maṭhas in Trichur (Kerala), one Maṭha was transformed into a Brahmasva Maḍam or Vedic College for Nambūdiri Brahmachārins. In the same manner in Purī besides the Govardhana Maṭha, there are four Maṭhas, namely, Śaṅkarānanda Maṭha, Śivatīrtha Maṭha, Gopālātīrtha Maṭha and Mahiprakāśa Maṭha. Of these, the first three are presided over by Sannyāsins and the Mahiprakāśa Maṭha is a Brahmachāri Maṭha. According to a palm-leaf record in Chāmu

Chitāvu, the Mahārājā Bir Kishore Dev of Purī has issued orders as regards the honours to be observed as a matter of right in the Jagannātha temple on the occasion of the visit of the Śaṅkarāchārya of the Badarikāśrama allowing the Paṇḍits of the Govardhana Maṭha, Śaṅkarānanda Maṭha, Śivatīrtha Maṭha, Gopālatīrtha Maṭha and the Brahmachāris of the Mahiprakāśa Maṭha to approach the Ratna-simhāsana of the Jagannātha-Purushottama-Mahāprabhu.

The following are the two verses from an address presented by the Paṇḍits of the Sabhā to the Āchārya of Kāñchī Pīṭha on 5-5-1936:

*eshā nīlāchalasthā jagati suviditā brahmapīṭha pratishṭhā
sanmānācchāsanīyaiḥ vividhabudhavaraiḥ rājamānātmanītyā
dharmādeśena deśāntaramupacharāchāra pricchā vyanasthā
dānādīśrautamārgairanudinamiha santishṭhate'dvaitanishṭhā
advaitāmṛitanirbharaikanilayaśrīśaṅkarasthāpite
kāñchīkāmāmakōṭisumahāpīṭhe tathā rājatām*

* * * * *

*śrīkshetrasthitamuktimaṇṭapasabhā dhatte svabhaktyā-
rchanam.*

25. Madan Mohan Mālavīyā, Founder, Benaras Hindu University, in the address presented at the University on the Māgha-śukla-saptami, Vikrama Saṁvat 1991, (1935 A.D.), says:

*yadvāchām la itaistrilokajanatāmohāndhakārakshayaḥ
pādābjasmarāṇena yasya kalushadhvaṁsāt prasādaḥ sthiraḥ
tasyādvaitagīrām gurorbhagavataḥ śrīśaṅkarasyonnatam
kāñchīpīṭhapadam*

From the above, it would be clear that there were several maṭhas or seats of learning for the propagation of Advaita. We shall conclude this article by citing the estimate of Śaṅkara by Dr. Paul Deussen and Charles Johnston.

“The conclusion is that the Jiva being neither a part or a different thing, nor a variation of Brahman, must be the Paramatman fully and totally himself, a conclusion made equally by the Vedantin Sankara, by the Platonic Plotinus, and the Kantian Schopenhauer. But Sankara in his conclusions goes perhaps further than any of them”.

“What shall we say, then, of the Master Sankara? Is he not the guardian of the sacred waters, who by his commentaries, has hemmed about, against all impurities of Time’s jealousy, first the mountain tarns of the Upanishads, then the serene forest-lake of the Bhagavad Gita, and last the deep reservoir of the Sutras, adding from the generous riches of his wisdom, lively fountains and lakelets of his own, the Crest-jewel, the Awakening and Discernment”.

—CHARLES JOHNSTON (England).

KAMAKSHI—THE AMNAYA-SAKTI

by

SWAMI ANANTANANDENDRA SARASVATI

I am fortunate in belonging to the *paramparā* of Upanishad Brahma, commentator of the *Hundred and eight Upanishads* (published in seven volumes by the Adyar Library, Madras). I had also an opportunity of going through *Ratnaprabhā* of Rāmānandīya which is regarded as one of the best commentaries on Śrī Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* and which is the one most consulted by students of Advaita philosophy. The author in the beginning of the work refers to Kāmākshī as having blessed his *Parameshthī-guru* with *prasāda* in which milk and ghee were found in abundance and which was cherished by the celestials.

śrīkāmākshīdattadugdhaprachurasuranutaprājyabhījya.

I had also an opportunity of going through *Mūka-pañchaśatī*, a hymn in five hundred verses in praise of Devī Kāmākshī or Kāmakoti by Śrī Mūkakavi, the dumb poet.

kāmadughā bhava kamale kāmakale kāmakoṭi kāmākshi.

Therein I came accross the verse

*aiśvāryam indumauleh aikāntmyaprakṛitikāñchimadhyagatam,
aīdavakīśoraśekhoraṁ aīdamparyam chakāstinigamānām.*

Here it is said that Śrī Kāmākshī in Kāñchī is the Treasure of Chandramaulīśvara, the Essence of the Vedas, and the Root of the realization of Advaita. From this it occurred to me that Śrī Mūkakavi while writing this verse had before him the inseparable connection between Śrī Kāmākshī and the Advaita philosophy of Śrī Śaṅkara which is the quintessence of the Vedas, i.e. Vedānta.

The Kāmākshī temple at Kāñchī contains a life-size stone image of Śrī Śaṅkara with his disciples, four of whom are *eka-daṇḍa-sannyāsis*. Besides this there are also sculptures of Śrī

Śaṅkara in various postures in the Utsava-Kāmākshī and Baṅgāru-Kāmākshī sannīdhies in the temple.

There is a sculpture in the hundred and eight pillared *maṇḍapa* at Śrī Varadarājasvāmi temple at Kāñchī which depicts a defiant and arrogant brahmin pandit with *śikha* and *yajñopavīta* and a young *sannyāsi* with *ekadaṇḍa* in front of him, the latter in a rather calm mood. The Śaṅkaravijayas say that after Śrī Śaṅkara wrote his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* Śrī Vyāsa, in order to proclaim the correctness of the *bhāṣya* on these sūtras, came in the guise of a brahmin controversialist and challenged Śrī Śaṅkara on his interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtras*, in the course of which he (Vyāsa) resorted to arguments, not straightforward and honest. Seeing that the controversy was becoming hot, Śrī Padmapādāchārya through his *jñānadṛishṭi* realized that the arrogant brahmin was Śrī Vyāsa himself who staged this scene so that learned contemporaries might become conscious of Śrī Śaṅkara's calm and correct replies to his unwholesome criticisms. Śrī Padmapāda then exclaimed:

*śaṅkaraḥ śaṅkarassākshāt vyāso nārāyaṇaḥ svayam,
tayoḥ vivāde saṁprāpte kimkaraḥ kiṁ karomyaḥam.*

Śrī Śaṅkara is Śiva incarnate and Śrī Vyāsa is Śrī Nārāyaṇa. When these two are engaged in disputation, what can I a servant do? The sculpture mentioned above of an arrogant brahmin pandit with a young *sannyāsi* in front of him, I surmise, depicts the above incident.

On hearing Śrī Padmapāda's words, Śrī Śaṅkara at once prostrated before Śrī Vyāsa, requesting him to reveal his real form and bless him. Śrī Vyāsa then appeared in his real form, blessed Śrī Śaṅkara, saying that his *bhāṣya*, which proclaimed and established the ultimate truth, '*ekameva advitīyam brahma*' (*Brahma* is one without a second) is the only correct interpretation of the sūtras. He also doubled Śrī Śaṅkara's life-tenure for the sake of *digvijaya* and the establishment of the Advaita philosophy.

In the Varadarājasvāmi temple itself there is another sculpture on a pillar in the *maṇḍapa* to the north of the *Tāyār Sannidhi*, showing an aged *ṛishi* with *jaṭā*, *rudrāksha*, and *yajñopavīta* in

the sitting posture, showing one finger, and an *ekadaṇḍa sann-yāsi* in the posture of performing *daṇḍavandanam*. This sculpture probably depicts the latter part of the incident after Śrī Vyāsa revealed himself before Śrī Śaṅkara and blessed him, confirming by the show of one finger the ultimate truth, '*ekameva advitīyam brahma*' as against his earlier dualist argument in the disguise of a Brahmin pandit. This raising of one finger in the image of the *ṛishi* is very significant as against the raising of two fingers in the image of the dualist teachers. The figure with *jaṭā*, etc. mentioned above fits in with the *dhyānaśloka* of Śrī Vyāsa, '*piṅga jaṭā baddha kalāpaḥ*'.

There is a Śiva temple in Kāñchī called Vyāsa Śrāntāśraya. According to the *Kāñchī-māhātmya*, Śrī Vyāsa is said to have performed special worship at this temple. On the upper structure of the main shrine of this temple there are two stucco figures, one standing and the other sitting, depicting some relevant purāṇic aspects in connection with that temple. There is similarity between Śrī Vyāsamūrti in this shrine and the one in the Varadarāja temple.

There is yet another temple in Kāñchī called Airāvatiśvara temple belonging to the Pallava period wherein we find in a niche in a wall Śrī Vyāsa. Near it is an *ekadaṇḍa-sannyāsi-mūrti* with a shaven head. The figure represents early boyhood. Although the head of the *sannyāsi-mūrti* is shaven, the sprouts of hair as seen in this sculpture depicts the stage of an elapse of about a month after the actual shaving. But there are no hair sprouts on the chin. This difference is probably intended to show that the figure is that of a *sannyāsi* in his early teens, and we may take it for granted that it is the figure of Śrī Śaṅkara, the *bhāṣyakāra*, seated near Śrī Vyāsa, the *sūtrakāra* of Vedānta. If the date of Śrī Śaṅkara according to recent writers, i.e. the eighth century A.D. may be accepted, this sculpture should belong to the actual life-time of Śrī Śaṅkara, the later Pallava period. Śrī C. Sivaramamoorti, Director, National Museum, New Delhi, who personally discovered this sculpture is of this opinion.

There are many other temples, both Vaishṇavite and Śaivite, in Kāñchī which contain on their walls and pillars sculptures of *ekadaṇḍa sann-yāsis* in various postures, like *yoga*, *samādhi*, *tapas*, *pūjā*, etc., a rare occurrence in other places noted for sculptures.



A photograph of ADI SANKARA FROM THE AIRAVATISVARA TEMPLE in Kancheepuram. The central panel shows Dhakshinamurti, the Lord of Wisdom and on either side there are two great rishis, Vyasa and Jaimini. To the left of Vyasa is Sankara as a boy of sixteen with the Danda in his hand and with his hair cut but grown into curls and with no beard on his chin as he is so young. The one sage represents Vedanta and the other Mimamsa. There are Rudraksha beads on the neck of Sankara.

After reading the verse in the *Mūka-panchaṣaṭi* connecting Advaita philosophy with Kāmākshī and also seeing these sculptures, I was at a loss to know why there was no reference to the name, Kāmākshī, in Śrī Śaṅkara's well-known life sketches.

Sri T. K. Balasubramania Iyer of Śrī Vāṇi Vilās Press, Śrī-raṅgam, brought out a Memorial Edition of the complete works of Śrī Śaṅkara. This press also published a small booklet containing the *Jagadguru-paramparāstotra* and the *Maṭhāmnāya*. Neither of these contained any reference to Śrī Kāmākshī. I then looked into *Mādhavīya-śaṅkaraviṇaya* which is regarded by most people as a correct biography of Śrī Śaṅkara. There is no reference to the name of Śrī Kāmākshī in that work either. But there are two verses in *sarga* 15 of that work from which we may infer a reference to Śrī Kāmākshī. Verses Nos. 4 and 5 therein state that Śrī Śaṅkara reached Kāñchī, had a temple built there on the pattern of 'Para-vidyā-charaṇa,' removed the *tāntrika* form of worship that was prevailing there and introduced the *vaidika* form of worship.

draviḍānścha tato jagāma kāñchīnagarīm hastigireḥ
nitambakāñchīm,
suradhāma cha tatra kārayitvā paravidyācharaṇā (śaraṇā)-
nusārichitram.
apavārya cha tāntrikānatanīt bhagavatyāḥ śrutisammataīm
saparyām.

Here 'paravidyācharaṇānusārichitram' means 'according to the charaṇa of Para-vidyā. The verse in *Saundaryalaharī*—

chaturbhiḥ śrīkaṇṭhaiḥ śivayuvatibhiḥ pañchabhirapi
prabhinnābhiḥ sambhornavabhirapi mūlaprakṛitibhiḥ,
chatuṣchatvārīmśadvasudalakalaścha trivalaya-
trirekhābhiḥ sārḍham tava śaraṇakoṇāḥ pariṇatāḥ.

—says 'tava-śaraṇa-koṇāḥ pariṇatāḥ'. Here the reference is to the koṇāḥ (angles) of Śrī Chakra which is said to be the seat of Para-vidyā. As Śrī Śaṅkara consecrated Śrī Chakra in the temple of Śrī Kāmākshī, the reference to *Śrī-vidyā-charaṇa* in verse No. 5 of *Mādhavīya-śaṅkaraviṇaya* may be taken to refer to Śrī Kāmākshī, the 'Bhagavati' in Kāñchī.

I then came across a small booklet *Yati-sandhyā* in Devanāgarī script published by the Dvārakā-piṭha in the year 1957 (Vikrama Śaka, 2013). I also fortunately had access to some other books, namely (1) *Śaṅkarāchārya-jagadguru-maṭhāmnāya*, published by Pandit Yogendra Ashtāvadhāna Śarma and printed by B. Mishra at the Balabhadra Press, Puri, in 1930, (2) *Unpublished Upanishads*, printed and published by the Adyar Library in the year 1937, and (3) *Śaṅkara-granthāvalī* in Bengali script published by Rajendranath Ghosh. I also came across manuscript copies of *Maṭhāmnāya* obtained from the Oriental Institute, Mysore, and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, No. 1517 of 1891-95.

These Āmnāyas give information about the various Sankaraite institutions for the Western, Northern, Eastern, Southern, and other super-regions (Ūrdhvāmnāya), etc., of India. A study of the Āmnāyas contained in the works mentioned above as well as those found in other libraries reveals certain features which arrest attention. The *Āmnāya* for each region deals among others with the *kshetra*, *devatā*, *devī* (*śakti*), and *āchārya* of each *Āmnāya*. The *devī* (*śakti*) of the Southern region (*Āmnāya*) is mentioned as Kāmākshī in all the *Maṭhāmnāya* editions and manuscripts mentioned above; but in the *Āmnāya* published in the Vāṇi Vilās Press, Śrīraṅgam, the *śakti* of Śrīṅgeri is mentioned as Śārādā. The mūrtis worshipped in the Śaṅkaraite institutions on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadrā are referred to as 'Śārādā-Chandramaulīśvara'. It may be mentioned here that Śārādā is the *śakti* of Brahmā and the sister of Śiva (cf. *brahma-jyāyāyai namaḥ* and *śivānujāyāyai namaḥ* in *Sarasvatī Ashtottaram*). Chandramaulīśvara-Kāmākshī is the *śakti* (Śivaśakti) of Parameśvara. In the *Lalitā-sahasranāma* and the *Lalitā-triśatī*, Parāśakti is described as Kāmākshī and Kāmakoṭikā (*Sahasranāma*) and Kāmakoṭinīlayā (*Triśatī*). In the *Lalitā-ashtottara* she is described as Kāmakoṭi-mahāpadma-piṭhasthā. A perusal of the *Lalitā-sahasranāma* and the *Lalitā-triśatī* will show that Śārādā is completely different from Kāmākshī or Kāmakoti.

A doubt arose in my mind as to why there is difference between the *śakti* of Śrīṅgeri as it is described in the Vāṇi Vilās Edition and the *śakti* for the Southern region mentioned as

‘Kāmākshī’ in the Dvārakā, Pūrī (Jagannāth) and other Āmnāya texts mentioned above.

The revised and enlarged edition of the book, *The Greatness of Śringeri*, says that Śrī Śaṅkara established the four maṭhas in the four directions, and the book, *Kumbakona Mutt*, also says that Śrī Śaṅkara established in the four corners of India four maṭhas of apostolic succession. Further, the work entitled *Throne of Transcendental Wisdom* says that Śrī Śaṅkara established four maṭhas in the cardinal points of the country.

But as a matter of fact we find that only the institutions for the Northern, Western, and the Eastern regions are situated in the respective corners of India. The institution for the Southern region should have been at Rāmeśvaram or Kanyākumārī which is the corner or cardinal point in the South. But according to the work, *The Greatness of Śringeri*, mentioned already, the institution in the South is at Śringeri, which, in fact, is situated in the North-West portion of South India. As regards this point, Śrī Mahādeva Rājārām Bodas, Bombay, in his *Śaṅkarāchērya* in Marāṭhi printed by the Jagat-Hitechu Press, Poona, in the year 1923 says at page 49: ‘we can say that the four mutts were established at the four “dhams”; but we see that neither the institution at Śringeri nor the one at Kāñchī is at a dham (corner). They are in the centre of the country. The institution should have been either at Rāmeśvaram or Kanyākumārī.’

chār diśām nā vachār mukhya dhāmām che tikāñīm chār maṭh sthāpan kele aseñ mhañāveñ tar ādya śringerī kiññā kāñchīmaṭh tase nāhīntaḥ te marutbhumīm tamadhyavartī aṭet dakṣiṇamath rāmeśvar kiñvā kanyākumārī yethe pāhi je hotām.

I then found that in all the Āmnāyas mentioned above, the Āmnāyasthānas (kshetras) are unanimously described as being in the four corners (*chārdhāms*), Dvārakā in the West, Badari in the North, Pūrī (Jagannāth) in the East and Rāmeśvaram in the South. It then occurred to me that Śrī Bhagavatpāda might have originally intended to establish the Āmnāya institutions in the four directions in the four places generally known as chārdhāms, i.e. Dvārakānāth in the West, Badrināth in the North, Jagannāth in the East, and Rāmanāth (Rāmeśvaram) in the South. But now we see that

there is a Śaṅkaraite institution on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadrā (Śrīṅgeri) in the North-West of the Southern region. There is also a Śaṅkaraite institution further south in Kāñchī. The *pīṭhaśakti* of the institution on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadrā is Śārādā, whereas the *śakti* of the institution at Kāñchī is Kāmākshī or Kāmakoṭī.

How is it that there are two Śaṅkaraite institutions in Southern India, one in the North-Western portion and the other further south at Kāñchī?

Another doubt also confronted me on an additional point. In all the maṭhas in the Ceded Districts and in Mysore bearing the names of Śrīṅgeri, like the Virūpāksha, Pushpagiri, Āmani, Śivagaṅga, etc., the preambles to the Śrīmukhas included the epithet, *Tuṅgabhadrā-tīravāsī*. But the present popular Śrīṅgeri also bearing the same epithet is not on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadrā but is on the banks of the Tuṅgā. How to account for this discrepancy?

Enquiries made from the people of Mysore revealed the existence of a tradition that Śrī Śārādā (Sarasavānī) after the defeat of Maṇḍanamīśra decided to ascend to Brahmaloṇa when Śrī Śaṅkara bound her by *Vanadurgā-mantra* and beseeched her to follow him till he installed her *śakti* in this *loka* itself for bestowing her grace on aspirants for knowledge. She agreed to follow him on condition that he did not look back while she was following him. While they were crossing the confluence of the Tuṅgā and the Bhadrā, the sounds of Śrī Śārādā's anklets were not heard by Śrī Śaṅkara as her feet were imbedded in the sands of the river. Not hearing the sound of the anklets, Śrī Śaṅkara looked back. Śrī Śārādā then reminded him of his promise not to look back and said that she would not proceed any further and would stay at that place itself. Śrī Śaṅkara agreed and installed the *śakti* there itself, consecrating the same in the temple, and made arrangements for an institution there with a line of succession for her worship. This accounts for the springing up of an accidental Śaṅkaraite institution in the North-West portion of Karṇāṭaka and for the inclusion of the epithet 'Tuṅgabhadrā-tīravāsī' in the preambles to the Śrīmukhas of that institution and its sub-divisions. This tradition is also mentioned in some form or other by many authors in their works.

Thus an accidental event led to the establishment of an institution on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadṛā with the *sāmnidhya* of Sarasavāṇi as Śāradā, a fifth name apart from the four śaktis. Bhadrakālī, Pūrṇagiri, Vimalā, and Kāmākshī as enumerated in the Dvārakā, Puri, and other Āmnāya texts. The Kāñchī institution is in Kāñchīpuram, the seat of Śrī Kāmākshī and the Southern-most *mokshapuri*. Among the many details in the Āmnāya relating to the institutions of Śrī Śaṅkara, the *kshetra* and the *devī-pīṭha*, i.e. the śakti are the most important. For instance, in the Uttarāmnāya the *kshetra* is mentioned as Badrināth and the *devī* as Pūrṇagiri. *Tīrthaṅka*, the 1957 Annual number of *Kaluāṇ* of Gorakhpur, at page 53 gives the information that the hill Pūrṇagiri is revered as the *devī* in her splendour and is situated on the banks of the river Śāradā near the borders of Nepal. The *devī*, Pūrṇagiri, in the form of a hill and the *kshetra*, Badrināth, make one Āmnāya institution. In the same way, the *kshetra*, Rāmeśvaram, (one of the chārdhāms) and the *devī*, Kāmākshī, at Kāñchī, the *mokshapuri*, make one Āmnāya institution. Kāñchī is not only the centre of Dakṣiṇām-rāya by being the seat of Śrī Kāmākshī, the Āmnāya-śakti, it is also the central point of the earth according to the works, *Kāñchī-māhātmya*, *Kāmākshīvilāsa*, and Merutantra.

Besides the variations as regards the *kshetra* and śakti of the Southern region, there are also some other variations between the Vāṇi Vilās edition of the *Maṭhāmnāya* and the other Maṭhāmnāyas mentioned already. In the Vāṇi Vilās edition the name of the *āchārya* is given as Sureśvara; but in the Dvārakā, Puri, and other Maṭhāmnāyas, Prithvīdhara is mentioned as the *āchārya* of the institution on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadṛā. Śrī Sureśvara (Mandanamīśra) being the husband of Śāradā (Sarasavāṇi) in his *pūrvāśrama*, it would not have been proper to appoint Sureśvara in that institution for the worship of Śāradā (Sarasavāṇi), his wife in his *pūrvāśrama*. It was but apt that Prithvīdhara was placed in charge of the institution of that place as mentioned in the Dvārakā, Puri, and other Maṭhāmnāyas.

This seems to be the reason for the difference in the names of the śakti and the *āchārya* in the Southern region.

As already mentioned, there is a Śaṅkaraite institution at Kāñchī, the seat of Kāmākshī, the śakti of the Southern region.

How did it come into existence? Besides the *śakti*, the *kshetra*, and the *āchārya*, each region has its own *devatā*. The *devatā* of the Northern and the Eastern regions are respectively Badrināth and Jagannāth, and that of the Western region is Siddheśvara. The *devatā* of the Southern region, according to the Maṭhāmnāyas mentioned above, is Ādivarāha. It may be noted here that Ādivarāha is the Perumal of Tirukkalvanūr, one of the hundred and eight divyadeśas of the Vaishṇavites, sung by the Vaishṇavite Ālvārs. About Tirukkalvanūr, the *Tīrthaṅka* says at page 92: *is divya deś ke ārādhyadev ādivarāh-bhagavān añjilaivallī lakshmī samet vāman vimān meṁ paśchimābhimukh khade hue kāmākshīdevī kē mandir meṁ ek or darsan de rahe haiṁ. inkā sākshātkār aśvatthanārāyaṇ ne aur maṅgalāsāsan saṁt parakāl ne kiyā hai, yah divyadeś aur iskī nitya-pushkarinī ab lupt haiṁ.* Kalvan means thief. There is at present a figure of Vishnu hiding himself in a niche of Śrī Kāmākshī temple outside the southern wall of the *sanctum sanctorum*. The *Kāñchīmāhātmya* and the *Kāmākshīvilāsa* give in full detail the story of this hiding of Vishṇu.

As originally intended, Śrī Āchārya stayed at Kāñchī, one of the seven mokshapuris of Bhāratavarsha and also the seat of Kāmākshī and Ādivarāha, the *śakti* and *devatā* of the Southern region. Kāñchī became more important because Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya himself stayed there. The *Kāñchīmāhātmya* and the *Kāmākshīvilāsa*, already mentioned, refer to Kāñchī as the *nābhi* (navel) or *kāñchī* (girdle) of Mother Earth.

*tapassthānam bilam sūkshmam paramam vyoma tatsmṛitam,
ādhibhautikamāhognam nābhīsthānam bhuvah param.*

kāñchīmāhātmye, 31, 70;

kāmākshīvilāse, 11, 6.

jagatkāmakalākāram nābhīsthānam bhuvah param.

kāmākshīvilāse, 13, 73.

prithivyāḥ gosvarūpāyāḥ yatkiñchitsthānatām gatam.

kāmākshīvilāse, 1, 56.

atha kshiteradbhutamkāñchimaikshata.

śaṅkarābhyudaye, 1, 56.

aikāro'bhūt kāmakoṭau nābhīstatra tu te'patat,

tatra sarve'pi siddhyanti kāmamantrāḥ na saṁśayaḥ.

merutantre.

Thus we see that Kāñchī is not only the seat of the *śakti* and *devatā* of the Southern region but also is the centre of another Earth. Śrī Āchārya, therefore, adopted the Kāmakoṭi-pīṭha at Kāñchī as his *pīṭha* and asked Sureśvara to occupy the *pīṭha* after him. Śrī Śaṅkara stayed at Kāñchī and attained *siddhi* there itself. The *Guruparaṁparā* of the *bhāratiya-sampradāya* of the institution on the banks of the Tūṅgabhadra included as No. 2146 in part III of Dr Hultzsch's *The Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southern India*, printed and published by the Government Press, Madras, in 1905, says that Śrī Śaṅkara installed Kāmākshī at Kāñchī and attained eternal bliss there.

*āgachchhatsvechchhayā kāñchīn paryātan prithvītaie,
tatra saṁsthāpya kāmākshīm jagāma paramaṁ padam,
viśvarūpayatiṁ sthāpya svāśramasya prachāraṇe.
svayaṁ kāñchīmagāttūrṇaṁ śrīprithvīdharabhārati,
tadvṛttāntaṁ samākarṇya tapasaḥ siddhaye tadā.*

The *Guruparaṁparā* of Kūḍali (Śrīṅgeri) *maṭha*, printed at Seshāri Press, Mysore, under the authority of the said *maṭhu*, also says the same thing with a very slight modification.

*svechchhayā paryātan bhūmau yayau kāñchīpurīm guruḥ,
tatra saṁsthāpya kāmākshīm devī paramagātpadam.
prithvīdharayatīḥ pīṭhe brahmavidyāprachāraṇe,
viśvarūpaṁ pratishṭhāpya kāmāchyām brahmatvamāptavān.*

The *Patañjalīcharita*, printed and published by the Nirṇaya-sāgar Press, Bombay, as No. 51 in the Kāvya-mālā Series, says in verse 71 of its last chapter that Śrī Śaṅkara spent his last days at Kāñchī.

*govindadeśikamupāsthachirāyabhaktyā
tasmin sthite nijamahimni videhamuktyā,
advaitabhāvyamupakalpaya diśovijitya
kāñchīpure sthitimavāpa sa śaṅkarāryaḥ.*

patañjalīcharite, 8, 71.

Another work, *Śaṅkarābhyaudaya*, by Rājā Chūḍāmaṇi Dikshita also says that Śrī Śaṅkara spent his last days at Kāñchī worshipping Kāmākshī. A work, *Śīvarahasya*, an Itihāsa comprising more than fifty thousand verses, published in Kannada script with Kannada translation as *Mahārājā Jayachāmarājendra*

Granthamālā Series, Volume 21, No. 32, 1950, refers at page 200 in the 16th Adhyāya of its 9th Aṁśa, to Śrī Śaṅkara's *siddhi* at Kāñchī.

*tadyogabhogavaramuktisumokshayoga-
līṅgārchanāt prāptajayaḥ svakāśramam,
tān vai vijitya tarasā'kshataśāstravādaiḥ
miśrān sa kāmichyāmathasiddhimāpa.*

The same verse appears in the copy of *Śivarahasya* obtained from some other libraries as well as in the commentary to verse 103 of the last Chapter of *Mādhaviya-Śaṅkaravijaya*. It is mentioned therein that Śrī Śaṅkara worshipped five sphaṭikaliṅgas given to him by Śrī Śiva, but it is not stated where those liṅgas were installed.

Śrī Rājeśvara Śāstri of Vallabha Rāma Sāligrāma Sāṅga Veda Vidyālaya, Vārāṇasī, has published a *Śaṅkara-pūjā-krama*. In that *Pūjā-krama* it is said that a copy of the *Ānandagiri-Śaṅkaravijaya* in the Rāmatārakā Mutt, Vārāṇasī, said to have been copied in Śaka 1737, i.e. about a hundred and fifty years ago was referred to while preparing the *Pūjā-krama*, and the *Pūjā-krama* contains extracts from the said copy of the *Śaṅkaravijaya*. In that book the various places where the liṅgas were installed are mentioned.

In the manuscripts of *Ānandagiri-Śaṅkaravijaya*, found in the various libraries in the country, as well as in the printed edition of the same it is said that Śrī Śaṅkara attained *siddhi* at Kāñchī after consecrating Kāmākshī there. Dr S. K. Belvalkar in his Gopal Basu Mallick lectures on Vedānta philosophy, Poona, 1929, says at page 240, 'According to one set of traditions, Kāñchī in the South of India is given as the place where the Āchārya breathed his last. According to other sources, he died at Badarikāśrama disappearing in a cave in the Himālayas. The weight of probability belongs to the first view.' Some old manuscripts of *Ānandagiri-Śaṅkaravijaya* found in the Mysore Oriental Institute, the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, and the Rāmatārakā Mutt, Vārāṇasī (as given in the *Śaṅkarāchārya-pūjā-krama* mentioned above) give some further details of Śrī Āchārya as follows.

*tatraiva.....bhoganāmakam liṅgam.....nikshipya
ānandagiriśaṅkaravijaye, prakaraṇam 63.*

*nīlakaṇṭheśvaram natvā . . . varanāmakaṁ līgaṁ pratishṭhāpya
 ānandagiriśaṅkaravijaye, prakaraṇaṁ 55.
 kedārakshetre muktilīṅgāranyaṁ pratishṭhāpya
 ānandagiriśaṅkaravijaye, prakaraṇaṁ 55.
 tatra nīyasiddhāntapaddhatim prakāśayitum antevāsinam sureś-
 varamāhūya yoganāmakaṁ līgaṁ pūjaya iti tasmai datvā tva-
 matra kāmakoṭipīṭhamadhivasa.
 ānandagiriśaṅkaravijaye, prakaraṇaṁ, 65*

Śrī Śaṅkara himself stayed at Kāñchī and attained *siddhi* there.

*svalokaṁ gantumichchhuḥ kāñchīnagare muktisthale kadāchi-
 dupaviśya sthūlaśarīraṁ sūkshme antardhāya sadrūpo bhūtvā
 sūkshmaṁ kāraṇe vilīnaṁ kṛtvā chinmātro bhūtvā āṅgushṭha-
 puruṣaḥ tadupari pūrṇamakhaṇḍamaṇḍalākāramānandamī-
 svarasannidhau prāpya sarvajagadvyāpakaṁ chaitanyama-
 bhavat. sarvavyāpakachaitanyarūpeṇādyāpi tiṣṭhati.
 ānandagiriśaṅkaravijaye, prakaraṇaṁ, 74.*

Professor Wilson says about the *Ānandagiri-Śaṅkaravijaya* that 'it bears internal and undisputed evidence of the composition of a period not far removed from that at which he (Śaṅkarāchārya) may be supposed to have flourished. We may, therefore, follow it as a safe guide.' Monier Williams in his *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* referring to the *Ānandagiri-Śaṅkaravijaya* says that it is a biography of Śrī Śaṅkara recording his controversial victories over numerous heretics. In the *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya*, Kedāra is mentioned as the place of Śrī Śaṅkara's *siddhi*. Why this difference?

In this connection I may state that Śrī Sampoorṇānand, the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, states in a letter dated 6-7-1958 addressed to Śrī T. N. Ramachandran, Retired Joint Director of Archaeology, as follows: 'There is nothing new to prove that Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya died at this spot. All that tradition says is that he came to Kedārnāth and in the modern phraseology disappeared thereafter. So what is called a *samādhi* is not a *samādhi* but a memorial.' In a letter published in 'The Hindu' dated 19-6-1959 one Svāmi Sahajānanda of Guruvāyūr writes from Badrināth as follows: 'On enquiry from the Joshi mutt they say that it is only a *saṅkalpa samādhi* and that the actual *samādhi* is not on the spot.'

I then went through the *Guruvamśa-kāvya*, the *Chidvilāsiya-Śaṅkaravijaya*, and the *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya*, all dealing with Śrī Śaṅkara's life. I then found that the place of Śrī Śaṅkara's *siddhi* had been gradually changed from Kāñchī to Kedāra. How it was changed is explained below.

The *Guruvamśa-kāvya* is a work dealing with the Śringeri maṭha's *guruparaṁparā*. In the colophon to each chapter of the work it is stated that it has been written at the direction (*nirmāpita*) of Śrī Sachchidānanda Bhāratī, the head of that maṭha (1705-1741). (*Vide* The Annual Report of the Archaeological Department of Mysore for the year 1928, page 15). *Nirmāpita* means 'caused to be written.' The author of the work has himself written a commentary on the same.

The first three chapters of the work deal with the life and work of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, The Great. The author of the work says that he follows the path laid down (by) Kavīndraiḥ: *āryāṇām kulamupadarśitam kavīndraiḥ* (Chapter 1, verse 6). The author's commentary on this is as follows.

āryāṇāmīti. kavīndraiḥ ānandagiriyaṭīndrādibhiḥ. upadarśitam—prakaṭīkṛitam. āryāṇām—śrīmadāchāryāṇām kulaparaṁparām.

Here he explains the word 'kavīndraiḥ' as 'by Ānandagiri-yatīndra and others'. It is clear from the above that the then head of the maṭha, Śrī Sachchidānanda Bhāratī, when directing the composition of the work, had in his mind that Ānandagiri was the important authority on the life and institutions (*paraṁparā*) of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya. But later when dealing with the place of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's final disappearance, the *Guruvamśa-kāvya* goes against the tradition recorded in all the versions of Ānandagiri's *Śaṅkaravijaya*.

As already stated, Monier Williams, in his *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (1899), referring to Ānandagiri's *Śaṅkaravijaya* says that it is a biography of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya recording his controversial victories as a Vedāntin over numerous heretics. But when referring to *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya*, he says that it is a fanciful account of the controversial exploits of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya.

Prof. Wilson in his *Sketch of the Religious sects of the Hindus*, though criticizing Ānandagiri's work for its narration of miracles,

finally remarks, as stated already, 'we may therefore follow it as a very safe guide' (*Indian Antiquary*, Vol. V, p. 587).

The *Guruvamśa-kāvya*, while referring to the last days of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya says:

aukaṁ samastānyapi pustakāni śishyānsamastānapi
tānamuñcham,
āstāmimau daṇḍakamaṇḍalū chetyālochia tatyāja sa tau cha
yogī.
daṇḍo drurūpeṇa saparyāṇaṁsūtīrthātmanā
chāmbukamaṇḍalustham,
mahātmano hastaparigraheṇa jaḍau cha tau sārthatanū
abhūtām.
dattātreyam bhuvanavinutaṁ vīkshya natvā nyagādīd
vṛittam svīyam sakalamapi tānpreshitān dikshuśishyār.
so'pi śrutvā munipatiradādāśisho viśvarūpā-
chāryādibhyaḥ sukhamaivasatām tatra tau bhāshamāṇau.
sargaḥ, 3; ślokaḥ, 68-70.

Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya towards the close of his life went from Siddheśvar in Nepal to Dattātreyā Āśrama, abandoned his *daṇḍa* and *kamaṇḍalu*, which became a tree and a tank (*tīrtha*) respectively, and stayed at Dattātreyā Āśrama at Māhurīpuri in Mahrāt-vāḍa (about thirty miles from Kinvat station on the Adilabad—Hyderabad section) conversing with Śrī Dattātreyā. The commentary says at the end of the chapter:

so'pi—dattātreyo'pi munipatirviśvarūpāchāryādibhyaḥ āśishaḥ
adāt — dattavān. tatra — māhurīpure, bhāshamāṇau — saṁla-
pantau, tau — dattātreyāśaṅkarāchāryau, chiram — bahukālān,
avasatām — ushitavantau.

The *Tīrthanika*, the 1957 Annual number of *Kalyān* of Gorakhpur, refers at page 239 to Māhurīpuri as Māhuragaḍha and as containing the shrine of Dattātreyā.

madhya-relve kī bhusāval-nagpur lāin par murtijāpur steśan hai.
vahān se ek lāin yavatmāl tak jāti hai. yavatmāl se māhur-
kshetr samīp hai, māhurkshetr meṁ anasūyā-dattaparvat par
maharshi jamadagni kī samādhi hai, reṇukādevī kī mandir hai
aur paraśurāmkunḍ hai. kahā jātā hai bhagavān dattātrey
kā āśram yahī thā. dattātreyji jamadagnirishi ke guru the.

*guru kī ājñā se maharshi jamadagni apnī patnī renukādevī ke
sāth yahāñ āye aur yahñ unhoñne tathā renukājī ne samādhi
lī. kile ke bhītar mahākālī kā mandir tathā sarovar hai.*

There are two devatās at Māhur (1) Jagadambā and (2) Dattātreyā. The temples of these two gods are at a distance of three and four miles respectively from Māhur town situated on two different mountains.

‘At the temple of Dattātreyā there is a *mahant* who looks after the *pūjā* and temple management. The devotees assemble for *pūjā* of Jagadambā and Dattātreyā on Mārgaśīrsha-śuddha-paurṇami and also for *pūjā* of Jagadambā on Chaitra-śuddha-paurṇami. At both the temples *pūjās* and *archanas* can be performed every day.’ (Extract from a letter from Manick Rao Patwāri, Assistant Engineer, P.W.D.)

It is not clear why, after naming in the beginning of the work Ānandagiri as the foremost of the earlier authors, the *Guruvamśa-kāvya* mentions some other place as the last resort of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya. Nor does it follow in this respect the *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya* (nowadays regarded by the *maṭha* on the banks of the Tuṅgā as the sole authority on Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya’s life), which says that the Āchārya ended his bodily career in Kedārnāth. Nor does the *Guruvamśa-kāvya* follow the *Chidvilāsīya-Śaṅkaravijaya*, which mentions Dattātreyā-guha in Badari, many miles distant from Kedārnāth, as the last resort of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from what is stated above is either that the two Śaṅkaravijayas, *Mādhavīya* and *Chidvilāsīya*, did not exist at the time of the composition of the *Guruvamśa-kāvya*, or that the authorities of the *maṭha* on the banks of the Tuṅgā were not aware of the existence of the above two works, while directing the composition of the *Guruvamśa-kāvya*.

The only answer to the question why the *Guruvamśa-kāvya* gives as the place of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya’s last resort, a place in Mahrātvāḍa is that in the opinion of the authorities of the *maṭha* on the banks of the Tuṅgā the mention of Kāñchī as the place of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya’s last resort would enhance the importance of the Śaṅkaraite institution in Kāñchī. This new alteration as regards the place of Śrī Śaṅkara’s last resort, namely that it was at Māhuripuri, noted for its shrine of Dattātreyā, gave a handle to

Chidvilāsa, who probably composed his *Śaṅkaravijaya* later than the *Guruvamśa-kāvya*, to further alter the place of Śrī Āchārya's last resort to a cave in the popular Badari regarded as the abode of Dattātreyā.

*vitānvan badarīm prāpa tapodhanakṛitāśrayām,
dināni katichittatra svachchhandamavasatsukhī.*

31, 25.

*ityuktvā śaṅkarāchāryakarapallavamādarāt,
avalambya karāgreṇa dattātreyassa tūpasah.
praviveśa guhādvāram datvā"jñām janasantateh,
kramāt jagāma kailāsam pramathaiḥ pariveshṭitam.*

48, 49.

The *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya* in its turn completely discarded the importance of Dattātreyā's *sānnidhya* for the place of Śrī Śaṅkara's last resort, but felt the necessity of the Āchārya's place of last resort being in a Śivakshetra, as Śrī Śaṅkara was an *avatāra* of Lord Śiva.

*pārikāṅkshīśvaro'pyūpaduddhārakaṁ
sevamānātulasvastivistārakam,
pāpadāvānalātāpasamhārakaṁ yogibṛindādhipaḥ prāpa
kedārakam.*

16, 100.

*iti kṛitasurakāryam netumājagmurenam
rajataśikhariśṛiṅgam tuṅgamīśāvatāram,
vidhīsatamakhaṇdropendravāyavāgnipūrvāḥ
suranikaravareṇyāḥ sarshisamghāḥ sasiddhāḥ.*

16, 103.

*indropendrapradhānaistridaśaparivṛidhaiḥ stūyamānaprasūnair-
divyairabhyarchyamānaḥ sarasiruhabhuvā dattahastāvalambah,
āruhyokshāṇamagrāyam prakatītasujatāḥātachandrāvataṁsaḥ
srīṇvannālīkaśabdaṁ sumuditamṛishibhirdhāmanaijam
pratasthai.*

16, 106.

Had the people of the eighteenth century regarded the *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya* as the sole authority for Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's life, the then Āchārya of the *matha* while directing the composition of the *Guruvamśa-kāvya* would have caused Kedārṇāth and not Dattātreyāśrama in Māhurīpuri, to be mentioned as the place of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's last resort.

This *Guruvamśa-kāvya* was, as already stated, directed to be written by Śrī Sachchidānanda Bhāratī who was the pontiff at the beginning of the eighteenth century in the *maṭha* on the banks of the Tuṅgā river in the Shimoga District of Mysore State.

Thus the reference to Ānandagiri as the main authority on Śrī Śaṅkara's life in the *Guruvamśa-kāvya* and the reference to Kāñchī as the place of Śrī Śaṅkara's last resort in the *Guruparamparā* of the Tuṅgabhadra (Kūḍali) Śringeri *maṭha* go to establish that all Śringeri institutions till the end of the latter part of the eighteenth century held the view that Kāñchī was the place of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's last resort, and that it was only after that period that the place of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's last resort was changed from place to place, namely Māhurīpuri, Badari, and Kedāra. (The latest alteration is to Kashmir in a work on the life of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya in Sanskrit verse published under the auspices of the Dvārakā *maṭha* by one Śrīnivāsa Ālaya of South Canara, in whose opinion alterations in the details of any hero's life are not wrong, provided they do not lower the dignity of the hero. Although he mentions Kashmir as the place of final resort of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, he declares in the preface to his work that he follows the *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya*, which on the other hand mentions Kedārnāth as the place of final resort.)

The *Bengali Encyclopaedia* or *Viśvakosh* (1892) gives under the heading Kāñchī the following information regarding Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's last days.

'kāmchīpur ek prāchīn mahātīrth hai. keval tīrth hī nahīn, kañchī mahāpīṭhsthān hai. śivakāmchīsthit ekāmrānāth nāmak mahādev kā ādiliṅg, bhagavatī kāmākshīdevī kī mūrti, bhagavān śaṅkarāchāry kī pratimā evaṁ samādhisthal kāmākshīdevī kā mandir kuchh chhoṭā hai. isī ke prāṅgaṇ meṁ bhagavān śaṅkarāchāry kī samādhi hai. isī samādhi par unkī prastaramayī mūrti pratishṭhit hai.'

Kāñchī is one of the seven mokshapuris. According to these *Guruparamparās*, not only Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya chose Kāñchī as the place of his last resort but also Prithvīdhara, the first pontiff of Śringeri *maṭha* on hearing of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's leaving his mortal coil at Kāñchī hurried to Kāñchī and attained *siddhi* there. Vidyāranya too, according to the *Pushpagiri-maṭhāmnāya* quoted by Kokkandrum Venkataratnam Pantulu in his *Śaṅkara-maṭha-*

tattva-prakāśikārtha-saṅgraha, a work in favour of the *maṭha* on the banks of the Tuṅgā (printed in the year 1877 at Sanjivana-mudrāksharaśālā, Peddanaickenpet, Madras), went to Hampi from Kāñchī and after his immortal life work there returned to Kāñchī in his last moments and attained Kailas there.

*tataḥ param gajādrīndurupake śakavatsare,
vidyāraṇyaguruḥ kāñchīnagaryām sa babhau mahān,
paṇḍpākshetre vasanmaunī bhaktarakṣaṭatparaḥ,*

* * * *

*visṛjya kāñchīnagaram sahaiśvaryām savīhanam,
vidyāraṇyagurusvāmī kailāsālayamāviśat.*

Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, Śrī Pṛthvīdharāchārya, and Śrī Vidyāraṇya, all these immortal sages have chosen Kāñchī, the Southern-most *mokṣhapuri* as their last resort. This was the traditional belief of all the followers of Śrī Śaṅkara including those of the Śrīṅgeri *maṭha* upto the eighteenth century.

On account of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya's presence during his last days in Kāñchī Kāmākshī or Kāmakoti pīṭha, the spiritual centre of the earth, that centre should have become the object of reverence to the then *āstika* world from Siberia to Java and from Thailand to Gāndhāra, wherever the Vedas and Śāstras flourished and the name of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya was known. In addition to Kāñchī being referred to as the spiritual centre of the world in different holy texts, it may also be deemed to be the geographical centre of the *āstika* world mentioned above. Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya seems to have graced Kāñchīpuri at the end of his career on the earth, not only on account of its being consecrated as the seat of the *devī* of Dakṣiṇāmnāya but also on account of its being the centre of the earth itself for the spiritual regeneration of which he incarnated.

The institution on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadṛā established for the worship of Śārādā should also be considered as a seat of Bhagavatpāda. That is why people pay homage to both these institutions, and would, by the grace of the all-pervading Mother, continue to do so.

I have put in some of the thoughts that occurred to me on the perusal of the various works read by me. It is requested that scholars who happen to read this may excuse me for any lapses and help me with their suggestions, if any.

(ii)

KAMAKOTI AND NAYANMARS

*ikshukodaṇḍapushpeshu
pāśāṅkuśakarojvalām
udyatsūryanibhām vande
mahātripurasundarīm.*

The śaktis of Ambikā or the consort of Śiva, present in each and every one of the Śiva temples have emanated from Śrī Kāñchī Kāmakoshṭha. There are about fifty Śiva temples at Kāñchī and none of them contains a sanctum sanctorum for the goddess. But the Śiva temples outside the limits of Kāñchī have a separate sanctum sanctorum for the goddess. The reason for this is to be found in *Lalitā-sahasranāma*, *Lalitā-trisati*, and *Lalitā-aṣṭottara*, texts on śilpa and Āgama, Purāṇas, inscriptions, and some of the devotional hymns traditionally known as *Śaiva-tirumurai* comprising *Tevāram* and *Tiruttāṇḍakam*. We shall now deal with this in detail.

The *Lalitā-sahasranāma* refers to the goddess as *kāmakoti-kāyai namaḥ*, the *Lalitā-trisati* as *kāmakotiṇilayāyai namaḥ*, and the *Lalitā-aṣṭottara* as *kāmakoti-mahāpūṭhapadmasthāyai namo namaḥ*. Thus in the three nāmāvalis, the name *kāmakoti* as the seat of the goddess occurs.

PURĀṆAS

The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* printed in the Grantha and the Telugu script referring to the *tīrtha-yātrā* of Balarāma in the tenth skandha describes Kāñchī as the *Kāmakoti-purī*: *kāmakotipurīm kāñchīm*.

This reading is found in the *Subodhinī*, a commentary on the *Bhāgavata* by Vallabhāchārya. And this reading slightly differs from the one found in the *Bhāgavata* texts printed in North India which reads as follows: *kāmakoshṇipurīm kāñchīm*.

KAMAKSHĪVILĀSA

The reason for the absence of any separate sanctum sanctorum for the goddess in the Śiva temples in Kāñchī and the presence of

it in the temples outside the skirts of Kāñchī is stated in this work. The god of love, who was reduced to ashes by Lord Śiva, out of desire to have a body performed penance at Kāñchī to propitiate Śrī Kāmākshī. Pleased by his penance, Śrī Kāmākshī by a mere glance from her eyes blessed him with a handsome body. He further requested her to bless him with the power to vanquish Lord Śiva. She acceded to his request; and, she withdrew into the *bilākāśa* in the Śrī Kāmākshī temple at Kāñchī the śaktis that are present in all the Śiva temples. Sometime later Brahmā went to Kailāsa to have darśan of Śiva. After worshipping Śiva, he went to worship Devī, but could not see her there. He went to all the Śiva temples on earth and in none of the temples could he find the presence of Devī. He reflected on the circumstances that led to the absence of Devī in all the Śiva temples and intuitively felt that it was due to the will of Śrī Kāmākshī herself. Desirous of having the presence of the goddess in all the temples as before, Brahmā went to Kāñchī and performed penance for twelve years. Pleased by his penance Kāmākshī said: 'Let there be the manifestation of my śaktis in all the Śiva temples outside Kāñchī; but in Kāñchī, which is known as Śivajit-kshetra there need be no separate sanctum sanctorum for me

*purā pañchaśaro'naṅgaḥ pratyakshāṅgābhilāshayā
kāmakoshṭam samāsādyā kāmākshīm samprapūjya cha
hṛidi dhyātvā tu tām kāmastapastepe'tidushkaram
tatastat kāmādevasya tapasā tushṭamānasā
kadāchit tatra kāmākshī mahātripurasundarī
prasannātha mahāśaktiḥ svakaṭākshanirīkshaṇāt
dadau kāmāya divyāṅgam nṛiṇāmānandadāyakam.*

(9-12)

*tadā sarveshu śaiveshu kailāsādyālayeshu cha
yatra yatra sthitāḥ sarvā gauriḥ svāṁśatayā sthitāḥ
samākṛishyaikyato devī tūshṇīmāśicchubhānanā.*

(31-32)

*kadāchidatha lokaśaḥ kailāsādyālayeshu cha
sevārtham parameśasya samāgatyaīlayam tadā
devahīnālayam dṛishṭvā śivasthāneshu sarvaśaḥ
kimarthamambikā nāsti sarvaśaivālayeshu cha
iti chintya tato brahmā kāmākshyāśchitramityapi
vijñāya jñānadṛishṭyā tu kāmakoshṭha mahītale*

*kāmākshyāssannidhim prāpya dhyātvārādhyā cheśvarīm
sarvālayeshu śaiveshu sarvalokasthiteshu cha
yathā śāmbhustathā gaurī sadā sānnidhyakāṅkshayā
hrīdi dhyātvā tu kāmākshīm dvādaśābdam tapo'karot
tataḥ prasannā sā devī kāmākshī bhaktikāmadā
tatra brahmāṇamālokya vachanam chedam abravīt. (68-73)
śivajitkshetramityuktam idam kshetram vinā bhuvi
sarvālayeshu śaiveshu sannidhattam sadā'mbikā. (75)*

As the goddess has withdrawn all her powers into the *bīlā-kāśa* which pervades the whole of Kāñchī-kshetra, there is no need for a separate sanctum sanctorum for the goddess in any of the Śiva temples at Kāñchī.¹

KĀÑCHĪMĀHĀTMYA

Each of the five primary elements has a *śiva-kshetra*; and, Chidambaram is considered to be the *ākāśa-śivakshetra*. In the same way, each of the five primary elements has a *śakti-pīṭha*; and, Kāñchī is the *ākāśa-śakti-pīṭha*. Chidambaram and Kāñchī are thus the *ākāśa-sthānas*. In Chidambaram, the *ākāśa* is present only in the *kanaka-sabhā*. But as regards Kāñchī, the whole of Kāñchī is considered to be the *ākāśa-sthāna*. The goddess, Kāmākshī, is in the form of *bīlākāśa* in the cave under the Gāyatrī-maṇḍapa at the Kāmākshī temple. And this *ākāśa* pervades the entire *kshetra*. This is the reason why there is no separate sanctum sanctorum for the goddess in the Śiva temples at Kāñchī-kshetra. As in Kāśī, there is no *sparśa-dosha* in the Kāñchī-kshetra.

*yatra pūrvam tvayā kāñchyām smarātūrīhamimam hrīdi
pūjanīyo mahāliṅge nāmnā mardalamādhave
tatraiva cha mahānṛittam sarvarakshākarābhidham
karomi satatam hṛishṭaḥ parākāśe bilāntare
atra dabhrasabhāmātram parākāśa iti smṛitam
tarta sarvāpibhūḥ kāñchyām parākāśaḥ smṛito budhaḥ
satyam jñānamanantamādyam yo vedāsyā guhāntare
paravyomni cha vai kāñchyām so'snuteyamathepsitān
sarvajñenānunāṇo'rvā mahato mahatāntaram*

1. Vide Kāñchīmāhātmya, 44, 4 to 11.

*ye tu paśyantyātmakṛitagunaḍhikṛitaśugjanāḥ
 tatra ye paramākāśe pravīṣanti janāḥ hare
 te sarve manmayāḥ syurvai muktātmānastu te smṛitāḥ
 agnimadhyagatam vastu tanmayam syādyathā kṣhaṇāt
 evam kāñchī pravīṣtā ye manmayāḥ syur na saṁśayaḥ
 tasmādatra nṛiṇāṁ saṅghe śvapachānāṇna sūtakam
 chaṇḍālānāmapī hare spṛiṣtvā kāñchyām na sūtakam.*

(44,4 to 11)

TĀNTRIC TEXTS

Oṭṭiyāṇam, as we know from its usage in the Tamil country, is an ornament worn around the waist. It is called kāñchī in Sanskrit. This will be over the navel position. The work, *Meru-tantra*, states that Kāñchīkshetra is the navel position of the earth.

vide Merutantra, 10, 848.

SAUBHĀGYA-CHINTĀMAṆI

This work which was composed by the great sage Durvāsa and is still followed in the Kāmākshī temple at Kāñchī refers to the seven moksha-puris in the words—

ayodhyādishu pīṭheshu pṛithivyādishvanukramat.

Of the seven moksha-puris,

*ayodhyā mathurā māyā kāśī kāñchī avantikā
 purī dvāravatī chaiva saptaite mokshadāyikāḥ,*

the first five, beginning with Ayodhyā and ending with Kāñchī, are five śakti-pīṭhas beginning with pṛithvī. And, Kāñchī, thus becomes the ākāśapīṭha. This is in conformity with the view expressed in the *Kāñchī-māhātmya*.

TEXTS ON SCULPTURE AND ĀGAMAS

The śilpa texts also speak of the goddess in temples only as Kāmakoṣṭham. For instance, the śilpa text, *Mānasāra*, states:

kāmakoṣṭhavidhim vakshye. (65, 1)

The Śaiva-āgamas, the Sūkshmāgama and the Karuṇāgama, refer to the seat of the goddess as Kāmakoṣṭha.

- (i) *kāmakoshṭhavidhim vakshye sṛiṇu tvam tat pramañjana*
[Sūkshmagama: Śaktipratishṭhā-kāmakoti-vidhipaṭala]
- (i) *bhogaṅgamarchanam kuryāt sarvasaṃpat samṛiddhidham*
rātrau pūjāvasāne tu ardhayāmena kārayet
mandirasyottare bhāge kāmakoshṭhasya madhyame
[karuṇāgama: yogāṅgārchana-bhāga]

INSCRIPTIONS

That the seat of the goddess in the Śiva temples is referred to as Kāmakoshṭha could be seen from the inscriptions found in the many Śiva temples. The book entitled *South Indian Temple Inscriptions*, published by the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, contains several such inscriptions which are as follows:

CHIDAMBARAM:

koilukkum tirukkāmakotṭamuḍaya peria nāchchiyārukkum
śāttiyaruḷa²

AVINĀŚI:

koilil tirukkāmakkoṭṭattu nāchchiyār peruṅkaruṇai³

VIJAYAMAṄGALAM:

tirunāgāśvaramuḍaiyār tirukkāmakkoṭṭattālu (kai) taḍa(ya)
na nāchchiyārukkamuḍupaḍi⁴

TIRUVORRIYŪR:

tiruvorriyūruḍaiya nāyanār koirtirukkāmakkoṭṭamuḍaiya
nāchchiyārukku veṇḍum nibandaṅgaḷukku⁵

2. *South Indian Temple Inscriptions*. (Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library), Part I, No. 14, p. 22.

3. *Ibid.*, No. 197, p. 190.

4. *Ibid.*, No. 267, p. 248.

5. *Ibid.*, No. 530, p. 517.

TIRUPPALAIVANAM:

*tiruppālavanamuḍaya nāyanār tirukkāmakkoṭṭam iyādilum
pāpādi nāchchiyārukku⁶*

TIRUKKAṬṬUPPALI:

*tirukkāmakkoṭṭamuḍaiya nāchchiyār aḷagamar maṅgaiyārkkku⁷
tirukkāmakkoṭṭamuḍaiya periyānāchchiār aḷagamar maṅgaiyā-
rukku karraḷi⁸*

VALLAM:

*ikkoiḷ śi kāmakoṭṭamuḍaiya nāchchiyārukkuṁ veṇḍum
nimittattirku⁹*

TIRUPPALAṆAM:

*ikkoiḷ pūjai nilaihaḷum tirukkāmakkoṭṭamuḍaiya nāchchiarkoiḷ
bhaṭṭāchārya nilaiyum¹⁰
nān elundaruḷuvitta tirukkāmakkoṭṭamuḍaiyār tiruppalāṇat-
tuḍaiyārkkku¹¹
innāyanār tirukkāmakkoṭṭamuḍaiya periya nāchchiyār¹²*

KOILAḌI:

*ikkoiḷil nān elundaruḷuvitta tirukkāmakkoṭṭamuḍai akhila-
nāyakiyārkkku pūjaiikkum¹³*

HASTIGIRI:

śrī puravarādiśubara kāmakoṭṭi (ti) mbikālaprāptāvaraprasāda¹⁴

CHIDAMBARAM:

*devyāstasyāḥ śikhariduhituḥ kāmakoṭṭasthithitāyāḥ
prākārajyāmapidashayitamosaukliptavān maṇṭapañcha*

6. *Ibid.*, No. 539, p. 528.

7. *Ibid.*, Part II, No. 597, p. 586.

8. *Ibid.*, No. 598, p. 586.

9. *Ibid.*, No. 635, p. 613.

10. *Ibid.*, No. 1042, p. 975.

11. *Ibid.*, No. 1048, p. 980.

12. *Ibid.*, No. 1049, p. 981.

13. *Ibid.*, Part III, Section I, No. 1175, p. 1152.

14. *Ibid.*, No. 1209, p. 1220.

kiñchestyāḥ svapati naṭanasyānayogyaprakāram
*satyām bhaktyā sukaramakarot bhūṣaṇam mauktipūrvam*¹⁵
pītāmbaram kāñchanamesha devyāḥ
tat kāmakoṣṭhasthitamāsthītāyāḥ
chakāra yadvairivilāsinīnām
*vanāgnidhūmāmbaratām karoti*¹⁶

ŚAIVA TIRUMURAI

Devotional hymns traditionally known as Śaiva Tirumurai in Tamil literature refer to the seat of the goddess as *Kāmakoṭṭam* or *Kāmakoṭṭi*. Appar of the seventh century in his *Tiruvadikai Tiruttāṇḍakam* uses the word *Kāmakoṭṭi*; and this conforms to the version in the inscriptions referred to above.

eḷundirai natittuvalai nanainda tiṅgaḷ
īlanilāttihālhinra vaḷarsadaiyane
koḷumpavaḷaccheṅganivāi kāmakoṭṭi
koṅgaiyinai yamarporudu kolaṅgoṇḍa
taḷumpuḷave varai mārbil veṇṇūluṇḍe
śāntamoḍu śantanttinaḷaru taṅgi
aḷundiya śentiruvuvuvil veṇṇūṟṟāne
avanākhila tihai vīraṭṭattāne

Sundaramūrti Nāyanār in the *Tevāram* relating to *Oṇakāntantaḷi* situated on the northern bank of Sarvatīrtha in Kāñchī speaks of *Kāmakoṭṭa* thus:

vārirum kuḷanmai vaṇeḍuṅgaṇ
malaimahaṇ madhuvimmu koṇṟait-
tāriruntaṭamārbu nāṅgāt-
taiyalālūlahuyya vaitta
kāriruṇṇipolir kacchimudāir
kāmakoṭṭamuṇḍāha nīr poy
ūriḍum picchaikoḷvadenne
oṇakāntanraḷiyulīre

[7th Tirumurai: Oṇakāntantaḷi 6]

15. Ibid., Part III, Section II, Nos. 1271-73, pp. 1321-23.

16. Ibid.

It is to be specially noted that the *Tevāram* of Tirujñāna-saṁbandar relating to Ālaṅguḍi—the Dakṣiṇāmūrtikṣetra in the Tanjore district in the south—refers to the sanctum sanctorum of the goddess as *kacchi kāmakoṭi*

*nacchittoluvīr kaṇamakkadu śolvīr
kacchippoli kāmakkodiyuḍan kūḍi
icchittirum pūlaiyiḍam koṇḍa vīśan
ucchittalaiyil baḷkoṇḍulaḷūṇe*

It may be added here that prior to the introduction of the printing press the same symbol was used to denote both the long and short sound of 'O'. Hence *koḍi* in *kāmakkodī* in the above *Tevāram* must be read as *kōḍi*. Here *kacchi* means Kāñchīpuram and Tirujñāna-saṁbandar explicitly states that the sanctum sanctorum of the goddess is *Kāñchī Kāmakoṭi*.

EPILOGUE

The *sthala-purāṇa*, *Kāmākshī-vilāsa*, already referred to, states the reason why there is no separate sanctum sanctorum for the goddess in any one of the Śiva temples in Kāñchī and the presence of a separate sanctum sanctorum for the goddess in all the Śiva temples outside the skirts of Kāñchī. Goddess Kāmākshī after blessing the god of love with a body retracted all her powers in the *bilākāśa* at the Kāmākshī temple in order to help the god of love in his victory over Śiva. Later, on Brahmā's request she spread all her powers in the Śiva temples outside Kāñchī. The goddess in the form of *bilākāśa* pervades the entire kāñchīkṣetra. Hence there is no need for any special sanctum sanctorum for the goddess in the Śiva temples at Kāñchī. It is only from here that she again spread all her powers to be manifested in the temples outside Kāñchī-kṣetra. Herein lies a matter of profound importance, namely that the term *Kāmakoṭi* which is applied to the sanctum sanctorum of the goddess in the Śiva temples is derived from the *Kāmakoṣṭha* of Kāñchī. This point is further substantiated in the *Ālaṅguḍi Tevāram* of Tirujñāna-saṁbandar wherein he refers to the sanctum sanctorum of the goddess at Ālaṅguḍi as *Kacchi Kāmakoḍi*. This *Tevāram* in unmistakable terms refers to the identity of Kāñchī Kāmakoṭi with the *ambikā* of the local shrine. And within the city boundary of Kāñchī there is no

garbha-griha with Ambikā installed in it. No key to this curious phenomenon in the millenium-old temple construction scheme within the Kāñchī city limits and to the countrywide practice of referring to Ambikā shrines in the Śiva temples as *Kāmakōṭi* would have been available but for the two texts—the *Kāmākshī-vilāsa* and the *Ālaṅguṭi Tevāram* of Saint Saṁbandar. A few lines in the simple *sthala-purāṇa* of Kāmākshī has regulated the millenium-old temple worship of Ambikā all over the country.

May Kāmākshī whose divine rays are manifested in the sanctum sanctorum of the goddess in all the Śiva temples and who is the *parā-śakti* of the Kāmakōṭi-pīṭha, which has been doubly sanctified by being presided over by Ādi Śaṅkara himself and now by our Jagadguru Śrī Chandraśekharendra Sarasvatī, protect us all !

kāmaparipanthikāminī
kāmeśvarī kāmapīṭhamadhyagate
kāmadughā bhava kamale
kāmakale kāmakōṭi kāmākshī.

SRI KAMAKOTI PITHA OF SRI SANKARACHARYA

by

N. RAMESAN

M.A., I.A.S.

Kāñchī, the famous city of temples, known from times immemorial as one of the seven *Mokshapuris* of India, is intimately connected with the life and works of the great Advaitic teacher Śrī Śaṅkara. Almost all the works which deal with the life and doings of Śrī Śaṅkara, called Śaṅkara-vijayas, refer to Śrī Śaṅkara's consecrating Śrī Kāmakshī and Śrīchakra in Kāñchīpuram. Thus, the Mādhaviya *Śaṅkara-vijaya* in chapter 15 says that Śrī Śaṅkara reached Kāñchī after worshipping Rāmanūtha at Rāmēśvaram. The Ānandagiri *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, which is recognised by orientalists as the authentic biography of Śrī Śaṅkara, refers to Śaṅkara's visit to Kāñchīpuram, the establishment of his Maṭha there, his giving the Yogaliṅga to Śrī Śureśvara as well as his *siddhi* at Kāñchī itself. The Chidvilāsiya *Śaṅkara-vijaya* says that Śrī Śaṅkara visited Kāñchī and himself drew and consecrated the *Śrīchakra* with his own hand in the temple and ascended the Sarvajñapīṭha at Kāñchī after satisfying the various opponents. These traditions have continued in other works like the *Patañjalicharita* by Rāmabhadra and the *Śaṅkarābhyudaya* by Rājachūḍāmaṇi Dīkshita. The great Itihāsa *Śiva-rahasya* in the chapter dealing with the life of Śrī Śaṅkara refers to Kāñchī as Śaṅkara's final place of resort. These literary evidences tend to prove that Śrī Śaṅkara established his monastery at Kāñchīpuram, ascended the Sarvajñapīṭha there and also attained his *siddhi* there. This Maṭha of Śaṅkara which has been adorned in a continuous line by the great Āchāryas of Śrī Kāñchī Kāmakoti Pīṭha is still serving as a beacon light for the spiritual guidance of all devotees who turn to it with devotion and sincerity.

Kāñchīpuram which is thus the seat of the Śrī Kāñchī Kāmakoti Pīṭha from times immemorial, is also well known to us from

ship that permanent arrangements were made for adequate sources of income to meet the expenses of the Maṭha. The duties of the Maṭha had enormously increased since then. And, the new Āchārya lost no time in getting himself equipped for the tasks awaiting him. For this, he had first to go to the headquarters at Kumbhakonam.

Leaving Kalavai in the same year, i.e. 1907, the Āchārya went to Kumbhakonam after making a brief halt at Tiṇḍivanam. One could well imagine what a proud day it should have been for the people of Tiṇḍivanam when they received their own Svāmināthan as the new Āchārya of Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha. The town wore a festive appearance. The teachers of the American Mission School and the former school-fellows vied with one another in meeting the Āchārya and conversing with him. The Āchārya had a good word for every one, and spoke tenderly to each one of the teachers. After three days' stay at Tiṇḍivanam, the Āchārya resumed the journey and reached Kumbhakonam in the month of Chitra in the year Plavaṅga.

The head of an Āchārya-Pīṭha is looked upon by the disciples as the spiritual ruler, and is invested with all the regalia associated with a king. The disciples of the Maṭha desired to celebrate the installation of the new Āchārya as the head of the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha with due ceremony. The installation was performed on a grand scale on Thursday the 9th of May 1907 at the Kumbhakonam Maṭha. Her Highness Jeejambabhai Saheb and Her Highness Ramakumarambha-bhai Saheb, queens of Shivaji of the ruling family of Tanjore sent all the regal paraphernalia for the coronation. The ceremonial *abhisheka* was performed with jasmine flowers. First, the representatives of the Bangūru Kāmākshī, Kāmākshī and Akhilāṇḍeśvarī temples performed the *abhisheka*. This was followed by the representatives of the princely family of Tanjore, of the various Zamindars, and of the several aristocratic families. Prominent scholars took an active part in the coronation. Seated on the throne of the Maṭha, the Āchārya blessed all the people assembled there. That night seated in the golden *ambāri* on the regal elephant, sent by the Tanjore ruling family, His Holiness went in a grand procession through the main streets of Kumbhakonam. Thus commenced the Āchārya's spiritual rulership as the *Jagadguru*.

4. The First Tour of Victory (Vijaya-yatra)

Tours of victory (*vijaya-yātrā*), in the present context, mean the journeys undertaken by the Āchārya to the different parts of the country to bless the people by his presence, to give them opportunities for participation in the daily *pūjā* performed to Śrī Chandramaulīśvara and Tripurasundarī (Parameśvara and Pārvatī), the presiding deities of the Maṭha, and to impart to them the light of spiritual knowledge and the guidelines for conduct. Wherever the Āchārya goes, the people of that place take the fullest advantage of his presence, celebrate the event as a great festival, listen to his soul-moving discourses in pin-drop silence, and find in the very atmosphere a sense of exaltation.

The first tour undertaken by the new Āchārya was to Jambukeśvaram (Tiruvānaikkā) in 1908. It was here that Ādi Śaṅkara had adorned the Image of the Goddess Akhilāṇḍeśvarī with ear-ornaments (*tāṭaṅka*). In 1908 arrangements were made for the *Kumbhābhishekam* of the temple there, after it had been renovated. Our Āchārya was invited by the temple Sthānikas and the authorities to grace the occasion with his presence. The *Kumbhābhishekam* was performed with all solemnity and grandeur. Śrī Sachchidānanda Śivābhinava Narasiṃha Bhāratī, Śaṅkarāchārya of Śringeri, visited the Temple a day after the *Kumbhabhishekam* was performed. Śrī Subrahmanya Bhāratī, Śaṅkarāchārya of Śivagaṅga, visited the shrine a few months later.

From Jambukeśvaram, our Āchārya proceeded to Ilaiyāttāṅkuḍi in Rāmanāthapuram District, the place where the Sixty-fifth Āchārya of the Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha, Śrī Mahādevendra Sarasvatī, had attained *siddhi*. On the way, he visited Pudukkottai, and stayed there for some days. At Ilaiyāttāṅkuḍi he offered his homage to his illustrious predecessor at the *Adhishṭhānam*. From there he returned to Jambukeśvaram for his *chātur māsyā*. At the end of the period, he went back to Kumbhakonam after a brief halt at Tañjāvūr. 1909 was the *Mahāmakha* year at Kumbhakonam — an event which occurs every twelfth year. The Maṭha did its part in playing host to the pilgrims. On the day of the festival, it was a feast for the eyes to see the Āchārya go for the ceremonial *bath* in the *Mahāmakha* tank. In a grand procession he went, seated in an *ambāri* on the back of an elephant.

5. Study and Training

Our Āchārya was only fifteen years old in 1909. For two years, the learned *paṇḍitas* of the Maṭha imparted to him instruction in Samskrit classics at Kumbhakonam itself. The management of the Maṭha felt that a less congested place than Kumbhakonam — a place which would not be frequented by visiting crowds — would be more suitable for study. Mahendramangalam, a quiet village on the northern bank of the Akhaṇḍa Kāverī, was selected for the purpose; a *parṇasālā* was put up near the edge of the river. From 1911 to 1914, the Āchārya stayed there studying and receiving the requisite training. It was a strange relation between the teachers and the taught. The teachers were the disciples of the Maṭha. The Āchārya showed the utmost consideration for and respect to the teachers who were entrusted with his training; they too were conscious of the unique honour that was theirs.

Whenever experts in and exponents of musicology met him, he sought to improve his knowledge of this science and art through conversations with them. He used to snatch time to visit the nearby islands in the Kāverī to marvel at the natural scenery. Photographers sometimes took photographs of the natural surroundings. The Āchārya evinced interest in the photographic art. Some of the other areas of study of which he gained intimate knowledge are mathematics and astronomy.

In 1914 the Āchārya returned to the Maṭha at Kumbhakonam. He was twenty then. He had acquired by then encyclopaedic knowledge. Whenever scholars went to him, he used to put searching questions relating to their respective fields of study, and thereby gain a lot of information. When he was studying in Kumbhakonam, he made it a point to pay an annual visit to Gaṅgaikōṇḍa-choḷa-puram, and study the inscriptions to be found there and the niceties of temple-architecture. Thus, in a variety of ways the Āchārya equipped himself with the all-round knowledge and ability required for fulfilling the obligations of the leadership of the Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha.

Since the Āchārya had not reached the age of majority, the Maṭha was managed under the direction of the Court of Wards from 1911 to 1915. When the Āchārya completed twenty-one years of age in May 1915, he took over the management of the Maṭha under his direct supervision. But the actual execution

of the affairs of the Maṭha was by duly appointed officers and agents. Even in the papers granting power of attorney to the agents, the Āchārya would not sign—this is in accordance with custom and usage. Only the official seal of the Maṭha would be affixed.

The Śaṅkara Jayantī Celebrations that year were performed on a grand scale. A new journal 'Ārya-dharma' commenced its publication under the auspices of the Maṭha. In October 1916, the Navarātrī festival was observed at the Maṭha with a new fervour. The poet Subrahmanya Bhārati wrote in one of his essays praising, in the highest of terms, the manner in which the festival was conducted in the Maṭha. This is the annual festival at which worship is offered to the World-Mother in Her triple manifestations—as Durgā, Lakshmī, and Sarasvatī. Learned *paṇḍitas* came from all over the country to participate in the *sadas*. The foremost exponents of music gave concerts in the presence of the Āchārya. At the conclusion of the festival on the night of the tenth day, the Āchārya went round the town at the head of a huge and colourful procession.

Some of the very first measures taken by the Āchārya for the promotion of classical learning and of social welfare yielded rich results and marked only the beginning of many more to come. Distinguished scholars were honoured by the award of titles such as 'śāstraratnākara'. Essay-competitions were held for college students on subjects relating to our *dharma*. Free student-ships were instituted for the benefit of deserving students in schools and colleges. A free Āyurvedic dispensary was started in the Maṭha. During the Āchārya's stay in Kumbhakoṇam from 1914 to 1918, almost every evening there were learned assemblies or music concerts. *Paṇḍitas* and *śaṅgīta-vidvāns* yearned for the Guru's grace. Even professors, scientists, engineers, and administrators went to him for guidance and encouragement. The followers of the other faiths found in the Āchārya a deep understanding of their respective doctrines and profound appreciation of every type and grade of spiritual endeavour. Everyone who came into contact with the Āchārya recognized in him the *Jagadguru*.

6. All-India Tour (1919-1939)

The Āchārya's great tour of our sacred land commenced in March 1919. It was a long and strenuous tour; but it was supre-

mely worthwhile because of the opportunities it gave to people all over the country to meet the Āchārya and receive his blessings. The Āchārya never uses any of the modern modes of transport. He mostly walks, and accepts the use of a palanquin only when it is absolutely necessary. An *entourage* accompanies him, consisting of the officials of the Maṭha, *paṇḍitas*, *vaidiks*, servants, and animals such as cows, elephants, etc. Wherever the Āchārya camps, lots of devotees gather and stay at the camp as long as they can in order to derive the utmost advantage from the Holy Presence. Besides the daily *anushtāna* and *pūjā*, meeting the devotees, receiving visitors, giving instructions to the people concerned for the conduct of the affairs of the Maṭha and of the many religious and welfare organizations occupy the Āchārya's time each day. He hardly gets two or three hours of rest out of twenty-four. With frugal diet taken in between fasting days, and with so much of pressing work day after day, it is a marvel how the Āchārya meets the demands on his time and attention with absolute serenity and with perfect poise. No one will fail to note that the ideal of the *sthita-prajña* (the sage who has gained steady wisdom) has become actual in the soul-elevating person of the Āchārya.

The long pilgrimage began, as we have seen, in March 1919. During the first three years, the Āchārya visited all the places of pilgrimage—even remote and out of the way villages—in the Tanjāvūr District, the District in which Kumbhakoṇam is situated. The *chāturmāsya* in 1919 was in Veppattūr village at a distance of five miles to the east of Kumbhakoṇam. During the *chāturmāsya*, the *sannyāsins* are to stay at one place so that no harm may be caused to insects and other creatures by treading on them when they come out of the ground in the rainy season. The *sannyāsins* camp at one place for four fortnights (*pakṣhas*); this observance starts on the full-moon day in the month of *Ashāḍha* which is dedicated to the worship of the sage Vyāsa, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*. The day affords an occasion to the devotees to visit the Āchārya's camp and offer to him their obeisance.

In 1920, on the most auspicious occasion of the *mahodaya*, the Āchārya took the ceremonial bath in the sea at Vedāraṇyam. The *Vyāsapūjā* and *chāturmāsya* that year were observed in Māyavaram. One day, during the Āchārya's stay at this place, a blind

old Muslim gentleman wanted to meet the Āchārya. When the permission was given, the old Muslim's joy knew no bounds. At the command of the Āchārya, he expounded the essential principles of Islam to the assembled audience. And, before taking leave he said that in the person of the Āchārya he found God Himself.

In 1921, there was the *Mahāmakham* festival in Kumbhakoṇam. The Āchārya who was touring in the neighbourhood went to Kumbhakoṇam on the festival day, but not to the Maṭha, for according to rule he could return to the Maṭha only after completing the *viṇaya-yātrā*. A number of Congress volunteers helped in the orderly conduct of the festival. There was a contingent of Khilafat volunteers also. They went to Paṭṭiśvaram to pay their respects to His Holiness. The Āchārya spoke in appreciative terms about their services and blessed them. One of the leading nationalists of the day, Subrahmaṇyaśiva, met the Āchārya at his Paṭṭiśvaram camp, and asked for his benediction for the liberation of the Motherland from foreign rule and for the spread of devotion to God among the people. The Āchārya readily gave his benediction and said that those laudable objectives would be fulfilled. It may be mentioned here that right from the year 1918 when the Khādi movement came into prominence, the Āchārya has been wearing Khādi.

During this tour of the Tañjāvūr District, the Āchārya was one day going from one village to another, when he saw about two hundred Harijans waiting for his *darśana*, after having bathed, putting on clean clothes and wearing *vibhūti* on their foreheads. The Āchārya spent sometime with them, made kind enquiries about their welfare, and gave them new clothes. Similar events have occurred very often during the Āchārya's journeys. His concern for the poor is great and unlimited, and he never fails to exhort the better-placed sections of society to go to their succour, and asks the Maṭha to set an example in this direction. The Āchārya visited Rāmeśvaram and collected a small quantity of sand for consigning it later on in the waters of the Gaṅgā, which act is symbolic of the spiritual unity of India.

After touring in the districts of Rāmanāthapuram, Madurai, and Tirunelvēli, the Āchārya went to Jambukeśvaram. This time it was for the *tātaṅka-pratishṭhā*. Mention has been made of the Āchārya's earlier visit to this sacred place in 1908, and of

the fact that the Image of Akhilāṇḍeśvarī bears the *tāṭaṅkas* consecrated by Ādi Śaṅkara. In those early times, according to legend, the Image was manifesting the Goddess's fierce aspect. Śaṅkara changed this state of affairs and enabled the benevolent aspect to express itself by adorning the Image with a pair of ear-ornaments (*tāṭaṅkas*) made in the shape of *Śrī-chakra*. When the ornaments fall into disrepair periodically, they are set right and re-fixed. This task is the sacred responsibility of the Kāmakoti Pīṭha; and it is the Head of the Pīṭha that has the ornaments re-fixed. In 1846, the then Āchārya of the Pīṭha had this ceremony performed. Now, again, in 1923, arrangements were made for the re-fixing of the *tāṭaṅkas*. Our Āchārya went to Jambukeśvaram for participation in this function. It was a great occasion for devotees to gather and pay their homage. Every detail of the ceremony was attended to with meticulous care. Opportunity was availed of for declaring open the renovated Maṭha of the Kāmakoti Pīṭha there. A Veda-pāṭhaśālā and centre for scriptural learning started functioning at the Maṭha. It is interesting to note that the late Sir M. Viśveśvarayya of Mysore said at a meeting in Tiruchi when he visited that town in 1923, that it was at the Kāmakoti Maṭha in Jambukeśvaram that he had his *upana-yanam* performed.

After the *tāṭaṅka-pratishṭhā* ceremony, the Āchārya resumed his journey. One of the places he immediately visited was Nerūr where the *Adhishṭhāna* of Sadāśiva-brahmendra is situated. Born in Tiruvisainallūr near Kumbhakoṇam, Sadāśiva-brahmendra soon became a *jīvanmukta*, roamed about on the banks of the *Kāverī* as an *avadhūta*, and showered his blessings on several people of his time. Śrī Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī was his *vidyā-guru*. Sadāśiva has written many Advaita works, and has also composed devotion-filled *kīrtanas*. Our Āchārya spent several hours each day in the *Adhishṭhāna* of Sadāśiva-brahmendra during the time he spent in Nerūr, quietly contemplating on the many benefits that had accrued as a result of Sadāśiva-brahmendra's exemplary life and precious teachings.

After Nerūr, the Āchārya was camping in the village Kuḷumaṇi near Tiruchi. One day, a prominent gentleman of Tiruchi, Sri F. G. Natesa Aiyar, who had himself lived twenty years of his life earlier as a convert to Christianity, brought along with him a young man from Kerala who had gone to Tiruchi with

the intention of getting himself converted to the Christian faith. The Āchārya engaged the young man in conversation on that day as well as on the subsequent few days. He explained to the youth the essentials of Hindu-dharma. It was all-comprehensive; the spiritual paths taught in the other religions were all to be found in Hinduism. It had its own additional advantages. There was no reason whatsoever for any one to leave Hinduism and embrace any other faith. The young man from Kerala was thoroughly convinced of the excellence of the faith he was born in; and he went back home revoking his earlier resolve.

The Āchārya's visit to different places in Cheṭṭināḍu and Pudukkōṭṭai State lasted about a year. During this period, many *paṇḍitas*, political workers, and nationalist leaders met the Āchārya and received his blessings. In 1925, Dr U. V. Swāminātha Aiyar, the world-renowned scholar in Tamil, was awarded the title 'Dākshinātya-kalānidhi'. In those days whenever he happened to be near the camp, he would witness the *pūjā* performed by the Āchārya. Recalling an earlier experience of his, he said once, "When I was eighteen years old, I met the Sixty-fifth Āchārya, Śrī Mahādevendra Sarasvatī and watched his unique *Śiva-pūjā*. It is the same experience I am now having again". During the Āchārya's Cheṭṭināḍu visit, a great *Śiva-bhakta*, Vaināgaram Rāmanāthan Cheṭṭiyār similarly enjoyed attending the *pūjā*, and meeting the Āchārya. The people of Cheṭṭināḍu organised a grand procession at Kaḍiyāpaṭṭi. During the procession the Āchārya looked out for Rāmanāthan Cheṭṭiyār, but he could not be seen. At the conclusion of the procession, the Āchārya enquired as to where Cheṭṭiyār was. Cheṭṭiyār who was standing at a distance in the crowd responded. Asked as to why he was not to be found in the procession, he replied with great elation that he had had the privilege that night of being one of the Āchārya's palanquin-bearers. Another eminent scholar who was honoured by the Āchārya during his sojourn in Cheṭṭināḍu was Śrī Paṇḍitamāṇi M. Kadireśan Cheṭṭiyār who was proficient in both Tamil and Samskrit. The Āchārya and Paṇḍitamāṇi exchanged views about the ancient classical Tamil texts as also about the measures that were needed for promoting the study of Tamil and Samskrit.

Among the politicians and nationalist leaders who met the Āchārya during this period were: Śrī C. R. Dās, along with

Sri S. Satyamurti and Sri A. Rangaswami Aiyangar, and Sri Jamnalal Bajaj along with Sri C. Rajagopalachari, and others. The latter group met the Āchārya in 1926 at Jambukeśvaram. Sri C. Rajagopalachari was staying out, sending in Śrī Jamnalal Bajaj. The Āchārya sent for Sri C. Rajagopalachari and asked him why he had not come in. When the latter replied that the reason was that he had not bathed that day, the Āchārya told him that those who were engaged in national work might not find the necessary time for daily bath, etc., and that Sri C. Rajagopalachari who had dedicated his life for the service of the nation could meet him at any time, and in any condition. The Āchārya made it clear to the politicians and political leaders that he, as a *sannyāsin*, would not identify himself with party politics of any brand; but he was free to ask them all to keep the good of the people always at heart and to work towards its achievement, and also to do all they could to strengthen faith in God.

An incident which occurred in 1926 deserves special mention. The Āchārya was proceeding to Paṭṭukkottai from Karambakkudi. Among the people who saw the Āchārya off at the latter place there were some Muslims also. One of the Muslims followed the party, touching the palanquin with his hands as a mark of respect. After about three miles of the journey, the Āchārya stopped, and called for the Muslim gentleman and made kind enquiries. The Muslim placed before the Āchārya some personal matters for his advice and guidance, and then offered some verses of praise he had composed along with flowers and fruit. At the command of the Āchārya, the Muslim read out those verses and explained their meaning also. When taking leave he expressed his joy in these words: "To my eyes the Āchārya appears as the embodiment of Allah Himself. The Āchārya's *darśana* is enough for a man who wants to get liberation from worldly bondage."

In July 1926, the Āchārya went to Uḍaiyārpālaiyam, a Zamindāri closely associated with the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha. When the transfer of the headquarters of the Maṭha from Kānchi to Kumbhakṣam was being made in the eighteenth century, the then chief of the Zamindārī had rendered all assistance to the Sixty-second Āchārya. Since that time the ruling family had been closely associated with Kānchi and Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha. Hence, it was a great occasion for Uḍaiyārpālaiyam when our Āchārya visited it in 1926. The Zamindar, his family, and the people ac-

corded to the Āchārya a magnificent reception, and valuable presents were made to the Maṭha to mark the occasion.

When the Āchārya was camping at Tiruppādirippuliyūr, an old lady who was a scholar in Tamil, and national worker came for his *darśana*. Achalāmbikai was her name. She had composed a narrative poem on the life of Mahātmā Gāndhi. She had known the Āchārya as a child in his *pūrvāśrama*; and had also studied under the Āchārya's father. Tears of joy streamed from her eyes when she now beheld the son of her teacher shine as the *Jagadguru*.

There is a place called Vaḍavāmbalam on the northern bank of South Pennār where a Pūrva Āchārya of the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha had his *samādhi*. At our Āchārya's wish the *samādhi* which had been obliterated was reconstructed, and arrangements were made for regular worship there.

At Pondicherry, the officials of the French Government and the people gave the Āchārya a royal welcome. During his stay there, the shocking news of the destruction of the famous temple-car at Tiruvārūr as a result of incendiarism arrived. The *āstikas* of the district of Tañjāvūr rose as one man and resolved to build a new car. The Āchārya blessed the effort; and through his blessing a new car equalling the old in magnificence was built in two years' time. One Eḷulūr Subbarāya Vādhyaṛ took a leading part in this laudable effort. Later on, he became a *sannyāsin* bearing the name 'Śrī Nārāyaṇa Brahmānanda'; even as a *sannyāsin* he did great service in renovating old temples and performing *kumbhābhishekams*.

In March 1927, the Āchārya went to Salem and toured in the district. At Erode, a Muslim gentleman offered a few verses in Samskrit which he had composed in praise of the Āchārya. The letters of the verses were written in small squares which together formed the figure of the Śiva-liṅga. In the presence of the Āchārya, the Muslim scholar read out the verses and explained their meaning. When the Āchārya asked him as to how he had mastered the language to such an extent as to be able to compose verses, he replied that his forbears were scholars in Samskrit, and that he himself had studied the language under his own father. The Āchārya complimented him on the proficiency he had attained in Samskrit and advised him to keep up his studies.

After visiting Coimbatore in April 1927, the Āchārya, arrived in Pālghāt in the first week of May. Kerala which had given birth to Ādi Śaṅkara was now jubilant at the visit of an illustrious successor in whose life and mission the greatness of the Ādi-Guru was luminously reflected. The Āchārya spoke to the śishyas in Malayālam. The people who listened to him mistook him for a Keraliya. It was during the Āchārya's Pālghāt visit that Śrī T. M. Krishnaswami Aiyar, a leading Advocate of Madras who later served as Chief Judge of Travancore, met the Guru with a party of devotees and conducted Tiruppugaḷ Bhajana. The Āchārya was greatly pleased with the devotion and the music, and blessed the leader by conferring on him the title 'Tiruppugaḷ-maṇi'.

In the latter half of 1927, Mahātmā Gāndhi was touring the South. He had heard about the Sage of Kāmakoti Pīṭha, and wanted very much to meet him. The meeting took place at Nallicheri in Pālghāt. They met in a cattle-shed in the Āchārya's camp. It was a unique experience for the Mahātmā. Here was an authentic successor of Ādi Śaṅkara, dressed in a piece of ochre cloth made of Khādi, and seated on the floor. The Āchārya too appreciated the occasion provided for getting to know at first hand the leader of the nation who had adopted voluntarily the mode of a simple peasant's life. The Āchārya conversed in Samskrit, and the Mahātmā in Hindi. The conversation took place in a most cordial atmosphere. On taking leave of the Āchārya, the Mahātmā gave expression to the immense benefit he had derived from this unique meeting. How profoundly he was drawn to the Āchārya will be evident from a small incident that occurred during the interview. It was 5-30 in the evening. Śrī C. Rajagopalachari went inside the cattle-shed and reminded the Mahātmā about his evening meal; for the Mahātmā would not take any food after 6 O'clock. The Mahātmā made this significant observation to Śrī C. Rajagopalachari: "The conversation I am having now with the Āchārya is itself my evening meal for to-day."

The Āchārya visited several places in Kerala, including Guruvāyūr, Tiruchūr, Ernākulam, Quilon, and Trivandrum. The States of Cochin and Travancore accorded to the Āchārya the highest veneration. At Allepy the Āchārya paid a visit to the Śrī Chandraśekharendra Pāṭhaśālā, and blessed the pupils of the school. At Cape Comorin, he worshipped at the Kanyā Kumārī temple after a bath in the confluence of the seas. After complet-

ing the Kerala tour, he proceeded northwards again. At Madurai, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru of Allahabad met the Āchārya and sought his blessings for the effort he was making to convene an All Parties' Conference, in order to impress on the British Government that it should not ignore the demands of the nationalist forces. The Āchārya told Sir Sapru that the urgent need in India was for achieving the good of the people through peaceful means, and that any effort in that direction had his good wishes.

In February 1929, the Āchārya began his tour of the South Arcot District. The *chāturmasya* that year was observed in Maṇalūrpeṭṭai. For about a month the Āchārya was having fever. In utter neglect of the state of his body, he performed the daily worship, taking his usual bath. In due course the fever left, relieving the devotees of their great anxiety.

During the present tour, the Āchārya was passing through Taṇḍalam village. A cowherd of that place wanted to sell his small holding and give the proceeds as his offering to the Āchārya. The Āchārya dissuaded him from doing so; but the devotee would not go back on his resolve. He actually sold his piece of land to a rich man of the place and made his heart-offering to the Āchārya. The Āchārya, however, did not like that the cowherd should become a destitute. He, therefore, arranged through the local Tahsildar for the allotment of sufficient piece of *puramboke* land to the cowherd.

In December 1929, the Āchārya went to Tiruvaṇṇāmalai for the *Dīpam* festival. Tiruvaṇṇāmalai is one of the most sacred places of pilgrimage. The holy hill Aruṇāchala is itself worshipped as a Śiva-liṅga. According to *Purāṇa* it was here that the Lord Śiva appeared as a column of light whose top and bottom Brahmā and Viṣṇu could not discover. And, it was here that Pārvatī acquired half of Śiva's body and as a consequence the Lord became Ardhanārīśvara. Saint Aruṇagirināthar had his vision of Subrahmaṇya here, and became the bard who sang the Tiruppugaḷ. The *samādhi* of Iḍaikkāṭṭu Siddhar is said to be within the precincts of the great temple of Aruṇāchaleśvara. In our own time Tiruvaṇṇāmalai became the hallowed residence of Śrī Ramaṇa Maharshi. Once a year on the full-moon day in the month of Krittikā, just at sun-down, a beacon is lit at the top of the sacred hill signifying that Śiva is worshipped at Tiruvaṇṇāmalai in the form of

light and fire. This is known as the *Dīpam* festival. Our Āchārya visited the sacred place during this festival in 1929, staying there for about a month, walking round the hill several times, and worshipping at the temple.

The next place of importance to be visited was Aḍaiyapalam near Āraṇi. It was here that the famous Appaya Dīkshita had lived about four centuries earlier. Dīkshita was a great Advaitin as well as an ardent Śaiva. He was a polymath who wrote several classical works. The Āchārya reminded the people of Aḍaiyapalam of the great service rendered by Dīkshita to Advaita and Śaivism, and asked them to observe the birth-anniversary of this eminent teacher and to arrange for popularising his works.

In December 1930, at Tirukkaḷukkunṛam (Pakshītīrtham), an address of welcome was presented to the Āchārya on behalf of the All-India Sādhu Mahāsaṅgham. The address referred in glowing terms to the invaluable service that the Āchārya was doing to Hindu *dharma* and society, both through precept and practice, following faithfully the grand tradition of Ādi Śaṅkara. In January 1931, the town of Chingleput had the privilege of receiving the Āchārya — the privilege to which the people of the town had been looking forward for a long time.

A notable event that took place during the Āchārya's sojourn in Chingleput was the visit of Mr Paul Brunton, a noted British writer, journalist, and spiritual seeker. Mr Brunton was on an extensive tour of India looking out for contacts with mystics, yogins, and spiritual leaders. It was the desire for *A Search in Secret India*³ that had brought him to this country from far off England. While in Madras, he met Śrī K. S. Venkataramani, the talented author in English of essays and novels on village life. It was Śrī Venkataramani that took Mr Brunton to Chingleput for an interview with the Āchārya. Through his personal representation to the Āchārya, he succeeded in securing for the English visitor an audience with the Āchārya. The beatific face and the glowing eyes of the Sage produced at once an experience of exaltation in the visiting aspirant. Mr Brunton looked at the Āchārya in silence, and was struck with what he saw. Referring to this

3. This is the title of a book he later on published, giving an account of his search (Rider & Company, London, 1934). Sir Francis Younghusband says in his Foreword. "Sacred India" would be as apt a title for this book.

memorable meeting, he wrote later in his book, "His noble face, pictured in grey and brown, takes an honoured place in the long portrait gallery of my memory. That elusive element which the French aptly term *spirituel* is present in his face. His expression is modest and mild, the large dark eyes being extraordinarily tranquil and beautiful. The nose is short, straight and classically regular. There is a rugged little beard on his chin, and the gravity of his mouth is most noticeable. Such a face might have belonged to one of the saints who graced the Christian Church during the Middle Ages, except that this one possesses the added quality of intellectuality. I suppose we of the practical West would say that he has the eyes of a dreamer. Somehow, I feel in an inexplicable way that there is something more than mere dreams behind those heavy lids."⁴

Mr Brunton put to the Āchārya questions about the world, the improvement of its political and economic conditions, disarmament, etc. In his own characteristic way, the Āchārya probed behind the questions and explained how the inward transformation of man was the pre-condition of a better world.

"If you scrap your battleships and let your cannons rust, that will not stop war. People will continue to fight, even if they have to use sticks!"

"Nothing but spiritual understanding between one nation and another, and between rich and poor, will produce goodwill and thus bring real peace and prosperity."

The Indian attitude towards life and the world, according to the critics, is one of pessimism. But that this view is utterly wrong is borne out by the answer which the Āchārya gave to one of Mr Brunton's questions.

Mr Brunton: "Is it your opinion, then, that men are becoming more degraded?"

The Āchārya: "No, I do not think so. There is an indwelling divine soul in man which, in the end, must bring him back to God. Do not blame people so much as the environments into which they are born. Their surroundings and circumstances force them to become worse than they really are. That is true of both the East and West. Society must be brought into tune with a higher note."

4. *A Search in Secret India*, p. 90.

Mr Brunton does not fail to make a note of the universalistic and catholic vision of the Āchārya. "I am quick to notice," he writes, "that Shri Shankara does not decry the West in order to exalt the East, as so many in his land do. He admits that each half of the globe possesses its own set of virtues and vices, and that in this way they are roughly equal! He hopes that a wiser generation will fuse the best points of Asiatic and European civilizations into a higher and balanced social scheme."

Adverting to the purpose for which he had come to India, Mr Brunton asked if the Āchārya would recommend anyone who could serve as his spiritual preceptor, or if the Āchārya himself would be his guide. "I am at the head of a public institution", said the Āchārya, "a man whose time no longer belongs to himself. My activities demand almost all my time. For years I have spent only three hours in sleep each night. How can I take personal pupils? You must find a master who devotes his time to them."

It was as directed by the Āchārya that Mr Brunton went to Tiruvannāmalai and found the Master he had been in quest of, in Śrī Ramaṇa Maharshi. Already a devotee of the Maharshi had told Mr Brunton in Madras about the Sage of Aruṇāchala. Mr Brunton was not keen then, because he thought that the Maharshi might turn out to be another Yogī like the ones he had met earlier in this country. But now, it was different. The Āchārya himself had asked him not to leave South India before he had met the Maharshi.

After the interview at Chingleput, Mr Brunton returned to his residence in Madras. That night he saw the Āchārya in a vision. There was a sudden awakening. The room was totally dark. He became conscious of some bright object. He immediately sat up and looked straight at it. This is what he writes:

"My astounded gaze meets the face and form of His Holiness Shri Shankara. It is clearly and unmistakably visible. He does not appear to be some ethereal ghost, but rather a solid human being. There is a mysterious luminosity around the figure which separates it from the surrounding darkness.

"Surely the vision is an impossible one? Have I not left him at Chingleput? I close my eyes tightly in an effort to test the matter. There is no difference and I still see him quite plainly!

"Let it suffice that I receive the sense of a benign and friendly presence. I open my eyes and regard the kindly figure in the loose yellow robe.

The face alters, for the lips smile and seem to say:

"Be humble and then you shall find what you seek!"

"The vision disappears as mysteriously as it has come. It leaves one feeling exalted, happy and unperturbed by its supernatural nature. Shall I dismiss it as a dream? What matters it?"⁵

From Chingleput, the Āchārya went to Kāñchī, the seat of the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha. This was his first visit after he had assumed the headship of the Pīṭha. The ceremonial entry into the holy city was made on Sunday the 25th of January, 1931. The city wore a festive appearance that day, the citizens offered to the Āchārya a reverential and enthusiastic welcome. Kāñchī is the city of temples par excellence. The temple of Śrī Kāmākshī occupies the central place. Ādi Śaṅkara installed the Śrī Chakra in this temple. In the inner *prākāra*, there is a shrine for Śaṅkara with a life-size image. Tradition has it that he ascended the *Sarvajña Pīṭha* and attained *siddhi* in Kāñchī. There are sculptured representations of Śaṅkara in many of the temples including those of Śrī Ekāmreśvara and Śrī Varadarāja. For several centuries past the management of the Kāmākshī temple was being carried on under the general supervision of the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha. In 1840 the Sixty-fourth Āchārya, Śrī Chandrasekharendra Sarasvatī, performed the *kumbhābhishekam*. The very next year, the British Government in India arranged for the taking over of the direct management of the Temple by the Maṭha itself. During our Āchārya's stay in Kāñchī in 1931, he made arrangements for the renovation of the temple and for the proper and regular conduct of the daily worship.

Leaving Kāñchī towards the end of April 1931, the Āchārya visited Uttiramērūr which is a place of historical importance as there are inscriptions there regarding the ancient democratic institutions. Another great place in Chingleput district to which the Āchārya went was Śrīperumbūdūr, the birth-place of Śrī Rāmānu-

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-96

jāchārya. In a discourse which he gave at the Śrī Adikesava Perumāl Temple, he explained the significance of the verse in Pushpadanta's *Śiva-mahimna-stotra* in which the various religious paths are compared to the different rivers joining the same ocean, and the differences in approach to God are attributed to the differences in taste.

The *chāturmāsya* in 1931 was in Chittoor. After that the tour was resumed. While the Āchārya was camping in Āraṇi, a party of about two hundred volunteers of the Indian National Congress wanted to have his *darśana*. Those were the peak days of the struggle for freedom. The British Government would come down upon anyone who showed any hospitality to the volunteers. Therefore, the officials of the Maṭha were hesitant in the matter of receiving the volunteers. When the Āchārya was informed of the intention of the volunteers, he immediately asked the officials to admit them and arrange for their hospitality. He made individual enquiries of the members of the party and gave to each one of them *vibhūti-prasāda*.

In March 1932, the Āchārya went to Kālahasti for the *Mahā-śiva-rātri*. During his stay there, he walked round the Kailāsa hill, a distance of about thirty miles along difficult forest paths. From Kālahasti, the Āchārya proceeded to Tirupati and Tirumalai; vast concourses of people listened to his daily discourses in chaste Telugu. Among other places in Chittoor District, the Āchārya visited Venkaṭagiri and Nagari. In Nagari, the Āchārya was presiding over a discussion on Vedānta among scholars, one day. The Manager of the Maṭha received a telegram from Kumbhakoṇam carrying the sad news of the passing away of the Āchārya's Mother on the 14th of June 1932. As the Manager was approaching the Āchārya with the telegram in his hand, the Āchārya enquired if it had come from Kumbhakoṇam, to which the Manager replied 'Yes'. The Āchārya made no further enquiry, but asked the Manager to get back. He remained silent for some time,⁶ and then asked the assembled scholars: "What should a *sannyāsin* do when he hears of the passing away of his mother?" Guessing what

6. The Āchārya's father, Śrī Subrahmanya Śāstrī passed away in Kumbhakonam on the 24th of July 1929. When the news was conveyed to the Āchārya he remained silent for some time, and said nothing.

had happened, the scholars were deeply distressed and could not say anything. The Āchārya got up and walked to a water-falls at a distance of two miles followed by a great number of people chanting the Lord's name. He took his bath, the others too did the same. The passing away of the Mother of the *Jagad-guru* was felt as a personal loss by everyone of the *śishyas*.

There is a spot of natural beauty near Nagari, called Buggā. In the same temple, here, there are the shrines of Kāśī Viśva-nātha and Prayāga Mādhava. A perennial river flows by the temple; and five streams feed the river. Commencing from the 17th of July 1932, the Āchārya observed the *chāturmāsya* at this fascinating place. During his stay there, the temple was renovated and *kumbhābhishhekam* was performed on a grand scale. A large number of devotees from Madras went to Buggā and invited the Āchārya to the Presidency City. *En route* to Madras the Āchārya visited Tiruttani and the famous Subrahmaṇya shrine there.

Before we follow the Āchārya to Madras, let us record here the epic of a faithful and devoted dog. Since 1927, a dog was following the retinue of the Maṭha. It was a strange dog — an intelligent animal without the least trace of uncleanness. It would keep watch over the camp during the nights. It would eat only the food given to it from the Maṭha. The Āchārya would therefore enquire every evening if the dog had been fed. When the camp moved from one place to another, the dog would follow, walking underneath the palanquin, and when the entourage stopped so that the devotees of the wayside villages could pay their homage, it would run to a distance and watch devoutly from there, only to rejoin the retinue when it was on the move again. One day, a small boy hit the dog; and the dog was about to retaliate, when the officials of the Maṭha, in fear, caused the dog to be taken to a distance of twentyfive miles blindfolded and left there in a village. But strange as it may seem, the dog returned to where the Āchārya was even before the person who had taken it away could return. From that day onwards the dog would not eat without the Āchārya's *darśana*, and stayed till the end of its life with the Maṭha.

The citizens of Madras had the great privilege of receiving the Āchārya on the 28th of September, 1932. During the four

months' stay of the Āchārya in the city, the people felt in their life a visible change for the better. In their crowds they flocked to the camp at the Madras Samskrit College and later in the different parts of the city, and drank deep of the elevating presence and the soul-moving speeches of the Āchārya. On the first night, there was a huge and colourful procession terminating at the Samskrit College. Seated in a decorated palanquin, the Āchārya showered his blessings on the people. Śrī K. Bālasubrahmanya Aiyar and other devotees had made all arrangements for the Āchārya's stay at the Samskrit College, founded by Śrī Bālasubrahmanya Aiyar's revered father, Justice Śrī V. Krishnaswami Aiyar. A discourse-hall for studying the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on the Vijayadaśami day was built, for which the Āchārya himself gave the name, Bhāshya-vijaya-maṇṭapa.

The Corporation of Madras wanted very much to present the Āchārya with an address of welcome. Śrī T. S. Ramaswami Aiyar was then the Mayor. Moving the resolution to present an address, Śrī A. Ramaswami Mudaliyār referred to the fact that that was the first occasion when the Corporation would be presenting an Address to a religious leader, paid his tribute to the Āchārya, saying that he was held in great esteem not only by the Hindus but also by the followers of other religions, and hoped that the resolution would be passed unanimously. The resolution was passed with acclaim by the entire House. But when the invitation was conveyed to the Āchārya, he politely declined as it would not be proper for him to associate himself directly with a secular function at the Corporation Buildings.

The *navarātrī* in 1932 was celebrated at the Samskrit College. During this *pūjā*-festival, the Āchārya fasts and observes silence on all the nine days. Women are honoured with offerings of gifts, as they are manifestations of Parā Śakti (the Great Mother of the World). And, ceremonial *pūjā* is performed to girls, commencing with a two-year old on the first day and ending with a ten-year old on the last day. This is what is known as *kanvā-pūjā*. Along with recitation of the *Vedas*, *pārāyaṇam* of the *Devī-bhāṣya-vata*, the *Rāmāyana*, the *Gītā* and other texts, the *Chandī* and Śrī-Vidyā homas are performed during the festival. Thousands of people participated in the *navarātrī* festival at the Samskrit College and received the Āchārya's benedictions.

After the *navarātrī*, the Āchārya delivered discourses every evening after the *pūjā*. Thousands of people listened to these in pin-drop silence. Seated on the *śimhāsana*, the Āchārya would remain silent for some time. Then, slowly he would commence to speak. It was not mere speech; it was a message from the heart, each day. With homely examples, in an engaging manner, he would exhort the audience to lead a clean, simple, unselfish and godly life. The essentials of Hindu *dharma*, the obligatory duties, the supreme duty of being devoted to God, the harmony of the Hindu cults, the significance of the Hindu festivals and institutions, the cultivation of virtues, and the grandeur of Advaita, formed some of the themes of these discourses.⁷ Those who were not able to listen to these speeches had the benefit of reading reports of them every day in "The Hindu" and "The Swadesamitran." The Āchārya's teachings enabled the listeners and readers to gain the experience of inward elevation.

During his stay in the city, the Āchārya visited some of the educational institutions such as the Ramakrishna Mission Students' Home, the P. S., Hindu, and Theological High Schools. He advised both teachers and students to be devoted to the sacred task of educating and learning respectively. Before leaving the city, he blessed some of the eminent scholars and devoted leaders by the award of titles: Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppuswami Sastri received the title *Darśana-Kalānidhi*, Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Aiyar, *Dharma-rakshāmaṇi*, and Sri A. Krishnaswami Aiyar, *Paropakāra-chintāmaṇi*.

Tiruvorriyūr near Madras, is a most sacred place. It has been for centuries the favoured resort of *mahātmās*. The temple of Tvāgeśa and Tripurasundarī is an ancient one. Ādi Śaṅkara installed the *Śrī-chakra* in this temple. Even to this day the *archakas* that officiate at the shrine of Tripurasundarī are Nambūdiris. There is an image of Śaṅkara in the inner *prākāra* of the temple. Several of the heads of the Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha chose to live at least for some time at Tiruvorriyūr. In the Śaṅkara Matha there, the *adhiṣṭhānas* of two Āchāryas of the Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha

7. These have been published in three parts: 1. *Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya Svāmīgal Aruliya Nan-moliḡal*; 2. *Śrī Śaṅkara Vijayam*; 3. *Śrī Jagadguruvīn Upadeśaṅgal* (Sri Kamakōṭi Kōśasthānam, Madras).

are to be seen. Our Āchārya visited Tiruvorriyūr and made the holy place holier.

Leaving Madras, the Āchārya went to the South again in order to participate in the *Mahāmakham* festival at Kumbhakonam in March 1933. Since the *viṣayā-yātrā* was still in progress, he did not enter the Maṭha at Kumbhakonam; the camp was set up in Tiruvidaimarudūr. From there, he went to Kumbhakonam on the festival day and took the ceremonial bath in the Tank. About six lakhs of people thronged to Kumbhakonam that day to participate in the festival that comes once in twelve years. After the *Mahāmakham* the Āchārya continued to stay for some months at the Śaṅkara Maṭha in Tiruvidaimarudūr. According to tradition, when Ādi Śaṅkara visited this holy place and had *darśana* of Śrī Mahāliṅga-svāmī in the temple, there appeared Śiva's form from the Liṅga, raised the right hand, declared three times that "Advaita alone is the truth", and disappeared. In 1933, our Āchārya celebrated the Śaṅkara Jayantī at Tiruvidaimarudūr.

For a long time the Āchārya had had the intention of visiting Chidambaram. But, for over two hundred years no previous Āchārya had gone there, the reason being that the Dīkshitaras of the Temple of Śrī Naṭarāja would not let even the Āchāryas of the Śaṅkara Maṭha take the sacred ashes straight from the cup as was the custom in all other temples as a mark of respect shown to the Pīṭha. Many of the devotees of Chidambaram, however, wished very much that the Āchārya should visit Chidambaram; and the Āchārya too wanted to have Śrī Naṭarāja's *darśana*. Accepting the invitation of the devotees, he arrived at Chidambaram on May 18, 1933. A great reception was accorded to him by the inhabitants of Chidambaram including the Dīkshitaras. The devotees of the Āchārya were rather apprehensive of what might happen when the Āchārya visited the temple in regard to the offering of *vibhūti*. The Āchārya, however, was utterly unconcerned. All that he wanted was to have Śrī Naṭarāja's *darśana* as early as possible. He resolved to go to the temple early in the morning: having asked one of his personal attendants to wait for him at the tank, he went there alone at 4 a.m., had his bath and *anusthāna*, and when the shrine was opened he entered and

stood in the presence of Śrī Naṭarāja absorbed in contemplation. The Dīkshitar who was offering the morning worship was taken aback when he saw the Āchārya there. He sent word to the other Dīkshitar; and all of them came at once. They submitted to the Āchārya that they were planning for a ceremonial reception, and that they were pained at the fact that none of them were present in the temple to receive him that morning. The Āchārya consoled them saying that he had gone to the temple to have the early morning *darśana* of Śrī Naṭarāja, known as the *viśva-rūpa-darśana*, and that he would be visiting the temple several times during his sojourn in Chidambaram. The Dīkshitar honoured the Āchārya in the same manner as he is honoured in the other temples. And, at the earnest request of the Dīkshitar, the Āchārya stayed in the temple for a few days and performed the Śrī Chandramaulīśvara-pūjā in the thousand-pillared Maṇṭapa. The devotees had the unique experience of witnessing pūjā performed, at the same place, to two of the five *Sphaṭika-līngas* brought by Śaṅkara, according to tradition, from Kailāsa—the *Moksha-Līnga* of Chidambaram and the *Yoga-Līnga* of Śrī Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha.

The 1933 *chātur māsyā* and *navrātri* were observed at Tañjāvūr. A Śaṅkara Maṭha was established there mainly through the munificence of the Tañjāvūr Junior Prince Pratapa Simha Raja and Śrī T. R. Joshi. The preparation for the Āchārya's northward journey to Kāśī had by now been completed. A number of years earlier the Āchārya had commissioned a youth Śrī Anantakrishna Śarmā to go to Kāśī on foot. He had to walk the entire distance and send notes regarding the route and places *en route*. He should learn Hindi before he returned and could do the return journey by rail. Śrī Anantakrishna Śarmā carried out the instructions in the letter and in spirit. It took six months for him to reach Kāśī. Aged *sannyāsins* like Brahmānanda Sarasvatī and revered scholars including Mahāmahopādhyāya Ananda Saran and Pratap Sītaram Sastri, Agent of the Sringeri Maṭha, sent their letter of invitation to the Āchārya of the Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha on behalf of the citizens of Vārāṇasī; Mahāmahopādhyāya Chinna-naswami Sāstrī, Professor of Mīmāṃsā in the Banaras Hindu University, read out the letter of invitation in the Chidambaram camp of His Holiness.

श्री श्री १००८ श्रीमद्विः श्रीकाञ्चीकोटिपीठमन्त्रद्वयः श्रीजग-
द्गुरु श्रीमत्परमहंस परिब्राजक श्रीमच्छङ्करपादाचार्यः श्रीमच्चन्द्रशेखरेन्द्र
सुरस्वतीसंयोगेन्द्र श्रीपौर्णरेचिरेण मद्र (मद्रास) नगरात्पद्गामेव श्री-
वाराणसीक्षेत्रमाजिगमिषादिः स्वैषां मार्गसौकर्योद्विजमवन्नेक्यप्र-
तिनिवारितुमाज्ञाप्ताः श्रीमन्तः स्वामिनाथायास्तेषामाज्ञांशिरसि कृत्वा
काशीं प्राप्य श्रीमच्चन्द्रमौलीश्वरप्रसाददत्तेनात्रत्यानस्मान्त्वगृ-
ह्णन् । श्रीमच्चन्द्रमौलीश्वरप्रसाददत्तेन श्रीमद्व्याचरणानुग्रह-
प्राप्या चातीव कृतार्थोद्विजमन्मानन्दमनुभवामः । परितुष्टमानसा-
श्च श्रीमद्व्याचरणान् प्राप्यामहे श्रीचरणदर्शनदृष्टितानस्मा-
न्त्र काश्यामचिरादेव दर्शनदानेनानुगृहीतम् ।

एतेषामाचार्यैर्दुर्गैकप्रयोजनानां श्रीस्वामिनाथायां
मार्गं सर्वमचलोक्य पद्गामेव मद्रनगरं यावज्जिगमिषतां मध्येमा-
र्गं तत्तद्वामनगरादिषु यथावत्सौकर्येत्तद्गम्य रोगतापूर्वं गन्तव्येदरा-
मिहच भूषणदीप्तिं भगवन्तं विश्वानि यन्तारमध्यर्चयामहे ॥

- | | |
|--|----------------------------|
| (1) स्वा स्वस्वामिन्द वरप्रवर हृदयवाक्यक | (11) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (2) चिन्तनस्य मित्रास्वी श्रीमांसास्त्रिषी | (12) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (3) पूर्वमीमांसाप्रधानाध्यायकः | (13) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (4) तालवोधमिश्रः | (14) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (5) ग. तं ब्रह्मविद्यालयाध्यापकः | (15) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (6) श्री श्री आनन्दः | (16) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (7) प्रभुसाद भट्टाचार्यः | (17) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (8) नारायणसेवक कान्ति कर्मा | (18) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (9) मार्तण्डशर्मा बौद्धिक ज्ञाने पा | (19) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (10) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (20) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (11) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (21) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (12) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (22) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (13) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (23) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (14) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (24) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (15) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (25) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (16) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (26) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (17) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (27) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (18) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (28) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (19) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (29) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |
| (20) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ | (30) श्री श्री शंकर त्त १८ |

- (१) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (२) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (३) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (४) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (५) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (६) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (७) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (८) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (९) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर
 (१०) श्री गुरुदेव की आज्ञा पर

श्रीशंकरभट्टाचार्य
श्रीशंकरभट्टाचार्य

[illegible]

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॥ श्रीकृष्णाय नमः ॥
विष्णोर्नाम सप्तशती प्रथमा ॥

अमरीष श्रीमरकतमिष श्रीमिषाणं समीपम् ॥ १३ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ राख्ये श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥
 महाशिवरात्रौ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

४८- काशी देवी घर, कुल्लुवा, काशी ॥

महाराष्ट्र शासन, पुणे, अर्थ विभाग, न्याय

पु. पञ्चाला उपाध्याय प्रोहित सकरके



100

A representative Committee had been formed at Vārāṇasī headed by His Highness the Mahārājā of Kāśī, with Pandit Madan-mohan Malaviya, the Mahāmahopādhyāyas, distinguished Scholars, and other eminent men as members. The citizens of the Spiritual Capital of our country were eagerly looking forward to the visit of our Āchārya, who had already made the *saṅkalpa* for *kāṣṭh-yātrā*.

In conformity with the past practice observed by the previous Government, the Government of Madras issued a notification to the Governments of other States, and the native States to accord due honour and all facilities to the Āchārya and his entourage during his journey to Kāśī.

The journey commenced in the second week of September 1933. The Āchārya proceeded northwards, covering about twenty miles each day. While camping at Kurnool, the Āchārya thought of going to Śrī-śaila which is regarded as the Southern Kailāsa. Here, the Lord Śiva appears as Mallikārijuna-līṅga, and Pārvatī as Bhramarāmbikā. The Līṅga is one of the twelve *Jyotir-Līṅgas* in the country. The holy place is counted among the eighteen Śakti-pīṭhas. The *sthala-vriksha* is the Arjuna tree. (The two other sacred places which have the Arjuna as the *sthala-vriksha* are Tiruviḍaimarudūr, also known as Madhyārjuna in Tañjāvūr District, and Tiruppuḍaimarudūr, also called Puṭārjuna in Tirunelveli District). The *tīrtha* at Śrī-śaila is Pātāla-gaṅgā (the counterpart of Ākāśa-gaṅgā at Tirumalai). Ādi Śaṅkara has sung the praise of Śrī Mallikārijuna in his *Śivānanda-laharī*. Our Āchārya delights in reciting these verses—especially the 50th verse: ‘I adore Mallikārijuna, the great Līṅga at Śrī-śaila (the Arjuna tree entwined by jasmine creepers on the beautiful mountain) who is embraced by Pārvatī (which is auspicious), who dances wonderfully at dusk (which blooms profusely in the evening), who is established through Vedānta (whose flowers are placed on one’s ears and head), who is pleasing with the loving Bhramarāmbikā by His side (which is grand with eager honeybees humming around), who shines in the repeated contemplations of pious people (which always wafts good scent), who wears serpents as ornaments (which embellishes those who seek enjoyment), who is worshipped by all the gods (which is the best

of flower-trees), and who expresses virtue (and which is well-known for its high quality)".⁸

Taking with him only a few attendants, the Āchārya went by boat upto Peddacheruvu, and from there walked the remaining distance of eleven miles uphill. He reached Śrī-śaila on the 29th of January 1934, went to the temple, and stood before the Deities for a long time reciting verses from the *Śivānandalaharī* and the *Saundarya-laharī*. After spending a few days at Śrī-śaila, the Āchārya returned to Kurnool. During the difficult Śrī-śaila journey through dense forests, the Chenchus, members of a wild hill-tribe, gave every assistance and protection to the visiting party. They considered the Āchārya's presence in their midst a great blessing.

Crossing the Tuṅgabhadra at Kurnool, the Āchārya entered the Hyderabad State. He reached the Capital of the State on the 12th of February 1934. The people and the State officials including the Chief Minister vied with one another in paying their homage to the *Jagadguru*. At the command of the Nizam, the State Government undertook to meet one day's expenses of the Maṭha. Every facility was provided for the conduct of the daily *pūjā*, etc. During the Āchārya's stay in Hyderabad a Sanātana-dharmasabhā was held; it was attended by many prominent scholars. In his inaugural address to the Sabhā, the Āchārya emphasized the need for safeguarding the *Dharma*, reminded the Hindus of their duty to follow the rules of conduct, and asked the people to hold the *panditas* in high esteem.

As the journey from Hyderabad northwards would be a difficult one—through wild forests and uninhabited areas—a large part of the entourage consisting of carts, cattle, attendants and others, was left behind; this part rejoined the group that accompanied the Āchārya, after four years, in Andhra Pradesh. Leaving Secunderabad on the 24th of April 1934, the Āchārya reached a place called Sonpā on the banks of the Godāvarī on the 5th of May, and had his bath in the sacred river.

8. There is a pun on the words of this verse. The description may be taken as applying to both the great Liṅga and the Arjuna tree.

What was then known as the Central Provinces was the part of India which lay next in the Āchārya's itinerary. In May that year, Śrī Śaṅkara Jayantī was celebrated at Bendelvādā on the banks of a tributary of the Godāvari. After spending a few days at Nagpur in June, the Āchārya travelled through the country of the Vindhya mountains. It was an arduous journey in burning summer, through practically waterless tracts. The members of the party braved all difficulties with cheer, their sole aim being to serve the Master in the fulfilment of the resolve to complete the pilgrimage to Kāśī. After crossing the Vindhyas, the Āchārya reached Jabalpur on the 3rd of July 1934, and had his bath in the sacred river Narmadā. Journeying quickly thereafter, the Āchārya arrived at Prayāga (Allahabad) on the 23rd of July 1934. At the outskirts of the holy city, the prominent leaders of the place headed by Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgānātha Jhā received the Āchārya with due ceremony. Thousands of people lined the route of the procession, uttering the words "Victory to the great Guru!" (Gurumahārāj-ji-ki Jai!).

On the 25th of July 1934, the Āchārya immersed the sacred sand he had brought from Rāmeśvaram in the holy waters at Prayāga, the place of *Trivenī-saṅgama*, the confluence of the Gaṅgā, the Yamunā, and the subterranean Sarasvatī; and gathering the holy water in vessels, he had it sent to the places of pilgrimage in South India. By these significant ceremonial acts, the Āchārya made it known to our people how custom and tradition are expressive of the spiritual, as well as geographical, unity of India. On the 26th of July, the Āchārya commenced the *chātur-māsya* at Prayāga. For the *Vyāsa-pūjā* that day, many devotees assembled there from the different parts of the country. During this *chātur-māsya* period, a conference of scholars was held in the immediate presence of the Āchārya. Several *paṇḍitas* of North India participated in the deliberations of the Conference, and received the Āchārya's blessings.

From Prayāga (Allahabad) to Kāśī—a distance of eighty miles—the Āchārya travelled by foot. He entered the most holy city of Kāśī on the 6th of October 1934, and was received by the citizens in their thousands, headed by the Mahārājā of Kāśī, Pandit Madanmohan Malaviya, and others. About a lakh of people participated in the procession that day, many of them uttering the full-

throated cries of victory, "Jagadguru-Mahārāj-jī-ki Jai!" Unprecedented crowds—a record in the history of the city—gathered to greet the visiting Āchārya. A glowing account of Kāśī's reception to the Āchārya was published in the Hindi newspaper "Pandit" dated the 8th of October 1934. Among other things, it said that the joy of the people knew no bounds when they beheld the beaming face of the great ascetic, and that the procession and the mammoth meeting were unprecedented in magnificence and splendour in the history of the holy city within memory.

Kāśī, the city of the Lord Viśvanātha and Śrī Viśālākshī, is considered to be one of the seven *moksha-puris*. The holy Gaṅgā flows here in a northward direction, and in the form of a crescent. The city is the resort of saints and scholars. Kāśī is also known as Vāraṇasī, because it lies between two tributary rivers Vāraṇa and Asī. It was in this city near the Maṇikarnikā Ghaṭṭa that Ādi Śaṅkara wrote his commentaries. It was Kāśī that proclaimed him as the Jagad-guru. It was from there that he started on his *dig-vijaya*. And so, our Āchārya's visit to Kāśī was full of supreme significance. On the very day of his arrival there, the Āchārya had *darśana* of the Lord Viśvanātha and Śrī Annapūrṇā. On the 7th of October, after a bath in the Gaṅgā at the Maṇikarnikā Ghaṭṭa, he performed the Chandramaulīśvara-pūjā in the Lord's temple itself. From the 9th of October onwards, the *navarātri* festival was celebrated. On the Vijaya-daśmī day, the Āchārya visited the Dakṣiṇāmūrtī Maṭha on the other bank of the Gaṅgā. On the 9th of February 1935, in response to Pandit Madanmohan Malaviya's request the Āchārya paid a visit to the Hindu University. In his welcome address consisting of five verses in Samskrit, Pandit Malaviya referred to the fact that the Āchārya was adorning the Kāñchī-pīṭha established by Śrī Śaṅkara, and that his fame and grace born of his great wisdom, austerity, compassion, generosity, etc., had spread far and wide in this sacred land, and requested His Holiness to bless the assembled University community by his words of advice. Addressing the teachers and students in felicitous Samskrit, the Āchārya pointed out that the end of education is to gain peace of mind, and that it is by acquiring wisdom that one realizes immortality. Commending the laudable efforts of Pandit Malaviya in founding the Hindu University, the Āchārya said that the main objective

of *āstika* education should always be kept in view in planning the details regarding the courses of study, etc., and expressed the wish that the University should train and send out leaders of thought and action who would set an example in ideal living for the masses of the people to follow. In his concluding speech, Pandit Malaviya said that while from the legends regarding Ādi Śaṅkara they knew that the great Master visited Kāśī and saved the world through his wondrous works, they now had the rare experience of seeing with their own eyes in Kāśī the Āchārya who was an *avatāra* of Ādi Śaṅkara.

The Citizens of Kāśī organized a meeting in the Town Hall on the 9th of March 1935, to offer their reverential homage to the Āchārya. Addresses in different languages were presented to the Āchārya and several scholars spoke hailing his visit to Kāśī. The Āchārya said in his speech that he had undertaken the journey, following in the foot-steps of Ādi Śaṅkara, that he was pleased with the boundless enthusiasm of the people, and that his prayers to the Lord Viśvanātha, Śrī Viśālākshī, and Śrī Annapūrnā were that Their grace should make the entire world march on the road to goodness.

A conference of the eminent Paṇḍitas and Daṇḍi Sannyāsins of Kāśī was held on the 9th of March 1935. A similar conference of the Paṇḍitas of Bengal led by the grand old Mahāmahopādhyāya Kamalanayan Tarkaratna was held at Calcutta. Over one hundred and thirty scholars met. The conference sent as its representative Śrī Mahāmahopādhyāya Durgasaran to Vārāṇasī to invite His Holiness to visit Calcutta, and to convey its considered view acclaiming the high status and the greatness of the Kāmakoṭī Pīṭha at Kānchi.

Leaving Kāśī on the 18th of March 1935, the Āchārya reached Patna (Pāṭalīputra) on the 24th of April. The English Daily of the place, "The Search-light", wrote in its issue dated the 28th of April: "Bihar accords a cordial and respectful welcome to Jagadguru Swami Sankaracharya of Kamakotipitam. Heir to a great and honoured tradition, Swamiji Maharaj is an object of veneration to Hindus all over India and his presence in our midst is a rare privilege We have no doubt Swamiji's message will leave an abiding impression on all who receive it, for what he has to say is the result of study and Tapas". The Āchārya blessed

the people of Patna by observing the Śaṅkara Jayantī there; the citizens participated in the *pūjā*, meetings, etc., wholeheartedly.

The next important place of visit was Gayā. Arriving there on the 20th of May 1935, the Āchārya bathed in the Phalguni River, and had *darśana* of the Viṣṇu-pāda. On the 25th of May, he went to Buddha Gayā and saw the Bodhi Tree and the Temple of the Buddha and also the tiny Śivaliṅga in a low flooring in front of the large idol of the Buddha, said to have been consecrated by Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. A great place of pilgrimage in Bihar is Deogarh (Vaidyanātha Kshetra). On June 21st, the Āchārya visited Deogarh, went to the Temple and stood for a long time in meditation before the *Svayambhu-Liṅga* and Śrī Girijā-devī.

After brief halts *en route*, the Āchārya reached Calcutta on the 13th of July 1935. The premier city accorded to him a rousing welcome. The Āchārya observed the *chāturmasya* from the 17th of July at Kali Ghat. In an Address presented on behalf of the Committee of the Kali Temple, Darśanasāgar Śrī Gurupāda Śarmā said that after founding the Maṭhas in the various parts of our country, Ādi Śaṅkara established a Maṭha at Kāñchī, that the present Śaṅkarāchārya whom they had the honour to receive was on a peripatetic tour of India following in the footsteps of Ādi Śaṅkara, and that through the grace of Śrī Parameśvara and Mahā Kālī the tour should be completed victoriously after planting firmly in the land righteousness and piety. In his reply, the Āchārya stated that he accepted the reverence shown as a representative of Ādi Śaṅkara, and blessed all the assembled people. On behalf of the Brāhmaṇa-sabhā of Bengal, an address of welcome in Samskrit was presented on the 23rd of September. The address, which was read out by the eminent scholar Paṇḍita Pañchānana Tarka-ratna, paid a glowing tribute to the Āchārya who by his grace was leading the people on the path of righteousness, referred to the sanctifying effect of the gracious visit to Calcutta, pointed out the significance of the title "Indra Sarasvatī" which belongs to the Āchāryas of the Kamakoṭi Pīṭha, and praised the manner in which His Holiness was performing the *viṣaya-yātrā*, following the example of Ādi Śaṅkara.

Navarātrī or *Daśarā* (called *Pūjā* in Bengal) is the most important festival for the Bengalis. The Āchārya performed the

navarātrī pūjā in September-October at Calcutta, delighting the hearts of thousands of devotees there.¹ In the third week of October, the All-India tour was resumed. A steamer took the Āchārya and the entourage on the rivers, Dāmodar and Rūpnārāyan which are tributaries to Ādigangā. The Āchārya reached Midnapore in response to the earnest request of the people of that place on the 27th of October 1935. Midnapore at the time was the spearhead of the revolutionary nationalist movement. Many young men—especially college students—were behind prison-bars as detenus. And the town was under curfew restrictions. The authorities, however, relaxed some of the restrictions to enable the people to receive the Āchārya and participate in the religious functions connected with the unique visit. Coming to know of the Āchārya's presence in Midnapore, many of the detenus desired to meet him. They obtained permission from the British officer in charge of the prison for this purpose; but the condition imposed was that they should return to the prison before 6 p.m., that day. When the detenus reached the Āchārya's camp late in the evening, the Āchārya had just then retired for brief rest after the day's *pūjā*. After waiting for some time, the young men started going back to the prison, disappointed. Meanwhile, the Āchārya came out and on learning about what had happened, sent for the detenus. They came again, prostrated before the Āchārya, and prayed to him for his blessings for the gaining of independence for the country and for the welfare and happiness of the people.

Kharagpur, where the well-known Railway Workshops are situated, and Tatanagar, the Iron and Steel-town, were the places which the Āchārya visited, after leaving Midnapore. Then followed the tour of the Native States in Bihar. While in Keonjar Garh, the Āchārya visited the temple dedicated to Dharanī Devī. The Image of the Goddess, according to the records of the State, was brought from Kānchī by one Govind Bhanj Deva. In Mayurbhanj State, the Āchārya had *darśana* of the Mahā-Liṅga in the Vāraṇesvara Temple at the State Capital, Bāripadā (Mayurbhanj State). In Rāj Nilgiri State, at a place called Sujanāgaḍ, there is a temple of Śrī Chaṇḍī Devī, where the *vāhana* is the boar instead of the usual lion. The Āchārya visited the temple, and halted in that place for four days.

Entering the Cuttack District of Orissa, the Āchārya arrived at Jājpūr on the 4th of April 1936. Jājpūr is famous for its

antiquity and sanctity. The place is referred to in the *Mahābhārata* as *Virājapīṭha*, one of the eighteen *Śakti-pīṭhas*. The river Vaitaraṇī flows in a north-ward direction here. There are twelve main temples and many smaller ones—each exemplifying in a marvellous manner the ancient skill in architecture. Because there resided at this place over one hundred Somayājins, about two centuries ago, it came to be called Jājpūr (Yājipuram). The Āchārya spent five days in this historic town, and then proceeded to Cuttack the District headquarters. That year's Śaṅkara-Jayantī was celebrated there. On the 3rd of May 1936, the Āchārya visited Sākshī-Gopāl, about which there is a legend current in Orissa. Two Brāhmaṇa pilgrims went to Kāśī from Kāñchī; one of them was old and the other young. The old one promised to give his daughter in marriage to the young man on their return to Kāñchī; this promise was made in Mathurā at the shrine of Gopāla. The old man, however, did not keep his promise. The youth lodged a complaint with the king. Asked if there was any witness, he said that Gopāla was his witness, and went to Mathurā and brought the Lord with him. The stipulation was that the young man should not look back, as Gopāla was following him. On the outskirts of Kāñchī, the young man violated the stipulation. Gopāla transformed himself into an image at the very place. Later, the image was brought from there to Sākshī-Gopāl by a king of Purī.

After visiting Sākshī-Gopāl, the Āchārya proceeded to Purī Jagannāth. At the end of a grand procession, a ceremonial reception was given to him at the Govardhana Maṭha. The other Advaita Maṭhas of Purī, viz, Śaṅkarānanda Maṭha, Śivatīrtha Maṭha, and Gopālatīrtha Maṭha, also associated themselves with this function, and co-operated in the arrangements connected with the Āchārya's visit. The Āchārya visited the temple of Jagannātha, and at the request of the scholars of the Mukti-maṇṭapa Sabhā, sat on the Pīṭha in the Maṇṭapa and blessed the assembly. In a speech delivered in Samskrit, the Āchārya said that he regarded the honour shown to him as belonging to Ādi Śaṅkara whose holy Feet are worshipped by all, and who made the false doctrines disappear from the land by establishing the supreme Truth. On the 6th of May 1936, the Āchārya bathed in the Mahodadhi (the Eastern Sea) at Purī; it was the auspicious Pūrṇimā day. On the 9th, he inaugurated a Paṇḍita-

sabhā; several elderly speakers recalled the visit of the Sixty-fifth Āchārya of Kāmakoti Pīṭha, Śrī Mahadevendra Sarasvatī, fifty years earlier, and said that they were having the unique privilege, again, of receiving in their midst the Sixty-eighth Āchārya.

The journey through the Chilka Lake area was an arduous one. High mountains, thick forests and sandy wastes had to be crossed. Walking at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, the Āchārya with the tour-party arrived at Chatrapūr on the 17th of May 1936; at this place which is on the sea-coast at the southern end of the Lake, there is a temple of Ādī Śaṅkara. The *cātur-māsya* which commenced on the 4th of July was observed at Berhampur. The *navarātri* festival was celebrated in October at Vijayanagaram. At a largely attended meeting on the 31st of October, the Āchārya spoke on Advaita, explaining that there was no difference between Hari and Hara, that saints like Samartha Rāmadās gained *mukti* by following the path of *Hari-Hara-Advaita*, that those who adopt the path of knowledge attain *Jīva-Brahma-Advaita*, and that the goal is the same for both *upāsana* and *jñāna*.

Simhāchalam is an ancient pilgrim centre in Andhra. On a picturesque hill is situated the ancient temple of Śrī Varāha Nṛisimha. On the 4th of November 1936, the Āchārya visited this shrine, and spent some time in meditation near the *Gaṅgadhārā Falls*. Three days later, the Āchārya reached Viśākhapatnam, the harbour-town. After touring in the District of Vizag, he journeyed through the Godāvarī area. The *chātur-māsya* in 1937 was observed in Palacole. The next important place of halt was Rajahmundry, on the banks of the Godāvarī. On the auspicious *Mahodaya* day on the 31st of January 1938, the Āchārya bathed in the sea at Kākināḍā.

The Andhra districts to receive the Āchārya next in sequence were Krishna, Guntur, and Nellore. At Vijayavāda, the Āchārya had his bath in the Krishna River. The 1938 *chātur-māsya* was observed in Guntur. During this period, the well-known Vyākaraṇa Paṇḍita Śrī Pulyam Umāmaheśvara Śāstrī offered to the Āchārya a poetical composition in Samskrit, consisting of one hundred and seventy verses. From November 1938 to January 1939, the Āchārya was in Nellore. After visiting Venkaṭagiri, he went to Kālahasti and Tirupati again. In April 1939, Śrī Śaṅkara-

Jayantī was celebrated at Buggā. After having Śrī Subrahmaṇya's *darśana* on the Tiruttani hill, the Āchārya reached Kāñchī on the 2nd of May 1939.

From Kāñchī, the Āchārya proceeded to Chidambaram *en route* to Rāmeśvaram. The sand collected at Rāmeśvaram in September 1922, it will be recalled, was immersed in the holy waters at Trivenī-Saṅgama (Allahabad) on the 25th of July 1934. The sacred water of the Gaṅgā that was gathered there was now to be offered to Śrī Rāmanātha as *abhisheka*. On the 10th of June 1939, after bathing in the Agni-tīrtha, the Āchārya went to the temple, and the *abhisheka* was performed. With this was concluded the Āchārya's Gaṅgā-yātrā. From the next day onwards, for over six months, the Āchārya observed silence. But the tour-schedule was continued, as also all the activities connected with the Maṭha. After re-visiting many places in Ramnād, Pudukkoṭṭai, Tiruchī, and Tañjāvūr, the Āchārya returned to Kumbhaḥoṇam, from where he had started out on his *vijaya-yātrā* twenty-one years earlier. The 29th of June 1939 was a red-letter day for the citizens of the town; there was no end to their joy in receiving the Āchārya again into their midst.

7. Consolidation and Furtherance of Our Ancient Dharma

The twentyone years' All-India tour had paved the way for taking concrete steps towards the consolidation and furtherance of our ancient *Dharma*. In the years that have followed, the Āchārya has given the lead in several directions for bringing together the different sections of Hindus, for the promotion of Vedic and Vedāntic studies, for the due observance of religious ceremonies, and rules of conduct as prescribed in the Śāstras, for deepening the spiritual life of the people, for rendering service to the sick and the disabled, and for universal welfare.

In 1939, the Āchārya had an organization of *Mudrādhikārīs* set up, with a view to serve the people in a comprehensive way. The *Mudrādhikārīs* are representatives of the Maṭha in the different places. Among their functions are: to enlist the co-operation of the people in keeping the temples in good repair, to see to it that temple-worship is performed in the proper order, to arrange for popular expositions of the *Purāṇas* on Ekādaśī days, to bring together all classes of people in such corporate activities as digging

tanks and wells, dragging the temple-car on festival days, etc., and cattle-care. In order to implement this programme and ensure the best possible results, the Āchārya toured the villages in the Tañjāvūr District, and other places several times, and convened periodical conferences of the *Mudrādhikārīs* to instruct them personally.

Under the guidance of the Āchārya, several of the old temples came to be renovated, and *kumbhābhishekams* were performed. The *kumbhābhishekam* for the temple of Śrī Baṅgāru Kāmākshī at Tañjāvūr, after renovation, was performed in June 1941. In Tiruvānaikkā (Jambukeśvaram), the ancient temple of Pañchamukheśvara (Liṅga with five faces) was in ruins. When the Āchārya visited the place in 1943, he had the accumulated rubbish and wild trees that had grown there removed, marvelled at the uniqueness of the temple, arranged for renovation, and had the *kumbhābhishekam* performed in June that year. There is an old Śiva Temple in Tiruviḍaimarudūr on the banks of the Vīracholan River. It was in a state of utter disrepair. The Āchārya had it renovated, and the *kumbhābhishekam* performed in 1943. The renovation work of Śrī Kāmākshī Temple at Kānchī had been in progress for some years. On the completion of the work, the *kumbhābhishekam* was performed on a grand scale on the 7th of February 1944. In the temple itself that day, over fifty-thousand devotees had gathered to witness the ceremony. To mark the occasion, the *Mūka-pañchaśatī*, a moving hymn of devotion to the Devī, was published by the Kāmakoti Kośasthānam.

In order that the evils caused by the Second World War may not oppress the people and distort their minds, the Āchārya suggested to the temple-authorities, and managements of religious charities, in 1942, that the *Śrī-Rudra* and *Śrī-Vishnu-sahasranāma* be recited and *archanas* performed in the temples. Accordingly, in many temples, this suggestion was carried out. In April 1942 at Pūvanūr near Mannārguḍi, an *Ati-Rudra-yāga* was performed, in the immediate presence of the Āchārya, for the purpose of securing the welfare of all people. In September, the performance of the *yāga* was repeated at Nattam in Tiruchi District where that year's *chāturmāsya* was observed. While touring in this District, the Āchārya visited Śaṅkara-malai which is at a distance of thirty miles to the west of Tiruchi Town; here is a Mahā-Liṅga establish-

ed on the hill here, similar to the one of the Śaṅkarāchārya Hill in Kashmir. On the day of this visit—the 2nd of March 1943—the Āchārya drew the attention of the people there to the striking similarity. The next *Ati-Rudra-homa* was performed in February 1949, at Tiruviḍaimarudūr. As on previous occasions, people in their thousands participated in the performance of this *yāga* and received the Āchārya's blessings. The *navarātrī* also was performed at Tiruviḍaimarudūr. After that, the Āchārya stayed during October-November, 1949, at Kuttālam, and went every day to Māyūram for *Tulā-snānam*.

The Vedas constitute the basic scriptures of the Hindus. It is through the preservation of the Vedas that Hindu culture has been preserved in spite of the vicissitudes of history. In recent times, the cultivation of skill in Vedic recitation and Vedic studies have been neglected because of alien influence and conditions of modern life. In order to offset the forces making for deterioration, the Āchārya caused to be organized the Veda-dharma-paripālana-sabhā. Under the auspices of this sabhā, which was started in 1944, annual conferences of Vedic scholars are held in the various parts of the country, examinations are conducted in Vedic literature and prizes are awarded to successful candidates, maintenance is provided for selected Vedic scholars, institutions for teaching the Vedas are set up and run, and every possible assistance is given for the preservation of Vedic culture. In January 1955 at Kāñchī where the Āchārya was staying at the time, a conference of eminent Vedic scholars was convened, and seventeen *paṇḍitas* in Ṛig, Yajus and Sāma Veda were selected from all over the country and honoured with presents and awards.

The consolidation of Advaita through his *bhāṣhyas* and numerous Vedāntic manuals, and through teaching by example and precept, was the greatest gift Ādi Śaṅkara conferred on the entire humanity. The central mission of any institution which owes its foundation to the great Teacher should be to spread the knowledge of Advaita. The Jagadgurus of Śrī Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha have, in various ways, rendered invaluable service to the cause of Advaita. An important measure designed to promote studies in Advaita was taken when the Parama-guru of our present Āchārya inaugurated, in 1894, at Kumbhakonam, the Advaita Sabhā. Besides the annual conferences of Advaita scholars, award of studentships for the study

of Advaita, arranging for courses in Advaita according to a syllabus, publication of works on Advaita, and of a journal "Brahma Vidyā", are among the activities of the Advaita Sabhā. The first conference was held in 1895 in the immediate presence of His Holiness the Sixty-sixth Āchārya; eminent scholars headed by Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Rāju Śāstrī participated in the deliberations. Learned discussions and *vāk्यārtha* in Samskrit and popular lectures in Tamil form regular features of these conferences. Examinations are held in Advaita-śāstra and prizes are awarded to successful candidates. Presents are given to them every year if they attend the conference. The Golden Jubilee of the Sabhā was celebrated in February 1945, at the Kumbhakonam Maṭha in the presence of our Āchārya. The Āchārya commended the work of the Sabhā, and explained the essentials of Advaita-Vedānta: The basic truth of Advaita is that the Self (Ātman) alone is real, and that all else is *mithyā*. Not understanding the implication of the words *mithyā* and *māyā*, the critics find fault with Advaita. Although ultimately the world of plurality is not real, it is not that it is not useful. Because the world of *māyā* is useful until the onset of wisdom, it is vested with empirical reality (*vyāvahārika satya*). It is in this world, and while living in it, that we have to strive for and gain release from bondage. The true *moksha* is the attainment of all-selfhood, in this very life, by the removal of *māyā* through knowledge. The followers of the different religions think that their particular mode of worship alone is the true mode. But we who follow Advaita believe that it is the same God that is attained through any of the religious modes, and that devotion to God is essential for realizing the truth of Advaita. In conclusion, the Āchārya referred to the fact that teachers of Advaita have appeared at all times and in all the different parts of the country, and have left behind immortal works on Advaita; and he declared that it was our duty to study those works and gain the wisdom that is contained in them. To mark the occasion of the Golden Jubilee, a volume entitled "Advaita-akshara-mālikā", containing fifty-one essays on Advaita written in Samskrit by various scholars, was published. Two other books one in English and the other in Tamil, containing articles on Advaita were also published on the occasion.

Ten years later, in March 1956, the Diamond Jubilee of the Advaita Sabhā was celebrated at Śivāsthānam near Kānchī, where

the Āchārya was staying at the time. Addressing the conference, the Āchārya observed that the aim of the Advaita Sabhā was to spread the light of the Self as revealed in the Upanishads, that those who adopted Advaita as their way of life should look upon all beings as they would on themselves and render some service or other every day to the afflicted and the distressed, and that they should investigate the cause of dispute among religious cults and seek to eliminate it.

It is on the basis of Advaita that the conflicts among religious cults could be removed. With sympathy and understanding, it will not be difficult to realize that, it is the same God that is worshipped under different names and forms. The special contribution of Hinduism to the world's history of religions is the truth that there are as many modes of approach to Godhead as there are minds. And, yet, on account of misunderstanding and narrowness, the followers of the different cults of Hinduism have indulged in quarrels sometimes. In South India, exclusive claims have been advanced, for instance, on behalf of Vaishṇavism and Śaivism. While the Ālvārs and Nāyanmārs were universalistic in their outlook, their later followers introduced narrow distinctions and dogmatic partisanship. Our Āchārya wanted to give a concrete form to the movement for unity and co-ordination as between the Vaishṇavas and the Śaivas in Tamil Nādu; and accordingly, the idea of Tiruppāvai—Tiruvembāvai—Shadāṅga—Conference was hit upon in 1950. Aṇḍal's *Tiruppāvai* and Māṇikkavāchakar's *Tiruvembāvai* are sung in the Viṣṇu and Śiva temples respectively in the month of Mārgaḷi (Mārgaśīrsha). The Āchārya had a conference of scholars in these sacred texts organized at Tiruviḍaimarudūr in December 1950. It was a unique experience to listen to the Vaishṇava and Śaiva scholars speak from the same platform. On the last day of the conference, the Āchārya spoke explaining how the goal of all the cults was the same, even as the end of all the rivers was the sea. He declared: "The redeeming Reality is one and the same. We may seek to reach God through several ways. But while marching on these diverse paths, we must not forget the fundamental unity of Godhead. If we are obsessed with diversity, there is no happiness." The Āchārya further showed how it is the state of plenary happiness and freedom from fear that is the significance of the images of the dancing Nāṭarāja and the reclining Viṣṇu, and concluded saying that in realizing this truth

the recitation and study of *Tiruppāvai* and *Tiruvembāvai* would be supremely helpful.

On another occasion speaking on the same theme, the Āchārya observed:

“Because two people worship different manifestations of One Supreme Being, there is no warrant for their quarrelling with each other. The Śiva-purāṇas extol Śiva and the Vishnu-purāṇas extol Vishnu. But a proper understanding will remove the misconception. The praise of a particular manifestation in a Purāṇa is to be understood in its context and not as absolute. How can there be a higher or lower, superior or inferior when in reality there are not two, but it is only One God manifesting differently? We must not forget that there are works which proclaim the oneness of Śiva and Vishnu, of Hara and Hari. It has been declared that the enemies of Śiva are the enemies of Vishnu too, and *vice versa*.

“Among us there is the concept of the *ishṭa-devatā*, of the particular form of God which one chooses for his worship and meditation. To get at the One Supreme, you must start from some manifestations of It, and you choose it as your *ishṭa-devatā*. Another man may choose some other manifestation. As each progresses in his devotion and concentration, he will be led on to the One where the differences disappear. That has been the experience of great sages and saints. A true Śiva-bhakta has no quarrel with a true Vishnu-bhakta.

“In this connection it is good to remember two devotional hymns one in praise of Vishnu and the other in praise of Śiva sung by devotees of the different persuasions. They are the *Tiruppāvai* of Āṇḍāl and the *Tiruvembāvai* of Māṇikkavāchakar. Both of them deal with awakening the sleeping devotees of God from their slumber before dawn. The language and the substance of the two hymns show a remarkable similarity bringing forcibly to our minds that, in the ultimate analysis, from the point of view of the devotee and his devotion there need be no difference in respect of Śiva or Vishnu. A devotee of one manifestation is a devotee of every other manifestation. That is the way to establish devotional harmony. All the theistic schools of our religion have stemmed from the Vedic religion which proclaimed: ‘That which exists is One; the sages speak of it variously.’ The substance is

ultimately one; its shape and name may be as various as you please."⁹

The unity-movement has been gaining in popularity since its inception. Encouragement is given for children to learn to recite the two poems. In the month of Mārgaḷi, the two poems are broadcast from the temples. All India Radio has also been cooperating by arranging for the singing and exposition of these two moving hymns. In the different parts of Tamiḷ Nadu Tiruppāvai-Tiruvembāvai meetings are held during the month. At the meeting held in Māyūram in front of Śrī Dakṣiṇāmūrti Shrine, on the 8th of December 1952, the Āchārya pointed out that recent research has brought to light the fact that in distant Thailand (Siam) the Tiruppāvai—Tiruvembāvai festival is still celebrated, although the people there do not seem to be aware, now, of its significance. The festival is being observed to propitiate both Viṣṇu and Śiva. The festival occurs there at the time of Ādrā-darśana, and the swing-festival is also observed, as here, in connection with it. Here, in Tamiḷ Naḍu, we do not call the Ādrā by the name Tiruppāvai—Tiruvembāvai, but the Thais call it so. Only, the name occurs there in a slightly mutilated form—Tiriyembāvai-Tripāvai. Drawing a lesson from the Thai festival for our people, the Āchārya observed that we should revive and popularise the tradition which we have forgotten, and which the Thais still observe, having received it from us.

Religion is the basis of Hindu culture; spirituality is its backbone. What are considered elsewhere to be secular arts, such as sculpture and dancing, are here in India regarded as sacred. Hindu culture in all its aspects spread far wide in the past. The evidences of its influence are even now to be found in widely distant countries from Egypt in the West to Java and Bali in the East. Speaking about the pervasiveness of Hindu culture at a meeting at the Kumbhakonam Maṭha in January 1947, the Āchārya dwelt on the need for the resuscitation of the traditional arts and crafts. These should be revived and popularized, bearing in mind that all of them serve the purpose of strengthening faith in God, faith in spiritual values. The temple is the centre of the ancient arts

9. Śrī Chandrasekharendra Sarasvatī, *Aspects of Our Religion*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1966, pp. 42-44.

and crafts. Architecture, sculpture, and iconography go into the building of temples and the making of images. The directions for these arts are to be learnt from the Āgamas—Śaiva, Śākta, Vai-khānasa and Pāñcharātra. It is from the same sources that the *archakas* have to know the correct procedures of temple-rituals and worship. Popular discourses on the Epics and Purāṇas used to be given mainly in the temples, and on occasions of temple-festivals. The folk-songs, dances, etc., have for their themes the religious stories as related in the Epics, etc. The Āchārya wanted to institute an organization which would work for the revival—leading to a renaissance—of the ancient skills and arts relating to the temples. He had a *sadas* arranged for, for the first time in 1962, during the *chāturarmāsya* at Ilayātaṅgudi—the Akhila-Vyāsa-Bhārata-Āgama-Śilpa-Sadas. Scholars and specialists in the various fields covered by the wide scope of the *Sadas* are invited to present papers and give expositions at the annual sessions of the conference. Besides the traditional *paṇḍitas* in the Āgamas and experts in Śilpa, some foreign scholars also take part in the *Sadas*. The *archakas* are asked to discuss and settle points relating to rituals and worship. Arrangements are made for cultural programmes consisting of *puppet-show*, *shadow-play*, *ōṭṭam-tuḷḷal*, *yaksha-gāna*, *burra-kathā*, *villup-pāṭṭu*, *kathaka*, etc. The *Sadas* has become now a permanent annual feature. It was held at Nārāyaṇapuram (Madurai) in 1963, at Kāñchī in 1964, at Madras in 1965, and at Kālahasti recently in 1966, where the Āchārya observed his sixtieth *chāturarmāsya*.

One of the most significant achievements in the last few years is the bringing together of the Heads of the Dharma-Piṭhas in South India in periodical conferences with a view to formulate and execute concerted measures for the safeguarding and furtherance of Hindu institutions and practices. This has become possible through the initiative and leadership of our Āchārya. In this endeavour, the Hindu Religious Endowments Board is offering its whole-hearted co-operation. The objectives of the conference of the Heads of the Dharma-Piṭhas are to strengthen the forces that make for *āstikya*, to project before the people the true image of Hindu-dharma, to work for the consolidation of the Hindu society, and to persuade its members to follow the path of virtue. Despite minor doctrinal differences, there is much that is common to the various Hindu denominations; and it is good

from today onwards the people of India from all over will be coming to him at Rāmeśvaram, and after touching his *Pādukā* placed in front of the Maṇṭapa, will receive the message and inspiration from him." The Āchārya thus gave the reason why Rāmeśvaram had been chosen as the first place for the installation of Śrī Ādi Śankara. There is the shrine of Añjaneya built in front of the Maṇṭapa. After adoring Śrī Añjaneya, one worships the twelve Jyotiṛ-līṅgas which Ādi Śankara himself had worshipped at the respective *dhamas* in the country. The Śrī Rāmanātha Setu Līṅga has been appropriately installed as the first of the twelve Līṅgas. One then comes to the shrine on the top adorned by the Image of Ādi Śankara and the representations of his four disciples. The Śankara Image is placed on a high pedestal so that every person who takes a dip in the Agni-tirtha would have Śankara's *darśana* when he turns back to the shore. The result of this *darśana* would be, as pointed out by the Āchārya, that through Śrī Śankara's grace one could get rid of nescience and gain the plenary wisdom.

Tiruvīḍaimarudūr, also called Madhyārjuna, is a notable place of pilgrimage connected with Ādi Śankara's *dig-vijaya*. When Śankara visited this place, he desired that the Mahālīṅga at the temple should itself declare the truth of Advaita so that the doubt in regard thereto lingering in the minds of some people might be dispelled. In response to the Jagadguru's prayer, the Lord Śiva appeared out of the Mahālīṅga, raised the right hand, and proclaimed the truth of Advaita three times thus: '*satyam advaitam; satyam advaitam; satyam advaitam.*' Our Āchārya wished that this greatly significant incident should be adequately represented in sculpture so that people would easily remember it. A *Vimāna* over the entrance of the local Śankara Maṭha was put up, and within it were installed sculptured figures of the Mahālīṅga with the right hand raised and of Ādi Śankara with palms joined. In the central courtyard of the Maṭha a shrine was constructed and in it was installed Śankara-pādukā. Our Āchārya accompanied by Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī Svāmī participated in the *Kumbhābhisheka* of this new Memorial, which took place on the 5th of December 1963. A special feature of the ceremony was the *archana* performed to the *Pādukā* with 108 laced shawls, which were subsequently presented to the *paṇḍitas*.

In the Śrī Maṭha at Kāñchī, a new sixteen-pillared hall was constructed, and therein were installed the Images of Ādi Śaṅkara and his four disciples, and the Guru-pādukā. The Āchārya arrived at Kāñchī on the 26th of February 1964, after a tour of the southern districts. On the next day, the 27th of February, the consecration ceremony was performed.

At Kanyākumārī, the land's end, where the eternal virgin Mother presides, a Memorial Maṇṭapa for Śaṅkara was built. The *Kumbhābhīshekam* for this was performed on the 31st of May, 1964.

Śrī-Śaila, the Holy Mountain, in Andhra Pradesh is one of the most sacred Śiva-sthalas. We have already referred to the visit of our Āchārya to this place in 1934 during his *viṇaya-yātrā*, and to the fact that Ādi Śaṅkara had also visited it. A fitting Memorial Maṇṭapa for Śaṅkara has been built there. And, our Āchārya went to Śrī-Śaila in March 1967 for the consecration ceremony. Arriving there on the 8th of March, the Āchārya and Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī Svāmī had their bath in the sacred Pātāla-gaṅgā, and thereafter *darśana* of Śrī Mallikāriuna Mahāliṅga and Śrī Bhramarāmbikā in the temple. On the 9th of March, which was Mahā-śivarātrī, Ekādaśa-rudra-homa was performed. The *Kumbhābhīshekam* of the Śaṅkara-Maṇṭapa took place on the 22nd of March, 1967.

At Rishikesh near Lakshman Jhula, where the Gaṅgā descends to level-ground, a temple for Śrī Śaṅkara has been constructed. This was consecrated on the 14th of May 1967, the Śaṅkara Jayantī day.

At Kurukshetra, the Images of Śrī Śaṅkara and of the Gītopadeśa have been installed. Among the other places of pilgrimage where arrangements are in progress for Śaṅkara-Memorials are Trayāmbaka where the Godavarī has its source, Prayāga where there is the confluence of the Gaṅgā, the Yamunā, and the invisible Sarasvatī, and Badarī on the Himalayas where Nara and Nārāyaṇa observe perpetual *tapasya* for the welfare of the world.

The following words of the Āchārya bring out clearly the supreme importance and value of Śrī Śaṅkara and his message to India and the world: "There is no *avatāra* greater than Āchārya

Bhagavatpāda. Even from childhood he travelled throughout the land, from the Setu to the Himalayas, from Rāmeśvaram to the Himalayas, and established the six faiths. If one wishes to know the real truth, one should study the Āchārya's works. There is no country where the Āchārya's commentaries are not known. Is it possible to measure his greatness? His fame has been sung even in stone. The spade of the archaeologists has unearthed in the far-eastern countries several precious inscriptions. In them there is reference to 'Bhagavān Śaṅkara.' The following verse is from one of those inscriptions."

*niśśeṣha-sūri-mūrdhāli-mālā-
līḍhāṅghripankajāt.*

The meaning is: 'the seekers of the truth all over the world bow their heads before Śaṅkara. Their bowed heads are like the bees that do not wish to leave the tender lotus-feet of the Master. The heads of all the wise ones, the realized souls, in the world have found a harbour at the holy Feet.' Thus the inscription."

During the period of the Āchārya's stay in Kāñchī in 1953-57, his second visit to the city 1957-59, and in subsequent years, several foreigners—scholars and savants, spiritual seekers and religious leaders, exponents of the Arts and even diplomats—have had interviews with the Āchārya, thereby gaining first-hand knowledge of the immortal tradition of India. What Professor Milton Singer, of the University of Chicago, said after meeting the Āchārya in 1955, expresses precisely the feeling of all those from abroad who have had the privilege of conversing with the Great One. This is what the Professor said: "Before I went to India I had heard and read much about the great 'soul force' of its holy men and saints, but I had assumed that this was something in the ancient past. And it was not until I had met Sankaracharya that I realized it was still a part of the living force of Hinduism to-day". In his book, *The Lotus and the Robot*, the well-known writer Mr Arthur Koestler records his impressions of a meeting which he had with the Āchārya in 1959, and speaks in glowing terms of the smile that transformed the Āchārya's face into that of a child: "I had never seen a comparable smile or expression; it had an extraordinary charm and sweetness". Mr Arthur Isenberg of the United States of America, reminiscing about the evening which he had the privilege of having with the sage of Kāñchī,

pādhyāya Harihara Śāstrī, Mylapore Mahāmahopādhyāya Mīmāṃsā Venkatasubba Śāstrī, and other eminent scholars.

9. 1911 to '13—*Śāstravichāra* at Mahendramangalam on the banks of Akhaṇḍa Kaverī in Tiruchi district.

10. 1916—Lakshadīpam at Kumbhakoṇam Śrī Maṭha during the auspicious occasion of Śrī Śārādā Navarātri. Separate Lakshārchanas to Durgā, Lakshmī, and Sarasvatī who were seated on separate rathas. Among those who offered archana was Karungulam Krishṇa Śāstrī of Tirunelveli district.

A vidvat sadas was held in which great scholars like Mahāmahopādhyāya Mannārguḍi Yajñasvāmi Śāstrī (grandson of Mannārguḍi Rāju Śāstrī), Mahāmahopādhyāya Krishṇa Śāstrī, Chidambaram Mahāmahopādhyāya Daṇḍapāṇi Dīkshitar participated. A Music Sabhā was also held in which Ramanāthapuram Pūchi Iyengar, Kumbhakoṇam Pañchāpagesa Śāstrī, Palladam Sañjīva Rao, Madurai Pushpavanam, and many other musicians participated.

His Holiness was then taken in procession on an elephant, witnessed by lakhs of people. The Head of Tiruppanandāl Kāśī Mutt personally presented Rupees Five thousand to His Holiness.

11. 1921—Mahodaya-snānam at Vedāraṇyam.

12. Stay at the palace of Śrī Govinda Dīkshita, and journey to Kumbhakoṇam for holy bath at Mahāmakham tank.

13. 1922—Performed Navarātri pūjā at Dhanushkoṭi. On the next full moon day His Holiness after taking saikatam (sand) at Dhanushkoṭi reached Rameśvaram, performed pūjā at the sannidhi of Sethumādhava, and bound the saikatam in the customary manner.

14. 1923—Kumbhābhishekam at Tiruvānaikkā. His Holiness invested Goddess Akhilāṇḍeśvarī with the repaired ear-rings (*tāṭaṅka*). Śrī Sadāśiva Tawker of Tawker and Sons had donated precious gems for the said repair. Śrī Tepperumānallūr Śrī Annadāna Śivan performed annadāna to thousands.

15. 1924—Heavy floods in the Kāverī threatening to link up with the overflowing Coleroon. His Holiness was at that time

observing Chāturmāsya at 'Tiruvaiyāru Pushyamaṇḍapam on the banks of the Kāverī. By His Holiness's blessings and the co-operation of the general public the whole place was saved from the floods.

16. 1927—Establishment of the Adhishṭhāna of His Holiness's Pūrvāchārya at Vaḍavambalam village on the banks of the South Pennār in South Arcot district.

17. 15th October 1927—Mahātmā Gāndhi paid his respects to His Holiness at Nallicheri village in Palghat.

18. 1928—Darśana of Śrī Guruvāyūrappan and bhikshā by Guruvāyūr Devasthānam through His Highness the Zamorin of Calicut.

19. 25th January 1931—Darśana of Kāñchī Śrī Kāmākshī. Mooted the idea of renovating the temple.

20. March, April, 1932—Darśana of Śrī Venkateśvara at Tirupati. Performed Sahasrakalāsābhishhekam for the Lord. Bhikshā by the Tirupati Devasthānam through the Mahant to His Holiness with all temple honours such as umbrella, śesha-vāstra (32 cubits), etc.

21. 1932—Chāturmāsya at Buggā in Chittoor district. Renovation and Kumbhābhishhekam of the temple there and installation of the image of Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya.

22. 1932—Navarātri mahotsava at Madras Samskrit College and establishment of the Bhāshyavijayamaṇḍapam. His Holiness's Bhāshyappravachana on the Vijayadaśami day. Śrī Rajendra Prasād paid his respects to His Holiness.

23. 1933—Camp at Tiruviḍaimarudūr, known as Madhyārjuna, and holy bath at Mahāmakham tank at Kumbhakoṇam.

24. 1933—Chāturmāsya at Mukāsa mansion in Tanjore. Procession on a richly caparisoned elephant on Visvarūpayātrā day. Navarātri also was celebrated at Tanjore. Beginning (*aṅkurārpanam*) of the practice of writing of Śrīrāmajayam, Śivanāmam, Muruganāmam, and the like. His Holiness commenced His northward journey to Vārāṇasī.

25. Darśana of the Lord at Śrī Śailam.

26. 1934—Reaching Prayāga His Holiness performed pūjā to the saikatam (sand) brought from Rāmeśvaram in the presence of Lord Prayāga Mādhava and mixed the same in the holy waters of Prayāga, at the place of the confluence of the Gaṅgā, the Yamunā, and the antarvahinī Sarasvatī. Gathered the holy water in vessels for abhisheka to Ramanāthasvāmī of Rameśvaram and to deities at other temples of South India.

27. 1934—Navarātri utsavam at Kāśī reaching the same walking all the way from Prayāga. Welcome address presented by Pandit Madan Mohan Mālaviya at the Benaras Hindu University. *Abhinandanapatra* presented by paṇḍits who included several Mahāmahopādhyāyas.

28. 1935—Meeting at the Kāśī Town Hall attended by many sannyāsins and scholars including several Mahāmahopādhyāyas. A *pranati patram* was read and presented to His Holiness by Mahāmahopādhyāya Giridhara Śarmā of Jaipur, Rājasthān.

A big portrait of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda with His four immediate disciples was taken in procession around the town by the scholars themselves and installed at Kāśī Viśveśvara shrine. His Holiness followed the portrait on foot.

An image of Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya made of white marble was installed in the compound wall of Kāśī Viśvesvara temple.

16th February 1935—The Rāja of Kāśī presented a *Rāja-patra* to His Holiness at a gathering of Vedic scholars at the sāṅga-Veda Vidyālaya.

29. 1935—*Danḍasparśa* (touching with the staff) of the Muṇḍapriṣṭha stone at Gaya.

30. 1935—Chātur māsyā and Navarātri utsava on the banks of Ādi Gaṅgā at Calcutta. Welcome address by the members of the Bengal Brāhmaṇa Sabhā and Kālighāṭ Nirvāha Sabhā. Presentation of Address by Mahāmahopādhyāyas of Calcutta.

31. 5th May 1936—Arriving at Purī, His Holiness camped at the Śrīmaṭha of Purī Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya Svāmigal. Took holy bath in the sea and had darśana of Lord Jagannātha. At the request of the Rājā of Purī His Holiness took His seat in the temple and received the welcome address presented by the members of the Vidyālaya Sabhā of the Devasthānam.

32. Śaṅkarajayantī at Mukhāmalā—East Godavari. Brahma Saptāham.

33. 1939—Abhisheka to Śrī Rāmanāthasvāmī of Rāmeśvaram with the holy waters of the Gaṅgā taken at Prayāga.

34. 30th June 1939—His Holiness entered the Śrī Maṭha at Kumbhakoṇam. Vyāsa pūjā, Navarātri pūjā, and Śatachaṇḍī homa were conducted at the Maṭha.

35. 4th June 1941—Kumbhābhishekam of Śrī Baṅgāru Kāmākshī temple at Tañjāvūr.

36. 1942—Atirudra homa at Pūvanūr near Mannārguḍi.

37. Vyāsa pūjā, Atirudra homa, and Śatachaṇḍī homa at Nattam village.

38. Vyāsa pūjā and Navarātri pūjā at Tiruvānaikkā. Kumbhābhishekam of Pañchamukheśvara shrine. Pārāyaṇa of the four Vedas was held, Atharvaṇa Vedins having been specially brought from Kāśī for this purpose. Recitation of the whole of Nālvar Tamil Tirumurai set to paṇ metres was also conducted.

39. 1944—Kumbhābhishekam of Kāñchī Kāmākshī temple on the completion of the renovation work. To commemorate the Kumbhābhishekam the Śrī Kāmakoṭi Kośasthānam brought out an edition of the *Mūka-Pañchaśatī* with Śrīmukham.

40. 1945—Inauguration of the Veda Śāstra Paripālana Sabhā at Kumbhakoṇam on the auspicious occasion of the Mahāmakha. The Golden Jubilee of the Advaita Sabhā was also celebrated at the same time. In commemoration of the Golden Jubilee three works were published, namely *Advaita-akshara-mālikā* in Sanskrit, *Ponvilāmalar* in Tamil, and Golden Jubilee Publication in English. In honour of the Guru and Paramaguru Adhishṭhānas a trust in the name of Kalavai Brindāvanam Paramaguru Svāmigal was established with the contributions of several devotees.

41. 1947—Completion of the silver chariot (*ratha*) of Śrī Kāmākshī; Celebrated the Rathotsava.

42. 1949—Atirudra and Vyāsa pūjā at Tiruviḍaimarudūr.

43. 1951—Inauguration of the Veda-Bhāshya-Vidvat-Saṁmānam.

44. 22nd March 1954—His Holiness' consecration of the disciple.

45. The Shashṭiabdapūrti of His Holiness. In commemoration of this auspicious occasion a *Bhūdāna* trust was established with the help of several devotees.

46. 1956—Diamond Jubilee of the Advaita Sabha was celebrated at the place known as Śivāshānam near Kāñchīpuram. (It is worthy of mention that in the *garbhagriha* of the temple here is a sculpture depicting Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda offering daṇḍavandana (obeisance with the staff) to Lord Somāskanda). Many works of Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya which had not been published till then were brought out on the occasion of this Diamond Jubilee.

47. 1958—Consecration of Śrīmaṭha at Old Mambalam in Madras and the installation of the pādukas of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda therein.

48. His Holiness awarded a grant for the translation of Kālidāsa's Śākuntalam into Tamil.

49. 1960—His Holiness inaugurated the Madras Samskrit Education Society; then arrived at Aḍayapalam village near Āraṇi for the *Kumbhābhisheka* of the temple there.

50. 1960—Kumbhābhisheka of the Śiva temple built by Śrī Appayya Dīkshita at Aḍayapalam.

51. 1960—Kumbhābhisheka of the Śrī Akhilāṇḍeśvarī temple at Tiruvānaikkā.

52. 3rd June 1961—Officials and Āsthāna Vidvāns of the Cochin Royal Palace presented to His Holiness the great Nyāya and Vedānta classic—*Brahmānandīya-bhāvaprakāśa*, personally edited and published by His Highness Śrī Rāma Varma Parīkshit Tampurān, the Mahārājā of Cochin.

53. 1962—Inauguration of the Akhila-Vyāsa-Bhārata-Āgama-Śilpa Sadas at Ilaiyāttāṅguḍi.

54. 1962—Publication of *Kolarupatigam* of Śrī Jñānasāmbandhasvāmigal.

55. 4th July 1962—His Highness the Mahārājā of Travancore paid his respects to His Holiness at Ilaiyāttaṅguḍi.

56. 7th April 1963—Kumbhābhishekam of Baṅgārukāmākshī temple at Tañjāvūr.

28th April 1963—Installed the images of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya and His four immediate disciples at Agni Tīrtha in Rāmeśvaram under the *Vimāna* constructed for the purpose.

28th June 1963—Kumbhābhishekam of Madurai Mīṇākshī temple.

1963—Sadas at Nārāyaṇavaram.

5th December 1963—Installation in the Śrī Maṭha at Tiruvidaimarudūr of the images of Mahāliṅga-mūrti and Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya depicting the tradition that Mahāliṅgamūrti conveyed to Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya through an ethereal voice (*Aśarīrivāk*) His confirmation of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya's Advaita doctrine in the words '*satyam advaitam*'.

57. 31st May 1964—Under the instructions of His Holiness images of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya and His four immediate disciples were installed at Kanyākumāri in the place between Ambikā temple and the sea. Vedic scholars were specially sent from the Śrī Maṭha for this purpose. A *Vimāna* maṇṭapa was also constructed.

58. February 1966—The Mahārāja of Mysore, Śrī Jayachāmarāja Wadiyar Bahadūr paid his respects to His Holiness at the House of Śrī Śaṅkararāma Iyer at Adyar, Madras.

59. Under instructions from His Holiness Vedic Scholars sent from the Śrī Maṭha installed at the place in Kurukshetra where the *Bhagavad-gītā* was imparted to Arjuna a white marble sculpture depicting a chariot with the Hanumān banner and drawn by four horses with Arjuna seated inside and Śrī Kṛṣṇa outside as charioteer.

4th and 5th of December 1966—Her Majesty Queen Frederika, Queen-Mother of Greece and Her Royal Highness Princess Irene with Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan had memorable interviews with His Holiness at Kālahasti.

60. March 1967—Darśana of the Lord at Ahobilam, Mahānandi, and other places. Installation in the Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya Vimānam at Śrīsailam of the images of Ādi Śaṅkara and His four disciples, His padukas, and the image of Nartana Vināyaka. A Kumbhābhishekam was then performed to this shrine.

61. May 1967—Under instructions from His Holiness a *Vimānam* was constructed near the bridge over the Gaṅgā at the place known as Lakshmana Jhūla, on the route taken by Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya to Badari.

SIXTY-ONE CHĀTURMĀSYAS

1. Plavaṅga	— 1907 —	Kumbhakonam
2. Kīlaka	— 1908 —	Tiruvānaikkā
3. Saumya	— 1909 —	Kumbhakonam
4. Sādhāraṇa	— 1910 —	Kumbhakonam
5. Virodhikṛit	— 1911 —	Tiruvānaikkā
6. Paritāpī	— 1912 —	Mahendramaṅgalam
7. Pramādiśa	— 1913 —	Mahendramaṅgalam
8. Ānanda	— 1914 —	Tiruvānaikkā
9. Rākshasa	— 1915 —	Kumbhakonam
10. Nala	— 1916 —	Kumbhakonam
11. Piṅgala	— 1917 —	Kumbhakonam
12. Kālayukti	— 1918 —	Kumbhakonam
13. Siddhārthi	— 1919 —	Veppattūr
14. Raudrī	— 1920 —	Māyurum
15. Durmati	— 1921 —	Kadirāmaṅgalam
16. Dundhubhi	— 1922 —	Āvuḍaiyārkoil
17. Rudrotkāṛī	— 1923 —	Tiruvānaikkā
18. Raktākshī	— 1924 —	Tiruvaiyāru
19. Krodhana	— 1925 —	Ilaiyāttaṅgudi
20. Akshaya	— 1926 —	Kāttumannārkoil
21. Prabhava	— 1927 —	Kaṇjikkodu
22. Vibhava	— 1928 —	Tiruvēḍagam
23. Śukla	— 1929 —	Maṇalūrpettai
24. Pramodūta	— 1930 —	Pūsamalaikuppam

25. Prajotpatti	— 1931	— Chittore
26. Āṅgīrasa	— 1932	— Buggā
27. Śrīmukha	— 1933	— Tañjāvūr
28. Bhava	— 1934	— Prayāga
29. Yuva	— 1935	— Calcutta
30. Dhātu	— 1936	— Berhampur
31. Īśvara	— 1937	— Palacole
32. Bahudhānya	— 1938	— Guntur
33. Pramādi	— 1939	— Kumbhakonam
34. Vikrama	— 1940	— Tuvaraṅkuricchi
35. Vishu	— 1941	— Nagapattinam
36. Chitrabhānu	— 1942	— Nattam
37. Subhānu	— 1943	— Tiruvānaikkā
38. Dhāraṇa	— 1944	— Eśaiyanallūr
39. Pārthiva	— 1945	— Tirukkarukāvūr
40. Vyaya	— 1946	— Kumbhakonam
41. Sarvajit	— 1947	— Vasanta Krishna Puram
42. Sarvadhārī	— 1948	— Vēṅkaṭādri Agaram
43. Virodhi	— 1949	— Tiruviḍaimarudūr
44. Vikṛiti	— 1950	— Tiruviśainallur
45. Khara	— 1951	— Muḍikonḍān
46. Nandana	— 1952	— Sāttanūr
47. Vijaya	— 1953	— Kāñchī
48. Jaya	— 1954	— Kāñchī
49. Manmatha	— 1955	— Kāñchī
50. Durmukhī	— 1956	— Kāñchī
51. Hevilambī	— 1957	— Kāñchī
52. Vilambī	— 1958	— Madras
53. Vikārī	— 1959	— Vānagaram
54. Śārvarī	— 1960	— Kāmānāyakanpālaiyam
55. Plava	— 1961	— Ilaiyāttāṅgudi
56. Śubhakṛit	— 1962	— Ilaiyāttāṅgudi
57. Śobhakṛit	— 1963	— Nārayaṇapuram
58. Krodhi	— 1964	— Kāñchī
59. Viśvāvasu	— 1965	— Kāttupalli
60. Parābhava	— 1966	— Kālahasti
61. Plavaṅga	— 1967	— Rajahmundry

when the significance of *Praṇava* is taught, it is declared that all is of the nature of Advaita, that *Om* is all; here the expression 'Advaita' occurs. The term 'Dvaita' occurs in an Upanishad. The context there is this: "Remaining as different, how can one perceive an object that is different? If all is of the nature of Ātman, who can experience what as different?" In this context occur the words "Where, indeed, there is Dvaita (duality) as it were". The meaning is: In the state where duality appears to be, there would be that (differentiated) experience:

yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati, taditarah itaram paśyati; yatra tvasya sarvam ātmaivābhūt, tatkena kaṁ paśyet.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka.

Where, however, all has become the Ātman, there, it is declared, there is duality *as it were*. In the context of the expression *as it were* (*iva*), duality is mentioned; and in the context of the statement 'where, however, all has become the Ātman', non-duality is taught. There is also the word '*tu*' (however) mentioned in the context where Advaita is declared. If after a statement, the word *tu* (however) or the word '*atha*' (then) occurs, it means that the final position is set forth thereafter. After the words '*yatra tu*' (where, however), it is declared 'all has become the Ātman'. Thus, from the expression '*tu*' (however) we have to understand the conclusive truth that all is of the nature of Ātman. The expression '*iva*' (*as it were*) indicates appearance and not reality. The expression 'like him' means 'not he himself'. Hence, when it is said 'duality, as it were', it means that there is no duality—this is the *siddhānta*. To our senses, duality is presented. That is mere appearance. What is understood with the help of sacred texts is Advaita. That alone is the *siddhānta*. That all is the Self (Ātman) alone is the truth.

Here, the expression 'Ātman' occurs; should not the expression be 'Paramātman' (supreme Self)? Thus it may be asked. If there is 'Paramātman', there would be 'alpātman' (little self) as different from it. There is no Paramātman too. It is only in the state of duality that there is the distinction of 'Paramātman' and 'jivātman'. When the state of Advaita is realised, there is only the Self (Ātman).

The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* declares: *dvitīyād-vai bhayaṁ bhavati*. It is from duality that fear, misery, strifes, etc., arise. Only if there

are two different entities, there would arise desire, fear, misery, etc.

If some one that is dear to us dies, there arises misery. If he passes away before our eyes, we feel distressed. We think that there would be no distress if we pass away. If we pass away, there would be no misery for us. Therefore, if all are ourselves, then there will be no misery whatsoever. When there occurs misery, there is the thought of difference. What is it that occasions desire? It is only when there is consciousness of duality that there arise desire and misery. If the other becomes us, then there is no misery at all. How to effect this identity? If all become the Paramātman, there would be the one Self alone.

Hence, Vedānta declares: There need not be duality; non-duality alone is the truth. This truth our Āchārya has expounded as a glowing lamp, and has asked us not to forget. His commentary is called '*bhāshya-dīpa*'. Simply because the expression 'Dvaita' occurs in Vedānta, people begin to say 'Dvaita', 'Dvaita'. They do not inquire as to where, what for, and before which concluding statement, the expression occurs. This is like the conclusion that there was the prevalence of drinking toddy among the Vedic circles, which some scholars arrive at, on the ground of the Vedic statement, 'Do not drink toddy'.

We are now in the state of dream. If we wake up from this state, that is the state of Advaita. If this *siddhānta* is retained in memory, at least one in a hundred-thousand will endeavour to attain that state. It is with this end in view that the great preceptors have written their works. It is not enough if we know that there is the Gaṅgā at Kāśī; we must buy the necessary ticket, travel by the appropriate train, cross the railway junctions *en route*, and without oversleeping arrive at Kāśī and actually bathe in the Gaṅgā.

The Veda declares that Advaita-experience is that whence words, speech and mind return, not being able to reach it:

*yato vācho nivartante aprāpya
manasā saha. (Taittirīyopaniṣad).*

If it cannot be thought by the mind, how to know it? What is the meaning of this Vedic declaration? What is the meaning of the

statement that the status of the Self cannot be thought by the mind? If it be that, the supreme Self could be known, it would become an object of knowledge. The knower would then be different. In the *Kenopanishad*, it is said: "He by whom it is not contemplated, by him it is contemplated. He by whom it is contemplated knows it not".

*yasyāmatam tasya matam..
yasya na veda sah.*

What is the meaning of the statement that the Self is not known? The meaning is that it is not an object of knowledge. There is no meaning in bringing in another lamp to show a lamp. It is only for illuminating what is non-luminous that a lamp is required. To see a lamp nothing else is needed. Consciousness is self-luminous. Īśvara is the nature of that very consciousness. In many places in the Tamil hymns, such as *Tevāram*, *Tiruvāchakam*, and the songs of Tāyumanavar, it is declared that Īśvara is 'consciousness alone', that He is 'of the form of consciousness'.

By the mind, the Self is not thought; the mind thinks by it. All that the mind thinks is false; that by which it thinks is true.

*yan-manasā na manute, yenāhur-mano matam
(Kenopanishad).*

All that is seen in dream is false. The seeing consciousness alone is real. It is this self that appeared in dream as all the objects seen. When the dream terminates, it will be realised that the one (consciousness) alone remains. If there be one that speaks and one that knows, they would be different. If there is no difference, there will be neither speech nor knowing. It is this non-duality that is declared in the Upanishads; and in the aforesaid sacred texts.

On the tree that is the Veda, there are the flowers, the Upanishads. The *Brahma-sūtra* serves as the thread which helps in making a garland out of them, fit to be worn round the neck: *vedāntavākya-kusuma-grathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām*.

If the maker of the thread (*sūtra*) was Vyāsa, the one who made the garland was the Āchārya. Those who wear the garland are we. That garland should adorn our neck.

What we have conclusively understood, is this: "The truth is only one ; all is of the nature of Īśvara". : On account of past impressions, things appear as different. But all must be made into one. Even what is referred to as 'we' must be dissolved. For that, the appropriate sacred texts should be studied. The means to this are the Veda, the Smṛitis, the Purāṇas, the sight of temples, pūjā, etc. We sacrifice so much for the sake of the objects of the world. We can do anything for gaining the bliss that is stable. The royal sage Janaka said: "I have given away the entire Videha kingdom; I have given away myself too".

videhān dadāmi mām chāpi saha dāsyāya.

To reach this state, the easy path is meditation on Śrī Chandramaulīśvara. Thus Appayya Dīkshita has said. Following this way, all should gain Advaita-siddhi.

*īśvarānugrahād-eva puṁsām advaitavāsanā,
mahadbhayaparitrāṇā dvitrāṇām upajāyate.*

2. On the Singnificance of Sankara Jayanti*

Today is Śrī Śaṅkara-Jayantī. It was by the *avatāra* of Śrī Śaṅkara that the Vedas, the Smṛitis, etc., were resuscitated. It is by their resuscitation alone that the observances connected with auspicious days such as Rāma-navamī, Nrisiṁha-jayantī, Kṛishṇa-jayantī, Uttarāyana-saṅkrānti, Śiva-rātri, etc., have been revived. The Jayantī of Śrī Śaṅkara is the Jayantī that has imparted to all Jayantīs their character as Jayantīs. On the fifth day of the bright-half of the month of Vaiśākha falls Śrī Śaṅkara Jayantī. Like the pure white jasmine (*vāsantī, mādhavī*) creeper, that causes delight, let this fifth day of the bright-half month in the spring season (*vāsantī, mādhavī*) embellish and delight our intelligence.

Who is Śaṅkara? Śaṅkara is the one who brings delight to the world. He alone is Śiva. Śiva is the giver of auspiciousness.

Toṭakāchārya says in his octad of verses in the *toṭaka* metre thus:

*bhava eva bhavāniti mē nitarām
samajāyata chetasi kautukitā,
gurupuṅgava puṅgava-ketana te
samatāmayatām na hi ko'pi sudh'*

"Knowing that Thou art the Lord Śiva, there arises supreme bliss in my heart; O the Best of teachers! The One whose banner is the bull-sign (Śiva)! None of the wise ones is equal to Thee!"
And, Padmapādāchārya says in the *Pañchapādikā*:

*namāmy-abhogi-parivāra-saṁpadam
vinā-vināyakam apūrva-śaṅkaram*

"I bow to the unique Śaṅkara whose wealth is the *entourage* of ascetics, (who has no serpents adorning him), and who has vanquished opposition by the Bauddhas and Jainas* (who is not accompanied by Gaṇeśa)."

And, it has been said by a well-instructed one of old:

"I bow to Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkara who is the repository of Śruti, Smṛitis and Purāṇas, the abode of grace, and the bestower of auspiciousness on the world."

What is śaṁ (auspiciousness)? Happiness is bliss. The *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad* says, it is love. Where that auspiciousness, love, or bliss exists, the world mostly does not know. Therefore it suffers. He who is always of the nature of auspiciousness, the Bhagavatpāda, seeing the world which suffers, became filled with grace. He became the abode of grace so that the world may experience the happiness of the impartite Self-experience. What is that happiness? It was on account of that experience that Śaṅkara was far removed from misery. Śaṅkara speaks: "For all, the Self alone is happiness; the Self alone is all; the Self itself is Brahman; and Brahman itself is all this. All is the effect of Brahman; and the cause itself is the effect. From the cause, the effect is non-different. All is, verily, auspiciousness. Let auspiciousness be

*'Vināyaka' is an appellation of the Buddha and the Jina.

perienced in all beings. Let the Self which is auspiciousness experienced."

A son becomes dear to the worldly people. Why? Because he is one's son. Wealth becomes dear to the worldly people, because it is one's wealth. A wife becomes dear to the worldly people, because she is one's wife. Corn and land become dear to the worldly people, because they are one's corn and land.

If the same corn and land have been sold to one other than one's self, say Yajñadatta, then they are not considered to be dear. And, thus in the world, since all that is external becomes dear because it is related to one's self, the self is the dearest; and since that itself is Brahman, that alone is the supreme bliss. Thus Śaṅkara said in his commentary on the topic dealing with the Self as love.

That the supreme Self is one is Śaṅkara's view. That, all is the supreme Self is Śaṅkara's view. That all is one is Śaṅkara's view. That all is Brahman is the view of Advaita. The view of Scripture is, verily, the view of Śaṅkara. Because all is Brahman, there is nothing whatever that is different from Brahman; this is Śaṅkara's view. The universe alone is real, there is no Brahman; this is the Chārvāka view. The universe and Brahman are both of them real: this is the dualistic view of the Naiyāyikas and others. The universe and Brahman are both of them non-existent: this is the Bauddha view. Brahman alone real, the universe as different from Brahman is non-existent: this is Śaṅkara's view.

On the rise of Buddhism, the views that were in vogue previously did not get exterminated. On the rise of the Chārvāka school, the views that differed from it did not get obliterated. But, on the rise of Śaṅkara's view, all the previous schools lost their alliance, even as the planets that shine by night are shorn of their luminosity at sun-rise.

When the impartite light shines, need it be said that the united luminaries get overpowered? In the supreme non-dual Self, the one impartite essence, which is like the ocean, all paths, i.e., devotion, meditation, ethical culture, and mutually incompatible *tāntrika-sādhana*s, stressing *Vaidika-āchāra* or *Yoga-samādhi*, come one, even like the great rivers which flow towards the East, South, West or North become one when they join the sea.

Therein alone all of them find auspiciousness. The following statement of an ancient sage bears this out:

*nānābhāshyāḍṛitā sā saguṇaphalagatiḥ vaidhavidyāviśeshaiḥ
tattad-deśāpti-ramyā sarid-iva sakalā yatra yāty-aṁśa-bhūyam,
tasminn-ānandasindhau atimahati phale bhāva-viśrānti-mudrā
śāstrasyodghāṭitā yaiḥ praṇamata hṛidi tān nityam āchārya-
pādān.*

“The relative path of gaining the fruit of contacting Godhead endowed with attributes (*saguṇa*) by guiding the souls to the respective celestial regions is revealed by the different Upanishadic *upāsanās* (meditations) and expounded by the various Bhāshyas. But, like a river which flows into the ocean and becomes a part of it, that path finds its end in the ocean of Ānanda, the final human goal, the quiescence of transmigration, which is the revelation of Scripture as explained clearly by the Āchārya-pāda. Adore him in the heart!”

The “Āchārya-pāda” is Śrī Śaṅkara-bhagavatpāda.

The conclusive view of Bhagavatpāda, as of all the preceptors of the Vedic tradition, is that the *dharma* as taught in the Veda should be practised by the humans according to their respective *varṇa* and *āśrama*. And, this *varṇāśrama-dharma* is prescribed by Scripture, not merely for the sake of the preservation of the human society from the economic standpoint through the people helping one another as helpers and the helped, but as the means to *mokṣha* for each individual soul; this *dharma* is prescribed prominently in *Śruti* and *Smṛitis* for the sake of purifying the mind by generating virtues like peace, self-control, discrimination, and dispassion, which cannot be acquired by any other means by those who seek them. This has been taught directly by Śrī Śaṅkara-bhagavatpāda in his work, *Aparokṣhānubhūti*:

*sva-varṇāśrama-dharmena tapasā hari-toṣaṇāt,
sādhanaṁ prabhavet puṁsām vairāgyādi-chatusṣṭayam.*

“By (following) one’s own *varṇāśrama-dharma*, by austerity, and by pleasing Hari, the four-fold means consisting of dispassion, etc., is generated for human beings.”

This teaching of Śrī Śaṅkara follows clearly the *Bhagavad-gītā*:
tasmāc-chhāstram pramāṇam te kāryākārya-vyavasthitau.

“Therefore, scripture is the authority for you in the matter of what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.”

In this passage of the *Gītā*, the word ‘therefore’ refers to some cause for Scripture being the authority for what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. What is that cause?

The cause has been explained in the previous verses:
trividham narakasyedam dvāraṁ nāśanam ātmanaḥ
kāmaḥ krodhas-tathā lobhaḥ tasmād-etat-trayaṁ tyajet.
etair-vimuktaḥ kaunteya tamo-dvārais-tribhir-naraḥ
ācharaty-ātmanaḥ śreyas-tato yāti parāṁ gatim.
yaḥ śāstra-vidhim utsrijya vartate kāmakārataḥ,
na sa siddhim avāpnōti na sukhaṁ na parāṁ gatim.

“Triple is the door to this hell leading to self-destruction — desire, anger, and greed. Therefore, these three should be rejected. Freed from these three doors to darkness, O Arjuna, man follows what is his good, and thereby attains the supreme goal. He who, transgressing the injunctions of Scripture, acts being impelled by desire, attains neither perfection, nor happiness, nor the supreme goal. Therefore, Scripture is the authority for you in the matter of what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. Knowing thus, you ought to perform here only such action as is ordained by Scripture.”

Thus the Āchārya transforms even the layman into the supreme Self through the teaching of the Bhāshyas gradually. Beginning with the statement “Let the Veda be studied everyday” (*vedo nityam adhīyatām*), he concludes his teaching with the statement “Let one remain as the supreme Brahman-Self” (*brahmātmanā sthīyatām*). The fruit of Veda is the performance of actions taught therein. The performance of actions ought to be done in a spirit of dedication to God, and not for the sake of any other fruit. The performance of (one’s) action is itself the worship of God. It has been stated by one who knows the tradition: “It is by God’s grace alone that there is for men an inclination towards Advaita”. It is by God’s grace that the mind becomes pure. Let the one who is endowed with purity of mind approach a teacher who is a knower of Brahman. Let him offer worship to the teacher’s *pādukā*. Let him listen to the meaning of the Upanishads. Let him pray for instruction. Let him renounce every

desire. Let him seek the company of the good. Let him partake of food got by alms, merely as medicine for the disease called hunger. Let him not ask for delicious food. Let him be satisfied with whatever destiny brings. Let him practise *samādhi*. Let him remain as the supreme Brahman-self. This is the gist of Śrī Śaṅkara's teachings.

Thus the *Parivrāṭ* (wandering monk), who expounds the hidden meaning of the Upanishads in the words of his commentaries which are clear and deep, wanders about. He wanders everywhere from the Setu to the Himalayas. He visits the holy rivers. He goes to the pilgrim-places. He tours the villages. He goes to the towns. He visits the temples. In those places, he augments the Presence Divine through such means as *mantras* and *yantras*. There is almost no holy place in India whose greatness has not been strengthened by Śaṅkara's visit. Even to this day people in the different parts of the country say: "This temple in our territory has been purified by the splendour of the *mantra* uttered by Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya; and has been rendered great by the installation of *yantras*." In the entire area where the Veda has spread — Aṅga, Vaṅga, Kāliṅga, Āndhra, Draviḍa, Kerala, Kārṇāṭaka, Mahārāshṭra, Saurāshṭra, Mālava, Gūrjara, Sindhu, Gāndhāra, Kuru, Pāñchāla, Kāśmīra, Nepāla, Maithila, Kānyakubja, Magadhā, Kāmarūpa, Kāmboja, etc. — there is no place where the Bhāshya of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya was not known to the seekers of release. Even now it is so in every place where the Veda is in vogue.

It is true that the growth of modern science is considered to be a great danger to the world because it has promoted the production of nuclear weapons which can cause the total destruction of living beings. Yet, from another standpoint, when one reflects carefully and thoroughly, one will be able to approve of the growth of science as what can possibly lead to the supreme peace of all beings. Till about fifty years ago, the eminent scientists were intent on establishing through enumerating the elements that those elements were absolutely distinct from one another. But now the scientists deny any distinction among the visible and invisible modes of matter, and proclaim that all matter is a transformation of one energy. Thus, gradually, the modern scientists reject difference and exhibit non-difference. This will be evident to all thinkers.

The foremost among the scientists, Einstein, Sir James Jeans, and others, come very close to the Advaita-siddhānta of the Upanishads as taught by Bhagavatpāda, by offering proofs for the relativity of the objective world and its dependent reality. The scientific research of the present age is thus getting into the proximity of Śaṅkara's *siddhānta*, as it rejects the host of differences. Hence, it is clear that modern science has opened a way to universal peace. When the non-perception of difference has been established through higher research, then those popular leaders and administrators who are the wise ones, the heroes, the thinkers, who are rid of such differences as one's own and others', and who experience the non-difference from even the people of the enemy-country, and regard the suffering of those people as their own, will become the central pillars of lasting world-peace. On this sacred day of Śaṅkara Jayantī, let the thinkers and the wise ones, according to their abilities, begin to spread, with enthusiasm, everywhere in the world, the conclusive view of non-difference, endorsed by the modern scientific researchers, proclaimed by the beginningless Upanishads and rendered radiant by Śrī Śaṅkara-bhagavatpāda. May the malady of lack of peace which is a universal affliction be removed through the life-giving ambrosia of the experience of non-difference, i.e. Advaita.

श्री चन्द्रमौलीश्वराय नमः

स्वस्ति श्रीमदखिलभूमण्डलालङ्कार लयल्लिशत्कोटिदेवतासेवितश्रीकामाक्षी-
देवीसनाथश्रीमदेकाग्रनाथश्रीमहादेवीसनाथश्रीहस्तिगिरिनाथसाक्षात्कारपरमाधिष्ठा-
नसत्यव्रतनामांकित काञ्चीदिव्यक्षेत्रे शारदामठसुस्थितानां अतुलितसुधारसमाधुर्य-
कमलासनकामिनीधम्मिल्लसंफुल्लमल्लिकामालिकानिष्यन्दमकरन्दझरीसौवस्तिकवङ्ग-
निगुम्भविजृम्भणानन्दतुन्दिलितमनीषिमण्डलानां अनवरताद्वैतविद्याविनोदरसिकानां
निरन्तरालंकृतीकृतशान्तिदान्तिभूम्नां सकलभुवनचक्रप्रतिष्ठापकश्रीचक्रप्रतिष्ठाविस्-
यातयशोऽलंकृतानां निखिलपाषण्डषण्डकण्टकोत्पाटनेन विशदीकृतवेदवेदान्तमार्ग-
षण्मतप्रतिष्ठापकाचार्याणां श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीमच्छंकरभगवत्पादा-
चार्याणां अधिष्ठाने सिंहासनाभिषिक्तश्रीमन्महादेवेन्द्रसरस्वतीसंयमीन्द्राणां अन्ते-
वासिवर्य श्रीमच्चन्द्रशेखरेन्द्रसरस्वतीसंयमीन्द्राणां चरणनलिनयोः अनन्तसाष्टाङ्ग-
प्रणामपरम्पराः समर्पयामः

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS VOLUME

1. ANANTANANDENDRA SARASVATI SVAMI, HIS HOLINESS SRI,
of Upanishad Brahmendra Matha, Kanchipuram.
2. BALASUBRAHMANIA IYER, K.,
B.A., B.L., M.L.C., Dharma Rakshamani, Padma Bhushan, Advocate,
Member of the Syndicate, University of Madras.
3. BALASUBRAHMANIA SASTRI, K.,
Sahitya-Mimamsa-Vyakarana Siromani, Principal, Sanskrit College,
Madras.
4. BALASUBRAHMANIAN, R.,
M.A., Ph.D., Reader, Department of Philosophy, University of Madras.
5. BRATINDRA KUMAR SENGUPTA,
M.A., D.Phil., Reader in Sanskrit, University of Burdwan.
6. CHANDRASEKHARAN, K.,
M.A., B.L., Tagore Professor of Humanities, University of Madras.
7. DEVASENAPATHI, V. A.,
M.A., Ph.D., Professor, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy,
University of Madras.
8. JAGADEESVARA SASTRI, V.,
Vedanta Siromani, Madras.
9. JAVADEKAR, A. G.,
M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy, M.S. University, Baroda.
10. KALYANASUNDARA SASTRI, V. R.,
Sahitya-Vedanta Siromani, Lecturer in Sanskrit, Vivekananda College,
Madras.
11. KRISHNA WARRIER, A. G.,
M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Sanskrit, University of Kerala, Trivandrum.
12. KRISHNAMURTI SASTRI, P. S.,
Vyakarana Siromani, Sanskrit Teacher, Pachaiyappa's High School,
Chidambaram.
13. KRISHNAMURTI SASTRI, S.,
Nyaya Siromani, Sanskrit Teacher, Semmangudi High School, Thanjavur
District.
14. KRISHNAMURTI SASTRI, S. R.,
Nyaya-Vedanta Siromani, Professor of Vedanta, Sanskrit College, Madras.

15. LALITHA RAMAMURTI,
M.A., Research Scholar, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy,
University of Madras.
16. MAHADEVAN, T. M. P.,
M.A., Ph.D., Padma Bhushan, Director, Centre of Advanced Study in
Philosophy, University of Madras.
17. MAHALINGA SASTRI, The Late Y.,
M.A., B.L., Oriental College, Dharmapuram, Thanjavur District.
18. MEENAKSHISUNDARAN, T. P.,
M.A., B.L., M.O.L., D.Litt., Vice-Chancellor, Madurai University.
19. MUTHUKRISHNA SASTRI, R.,
Sahitya-Mimamsa Siromani, Editor, Hitabhashini, Thanjavur.
20. NAGARAJA RAO, P.,
M.A., D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy (Retd.), S. V. University, Tirupati.
21. NARAYANA RAO, T. S.,
B.E., Engineer (Retd.), Esso, Madras.
22. POLAGAM RAMA SASTRI, The Late,
Sastra Ratnakara, Sanskrit College, Madras.
23. RAGHAVAN, V.,
M.A., Ph.D., Padma Bhushan, Professor of Sanskrit, University of Madras.
24. RAGHUNATHAN, N.,
M.A., B.L., Assistant Editor (Retd.), The Hindu, Madras.
25. RAJAGOPALA SASTRI, S.,
M.A., M.Litt., Professor of Philosophy, Vivekananda College, Madras.
26. RAJAGOPALAN, V.,
M.A., Professor of Sanskrit, Vivekananda College, Madras.
27. RAJESVARA SASTRI DRAVID,
Mahamahopadhyaya, Padma Bhushan, Head of the Dept. of Ancient
Politics and Economics, Sanskrit University, Varanasi.
28. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR, T. V.,
Vedanta Visarada, Vedanta Siromani, Sanskrit University, Varanasi.
29. RAMACHANDRAN, T. P.,
M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Univer-
sity of Madras.
30. RAMAKRISHNA SASTRI, N.,
Vedanta Siromani, Asthana Vidvan, Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Matha,
Kanchipuram.
31. RAMAKRISHNAN, S. O.,
M.A., Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Centre of Advanced Study in
Philosophy, University of Madras.

12. RAMALINGA REDDIAR, D.,
M.A., B.L., Formerly Dy. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras.
13. RAMESAN, N.,
M.A., I.A.S., Secretary to the Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.
14. RAMANUJAM, N. S.,
Nyaya-Vyakarana-Mimamsa-Vedanta Siromani, Lecturer, Kendriya Samskrita Vidya Pitha, Tirupati.
15. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, K. S.,
B.A., B.L., Dewan Bahadur, District and Sessions Judge (Retd.), Madras.
16. SETHURAMAN, V. L.,
M.A., Lecturer in Sanskrit, Madras Christian College, Tambaram.
17. SITAMAHALAKSHMI, B.,
M.A., Research Scholar, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras.
18. SIVARAMA DIKSHITAR, P. V.,
Vedanta Visarada, Vedanta Siromani, Sanskrit College, Madras.
19. SIVARAMAMURTI, C.,
M.A., Director, National Museum, New Delhi.
20. SRIVATSA SOMADEVA SARMA,
Editor, Vaidika Dharma Vardhini, Madras.
21. SUBBAMMA, P. C.,
M.A., M.Litt., Lecturer, V. R. College, Nellore.
22. SUBRAMANIA AIYER, N.,
B.A., L.T., Secretary, Ramakrishna Students' Home, Madras-4.
23. SUBRAHMANIA SASTRI, S.,
M.A., Acharya, Bharatiya-Vidya Bhavan, Bombay.
24. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI, S. V.,
Vedanta Siromani, Principal (Retd.), Pazhuvur Vedanta Pathasala, Tiruchi District.
25. SUBRAHMANIA SASTRI, V.,
Nyaya Siromani, Reader in Sanskrit, (Retd.), Annamalai University.
26. SUBRAMANIAM, T. R.,
Mimamsa Siromani, Sanskrit Teacher, George High School, Vishnupuram, Thanjavur District.
27. SUNDARAM, P. K.,
M.A., Ph.D., Reader, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras.
28. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI, The Late S. S.,
M.A. (Madras), B.Sc. (Oxon.), Bar-at-law, (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Madras).